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A Note on the Title of  this Book 
Originating in the Latin word auctor – which is tied to the past participle auctus of the verb 
augere and therefore literally means ‘someone who increases’, ‘an augmenter’ and hence ‘a 
founder’ (Partridge, 2009, pp. 178-179) – authority refers to a trait found in human 
personalities that is connected to the ability to enforce, control, sanction, command, judge, 
persuade, inspire, influence, convince, and change, as well as to being in power and the 
ability to speak the truth. Authority, according to the OED, not only refers to ‘a power to 
enforce obedience’, or ‘a power to influence action and opinion’, or ‘a power to inspire belief 
in the truth of something’; but also to ‘a power derived from or conferred by another’, or 
‘someone whose knowledge and expertise are recognized’, or ‘someone whose opinion is 
accepted as true’; and finally to ‘a power or right to make decisions’ that is connected to 
the idea of ‘moral, legal, or political supremacy’ (OED, 2017b). Finally, it is related to such 
terms as expertise, prestige, credibility and responsibility.
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Introduction
 3 
Edward Said, ‘Father’ of Postcolonial Studies 
Few scholars can claim to have founded a discipline in the way that Marx is said to have 
fathered Marxism, Durkheim sociology, and Freud psychoanalysis. Few critics can claim 
to have written a book that inaugurated an entire academic worldwide industry with 
specialist journals, conferences, symposia and professorships. Edward Said is one of them 
– and he hated it. 
Published in 1978, Said’s Orientalism is without a doubt one of the most well-known 
works of literary criticism today. Its impact is enormous. Despite his denials, by writing 
Orientalism Said is widely credited with having produced one of the most valuable works 
of literary criticism in the latter half of the twentieth century, as it is considered to have 
single-handedly defined, shaped, and initiated the scholarly field that was initially referred 
to as ‘colonial discourse analysis’, then ‘postcolonial theory, and nowadays more simply as 
‘postcolonial studies’ (Young, 2001, p. 385; 2012, pp. 23-24). The commonly held idea in 
literary departments today is quite succinctly put by R. Radhakrishnan: “no Orientalism, 
no postcoloniality” (2012, p. 86). Orientalism initiated postcolonial studies, Edward Said is 
its father. That is the consensus.  
This image of Said as father of postcolonial studies is an obstacle to any study of the 
authority of criticism. For in order to study the authority of criticism, I need to get rid of 
the imposing authority of that dominant image that has pressed too hard on the field of 
postcolonial studies and studies of his works, and would equally be too much of a 
constraint on this study. And so, it is imperative, as a first theoretical gesture, to move 
away from that consensus and get rid of the authority of Said as ‘a father’ of a scholarly 
field in order to study the authority of Said as a critic, which I propose to do. In this 
introduction I mean to dispose of or at least nuance that dominant image by highlighting 
the disjunctions between his criticism and postcolonial studies as it found institutional 
expression. I do not mean to argue that Said’s work is not relevant to the field of 
postcolonial studies and that the field has fundamentally misunderstood some ‘essential’ 
Said, in which I do not for one moment believe. What I do mean to do is clear a space that 
enables the kind of study of the authority of criticism which I propose. 
To begin getting rid of that dominant image of Said as father of postcolonial studies, 
let us look at some of the possible reasons for Said’s antipathetic stance towards the field 
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of postcolonial studies or at least towards the way it turned into an institutionalized school 
of thought. For as Robert Young remarks in a book chapter called “Edward Said: 
Opponent of Postcolonial Theory” (2012), Said himself reacted always quite indifferently 
and sometimes even downright hostilely to anyone claiming that he initiated the discipline 
by setting up the fundamental paradigm for the general postcolonial methodology in 
Orientalism. That postcolonial paradigm can be summarized thusly: a comparative reading 
of literature with other discursive statements, focusing on its representation and mediation 
at a particular socio-historical imperial moment, as well as an analysis of literature’s 
connection to imperial practices, attitudes and beliefs, and the effects of literature’s 
embeddedness in, contribution to, and possible resistance to a Eurocentric discursive 
framework on the formation of subjectivity. The paradigmatic postcolonial reading is a 
symptomatic reading of literature whose goal is to disclose literature’s obscured and 
repressed relations with imperial power and reveal the latent socio-political meaning of 
literature behind its manifestly aesthetic one. Questions of aesthetics and form are deemed 
less important than inquiries into the socio-political uses of literature (Young, 2012, p. 25). 
In his book chapter, Young analyzes Said’s critical position towards postcolonial studies 
pronounced in various interviews, speeches, keynote lectures, and interventions at 
conferences worldwide since the publication of Orientalism in 1978 up until his untimely 
death in September 2003. According to Young it is crucial to link that stance to Said’s 
general impatience with and antipathy for the kind of abstract and opaque theorizing of 
many postcolonial theorists such as Homi K. Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak who 
drew heavily on the works of French postmodern thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Jean 
Baudrillard, and Jean-François Lyotard (Young, 2012, p. 39). Though Said made 
significant contributions to theory himself, in what is clearly an act of discursive 
positioning, he publicly distinguished himself from his postcolonial colleagues preferring 
to see himself as a literary critic who produces worldly readings of literary texts to be 
distinguished from theorists who posit unworldly laws, mystified models, textual doctrines, 
and theoretical orthodoxies. For the literary critic Said, questions of aesthetics and form 
are crucial in postcolonial studies. One cannot talk about, let alone understand imperialistic 
stereotypes and their embeddedness in historical and social circumstances while ignoring 
such formal characteristics as tone, sentiment, rhythm, style, figures of speech, setting, 
narrative structure and narrative devices (Eagleton, 2005, p. 262). With all its 
abstractness, mystified language and lack of attention to literary form, postcolonial and 
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literary theory, Said seems to argue, are religious and unworldly forms of criticism. Said 
on the other hand elaborates such notions as ‘secular criticism’ and ‘worldliness’ to 
designate his own critical practice, by which he means to argue that literary criticism is 
secular, manmade and always inescapably in and of this world (1983c). In short, Said 
opposed postcolonial studies as worldly secular critic. 
Another possible reason for Said’s antipathy has a lot to do with his critical relation to 
the French thinker Michel Foucault, who is known for his antihumanism – a philosophy 
of human nature that rejects the idea that humans are free agents but considers them to 
be determined by a whole machinery of impersonal historical forces (see Davies, 2008, p. 
67). Foucault was skeptical about the very possibility of radical freedom and highly 
dubious that literature or its criticism can explain our oppression let alone provide the 
keys to our liberation. The irony of Said’s reception in postcolonial studies has been that 
by his very own application of Foucault’s notion of ‘discourse’ and such concepts as 
‘power/knowledge’ in Orientalism, the greatest theoretical influence in the field of 
postcolonial studies of the 1980s and 1990s has been that of Foucault (Nichols, 2010). 
Though I do not mean to argue that postcolonial studies are themselves antihuman, the 
application of Foucault’s antihumanist model of reading, as this study makes clear, often 
leads to conclusions that highlight the determination of individuals by these impersonal 
historical forces. Again, Said always distanced himself from this. And though he himself 
to a considerable extent draws on Foucault’s antihumanist toolbox in Orientalism and 
openly attacks Orientalism’s underlying humanist tradition and its ideological 
commitment to empire, he paradoxically defined himself as a humanist literary critic 
willfully affiliating himself with philology and the New Criticism against the antihumanism 
commonly associated with such thinkers as Foucault (Young, 2012, pp. 29-33). As a 
humanist, Said defends the power of individuals to change society and topple determining 
systems of thought such as imperialism and Orientalism. Moreover, his active political 
involvement in the Palestinian cause indicates that Said believes in the political role of the 
intellectual whose work is guided by the ethical imperative to unmask and oppose such 
determining systems of thought and ‘speak truth to power’ (1994b, p. xiv) – a tag to 
designate the work of intellectuals that Said did not himself coin but used to designate his 
own intellectual vocation and has therefore become inextricably tied to his own practice. 
In short, Said opposed postcolonial studies as oppositional humanist intellectual. 
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A third possible reason which I would like to raise for Said’s dislike of postcolonial 
studies as an academic discipline takes a bit more time to explain. Although Young does 
not mention this reason, it can be found in his discussion with Timothy Brennan, who is 
one Said’s most eminent and outspoken commentators. Through the years Brennan 
himself has also come up with a rather provocative answer for Said’s antipathetic relation 
to postcolonial studies. His argument is that Said’s Orientalism did indeed inaugurate the 
field of postcolonial studies, “although an Orientalism that Said did not write” (2006, p. 
103). Brennan’s argument also revolves around the important theoretical influence of 
Foucault on postcolonial studies. According to him, such influence is the result of what he 
believes to be a fundamental misreading of Orientalism as a Foucaultian work of criticism. 
His argument is that “a good deal of postcolonial studies drew on Orientalism without 
being true to it” (Brennan, 2000, p. 577; my emphasis). To prove his point that Said cannot 
have fathered postcolonial studies because his work has nothing to do with the overall 
Foucaultian tone of postcolonial studies as a discipline, Brennan himself reads Orientalism 
against the evidence of the text in a way that obscures the influence of Foucault and 
highlights that of the historical materialist Antonio Gramsci. Though Brennan is right 
that Said’s Orientalism is far more complex than the simplified and one-sided image of that 
text that circulates in postcolonial studies, Young is equally right to dismiss Brennan’s 
argument by replying that such is the fate of any work of criticism and that no field is ever 
‘true’ to a founding text. To dismiss Brennan’s argument completely, Young notes that 
surely “Said did not dislike postcolonial studies simply because it did not turn the method 
of Orientalism into a repetitive orthodoxy” (2012, p. 25). 
And yet, what I mean to argue in this introduction, runs to a considerable extent 
counter to Young’s argument. For what Said disliked so much about postcolonial studies 
is precisely that which Young all too easily dismisses, namely, that it did turn Orientalism’s 
method into a repetitive orthodoxy. As Foucault shows in “Qu’est qu’un auteur?” (1994e) 
the establishment or foundation of a new discipline or academic field is not something 
which happens intentionally by a decision of the individual author at the beginning of his 
or her writing but rather accidentally after the writing is produced and the impersonal 
rules of discursive formation come to exert their determining force on the individual 
writing. His argument boils down to this: names like ‘Karl Marx’, ‘Émile Durkheim,’ 
‘Sigmund Freud’, or, in the case of this study, ‘Edward Said’ have become such 
authoritative names in the history of thought and criticism not because their writing is 
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intrinsically better than other writing but because they have been attributed such 
authority by the impersonal discursive feedback process in which respectively Marxist, 
sociological, psychoanalytical, and postcolonial writings have referred and still refer to the 
writings of these authoritative ‘father figures’. The reason for this is that such texts refer 
to these foundational writings to locate themselves in the discursive field and derive part 
of their authority from referring to these foundational texts. Because of the sheer amount 
of references to these foundational texts, these latter texts accrue even more authority by 
the former who in their turn derive even more authority from the latter, and so on in a 
never-ending discursive spiral. 
In this way, Foucault would argue, authors like ‘Marx’, ‘Durkheim’, ‘Freud’, and ‘Said’ 
become special author-functions or what he calls “fondateurs de discursivité” (1994e, p. 
804). What is so special about these founders of discursivity is that they are attributed 
such enormous authoritative weight or power in the order of discourse of a certain 
discipline that “ils ne sont pas seulement les auteurs de leurs oeuvres, de leurs livres. Ils 
ont produit quelque chose de plus: la possibilité et la règle de formation d’autres textes. . . 
ils ont établi une possibilité indéfinie de discours" (1994e, pp. 804-805). And so founders 
of discursivity come to authorize and determine an entire dynasty of thought, an entire 
academic field or a discipline within which other writings can take their place by 
conforming or, as Brennan calls, being ‘in the true’ to the foundational writing.  
As Brennan’s own ex negativo attempt to be more ‘truthful’ to Said than his colleagues 
suggests, this is exactly what has happened and is still happening in the discipline of 
postcolonial studies. For as becomes clear from Young’s own historical introduction to the 
discipline: 
The reproduction of a critique of Orientalism even today functions as the act or 
ceremony of initiation by which newcomers to the field assert their claim to take up 
the position of the speaking subject within the discourse of postcoloniality. It goes 
without saying that . . . the statutory requirement of this initiation rite is that the 
newcomer denounces one or preferably several aspects of the founding father’s text, 
criticizes the very concept of the postcolonial and then asserts that he or she stands 
completely outside it in a position of critique . . . Only by doing this do you 
demonstrate that you are discursively ‘in the true’, as Foucault put it, with the 
postcolonial. (Young, 2001, p. 384) 
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All good intentions of these postcolonial scholars aside, by persistently referring to Said’s 
text and labeling him ‘the father of postcolonial studies’ (see Abu El-Haj, 2005, p. 547), 
they seem to resemble biblical exegetes who constantly reinterpret the Holy Scripture that 
is Orientalism. And while this kind of religious criticism in itself would already be enough 
for Said as a secular humanist critic to object to and dismiss these compliments, as he has 
done (see Said, 1983a; Veeser, 2010, pp. 100-101), the problematic consequences of this are 
far-reaching. 
In the quintessential initiation rite of postcolonial studies, Said’s ‘fatherly’ writing is 
afforded so much authoritative weight that it comes to function as one of the determining 
constraints of discursivity on other writings.1 And so by claiming Said to be the founder 
of postcolonial studies and by endlessly referring to his writing, reinterpreting it but not 
really developing its insights further, postcolonial studies established itself as an 
institutionalized school of Saidian postcolonialism or, in short, Saidianism. As postcolonial 
studies found institutional expression in schools, departments, journals, conferences and 
books, Said seemed to argue that they lost their critical edge. Instead of being critical to 
Said, postcolonial studies kept ranks with his writing, a tendency of criticism that Said 
identified in Marxism and many other such institutionalized ‘-isms’ that he himself 
abhorred and fiercely reacted against: 
It needs to be said that criticism modified in advance by labels like ‘Marxism’ or 
‘liberalism’ [or ‘postcolonialism’] is, in my view, an oxymoron. The history of 
thought, to say nothing of political movements, is extravagantly illustrative of how 
the dictum ‘solidarity’ before criticism means the end of criticism. (1983c, p. 28) 
The result of this ‘solidarity before criticism’ is that criticism – like many other discourses 
– becomes increasingly more elaborated, self-referential, accumulative, and hermetical. In 
this self-referential discursive process, criticism loses its radical edge and its connection 
with the world, and domesticates itself (see Said, 1983e). And so Said’s dislike for 
postcolonial studies is that his own theories and methods were gradually turned into 
‘postcolonial’ dogma, orthodoxy or doctrine, in the same way that he witnessed Marx’s 
writings being turned into Marxist dogma by his contemporary Marxist colleagues, 
                                               
1 In 1995 Young drew our attention to the fact that Said, Bhabha and Spivak had become so central to the field 
that they constituted what he famously called “the Holy Trinity of colonial-discourse analysis” (1995, p. 163). He 
noted a remarkable increase in the field of postcolonial studies to produce new archival material rather than to 
develop further the insights set up by Said, Bhabha and Spivak. To me, this historical absence of proper critical 
engagement with Said’s Orientalism attest to what I label postcolonialism’s religious criticism. 
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instead of being decoded, demystified and rigorously clarified (1983c, p. 29). Criticism, 
Said believed, must teach us to be critical rather than good members of a school; it must 
incite critical thinking and not as some kind of critical authoritarianism inhibit such 
thinking. In short, Said disliked postcolonial studies as opponent of doctrinal thinking. 
These three possible explanations for Said’s hostile reactions to the research influenced 
by his most famous publication emerge from the image of Said in this study that I have 
established by closely reading his first three major publications, Joseph Conrad and the 
Fiction of Autobiography (1966), Beginnings: Intention and Method (1975a), and Orientalism 
(1978) combined with other minor – but therefore no less important – essays, book 
chapters, reviews, and articles mostly limited to the period 1966-1978. What links all of 
these works is that the author ‘Edward Said’ – whether real, implied or as a discursive 
function – of all these texts appears to the kind of author whom I have described above. 
The image that emerges is not that of some Postcolonial Deity, but a creature of his time. 
A worldly, secular critic who produces concrete and demystifying readings of literature 
that pay attention to the formal characteristics of literature and literature’s affiliations 
with the workings of power. A humanist literary critic who defends the value and the 
power of the individual particular, with an intellectual vocation to oppose all forms of 
doctrinal thinking. 
To be clear, this study is situated within that same field of tension between Said as an 
existential individual and the broader discursive field within which his writings are 
located. And though I am self-consciously aware of this field of tension there is simply no 
escaping the discursive reality within which my own study is embedded. Moreover, 
though I firmly stand behind the reading of Said that I have been introducing here and 
that I will elaborate in the course of this study, I do not mean to argue that my reading of 
Said is more ‘in the true’ to him than what other critics have made of him. Given my own 
criticism of the reception of Said’s works in postcolonial studies that I have just been 
giving, such a claim would indeed be nothing short of bad faith. There is simply no 
escaping the fact that in spite of all his protests, Said has come to fit into the methodology 
of postcolonial studies not because he intended so but because that is the discursive reality 
of postcolonial studies. We can lament this as much as we like but such are unfortunately 
the workings of a collective discursive formation that is an academic discourse. Now, what 
I do mean to argue is that for Said himself his works have less to do with the field of 
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postcolonial studies as it developed in the way it did. This is how I, based on my own 
readings of his works, think we should understand his critical position.  
 11 
The Authority of Criticism 
I have begun this study with four observations, each of which I will address in the course 
of this book. The first is that according to most critics the works of Said are characterized 
by a tension between concepts that derive from two supposedly opposing and mutually 
exclusive philosophies: humanism and antihumanism (Ahmad, 1992, pp. 162-170; Bové, 
1986, pp. 26-33; Cain, 1984, pp. 209-215; Clifford, 1988, pp. 255-276; Howe, 2007, pp. 58-
59; Moore-Gilbert, 1997, pp. 42-43; Young, 1990, pp. 119-140). This tension is said to be 
most clearly present in Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993), which are 
not coincidentally also Said’s two most well-known and most discussed works. 
Said’s critical practice is on the one hand influenced by the criticism of Foucault and his 
antihumanist notion of ‘discourse’. According to antihumanist thinkers like Foucault, the 
individual human consciousness is determined by a whole set of impersonal historical 
forces of which it remains painfully unaware. Moreover, because individuals are unable to 
alter the rules of these determining forces, antihumanists do not consider them to be 
motors of historical change or the principal producers of culture or knowledge (Foucault, 
1970, p. ix). An antihumanist approach to literature and culture therefore does not 
privilege literary texts in the study of culture but sees these texts as part of a larger system 
of representation. Individual consciousness and human experience cannot be final objects 
of study because they are seen as surface phenomena, illustrations of deeper impersonal 
laws. Foucault’s discourse analysis, for instance, therefore aims to go beyond individual 
experience by linking discursive statements with other discursive statements in order to 
unveil an entire system of knowledge and network of power. In this antihumanist 
approach, literature is not the privileged expression of a human mind but, as Said himself 
phrases it, “rather the activation of an immensely complex tissue of forces, for which a text 
is a place among other places (including the body) where the strategies of control in society 
are conducted” (1983b, p. 215).  
Yet on the other hand, Said’s critical practice is marked by a strong humanist current 
with a focus on individual human experience as the central locus of cultural knowledge. A 
humanist approach to literature and culture considers individuals to be prime motors of 
historical change, of culture, and of the production of knowledge. Although the individual 
consciousness is formed by the culture in which it is embedded, it is nonetheless a 
legitimate final object of study because, as Said himself writes, it “is not naturally and 
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easily a mere child of the culture, but a historical and social actor in it” (1983c, p. 15). A 
humanist approach to literature and culture privileges literary texts as entry-points into 
the cultural fabric because they are seen as privileged expressions of the human mind 
(Poirier, 1987, pp. 133-134). According to most humanist theories of reading, literature is 
said to embody a unique consciousness or express a human experience.  
The second observation is that Said’s effort to use two supposedly oppositional critical 
methodologies has led to roughly two types of critical responses. In the first response, 
critics dismiss his works as theoretically ambivalent and inconsistent (Ahmad, 1992, pp. 
159-220; Clifford, 1988, pp. 255-271) or as highly untheoretical and incoherent (Robbins 
et al., 1994, pp. 8, 14) – a critique which, given his own antipathy for theory, on numerous 
occasions Said himself fashioned into an honorary nickname to designate his own practice, 
quipping “who wants to be consistent?” (Said quoted by Ashcroft 2004, p. 90). According 
to Young, Said’s theoretical hybridity was simply bound to cause problems as humanism 
is irreconcilable with Foucault’s antihumanism (Young, 1990; compare Davies, 2008, p. 
34). In the other type of response to Said’s works, critics consider him to be primarily a 
humanist despite his antihumanist tendencies (Bhabha, 2005; Bilgrami, 2005; Brennan, 
2000; Hussein, 2002; Makdisi, 2005; Mitchell, 2005; Pannian, 2016; Radhakrishnan, 2007, 
2010). According to some of these critics, Said’s combination of both humanist and 
antihumanist concepts in one analytical totality should be seen as an attempt at discursive 
positioning vis-à-vis Foucault (Bové, 1986, p. 214; Marrouchi, 2004, pp. 91-92).  
The third observation is that the majority of Said’s commentators concentrate on the 
socio-political dimensions of his works. Though that is not problematic per se, it is 
problematic when they subordinate the literary critical dimension to what they consider 
to these main socio-political claims, namely, the critique of Orientalism, imperialism and 
colonialism, as well as his stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, U.S. foreign affairs and 
the political and cultural policies of Israel and Arab countries. It is not surprising that 
Said’s critical interventions about the political situation in the U.S., the Middle East and 
one of the most precarious geopolitical conflicts of the world that still cause the daily 
sufferings and deaths of many individuals have drawn much critical attention. And yet, 
while I do not mean to argue that matters of literary criticism are more important than 
matters concerning the life and death of a large portion of the earth’s population, I do 
mean to argue that it is strange that critics subordinate the literary critical dimension of 
Said’s works to their socio-political claims. After all, Said never claimed any authority to 
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talk about such things and considered himself to be a trained literary critic who talked 
about the current political moment not as an expert but as an amateur – or, as Brennan 
sharply observes, “Edward Said’s authority was always ultimately literary” (2004, p. 23; 
my emphasis). While this literary critical dimension of Said’s works has in the last decade 
been acknowledged and given slightly more attention (Radhakrishnan, 2007; Veeser, 
2010; Wood, 2010), studies that methodically examine the specific status of literature as 
well as discuss the literary critical aspects of Said’s critical practice are still lacking. As a 
result, Said’s intellectual significance seems to be increasingly confined to the question of 
Middle-East politics (see Abu El-Haj, 2005, p. 540). While the socio-political aspects of 
Said’s critical practice are certainly important and do not need to be subordinated to the 
literary critical aspects of his practice, I do however feel that the socio-political claims of 
Said’s works cannot be separated from our understanding of Said as a literary critic. This 
book is a study about precisely this underestimated aspect of Said’s critical practice. 
The fourth and final observation is tied to the third. For in all the attention that is given 
to Said’s socio-political claims, critics tend to spend a staggering amount of attention to 
what many consider to be the anni mirabiles of Said’s career as a public intellectual – a 
period roughly demarcated by the publication of Orientalism (1978) as terminus post quem 
and Culture and Imperialism (1993) as terminus ante quem, two works with explicitly socio-
political claims. It is striking that hardly any attention is attributed to his first more 
‘traditional’ works of literary criticism such as Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography (1966) and Beginnings: Intention and Method (1975a). This is again remarkable 
because, as Brennan again rightly makes clear, in works such as Orientalism and Culture 
and Imperialism Said expressed his socio-political imagination through an analysis of 
literature and the tropes of literary criticism (2004, pp. 23-24). Literature lies at the heart 
of Said’s critical practice and his intellectual signifance lies as much in the domain of 
literary criticism as it does in the socio-political domain. By overlooking this fundamental 
aspect of Said’s critical practice and this particular period of his career as a literary critic, 
Said’s critics have failed to see how he was able to contribute to all these topics as a literary 
critic. Either they have failed to see how Said made literary criticism authoritative, or he 
himself has been unsuccesful in his attempt. This book, then, is a study about the authority 
of criticism. 
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Literature and Agency, 1966-1978 
Every study needs a starting point, a methodological point of departure or a beginning 
intention. As Said himself makes overtly clear in Beginnings (1975a), in the humanities 
there is no such thing as a given point of departure or a ‘natural’ beginning. Therefore, it 
is imperative that the critic selects a beginning for his or her study. This beginning 
provides the work with an intention that enables what follows and makes possible that 
work’s insights by providing it with a certain method. 
And so I have begun this study, as the subtitle of this book suggests, with a set of two 
interrelated questions: ‘what is literature?’ and ‘what is agency?’. These questions serve as 
the point of departure for my reading of Said’s works and are the guiding questions that 
enable the four chapters which make up this book. And while the beginning observations 
which I have outlined above still serve as the inevitable background to these chapters, my 
selection of a particular beginning does however mean that I have provided my work with 
an intention, which is deliberately not to continue the line of thinking set out by Said’s 
commentators but, to use one of Said’s own metaphors, to properly begin anew.  
My intention is therefore not to foreground the oppositional or dichotomous logic 
between humanism and antihumanism that dominates the current debate about Said but 
rather reconstruct their shifting meanings as well as Said’s frequent attempts to redefine 
these terms and their functions in his works. I doing so I will focus on Said’s 
conceptualization literature as a critical locus and point of departure to investigate the 
concept of agency in Said’s critical practice – hence the order in which these two terms 
appear in this book’s subtitle. My intention is not to submit the concept of literature to 
that of agency, but precisely to show the reciprocity between both concepts, to show how 
Said’s view of literature is informative for his view of agency, which in its turn informs the 
way in which Said conceptualizes the workings of literature, and so on.  
An important part of my method is to analyze the theoretical intertexts that make up 
the theoretical framework of his critical practice. The understanding of these intertexts 
and the relationship which they take up in Said’s critical practice are a means for us to 
understand his ideas about literature and agency. In contrast to previous critics I do not 
consider the tension between humanist and antihumanist tendencies as problematic per se 
but rather as ‘a problematic’ in the sense given to it by Louis Althusser in a 1960 essay on 
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‘the young Marx’ included in Pour Marx (1977). A problematic is a determinate unitary 
structure of a text or group of texts that makes it possible for that text or group of texts 
to raise certain questions in a particular form, while at the same time ruling out others 
(Althusser, 1977, p. 63). A problematic unifies a text or group of texts and makes it 
impossible to extract one element from a text, without altering its meaning (Althusser, 
1977, p. 59). However, labeling the tension between humanism and antihumanism as a 
problematic does not entail seeing that problematic as the ‘essence’ of Said’s works. As 
Althusser makes clear, a problematic serves as methodological handle by which the critic 
can seize a person’s text or group of texts, conceive the meaning of the constitutive 
elements of this text or group of texts in relation to each other internally, look at the form 
in which problems are posed and relate this to the problems posed to the person by the 
historical period in which he or she lives without any totalizing claims (1977, pp. 63-64). 
This historical aspect of a problematic is important. For what can be identified as a 
problematic in one period is not necessarily a problematic in another and has much to do 
with larger institutional discourses and cultural conversations, which are of course 
susceptible to change. 
And so I read that tension between humanism and antihumanism as an Althusserian 
problematic of Said’s critical practice, as an indication that the status of literature and the 
author, and their relation to culture are not univocal but difficult to pin down in Said’s 
works of the period 1966-1978. I read the tension as fundamental and formative for Said’s 
vision on the status of literature and, subsequently, his view on agency which transcends 
the realm of literary theory and has far wider implications about human existence. 
Moreover, seeing this tension as a problematic rather than as a problem, allows me to 
identify and analyze a number of theoretical intertexts or strings in Said’s critical practice 
that belong to the most important institutional discourses and critical debates in the period 
and together make up the overall tension of his works. In order of appearance in this study, 
these intertexts include but are not limited to the Anglo-American New Criticism, 
Genevan criticism of consciousness, existential phenomenology, philology, 
poststructuralism, and historical materialism, all of which are theoretical traditions with 
an important cultural status in the particular institutional and cultural moment studied 
here.  
Even though I have just listed a number of institutionalized schools of thought and I 
will refer to them by these names in the course of this book, given Said’s remarks on the 
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degeneration of criticism, it is important to note that he himself considers his critical 
practice not so much a combination of differing schools of thought but rather an eclectic 
blend of creative energies of individual thinkers. This does not mean that we should follow 
Said in all too quickly dismissing the impact of anonymous forces and impersonal 
theoretical intertexts on his practice or that of others. This study explores the impact of 
impersonally circulating ideas in Said’s institutional and cultural moment on his critical 
practice and at the same time his own explicit engagement as a critic with the particular 
ideas of individuals. And so I will also discuss the most important thinkers on Said’s critical 
practice of the period 1966-1978, including Richard Palmer Blackmur, Harry Levin, 
Georges Poulet, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Georg Lukács, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Erich Auerbach, Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, 
and the novelist who seems to provide Said with vivid examples of the thought of these 
thinkers, Joseph Conrad. The fact that, with a few exceptions, all of these thinkers belong 
to the historically dominant gender and ethnic group that can be characterized as ‘white’, 
‘European’, ‘heterosexual’, and ‘male’, is telling of Said’s own theoretical framework and 
the cultural moment in which it is embedded and does not entail a critical position on my 
behalf about the exceptionality, importance or talents of these thinkers by virtue of their 
belonging to that particular gender and ethnicity. 
The act of beginning necessarily involves an act of delimitation. And so I have limited 
this study to, strictly speaking, the period 1966-1978 – a period in Said’s literary critical 
career that comprises three major critical works Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography (1966), Beginnings (1975a) and Orientalism (1978) as well as dozens of minor 
articles, book chapters and essays. All periodizations are ultimately artificial critical 
constructs, projections of the critic to order that what fundamentally resists such order. 
So in proposing to study the period 1966-1978, I do not mean to argue that this period is 
some kind of easily discernable ‘early period’ of Said, to be distinguished from a ‘middle 
period’ of the so-called anni mirabiles 1978-1993 of Said as a public intellectual, and a period 
of his ‘late style’ 1993-2003 that also includes his posthumous works. Moreover, the period 
1966-1978 in this study is less strict than the subtitle of this book might suggest. The 
reason is that I have sparsely included texts written by Said after 1978 – but, as will 
become clear in the next section, not too much so as to avoid the teleological fallacy – and 
important institutional discourses and cultural debates that strictly speaking precede the 
period under study but nonetheless occupy Said in this particular period. I also discuss the 
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continued relevance and importance of the critical debates and theoretical intertexts that 
I have analyzed in the period studied here for our understanding of Said’s later works. My 
argument is after all that we cannot understand the socio-political claims of Said’s works 
in separation from our understanding of Said as a literary critic, especially in the period 
1966-1978. 
So then, why do I propose to study this particular period? First of all, because critics 
have focused too much on Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993), two 
works that deal with socio-political2 concerns in a more visible manner than his earlier 
works and, one could even say, of postcolonial criticism. In singling out these works as 
pivotal moments in Said’s career, critics have isolated them and distorted Said’s method 
all too much, designating it as postcolonial criticism tout court. The period 1966-1978 in 
Said’s career is hardly ever studied as a timeframe. Possible explanations for this lack of 
attention are that while the socio-political dimension and impact of Orientalism (1978) are 
widely acknowledged, his works in the period leading up to Orientalism are wrongly 
considered to be apolitical and unconcerned with socio-political matters. Said’s revised 
doctoral thesis Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966) is scarcely studied as 
it is seen as an old-fashioned work of literary criticism that is theoretically uninteresting 
or even “bluntly straightforward” (Veeser, 2010, pp. 27-28) because it is considered to be 
the twilight product of an uninteresting period of traditional literary criticism in the U.S. 
that predates the period of structuralism and poststructuralism in the U.S. inaugurated in 
October 1966 just months after the publication of Said’s book on Conrad. This period is 
still seen by many today as the revolutionary and therefore more interesting period of 
literary theory. This book presents an argument to correct that image by highlighting the 
interventional potential of theories predating that artificial 1966 demarcation line. 
Moreover, despite Conrad’s obvious connections to issues concerning imperialism, 
colonialism and postcolonialism, Said’s treatment of the Anglo-Polish author is wrongly 
considered to be only concerned with matters of literature and intellectual life and not 
                                               
2 In this book I will be using the term ‘politics’ or ‘socio-politics’ to refer to a number of interrelated meanings: 
(1) activities and beliefs associated with the practice of government, the organization and administration of a 
community, state or part of a state, and the relationships between states, as well as the management and 
regulation of public and private life; (2) activities and beliefs concerning the acquisition and exercise of power or 
authority in the broadest sense of the word; (4) the moral principles, codes of conducts and the ethical implications 
and consequences of actions and ideas; (5) the underlying ideas, beliefs, outlooks, attitudes and ideology forming 
the basis of any activity, theory, or practice. These meanings are inextricably connected, so that, when it comes 
to discussing literature, the politics of reading have consequences for the politics of state, and vice versa. 
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with matters of ideology and socio-politics that might be the concerns of postcolonial 
criticism in the twentieth or twenty-first centuries (McCarthy, 2010, p. 16). And while 
Said’s second book Beginnings (1975a) has received somewhat more attention and is 
considered to be more politicized than his first, it is hardly ever studied in itself and mostly 
considered in relation to Said’s later works, of which it is said to contain all of the concerns 
in embryo (Brennan, 1992, p. 75). 
Studying the period 1966-1978 should therefore be seen as part of my overall intention 
to begin anew. By closely reading Said’s first three major works in themselves and in close 
relation to each other, I am able to show the broad spectrum of concerns that occupy Said 
as a literary critic. In the course of this book’s four chapters, I highlight how these concerns 
include but are not limited to the concerns of postcolonial studies most commonly 
associated with his works, are of great socio-political interest, and connected to the 
ongoing avant-gardist critical debates about literature, agency, and literary criticism in 
that period. Even to a reader of the twenty-first century, Said’s interventions have not lost 
their interventional value or force that transgress the narrow confines of literary criticism 
and theory. Said’s texts should be read as an inseparable ensemble. Not because there is 
such thing as the organic unity of an oeuvre but simply because of the discursive reality of 
these texts, namely, that all three of them stand in a close intertextual relationship to on 
another, refer to each other, nuance, revise and strengthen the arguments in one another, 
in ways that have hardly ever been noticed by Said’s critics.  
Second of all, because the selection of this particular period allows me to identify a 
number of theoretical intertexts that inform Said’s critical practice, which are seldom 
acknowledged let alone discussed as an ensemble by the majority of his commentators. 
The reason for this is quite simply that these intertexts are part of the larger institutional 
discourses and cultural debates in the U.S. during the period 1966-1978. It goes without 
saying that those discourses and debates in the period after 1978 are different than those 
in the years after 1958, to name the point of departure of my first chapter, or in the years 
after 1966, to name that of my second chapter, if not in nature, than at least certainly in 
tone, in the particular questions and the ways in which they are formulated, and in the 
contributors to these debates. By predominantly focusing on the debates and institutional 
discourses in the year 1978 and after, Said’s critics have commonly discussed Said’s 
engagement with poststructuralism and historical materialism, but have failed to identify 
and assess his additionally and equally important engagement with the New Criticism, 
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criticism of consciousness, existential phenomenology and philology – all of which were 
important parts of the institutional discourses of the period 1966-1978 – for our 
understanding of his model of reading. And so the image of Said in this study nuances and 
corrects the dominant understanding of his method as ‘poststructuralist’ and himself as an 
American adept of Foucault, who later became disillusioned by the French thinker’s stress 
on determination and turned to the historical materialism of such thinkers as Gramsci, 
Raymond Williams and Frantz Fanon. To be clear, the image of Said in this study is not 
the image of a critic whose model of reading is highly untheoretical and inconsistent. Nor 
is it a monolithic image of a critic whose model of reading in 1978 is the same as it was in 
1975 or 1966. It is, rather, the image of thinker who is engaged with an eclectic number 
of creative energies, of a thinker who is trying to find answers to the questions that occupy 
him, of thought as it develops. Presenting such an image is only possible when Said’s works 
are studied both closely in themselves and in close relation to each other – as a continuous 
development rather than as discontinuous moments in his career. 
Third of all, I treat the tension between humanism and antihumanism in Said’s works 
as a problematic that should be related to the problems dealt with in the historical period 
in which he lives. Those problems have recently been described by Mark Greif as problems 
concerning the core values and meanings of human existence. From reading Greif’s The 
Age of the Crisis of Man: Thought and Fiction in America, 1933-1973 (2015), it becomes clear 
that the preliminary questions that occupy me are the same questions that have occupied 
an entire generation of philosophers, artists, scholars, intellectuals, critics, poets and 
novelists living and writing in the U.S. in the midcentury of the twentieth century – the 
period 1933-1973 according to Greif’s delineation. That period sees the rise of theories of 
human rights, humanitarianism and activism, debates about antihumanism, and a constant 
tug of war between universalism and difference, all of which, Greif shows, draw on what 
he labels “the discourse of the crisis of man” (2015, p. 318). 
It is important to briefly outline Greif’s argument as it clarifies the main tensions in the 
work of Said from a broader perspective of intellectual history, by concentrating on two 
pivotal moments of crisis in that history: 1945 and 1968. In 1945 the discovery of the 
camps and the use of the atomic bomb made painfully visible the inhuman consequences 
of the worldwide totalitarian crisis leading up to the events of World War II. The postwar 
response to this inhumanity was more humanity, and a humanist discourse took hold in 
thought and literature on both sides of the Atlantic (Greif, 2015, pp. 103-104). In that 
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postwar discourse ‘Man’ was explicitly seen to be universal so as to combat the identity 
politics that caused the horrors of the war. The universalist doctrine of the postwar 
discourse did not account for much nuances and stressed that regardless of their religious 
beliefs or the color of their skin, all humans were the same, had the same unalienable rights, 
and should therefore be treated alike (Greif, 2015, p. 147). However, the postwar rise of a 
universalist humanist discourse was almost immediately accompanied by criticism (Greif, 
2015, pp. 18-19). It did not take long before the ‘normal’ subject of this discourse was 
unmasked as white and male. Women, as Simone de Beauvoir argued, were secondary; and 
African-Americans, Ralph Ellison made clear, were simply invisible (Greif, 2015, pp. 20-
21). Hence the postwar period saw the rise of existentialism in the U.S. taking the New 
York intellectual scene by storm in 1946-1947 (Greif, 2015, pp. 65-73; see also Cotkin, 
2003). Existentialism reframed the humanist discourse and the dominant notion of ‘human 
nature’ into a notion of the ‘human condition’, a view of humanity that was still universal 
but sought no inner essence, had no ‘normalized’ subjects, and was nonmetaphysical, 
because it simply “spoke of circumstances that just happened to be reproduced for every 
single human being, as each person was born mortal in a world of others, a world that 
furnished certain limits or boundaries within which the individual was free” (Greif, 2015, 
p. 68). This view allowed for the combination of universalism and particularism in the New 
York intellectual scene, which also echoed the nuanced identity politics that accounted for 
differences in race and religion formulated by such authors as Ellison and Saul Bellow. 
The latter was heavily influenced by the Great Books programs encountered in his 
education at the University of Chicago, the former by Communism and African 
Nationalism in Harlem (Greif, 2015, p. 149). And so in this postwar humanist discourse 
the identity politics of the prewar years was reframed into the politics of universality, 
which in its turn, quickly became synonymous with the more nuanced politics of 
responsibility (Greif, 2015, p. 78). In March 1946, Albert Camus, the literary star of 
French existentialism, gave a speech at Columbia University that was aptly titled “La crise 
de l’homme” (2006). He argued that we were all responsible for the Holocaust. 
The second moment of crisis is 1968, when massive worldwide protests in Europe, Asia 
and South-America, the escalation of the Vietnam War during the Tet-offensive and anti-
war protests across the U.S. coincided with the rise of structuralism and poststructuralism 
in the humanities. Heralded by the linguistic turn of anthropologists like Claude Lévi-
Strauss, these French theories reconfigured the entire American postwar humanist 
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discourse in distinctly antihumanist terms (Greif, 2015, p. 281). The antihumanism of 
‘theory’, as the combination of structuralism and poststructuralism is commonly known 
as, carried the critique of the subject to an extreme, sought to radically combat the postwar 
subjectivist humanism and undid ‘Man’ entirely by dissolving the concept of ‘Man’ in 
language. As instable as the socio-political situation, so was the concept of ‘Man’ that 
emerged in this period. ‘Theory’ not only championed difference as structuring principles 
of thought and expression it implicitly even esteemed difference as the very core of human 
value (Greif, 2015, p. 303). In November 1971, the most famous debate in this phase of the 
crisis of man took place. This time the location was on the other side of the Atlantic. The 
events of 1968 were still fresh as linguist and political activist Noam Chomsky went head 
to head with Foucault to discuss ‘human nature’ on Dutch television (Chomsky & Foucault, 
2006, p. 312; Greif, 2015). Chomsky was a fighter for social justice, Foucault a critic of 
power. And though they understood each other well on their respective positions, they 
could not find common philosophical and political grounds (Greif, 2015, p. 314). The result 
of these two cultural movements is a cultural tension between critical humanism and 
radical antihumanism, which Greif summarizes as follows: “On one side, human rights and 
humanitarianism defended the human individual. On the other, the critique of the subject 
and the discovery of difference exposed the all-too-human coercions that kept the 
individual from true liberation” (2015, p. 316). 
The period 1966-1978 roughly coincides with the latter transitional phase between 
humanism and antihumanism identified and described by Greif. Though I do not always 
explicitly refer to Greif’s work, the discourse of the crisis of man is an important discursive 
context and cultural framework within which Said’s works should be understood. The 
tensions in his works are the tensions of his culture. And so, though this book is strictly 
speaking about the works of Said in the period 1966-1978, to analyze and understand 
Said’s problems one must at the same time transcend the boundaries of his works and 
understand the larger institutional discourses, cultural debates and events from roughly 
the late 1920s to the mid-1980s in Europe, North-America, and in Said’s case, the Middle-
East.  
In each of the four chapters I have begun with a particular anecdote, either a remark 
made by Said or an event that impacted his thinking. These anecdotes serve as the point 
of departure from which I analyze Said’s works and the institutional discourses, cultural 
conversations and worldly events within which we should understand his critical practice. 
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My focus in each of the chapters is on the theoretical intertexts that inform that practice. 
At the end of each chapter, I have provided what I have called an ‘epilogue’ in which I have 
singled out a particular concept, work or evolution in Said’s works after the strict period 
studied here to highlight the continued importance and relevance of my discussion in that 
chapter for an understanding of Said’s critical practice after the year 1978. These epilogues 
serve to bring out certain key concepts of Said’s later practice and do not provide a 
synthesis of that practice, for the precise theoretical frameworks and the relationships 
between intertexts in his later works should be studied in the same methodical way as I 
have studied the theoretical constellations of his first three works. The intertexts which I 
have discussed here remain crucial parts of his critical practice post-1978 and my 
discussions in this book provide the outline for an integral understanding of Said’s works. 
In the first chapter the point of departure is Harvard University, 1958. In this chapter 
I discuss the gradual ‘decline and fall’ of the New Criticism in the period leading up to 
World War II and the immediate postwar years. I discuss how the New Criticism 
gradually established itself as an institutionalized school of criticism in the U.S. literary 
departments and thereby turned into a universalist theory of reading. My discussion 
singles out the works of Richard Palmer Blackmur and Harry Levin, and Said’s critical 
engagement with their works in his revised doctoral dissertation Joseph Conrad and the 
Fiction of Autobiography (1966). Especially Blackmur is an important and all-too overlooked 
influence on Said’s own model of reading. 
The second chapter opens with the seminal 1966 Johns Hopkins conference on ‘The 
Languages of Criticism and the Science of Man’, a pivotal event in the history of American 
literary theory. Instead of focusing on the contribution of the young philosopher who was 
still relatively unknown to the Americans, Jacques Derrida, my discussion illustrates that 
we can better understand Said’s critical practice by looking at the talk of Derrida’s twenty-
eight year older senior, Georges Poulet. In this chapter I single out Poulet’s strand of 
phenomenology, commonly known as criticism of consciousness, to illustrate the way in 
which Said is part of a larger generation of critics that draws upon phenomenology and its 
existential variant to reinvigorate what they considered to be an exhausted New Criticism. 
My discussion highlights the importance of not only Poulet but of Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty on Said’s treatment of Joseph Conrad (1966), two thinkers that 
allow Said to reconnect literature to human experience and the world. This chapter also 
presents an implicit argument for what Greif identifies as the transition from the politics 
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of universality to the politics of responsibility, which is the defining politics of Said’s model 
of reading. It shows how Said’s critical engagement with existential phenomenology 
allows him to reconceptualize the supposedly universal model of reading and agency of 
the New Criticism into a situated theory of reading and agency that highlights the 
particular choice and responsibility of individuals. 
The point of departure for the third chapter is Columbia University, 1967, and the 
events of the Third Arab-Israeli War of June that year. These events and the cultural tidal 
waves impacted Said’s thinking in a profound way, inciting him to politicize his model of 
reading in Beginnings: Intention and Method (1975a). To understand Said’s model, I single 
out the importance of the philology of Erich Auerbach, whose work should be situated at 
the so-called twilight of humanism and the early phases of the worldwide totalitarian crisis 
and the crisis of man in the 1930s and 1940s. In Beginnings Said contrapuntally combines 
Auerbach’s Weltphilologie with Michel Foucault’s work on discourse. It will become clear 
how Foucault’s antihumanist theory of reading serves as an inspiration and fierce target 
of criticism for Said who is deeply committed to a humanist project.  
The last point of departure in the fourth chapter is Stanford University, 1975, and the 
events in the first phase of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1976. These events are at the 
heart of Said’s most well-known work, Orientalism (1978). In this chapter it becomes ever 
so clear how Said’s approach to literary criticism eclectically combines a myriad of creative 
energies from differing schools of thought. The cultural and institutional midcentury 
debate between humanism and antihumanism is best exemplified by Said’s application and 
willful combination of Foucault’s poststructuralism and Antonio Gramsci’s historical 
materialism. My argument is that Said’s Orientalism is at the same time the product of and 
a clear answer to the crisis of man and to the broader critical debates on literature, agency, 
and the role of literary criticism. 
In the conclusion to this book, I reflect on the role of humanism as a resistance to idées 
fixes in Said’s practice. In that conclusion I argue that throughout the period studied here, 
Said does not radically question the doctrines of humanism, which comes to function as 
the master discourse of his practice, his secular religion or his own critical orthodoxy. 
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Questions of Method: Blindness and Insight 
Every reading has its blindness and its insights. As Paul de Man argues in his seminal 
reading of Derrida’s reading of Rousseau, every reading has an inevitable blindness to 
certain aspects of a text but this very blindness makes possible the discovery of that 
reading’s most valuable insights (1971d, p. 105). We must always take into account that 
one text’s blindness with regard to a text is not always identical to that text’s own 
blindness with regard to another text that has of course a blindness of its own. We must 
therefore take into account that the blindness of de Man’s to the text of Derrida or my 
blindness to the text of Said are not identical to the blindness of Derrida to the text of 
Rousseau or to the blindness of Said text to the text of Conrad, for instance,. And so one 
reading can effectively illuminate or see the faults of another, to which that reading was 
itself blind – which is why the word ‘criticism’, according to the OED, also refers to ‘the 
action of fault-finding’ (OED, 2017c). Though every reading has a blindness of its own, 
one reading’s method is able to judge, discern or provide insight into another reading’s 
blindness. This interplay between blindness and insight, between a critic’s choice of 
method and the consequences of that choice, is what makes literary criticism not only 
possible but valuable. And while the insights of my reading will become clear in the course 
of this study, its blindness must be confronted early on. 
In the Quaderni del carcere (2007b)3, the Italian Marxist and founder of the Italian 
Communist Party, Antonio Gramsci describes the critical project of this study. He writes 
that in order to study the intellectual development of a thinker who seldom explicitly 
expounds his or her principles, some preliminary philological work has to be carried out: 
first the reconstruction of the thinker’s biography – both as regards his or her practical 
activity and intellectual activity – and then the catalogue of his or her works including 
                                               
3 The text I refer to is the Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith’s English translation Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks (Gramsci, 1971), which is also the version used by Said in his writings. As the title suggests, 
this edition contains only selections from Gramsci’s original Italian essays. Recently, Joseph Buttigieg has 
started the project of editing, co-translating and producing a complete critical edition of Gramsci’s notebooks in 
English with all attendant notes and materials (Gramsci, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Though his work is excellent 
and indispensable for scholars in the humanities and beyond, lack of funding means that these three volumes 
only include notebooks 1 through 8 of the 29 produced by Gramsci. 
 When I cite from translated works, I will first refer to original title of the work, preferably even to the original 
edition, adding a footnote in which I refer to the translation that I will be citing from. In all following mentions 
of work, I will be using the title of the English edition of the work to which I refer. 
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minor writings most easily overlooked, in chronological order and divided according to 
work-intrinsic criteria (1971, pp. 383-384). I too have begun my research with a 
reconstruction of Said’s biography, practical and intellectual, with his involvement with, 
connection to, and embeddedness in worldly events both inside and outside the academy. 
I have listed his work in chronological order and then proceeded to select and present 
those parts of this biographical evidence that are relevant to the development of his 
intellectual work, of which the coherence is not to be sought in each individual writing or 
series of writings but, as Gramsci adds, “in the whole development of the multiform 
intellectual work” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 382).  
When studying such a whole development it is necessary, Gramsci continues,  
to reconstruct the process of intellectual development of the thinker in question in 
order to identify those elements which were to become stable and ‘permanent’ – in 
other words those which were taken up as the thinker’s own thought, distinct from 
and superior to the ‘material’ which he had studied earlier and which served as a 
stimulus to him. (1971, pp. 382-383) 
Though unlike Gramsci, I myself doubt the existence of such ‘stable’ entities of thought, 
in the course of this study I too have identified a number of important themes of Said’s 
method in order to further our overall understanding of his intellectual development – all 
the while stressing, I hope, that his intellectual development was not carefully planned or 
orchestrated according to some intellectual blueprint but rather an improvisation on 
worldly circumstances inside and outside the academy.4 When Said enrolled at Harvard 
University in 1958 to begin reading and writing on a doctoral dissertation that would be 
revised and published as Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966) eight years 
later, he did not have in mind the publication of Orientalism (1978) twenty years later. And 
while there are important pivotal texts in Said’s intellectual development, that whole 
development should rather be understood as a combination of worldly actions and 
reactions, as the product of a balancing act between being influenced and active critical 
engagement. 
In my approach to Said’s intellectual development I have tried to achieve a critical 
balance between proximal understanding and distance, between comprehension and 
                                               
4 On this point, I find myself in agreement with Veeser who attacks Brennan for producing such an intelligent-
design version of Said, as if “Said possessed a blueprint that he systematically went about filling over several 
decades, without wavering or backfilling” (Veeser, 2010, p. 24). 
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interpretation, evaluation and judgment. My method reconstructs the web of theoretical 
intertexts and the broader discursive field within which Said’s writings should be situated 
in order to understand his ideas about literature and agency, as well as those relevant ideas 
circulating in the broader institutional and cultural context. To do so I have combined the 
method of close reading to clarify and understand Said’s writings with a more distant 
discursive approach that situates his writings within the broader discursive field and 
establishes connections and implications that he may never have made or stated explicitly. 
My goal is ultimately to describe, understand, and criticize not just a collection of works 
but an intellectual development in which, as Gramsci writes, “the rhythm of the thought as 
it develops, should be more important than . . . single causal affirmations and isolated 
aphorisms” (1971, pp. 383-384; my emphasis). My goal is not to reproduce the dominant 
image of Said as the authoritative critic with a fully developed system of thought, a 
consistent, orchestrated or carefully planned totality, but rather to show the rhythm of his 
thought as it develops with a basic sense of direction but without a premeditated plan. My 
goal is precisely to correct that initial image of Said as an authority and show how his 
ideas about literature and agency are not stable entities of thought but dependent on the 
constellations of his theoretical framework that are different in each of his writings.  
I have therefore ordered my discussion as much as possible according to the principle 
of chronology, which is of course still an order imposed on my materials but also a method 
of organization that allows me to achieve the goal that I have in mind and obtain a position 
of critical distance to Said’s own recollections, reminiscences and sometimes even 
downright willful revisions of his earlier works in later writings. Said has a habit of 
reconsidering his works in later prefaces or afterwords to reprints, interviews, lectures 
and essays, so as to recuperate his earlier writings into his current projects and debates. 
As the years progress he seems to be increasingly more self-conscious about his own 
discursive positioning. This is why we encounter numerous essays and articles with titles 
like “Traveling Theory Reconsidered” (2000h), “Orientalism Reconsidered” (2000f), 
“Orientalism Revisited” (2004c), “Orientalism and After” (1996), “Orientalism, an 
Afterword” (1995), “Orientalism Once More” (2004b). These texts should be analyzed as 
objects of study rather than as perspectives of study. In other words, they should be 
critically examined and situated within their own discursive context, and excluded as 
much as possible from a study of the period to which they do not belong but nonetheless 
attempt to reinterpret. This is also why my own method of reading focuses so much on 
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the language of Said’s works, on his use of metaphors and choice of words in the texts 
themselves from the period studied. 
In attributing so much interpretative weight to metaphors, words and rhetoric, I have 
based my own method on what Steven Mailloux in Rhetorical Power (1989) calls ‘rhetorical 
hermeneutics’, a critical-theoretical practice to incorporate rhetoric at the level of 
interpretive theory and its analysis of literary and cultural practice (1989, p. 18). I share 
Mailloux’s conviction that all textual interpretation is inseparably connected to rhetorical 
power, that is, the power of that interpretation to inspire belief and convince its readers, 
audiences, and opponents of its value and ‘truth’ (Mailloux, 1989, p. 179). Literary 
criticism or interpretation takes place at a particular moment, in a specific place, for a 
certain audience and against, alongside or in line with other writing that is not always 
explicitly referred to – which is of course a very Foucaultian way of looking at things. 
Bearing all of this in mind, rhetorical hermeneutics studies the rhetorical exchanges 
among interpreters embedded in discursive and other social practices at specific historical 
moments (Mailloux, 1989, p. 133). According to Mailloux, the method has a threefold 
focus: first, it seeks to reveal the embeddedness between the individual writing and “its 
most relevant critical debates (and there may be several)” (1989, p. 133); second, it attempts 
to situate the individual writing and its participation in ongoing arguments in “the 
rhetorical traditions within relevant institutional discourses” (1989, p. 133); and thirdly, it 
places the individual writing, its arguments and institutions within “the cultural 
conversations, relevant social practices, and constraining material circumstances of its 
historical moment” (1989, p. 133). This threefold focus should make clear that rhetorical 
hermeneutics, is the practice of “using rhetoric to practice theory by doing history” 
(Mailloux, 1989, p. ix).  
And so my own method of reading is a combination of close rhetorical reading and 
rhetorical hermeneutics, of focusing on both the interiority of Said’s intellectual 
development – his rhetoric, metaphors, vocabulary, images, concepts, arguments and what 
Said’s choice of words mean for our understanding of his practice – and the exteriority of 
that development to other writing – its constituents, audiences, opponents, its affiliations 
and disaffiliations with other texts, and the way in which his writing attempts to open up 
or close certain discursive spaces both in and outside the traditional confines of the 
academy. All of this is to make clear that even though I have chosen to let my method be 
guided by Said’s intellectual development, it is at the same time not constrained by it, as 
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it investigates the way in which Said’s own concepts and insights ‘travel’ within his work. 
And though my method certainly has affinities with what some could call traditional 
philology and source studies, it surpasses such humanist theories of reading by also 
examining, which is not to say taking at face value, Said’s own discursive positioning as a 
critic, his reflective and irreflective positioning in the discursive field of literary criticism, 
and the way in which his intellectual development echoes ideas circulating in the 
discursive field well before (and after) the strict period that is studied here. This makes 
clear that though the strict object of this study of the intellectual development of Said in 
the period 1966-1978 it is at the same time a study of a wide array of theoretical intertexts 
and the history of (American) literary theory from the 1920s to the mid-1980s. 
And yet despite my attempt to elucidate my method and identify the blindness of my 
reading, I am aware that even then my method does not escape de Man’s description of 
the double-edged blade of every work of literary criticism. In the words of Gramsci: 
It is a matter of common observation among all scholars, from personal experience, 
that any new theory studied with ‘heroic fury’ (that is, studied not out of mere 
external curiosity but for reasons of deep interest) for a certain period, especially if 
one is young, attracts the student of its own accord and takes possession of his whole 
personality, only to be limited by the study of the next theory, until such a time as a 
critical equilibrium is created and one learns to study deeply but without 
succumbing to the fascination of the system and the author under study. These 
observations are all the more valid the more the thinker in question is endowed with 
a violent impetus, has a polemical character and is lacking in esprit de système, or when 
one is dealing with a personality in whom theoretical and practical activity are 
indissolubly intertwined and with an intellect in a process of continual creation and 
perpetual movement, with a strong and mercilessly vigorous sense of self-criticism. 
(1971, p. 383) 
By deliberately choosing to allow the method of this study to be guided by Said’s own, I 
am convinced that I am able to show Said’s intellectual development in progress. However, 
as Gramsci warns, the risk of this is that one’s own method can at times be swallowed up 
by the method of the thinker studied, especially a thinker like Said who lacks such esprit de 
système, whose theoretical and practical activity are so strongly entwined, and whose 
intellectual development is marked by the kind of intellectual vigor and movement that 
Gramsci describes. And though I am the first to admit that my method is to a great extent 
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indebted to Said’s own method of reading, I have attempted to achieve that necessary 
critical equilibrium.
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Chapter 1  
Cold Reading
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1.1 Introduction: Harvard, 1958 
In the Fall of 1958 Said began the first of five years as a graduate student in comparative 
literature at Harvard University. Having graduated from Princeton University a year 
earlier in June 1957, he agreed to write a doctoral dissertation under the guidance of 
Harvard professors Monroe Engel and Harry Levin on the letters and short fiction of the 
Anglo-Polish writer Joseph Conrad. The whole period as a graduate student at Harvard, 
Said recalls in his autobiography, was a continuation of his experience as an undergraduate 
at Princeton: attending courses that were taught by professors of the utmost competence 
and philological rigor, but that were nevertheless dull, unreflective and induced a lethargic 
mood in him (1999, pp. 276-278). “Conventional history and a wan formalism ruled the 
literary faculty”, he goes on to describe the atmosphere at Harvard,  
so in fulfilling my degree requirements there was no possibility of doing much 
beyond marching from period to period until the twentieth century. I recall hours, 
days, weeks, of voracious reading with no significant extension of that reading in 
what professors lectured on or what they expected from a largely passive student 
clientele. There was scarcely a ripple on the surface of student placidity, perhaps 
because, with no sense of intellectual example to animate our exertions, all of us 
were out of place, or uncomfortable in the institution. (Said, 1999, pp. 289-290) 
That “wan formalism”, which ruled the Harvard literary faculty and which was taught by 
the majority of professors in the literary departments across the United States in the 1950s 
and early 1960s, has come to be known as the American New Criticism. Deriving its name 
from a book of that designation by John Crowe Ransom (1941), the New Criticism 
flourished in the U.S. from the early 1940s onwards and is taken to include the work of a 
variety of American literary critics such as Ransom, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, 
Austin Warren, William K. Wimsatt Jr., Monroe Beardsley, Richard Palmer Blackmur, 
Kenneth Burke, Yvor Winters, and Cleanth Brooks. Though they did not find much 
common theoretical ground, they did have a common reaction to previous schools of 
criticism and a similar conceptualization of the task of literary criticism (Berman, 1988, p. 
26; Jancovich, 1993, p. 3).  
These critics drew inspiration from a series of experiments conducted by the English 
literary critic and rhetorician Ivor Armstrong Richards, who gave poems to his 
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undergraduate students without any information about who wrote them or when they 
were written and asked them to concentrate on the actual text rather than relying on 
preconceived opinions or received beliefs about that text (Zrnić, 2017, p. 266). In his 
seminal book Practical Criticism (1930) argued that a close and methodical analysis of the 
“bare words . . . on the paper” (1930, p. 4) resulted in psychological benefits for his 
undergraduate students that they derived from their full response to the poem, which was 
organized and controlled by the form of the poem. Like Richards, the New Criticism 
defended the idea that literary criticism had to be practical and study the literary work as 
a self-sufficient verbal artifact or icon that could be criticized or evaluated in its own terms. 
The goal of criticism was to reaffirm the specificity of literature – what the Russian 
Formalists in the 1920s would call the ‘literariness’ of literature, that what makes a given 
work literary (Jakobson, 1973, p. 62)5 – and elucidate individual works of art by showing 
how elements of poetic form, such as metaphors, ambiguity, irony, the interplay of 
connotation and denotation, and poetic imagery, all contributed to the unified structure of 
that literary work (Culler, 1988, p. 10). Contrary to what terms such as ‘verbal icon’ or 
‘artifact’ might suggest, that structure was not seen to be static but dramatic and made up 
the essence of a literary work, which, according to the New Critics, could only be grasped 
as a whole that is greater than or different from the sum of its individual parts. The literary 
work should be seen as a totality or, borrowing a term from experimental psychology, “a 
Gestalt” (Wellek, 1978b, p. 620). 
The New Criticism effectively promoted the idea that literature was valuable in itself 
and had to be taken seriously; likewise, the criticism which sought to illuminate and 
interpret it was also valuable (McDonald, 2007, p. 14). As a movement, the New Criticism 
had a huge influence on the university and beyond. It succeeded in effecting an educational 
transformation in the 1940s and by the early to mid-1950s established itself as the 
dominant pedagogic tradition in academic literary studies after World War II until the 
1970s and well into the 1980s (Fekete, 1977, p. 88; Green, 1965, p. 20). The immediate 
postwar years were marked by a sudden massification in American institutes of higher 
education. The 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, informally known as the ‘G.I. Bill’, 
made it possible for many veterans, who had just been discharged from active service after 
                                               
5 For a comparative study that contextualizes the New Criticism and the Russian Formalism with respect to 
their philosophical backgrounds, main concepts and the practical application of their general principles, see Ewa 
Thompson’s Russian Formalism and Anglo-American New Criticism: A Comparative Study (1971). 
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the war, to attend universities or colleges as their tuition fees and living expenses were 
paid for by the government. The G. I. Bill was an immense success: student numbers 
swelled and, to keep up with this nationwide hike in numbers, university faculty 
exponentially expanded.6 The teaching methods of the New Criticism, which, contrary to 
those of contextual approaches to literature, generally did not require much background 
training or specialized knowledge, suited this massification trend and catered to the needs 
of these new veteran students who lacked the kind of formal education that their 
nonveteran fellow students were able to enjoy (Leitch, 2010, p. 130). The New Critical 
pedagogical model was unspecialized enough, and therefore accessible to a large number 
of students, to the extent that it remolded the teaching of English not only in the 
institutions of higher education, but in secondary schools too, and thus influenced the 
culture at large (McDonald, 2007, p. 14). In fact, according to Jonathan Culler in 1988, the 
pedagogical method of the New Criticism dominated postwar literature programs in the 
U.S. in such a way that he designates the postwar period in American literary studies as 
“the hegemony of the New Criticism” (1988, p. 11). 
But although the New Criticism was the hegemonic form of U.S. literary criticism and 
would remain the standard method of courses on literature and literary history up until 
the 1970s and well into the 1980s, when Said pursued his graduate and undergraduate 
studies in the 1950s and early 1960s many up-and-coming literary scholars felt that the 
movement was at its critical twilight. Instead of the innovative and fresh approach to 
literature that it had been at the start two decades earlier, Said was taught a pale, bleak 
and exhausted version of the New Criticism that could barely excite him or his fellow 
students. According to Said, reminiscing on the period well over two decades later – which 
means that we should not simply take his words at face value – what was once an 
invigorating, engaged method of reading that forcefully insisted that literature and culture 
mattered and that prompted critics to actively reflect about the specificity of literature, its 
human meaning, social and cultural functions, as well as the worldliness of literary 
criticism, had now faded into a pale version of itself that, in its critical practice, obscured 
the social and cultural dimensions of texts beneath a narrow focus on textuality and form. 
                                               
6 In the first decade after World War II (1946 to 1957) 2,232,000 veterans benefited from the G. I. Bill to attend 
colleges or universities (Olson, 1973, p. 596). The total amount of students in higher education in the U.S. rose 
from 1,677.000 to 3,138,000 – a trend that cannot just be explained by the effects of the G.I. Bill alone, but also 
by the large amount of students who enrolled in higher education to avoid military service in the Korean War 
(1950-1953). As a result, in that same decade, the amount of professorships surged and the number of university 
faculty members nationwide more than doubled, from 136,000 to 344,000 (Leitch, 2010, p. 130). 
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The New Criticism had lost its interest in politics and societal change. Literary programs 
dominated by the pedagogy of the New Criticism, Said feels, produced “a largely passive 
student clientele” (1999, p. 289) that was taught the kind of political quietism and societal 
conformity that was characteristic of the first postwar decade in the U.S. (Leitch, 2010, p. 
130).7 And so the New Criticism, Said feels, was not only the hegemony in the U.S. literary 
departments, it consolidated the societal status quo. Therefore, as the location of the 1968 
anti-Vietnam protests in the U.S. vividly exemplify, societal struggle would also have to 
take place on campus. 
Said’s experience was echoed by many others. In 1952, a year before Said started his 
undergraduate education at Princeton, John Crowe Ransom, who had been the standard-
bearer of the New Criticism up until then, felt that the movement had become bogged 
down and its members had gradually become “cold-blooded critics of poetry working away 
at what sometimes appear to be the merest exercises with words” (1952, p. 159). The New 
Criticism was in decline, a development that was further attested in 1956 by Murray 
Krieger who wrote one of the first critical monographs on the movement. Krieger 
remarked that although the New Criticism had offered many fresh and energetic 
theoretical insights to the study of literature and was to be given credit for successfully 
making its argument about the specificity of literature and for reintroducing criticism to 
U.S. literary departments, by the time of his book’s publication the movement had reached 
a dead end. According to him, the New Criticism had played its role and, even though 
internal critical debates between its self-identified members had always been a 
characteristic of the movement, it was now plagued by too many inherent contradictions 
and critical dogmas. “Time was running out on its vitality,” Krieger believed, “and its little 
life was soon to be rounded with a sleep” (Krieger, 1963, p. vii). He argued that the original 
strength of the New Criticism was that, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, it had been an 
unsystematic and non-purist form of literary criticism without a defined program (Krieger, 
1963, pp. 5-6). This meant that while many practitioners significantly differed from each 
                                               
7 While Said’s testimony is undoubtedly true for himself, it is probably an exaggeration on his part to say that 
all of his fellow students felt the student passivity propagated by the literary program to be problematic. Aware 
of their unique opportunity provided by the G. I. Bill, many veterans were of good will and tolerated many 
ordeals, such as crowded classrooms, inadequate student accommodations and overworked and understaffed 
faculty (Olson, 1973, p. 596). Moreover, many of these veteran students wanted to get on with their war-
interrupted lives and were rather indifferent to social and political issues, let alone academic or societal change 
(Leitch, 2010, p. 130). Said’s experience is probably more representative of that of nonveteran than veteran 
students. 
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other, they could nevertheless all be grouped under the same New Critical banner because 
they all asserted the unique value of literature (Culler, 1988, p. 10). But from the mid-
1940s New Critics had begun to codify their tenets and solidify their theoretical 
assumptions. While this is a common evolution for schools of criticism when they 
gradually become institutionalized and is not problematic as such, the problem with the 
New Criticism was that it did so ex negativo, in terms and criteria defined by its scholarly 
opposition that was in control of the literature departments and professed a contextualized 
approach to literature that did not pay attention to questions of aesthetics and form (Graff, 
1987, p. 145). Though this led to the successful institutionalization of the New Criticism 
in American universities, secondary schools and colleges, the eventual drawback was that 
the movement had evolved from an open-ended and critical method of reading to a closed-
off theoretical orthodoxy that sought to formulate ‘grammars’ (Burke) and purify itself of 
the ‘heresies’ (Brooks) and ‘fallacies’ (Wimsatt and Beardsley) of literary criticism. The 
result was that by the 1950s, the New Criticism had gradually turned into a systematic 
theory and methodology that aimed to be applicable to any and all works of literature by 
whomsoever. But therefore, unintentionally no doubt, the movement lost its critical edge 
(Graff, 1987, p. 161). “By about 1957”, Frank Lentricchia sums up the period, “the 
moribund condition of the New Criticism and the literary needs it left unfulfilled placed 
us in a critical void” (1980, p. 4). That void was caused by the fact that the New Criticism 
had become the hegemonic form of literary criticism, but it was no longer new nor critical. 
Said’s experience is significant to that of a larger generation of young American literary 
critics who graduated at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s and who were in search of 
vital alternatives to the ‘wan’ New Criticism of the time (see Leitch, 2010, p. 130). It would 
not be long until they would find these alternative modes of reading in European theories 
of phenomenology and existentialism. They would then transpose them to their particular 
context and develop a specific American model of existential phenomenology that 
gradually started to contest the hegemony of the New Criticism. While some critics 
resolutely dismissed the New Critical model of reading, Said was part of a different group 
of critics of consciousness that sought to synthesize the New Criticism with existential 
phenomenology and develop an approach to literary criticism that was aimed both at the 
comprehension of an experience and at the evaluation and criticism of form (see Lawall, 
1968, p. 273; Leitch, 2010, p. 138).  
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In order to understand Said’s experience of the New Criticism as a “wan formalism” and 
his subsequent intellectual engagement with the movement in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography (1966), in this chapter I will discuss the institutional rise of the New 
Criticism and its evolution into what many consider to be a ‘critical orthodoxy’. My 
account of the history of literary criticism in the U.S. from the 1930s to the 1960s does 
not consider such critical schools or movements as the ‘Chicago School of criticism’ and 
its Neo-Aristotelian model of rhetorical reading associated with Ronald S. Crane (1951), 
the group known as the ‘New York Intellectuals’ centered around Lionel Trilling and their 
non-academic form of criticism that fuses radical politics with a focus on avant-garde 
writings (see Webster, 1979, pp. 209-292), the ‘myth criticism’ of the Canadian critic 
Northrop Frye (Frye, 1957; see Lentricchia, 1980, pp. 3-26), psychoanalytical or 
philological literary criticism, or the works of critics not easily associated with a particular 
school or method such as Wayne C. Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961) and Meyer H. 
Abrams The Mirror and the Lamp (1953), because these schools, movements and thinkers 
did not achieve the same kind of institutional weight as the New Criticism that by 1950 
“was firmly established in the centers of academic power and influence” (Webster, 1979, 
p. 113). When Said was enrolled, the movement had reached the height of its institutional 
hegemony and the very term ‘New Criticism’, Terence Hawkes writes, “was criticism 
itself” (2003, p. 126). 
My discussion therefore singles out the New Criticism as the most authoritative 
approach to criticism in the period in which Said wrote his doctoral dissertation on the 
letters and short fiction of Joseph Conrad. In the first sections of this chapter I will follow 
Said’s line of thought and discuss the evolution of the New Criticism from the 1930s to 
the 1950s. In doing so, I will at the same time discuss the institutional and cultural context 
of the New Criticism and closely read a number of pivotal texts to distill the movement’s 
theoretical positions. The guiding questions that help me on my way are: what was the 
New Criticism originally? How did the movement develop in such a way that Said thought 
it necessary to reinvigorate and rehumanize its conceptualization of literature? What was 
his overall critique of the New Criticism and what was the model of criticism that he 
proposed? As we answer these questions, we gradually begin to see how the New Criticism 
evolved from a worldly humanist formalism in the postwar years to a dehumanized, 
autonomous textual practice in the postwar period. It also allows us to understand Said’s 
critical engagement with the New Criticism as a hegemonic institutional discourse and his 
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attempts to rehumanize the literary experience, reconnect it with the world and 
reinvigorate its model literary criticism in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography 
(1966), by drawing on the prewar phase of the New Criticism and fusing it with methods 
derived from French existential phenomenology – which is the focus of the second chapter. 
In the last section of this chapter, I will analyze Said’s model of reading and 
conceptualization of literature in his revised doctoral dissertation and focus more closely 
on his critical relation to the New Criticism in general and to two texts that codified the 
postwar doctrines of the movement in particular, namely, Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “The 
Intentional Fallacy” (1946) and “The Affective Fallacy” (1949). I will be discussing these 
texts to nuance and correct the dominant image of the New Criticism as an approach that 
is uninterested in all forms of biographical evidence and intentionality. 
To be clear from the outset, though I have labeled Said’s approach ‘an ode to the 
fallacies’, his reading of Conrad’s letters and short fiction does not reject the formalist 
approach of the New Criticism completely but its postwar formalist orthodoxy and the 
concomitant suppression of intentional and affective reasoning in literary criticism – and, 
equally important, the implications of that suppression in thinking about human agency. 
As a result, Said’s reading still foregrounds literary form but, in what I argue to be a turn 
to the prewar phase of the New Criticism, it reconceptualizes that form as involved in 
social history and the author’s lived experience and thereby prefigures the call to political 
history and a broad, humanist and historical form of textuality in Beginnings (1975a) and 
Orientalism (1978). As I discuss Said’s treatment of Conrad, it will become clear that the 
works Harry Levin and R.P. Blackmur are formative on his critical practice. Said’s critical 
engagement with Levin and, most notably, with Blackmur would facilitate his combination 
techniques of the New Criticism with methods derived from existential phenomenology. 
In the course of this chapter, I will therefore also be comparing the New Criticism to 
existential phenomenology and highlighting concrete points where both approaches to 
literature show themselves compatible. But to begin all of this we need to go back to the 
origins of the New Criticism and its gradual march to institutional dominance. 
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1.2 The Origins of the New Criticism: Close(d) Reading? 
To combat the obstinate idea that the New Criticism was an apolitical movement from its 
very beginnings, it is important to locate the New Criticism both historically and 
geographically.8 The origins of the New Criticism lie in the Deep South of the U.S. and 
are closely related to the Southern Agrarian Movement and its cultural critique of 
industrial capitalism and bourgeois society of the 1920s and 1930s. The Southern 
Agrarians were a conservative group of mostly right-wing scholars, writers and essayists 
centered around Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, who heavily opposed the 
rapid urbanization, scientification and industrialization of the U.S. in general and the 
Southern U.S. in particular. Its members included John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate and 
Robert Penn Warren, who would all later be responsible for organizing the New Criticism 
as a movement (Jancovich, 1993, p. x).  
In the group’s manifesto I’ll Take My Stand (Davidson et al., 2006), originally published 
in 1930, the Southern Agrarians pleaded for an Agrarian way of life in contrast to an 
industrial one and raised the traditional pre-capitalist values of the American South such 
as its agrarianism, religiosity, conservatism and paternalism as a bulwark against the 
mounting pressures of industrial capitalism and the commercial North (Jancovich, 1993, 
p. 12; Shapiro, 1972, pp. 75-76). Although the South, with its history of plantations and 
slavery, had been more deeply entangled with the rise of a capitalist world market than 
the authors of the Agrarian manifesto would have us believe, it was not a capitalist society. 
What made the South distinctly different from capitalist societies was its tradition of 
paternalism, associated with the slaveholder and planter classes, that organized human 
relations according to a pre-capitalist conceptualization of family (Genovese, 1971, p. 16). 
In a fashion that was to an extent similar to certain Marxist ideas, Southern society was 
thought of as an ensemble of organic relations between members “which were opposed to 
the acquisitive individualism associated with the capitalist market” (Jancovich, 1993, p. 
13). Southern paternalism went hand in hand with a populist, anti-bourgeois defense of 
                                               
8 Most attempts to contextualize the movement have done so by deducing that context from the theoretical 
positions of its identified members. This has led critics to believe that the movement was originally uninterested 
in history, society and politics. Though there are earlier attempts at contextualizing the New Criticism (most 
notably Fekete, 1977, pp. 61-84), the work of Mark Jancovich (1993) is an exception and clearly shows how the 
cultural politics of the New Criticism were deeply implicated within the right-wing political movement of 
Agrarianism. In my discussion of the historical context of the New Criticism I am greatly indebted to his work. 
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individual property that was opposed to the individualist bourgeois idea of property 
associated with the wage relation of capitalism. Moreover, entrenched within that 
tradition of paternalism was a staunch belief in self-sufficiency as a way of achieving 
independence from capitalist wage relations. This meant that in the South the small 
communities of subsistence farmers were regarded to be spiritually superior to the 
industrialized estates of cash crop farmers (Culler, 1988, p. 9). The Southern Agrarians 
tapped into this idea to encourage farmers to free themselves from the increasing pressures 
of capitalist relations of production (Jancovich, 1993, p. 13). 
But Southern farmers had other concerns on their mind. Following the devastation of 
cotton crops by boll weevils from the 1910s onwards, the first wave of the Great Migration 
saw millions of African Americans leave the South for Northern and Midwestern cities in 
the period from the 1910s to the 1930s. They did not only flee from the lack of social and 
economic opportunities but also from intense segregation and an increase in racially 
motivated murder, lynchings and violence in the former slave-owning Confederate States 
of America (Tolnay, 2003, p. 215). In the 1930s, the Southern economy was dealt 
additional blows by the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl. While this caused a 
temporary decline in the number of African Americans migrating North due to a 
nationwide drop in labor demand caused by the recession, hundreds of thousands of 
African American migrants still crossed the Mason-Dixon Line in search for better living 
conditions in the industrialized cities in the North, and below that line millions of workers 
were left unemployed, homeless and hungry. Given this precarious economic situation, 
self-sufficiency for Southerners, then, seemed less than a possibility and more like a noble 
dream. It can hardly come as a surprise that the Southern Agrarians were unable to win 
support for their economic program and that by the early 1940s the Agrarian movement 
was as good as dead (Jancovich, 1993, p. 13). It lasted until 1945 when John Crowe 
Ransom, the unofficial leader of the movement, delivered the coup de grâce by expressing 
his disbelief in the possibility of ever founding an anti-capitalist Agrarian society in the 
U.S. (1945, p. 686). 
Although Southern Agrarianism failed on a political level, the movement was highly 
influential on a cultural level. Its cultural critique caught on and would eventually result 
in the institutionalization and integration of the New Criticism in the American academy 
during the 1930s and 1940s, when, in what almost seemed to be a concerted move, many 
Southern New Critics decided to move to Northern states (Jancovich, 1993, pp. 13-14). 
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Ransom was the first to migrate North, swapping Vanderbilt University for Kenyon 
College, Ohio, in 1937. He was followed by René Wellek,9 who had previously been a tutor 
at Princeton and Smith College, Massachusetts, and emigrated to the U.S. to be appointed 
at the University of Iowa in 1939. That same year, Allen Tate made the move from the 
University of North Carolina to Princeton where he became a fellow in the Creative 
Writing program. A year later, in 1940, Tate arranged for R.P. Blackmur to take over his 
place at Princeton, Austin Warren joined the faculty at Iowa and William K. Wimsatt Jr. 
was appointed in Yale University. At the heyday of the New Criticism in the end of the 
1940s, Wellek (1946), Brooks (1947) and Robert Penn Warren (1950) joined Wimsatt at 
the literary faculty and together they would turn Yale into the most important center of 
New Critical reformation (Culler, 1988, p. 11; Graff, 1987, p. 153).  
The arrival of the New Critics in Northern universities was a major game changer for 
American literary studies. Although the New Criticism was strictly speaking an academic 
movement, its cultural politics were deeply entrenched in those of Southern Agrarianism. 
This meant that, unsurprisingly, the New Criticism defined itself in terms that were 
reminiscent of the Agrarian movement and diametrically opposed to the dominant cultural 
hegemony: it was anti-bourgeois and anti-scientific (Jancovich, 1993, p. 14; Thompson, 
1971, p. 37). We might even better understand this oppositional self-definition when we 
take into account that, though many New Critics such as Ransom, Tate and Penn Warren 
came from families that were financially well-off and had enjoyed a decent amount of social 
and cultural capital, most of them were outsiders to the academy with little training in the 
kind of philological research that was de rigueur in the U.S. literary departments at the 
time (Jancovich, 1993, pp. 144-145). While most of them had taken advanced degrees, they 
lacked academic standing: Tate had been the recipient of only a B.A., Burke had dropped 
out of college and Blackmur, having been expelled from high school, was an autodidact 
who never received a college degree at all (see Fitzgerald, 1985, pp. 5-6; Fraser, 2010, p. 
xxxv; Graff, 1987, pp. 152-153; Vrijders, 2013, p. 5). As Gerald Graff points out, these 
                                               
9 Wellek was born in Vienna, studied philology at the Charles University in Prague, and was therefore never a 
member of the Southern Agrarian Movement. However, as a result of writing Theory of Literature (1949) with 
his New Critical colleague at Iowa, Austin Warren, his name has over the years been connected to the New 
Criticism as movement (see Searle, 2005, p. 692), in spite of Wellek working closer in the philological tradition 
of his contemporary Erich Auerbach and being foundational for the discipline of comparative literature in the 
U.S.. 
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New Critics were only able to gain a foothold at Northern universities on account of the 
strength of their literary writing rather than their scholarly qualifications (Graff, 1987, p. 
153). 
The result was that when they made the move to Northern universities, colleges and 
research institutions, these Southern New Critics felt alienated and out of place. It might 
be remembered that in the 1940s – and even in the 1950s and 1960s – many senior faculty 
members looked down upon their new colleagues as unqualified, amateur intruders in their 
departments and gave them a hostile welcome (Fraser, 2010, pp. 188-189; McDonald, 
2007, p. 13). Many academic superiors warned their students to keep away from these New 
Critical ‘charlatans’, as they saw them, and some, at Princeton, Harvard and Columbia – 
precisely those universities where Said would make his career – went even further and 
kept their new colleagues from teaching graduate courses altogether (Graff, 1987, pp. 153-
155). But instead of giving in to these institutional pressures and downright bullying, the 
New Critics again took their stand. Unhappy with the academic climate, they sought to 
redefine the politics of literary study within the American academy (Culler, 1988, p. 10; 
Jancovich, 1993, p. 12). What happened, according to Mark Jancovich, was an attempt by 
the New Critics “to redefine the literary institution and its claim to professional status” 
that resulted in “a struggle to displace the existing modes of scholarship with an 
oppositional set of professional criteria” (1993, p. 144). In short, at the beginning of the 
1940s the American university was at war, so to speak. The belligerents were, on the one 
side, the emergent self-styled ‘New’ Critics who sought to uproot the academy and liberate 
literature from the authoritative grip of its professional establishment and, on the other 
side, the dominant class of established scholars – or ‘old’ scholars, as some would call them 
(Graff, 1987, p. 193) – that wanted to uphold the existing modes of scholarship.  
Those existing modes of scholarship were characterized by a highly professionalized 
and elitist approach to philology that combined a penchant for positivistic facts – such as 
source studies, authors’ biographies and historical circumstances – with an awe-inspiring, 
almost pedantic, mastery of intellectual history, classics, historical linguistics and 
philosophy (Culler, 1988, pp. 4-5). This meant that when the Southern New Critics arrived 
at Northern U.S. literary departments, these departments were populated by two kinds of 
faculty. On the one hand there were highly specialized professors who practiced a 
positivistic form of facts-based research in the humanities and a German-style philological 
approach to the investigation of modern literature. On the other hand, there were the so-
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called ‘generalists’ who advocated the humanist ideals of liberal arts and college education 
and, instead of the narrowly specialized type of research of their colleagues, promoted the 
study of general culture and valued appreciation of literature over research, and values 
over facts (Graff, 1987, pp. 55-56). Although these two strands of scholarship in significant 
ways differed from each other, they were seen as a unified front of professional teachers 
against which the New Critics reacted. Ransom, for instance, attacked these professional 
teachers of literature for being, what he had earlier described as “learned but not critical” 
(1937, p. 587). He believed that in their factual knowledge of literature and erudition of 
philosophy they had come to resemble philosophers or scholars who confused literary with 
non-literary discourse and had gradually drifted away from their core business of literary 
criticism (Ransom, 1937, p. 587). Indeed, prior to the institutionalization of the New 
Criticism, the majority of American literary scholars were mainly concerned with 
contextualizing literature, not so much with judging the aesthetic qualities of a literary 
work or distinguishing between politically partisan and disinterested interpretations 
(Graff, 1987, p. 132).10 Although there had been a heightened sense of political awareness 
during and after World War I, what was lacking in the American university at the advent 
of the 1940s was criticism (Culler, 1988, pp. 5-6). The New Critics would attempt to fill 
this gap and propagate the idea of a literary department in which the critical study of 
literature for its own sake had its proper place (Fekete, 1977, p. 86). In Ransom’s view, 
there was an overemphasis on the historical in literary studies and now it was due time for 
a shift to the critical and for “the students of the future . . . to study literature, and not 
merely about literature” (Ransom, 1937, p. 588). To him, this meant that the students of 
the future must finally be permitted to pay close attention to the literary work. 
The New Criticism has come to be associated with the method of ‘close reading’, a 
detailed and at times almost analytic interpretation of literary works.11 Close reading is a 
call to study a particular poem or piece of prose as closely as possible (Eagleton, 2008, p. 
38). As a reaction against the dominant contextualizing approaches to literature and 
                                               
10 For a less cursive overview of the then dominant movements in the U.S. literary departments, see Gerald 
Graff’s institutional history (1987, pp. 121-144). 
11 It is worth noting that ‘literature’ and ‘literary works’ in the eyes of the New Critics slides over into ‘poetry’. 
I am on firm ground with Terry Eagleton who argues that “literary theories . . . unconsciously ‘foreground’ a 
particular literary genre, and derive their general pronouncements from this; it would be interesting to trace this 
process through the history of literary theory” (2008, p. 44). In the case of the New Criticism and its isolating 
approach to literature, the coincidence of ‘literature’ with ‘poetry’ is significant, as will become clear later, because 
“poetry is of all literary genres the one most apparently sealed from history” (Eagleton, 2008, p. 44). 
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literary history, the term ‘close’ implies that these earlier approaches read literature from 
too far a distance and that they did not pay enough attention to the specificity of literature 
as a medium. The New Critics believed that these approaches trivialized literature because 
they reduced literary texts to being mere reflections of external factors such as 
biographical facts, historical details or metaphysical speculations (Eagleton, 2008, p. 41). 
In opposition to what Said in his autobiography called “conventional history” (1999, p. 
289) the emergent New Criticism argued that the literary work had to be isolated from its 
cultural, literary and historical contexts and read as an object in itself (Eagleton, 2008, p. 
37). New Critics, then, treated literary works as individual aesthetic objects of study in 
their own right rather than as documents from which the author’s antecedent intentions, 
the work’s social and historical conditions or its subsequent effects on society could be 
deduced (Culler, 1988, p. 10; Wellek, 1978b, p. 620). 
It is important to stress that to the founding generation of New Critics like Ransom, 
Tate, Penn Warren and Brooks12 isolating a literary work was but a necessary first step 
to define an object of study (literature) needed to form a coherent body of knowledge 
(literary criticism). 13  To them, reading literature in isolation did not mean that they 
considered literature to be an autonomous practice that was severed from society (compare 
de Man, 1971b, pp. 20-21). On the contrary, they argued that it was precisely a 
characteristic of good literary works to be organically tied to the social and cultural life 
from which they originated. They believed that literature had important moral and social 
functions in society and regarded literary criticism to be a form of socio-cultural criticism. 
Their point was that these moral and social functions were apparent in literary works as 
they had become qualities of the text’s internal unified formal structure which had to be 
                                               
12 While not an original member of the Southern Agrarian movement, Brooks had close ties with its founding 
members. He had studied at Vanderbilt with Ransom and Tate in the 1920s and became good friends with Penn 
Warren during a stay at Oxford in the 1930s where they encountered the arch-Practical Critic I.A. Richards. 
While this does not mean that he argued as forcefully on behalf of the conservative Southern traditions as 
Ransom, Tate and Penn Warren, he did admit reading the Southern Agrarian manifesto “over and over” and 
trying “to assimilate the whole position, philosophical and political” (Brooks quoted in Leitch et al., 2001a, p. 
1350). 
13 The New Criticism successfully established the assumption, which still holds sway in literary departments, 
that ‘good’ or ‘innovative’ literary criticism should not only produce new and richer interpretations of particular 
literary works but also more compelling ones (Culler, 2007, p. 226). A historical result of this assumption was 
that interpretations of literary works were considered to be a new kind of knowledge that, unlike previous 
historical or philological investigations, was not only positive but also rhetorical (Thompson, 1971, p. 37). 
Literary criticism produces a kind of knowledge that is a form of writing in itself, not just something that is 
written up. As such, Jonathan Culler stresses that the result of interpretive criticism – just like literature 
according to the New Critics – is not something that can be summed up or paraphrased, but a text that tries to 
render explicit the poetic structure that is deeply woven in a particular literary work (2007, p. 226). 
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studied by the critic (Graff, 1987, p. 148). To do so, the critic had to bracket both his- or 
herself and the text off from the world by rigorously focusing on the formalist, textual 
aspects of a literary work, and only on these aspects. In a similar vein to the Southern 
farmers who were encouraged by the paternalist idea of self-sufficiency to become 
independent, they argued that the literary text had to become a self-sufficient object of 
study that could speak for itself (Culler, 1988, p. 9).  
The New Criticism therefore proposed an anti-reductionist and evaluative approach to 
literature in which literature should again be studied as literature proper and not as a 
mirror of external, non-literary phenomena. Readings that focused on these external 
phenomena were certainly interesting and even “invaluable in preparing for the proper 
reading of a poem”, Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren wrote in a programmatic 
essay, but they ultimately “do not constitute that reading” (1937, p. 438). That ultimate 
reading is a close reading which attentively examines the text’s formal, linguistic aspects 
in close relation to its meaning. 14  A New Critical reading would then proceed to 
foreground a pattern of formal and textual features that are indicative of the ambiguity 
and dissonance in the individual literary work but, if that literary work was successful, 
would ultimately dissolve in a formal unity or consonance characteristic of a living 
organism (Graff, 1979, p. 140; Wellek, 1978b). 
Scholars of the New Critical movement agree that the concentration on the textual – 
one could speak of a ‘textual turn’ – was its specific innovation in the American academic 
study of literature (Cain, 1982; Jancovich, 1993, p. 138). Indeed, New Critics paid careful 
attention to the content, form and structure of a literary work and believed that the 
specificity of literature – or what they labeled “the poetic principle” (Wimsatt & Brooks, 
1957, p. x) – was something that could not be paraphrased or expressed in any other 
language than that of the text itself (Eagleton, 2008, pp. 40-41). According to Brooks, 
literature is so subtle and rich a medium that its message cannot be paraphrased, translated 
or reduced into something else:  
                                               
14 In spite of what is often believed, the New Criticism did not propagate the idea that a particular literary work 
could have only one, definitive meaning waiting to be unearthed and explained by the critic (Jancovich, 1993, p. 
144). On the contrary, New Critics like Tate believed that it was reductive to impose a single reading upon a 
text and were intensely and sincerely interested in the linguistic processes that generated meaning (see 1952). 
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the poem . . . is the sole linguistic vehicle which conveys the thing communicated 
accurately. In fact, if we are to speak correctly, the poem itself is the only medium 
that communicates the particular ‘what’ that is communicated. (Brooks, 1947c, p. 60) 
When it comes to studying literature, the medium is the message; the meaning of a literary 
text was coterminous with its poetic structure, which should therefore be the focus of 
literary criticism.  
Contrary to what opponents of the New Criticism would have us believe (see Wellek, 
1978b), the work of Brooks is a sign that New Critics were in fact interested in literature’s 
relation to society. Drawing upon the cultural critique of the Southern Agrarian 
movement, Brooks argued that modern society was sick. In his view, industrial capitalism 
had led to an increasing scientification and rationalization of society that defined 
individuals as human resources in a manufacturing process of labor-products from which 
these individuals had increasingly become estranged (Jancovich, 1993, p. 19). Moreover, 
individuals had also become alienated from each other and this had caused society to lose 
its sense of community (Jancovich, 1993, p. 20). Unsurprisingly, modern industrial 
capitalist society had to emulate the society of the old American South, which was 
distinctly less industrialized in the 1930s and the 1940s and had still been able to retain 
that sense of community – though at the price of excluding a substantial part of the 
population on ethnic grounds (see Simpson, 1976, p. 62). Fortunately, Brooks believed that 
there was a cure: in order to help society restore its lost sense of community, its members 
needed to read literature (Jancovich, 1993, pp. 19-20). The underlying idea was that 
literature could be a medicine for society, because reading literature critically would allow 
readers to reestablish a connection between themselves and others.15 Literary works were 
said to provide a precise, yet intuitive, non-conceptual kind of knowledge that was 
diametrically opposed to the conceptual knowledge of science and was the result of the 
                                               
15 This idea echoes that of the so-called ‘Great Books Courses’, originally initiated at Columbia by John Erskine 
in 1901, then gradually established in numerous colleges across the U.S. and now even in honors programs or 
lifelong learning programs worldwide. The belief of these courses is that reading so-called literary masterpieces 
in one week and then criticizing them one evening in group, instead of attending lectures by some authoritative 
literary scholar about them or rigorously studying the critical literature on that particular literary masterpiece 
or the oeuvre of its author for weeks on end, would contribute to a general education of readers and counteract 
the individualizing and alienating forces of scientific positivism and vocationalism (see Graff, 1987, pp. 133-135). 
The result of such courses seems to be that they invite readers to talk about literature without having to reckon 
with dense archives of scholarship and thus, in short, produce amateur critics. These ideas still hold sway in 
popular literary culture and have found additional, contemporary expression in social media and (televised) book 
clubs, which have turned the once solitary and print-based experience increasingly more into an exuberantly 
commercialized social activity enjoyed as much on the screen and on the page (see Collins, 2010).  
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unique language in which literary discourse is formulated (Thompson, 1971, p. 38). This 
non-conceptual knowledge meant that literature provided a deeper and, the suggestion 
seems to be, more truthful insight in human experiences than science could offer (see also 
Tate, 1955a, p. 34).  
Brooks argued that all Western poetry from early modernity to the present makes use 
of a constant interplay between seemingly opposite, irreconcilable metaphors that are in 
fact harmoniously complementary (1947b, p. 2). Successful poems – like those of William 
Wordsworth, for instance – were able to achieve a unity of opposites and reconcile the 
irreconcilable: Wordsworth’s poems show that “the common was really uncommon, the 
prosaic was really poetic” or that “it is that kind of calm and that kind of excitement, and 
the states may well occur together” (Brooks, 1947b, pp. 4, 6). Paradoxes like these inform 
the structure of a work, are the essence of not only Wordsworth’s but of all good poetry 
(Thompson, 1971, pp. 51-52) and provide it with a truth distinctly different from science: 
there is a sense in which paradox is the language appropriate and inevitable to 
poetry. It is the scientist whose truth requires a language purged of every trace of 
paradox; apparently the truth which the poet utters can be approached only in terms 
of paradox. (Brooks, 1947b, p. 1) 
New Critics like Brooks believed that, unlike science, literature does not rationalize, 
compartmentalize and pin down a human situation, but understands this situation in its 
wholeness – in all its orderly, disorderly and seemingly chaotic aspects – and achieves this 
through its particular use of metaphorical language. Literature is able to examine the 
complexity of human experience, to move from one end of things to another, and to 
constantly let its reader shift his or her perspective on things. “The tendency of science is 
necessarily to stabilize terms, to freeze them into strict denotations”, Brooks goes on to 
clarify the difference, “the poet’s tendency is by contrast disruptive. The terms are 
continually modifying each other, and thus violating their dictionary meanings” (1947b, 
p. 6). This disruptive tendency, a quality attributed to its aesthetics, makes literature a 
medium of cultural criticism par excellence that has the power to defamiliarize its readers 
by offering new and opposite perspectives on human situations, which they have grown to 
take for granted. Reading literature as literature – and not as, say, direct scientific 
communication – does not offer conceptual knowledge about experience reached by logical 
methods but a controlled experience in progress that is dramatic, rather than static, and 
therefore resists being paraphrased (Graff, 1970, pp. xi-xii; 1979, pp. 139-143). In a process 
 49 
that is quite similar to the existential phenomenological idea of literary criticism as an act 
of comprehension, Brooks argued that this controlled experience cannot be explained by 
logic, but has to be experienced first-handedly by the reader during the reading process 
(1947d, pp. 155-156). Through a reader’s experiencing of a controlled experience, then, 
literature could be disruptive and alleviate the alienation of modern society. 
The difference between Brooks’s New Critical conceptualization of experience in 
literature and the existential phenomenological conceptualization is that the New Critics 
understand this human experience as impersonal, collective and universal, whereas their 
existential phenomenological counterparts consider it to be a personal, idiosyncratic and 
concrete (Graff, 1979, pp. 139-140). According to the New Criticism, from reading a poem 
we cannot simply deduce a poet’s intentions or his or her personal experience without 
breaking up the unifying experience of the poem; it asserts, to refer to Brooks’s use of 
Yeats’s famous line of poetry, that we cannot separate the dancer from the dance without 
waiting until the dance has been completed or stopping it (Brooks, 1947d, pp. 155-156). 
Poetry fuses the poet to the poem, so to speak, and it is this dramatized experience in 
progress of the poem that is the focus of criticism and that has to be understood intuitively. 
According to existential phenomenology, however, from reading a poem we can intuitively 
grasp or comprehend but never obtain positivistic knowledge about the maker’s personal 
experience; it asserts that we can separate the poet from the poem and come to understand 
what moves this poet to write this particular poem in the first place, without breaking up 
that poem. By briefly comparing the New Critical approach to literature to that of 
existential phenomenology, which I will discuss at length in the next chapter, I mean to 
illustrate that the New Criticism does not run counter with existential phenomenology. 
In fact, both approaches share fairly similar goals and are to a considerable extent 
compatible (Graff, 1979, p. 136). Both study literature as literature proper, and posit that 
literature is experience and not conceptual knowledge. This compatibility would facilitate 
the attempts of Said and his fellow avant-gardist critics to combine elements of the New 
Criticism with elements from existential phenomenology so as to develop a specific 
American model of phenomenology that pays distinctly more attention to form than its 
European counterpart.  
From my description of the origins and cultural politics of the New Criticism, it has 
become clear that contrary to the obstinate view of the New Criticism as an apolitical, 
ahistorical and disinterested approach to literary criticism, the founding generation of 
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New Critics was very much interested in politics, history and ideology.16 Although they 
primarily focused on the formalist, textual aspects of literary works, they certainly did not 
wish away the historical context and – perhaps not always explicitly present in their 
writings – attempted to perform literary criticism as a means of airing larger cultural and 
political concerns. In fact, it is precisely a condition of the institutionalization of the 
movement that the New Criticism gradually began to cut its ties with social and cultural 
criticism and eventually, as Gerald Graff argues, “the very term ‘New Critical’ would 
become synonymous with the practice of explicating texts in a vacuum. This is what it 
became in institutional practice, but decidedly not what it was for the founding generation” 
(1987, p. 146). Now that we have established what the New Criticism was originally, it’s 
time to look at how it developed in its institutional practice and begin seeing why Said 
thought it necessary to reinvigorate its method.  
                                               
16 Precisely one of the factors that contributed to the institutional success of the New Criticism was that, although 
it was a right-wing conservative ideology and some of its members unabashedly pronounced themselves to be 
anti-Marxist (Leitch, 2010, p. 18), during the Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s it was welcomed by many left-
wing intellectuals who were unable to openly adhere to Marxist theories of literature. The New Criticism offered 
them an opportunity to criticize capitalist society and its bourgeois ideology without the risk of being accused of 
Soviet sympathies (Jancovich, 1993, p. 18). 
 51 
1.3 Toward a New Critical Orthodoxy 
In 1943, Brooks lamented that “the New Critics have next to no influence in the 
universities” (1943, p. 59). Whether he was right in judging the academic situation of the 
New Criticism or not (compare Culler, 1988, p. 11), the final years of World War II and, 
to a larger extent, the immediate postwar years, saw many attempts by New Critics to 
gain more influence in the universities by professionalizing the New Criticism and turning 
implicit methodological assumptions into explicit theoretical principles. Two seminal 
essays – the “Intentional Fallacy” (1946) and the “Affective Fallacy” (1949) – coauthored 
by William K. Wimsatt Jr. and Monroe Beardsley in the latter part of the 1940s did just 
that. I’d like to single out these essays and elaborate on the ideas propounded by their 
authors to highlight a crucial difference between the original, emergent version of the New 
Criticism of the late thirties and forties and the institutionalized, dominant version of the 
postwar years. In addition, singling out these essays allows us to comprehend Said’s 
experience as a student at Princeton and Harvard and to see more clearly how the New 
Criticism evolved in the way it did: how it developed from an open-ended, critical and 
socially committed formalism into an increasingly closed-off theory and self-centered 
formalist orthodoxy that severed all ties with society and politics. 
As card carrying New Critics, Wimsatt and Beardsley were mainly concerned with 
determining the specificity of literature and critical ways to evaluate it. Their essays set 
up rules and defined good practices that would eventually lead to the institutional 
establishment of a formalist approach to literary criticism that strove to be as objective as 
possible. Neither of the two essays is therefore wholly original, but each codifies a crucial 
tenet of the New Critical orthodoxy (Leitch et al., 2001b, p. 1371). The essays are 
‘negatives’ in which the authors react against prevalent approaches to literary criticism 
and in which they propound a theory of verbal meaning that argues that the meaning of a 
particular literary work arises from the harmonious tension and union of its verbal content 
and poetic structure (Wimsatt, 1954b, pp. 201-203). Because the specific meaning of 
literature is said to lie in this principle of unity, in the harmonic interrelation between what 
is being said and how it is being said, the message of a particular literary work can only be 
expressed by the work’s exact same verbal content and poetic structure.  
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s theory of verbal meaning at first sight can hardly strike us as 
novel or strange and seems to resemble Brooks’s theory of the unique knowledge of 
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literature and the problem of paraphrase, which I have outlined above. The difference is 
that Brooks’s conceptualization of poetic structure does not equate ‘form’ in the 
conventional sense in which we think of form as an envelope containing a content (1947a, 
p. 159). To him, poetic structure means “a structure of meanings, evaluations and 
interpretations” and the informing principle of unity “seems to be one of balancing and 
harmonizing connotations, attitudes, and meanings” (Brooks, 1947a, p. 159). He argues 
that criticism should therefore transcend the boundaries of narrow formalism and 
textuality into more broader, humanist directions and should include metaphysical and 
psychological elements besides linguistic and rhetorical ones. Wimsatt and Beardsley, on 
the other hand, conceptualize ‘form’ according to the metaphor of the envelope: they 
believe that a text’s poetic structure is the envelope in which all its verbal content is 
contained and that, consequently, all information which is vital to the interpretation of a 
literary text is verbal or linguistic and therefore present in the text itself. To find that 
information, a literary critic needs to discover the principle of unity by centering his or 
her analysis on the text itself (Leitch et al., 2001b, pp. 1371-1372). The reading which 
Wimsatt and Beardsley propose is a more narrowly formalist reading, which, I believe, is 
more forcefully than that of their predecessors an emancipatory reading in which the 
literary text could speak for itself. But in order for the text to do so, it first had to be 
wrested away from what were up until then the two most authoritative figures in the 
history of literary criticism: the author and the reader (Eagleton, 2008, p. 41). 
In their first essay, “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946), Wimsatt and Beardsley targeted 
the author by pleading against the importance of authorial intention in literary criticism 
and openly advocating literary autonomy. The essay is a position paper against an 
intentionalist approach to literary criticism, which starts from the idea that an author’s 
intention or design precedes a literary work, causes it to come into being and retains final 
authority over its meaning. Contrary to this idea, Wimsatt and Beardsley defined 
literature as impersonal art (Leitch et al., 2001b, p. 1372). They believed that a literary 
work “is detached from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to 
intend about it or control it” (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946, p. 470). Literature, in their view, 
is a public utterance embodied in language. This means that no individual, neither the 
author nor the critic, can ever have final control over its meaning. In Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s view, a literary text is made up of language and should therefore be read as 
language. The essay’s authors therefore insist that literary criticism is very similar to 
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linguistics and that literary critics should dismiss all external – or contextual – evidence 
and study the literary text as “linguistic fact” (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946, p. 477). If the 
words on the page weren’t the only objects worthy of the New Critic’s attention, then at 
least they were the only decisive elements on which a critical interpretation of a text could 
be based. Wimsatt and Beardsley’s theory of verbal meaning argues that a text’s meaning 
should be reconstructed through the use of ‘internal’, linguistic evidence such as a text’s 
organization of words, rhythm, meter, coherence, emphasis, diction and structure. The 
experience that incited the author to write a particular poem or novel is not considered to 
be significant for its interpretation, nor is it deemed relevant to read the literary work in 
comparison with or against the backdrop of other literary works by the same author or 
not: what is relevant to the interpretation of a text is mentioned in the text (Wimsatt & 
Beardsley, 1946, p. 469). Everything else – such as other literary works, an author’s 
psychology, his or her experience, emotions, character and intention – is external to the 
text and should therefore be dismissed as irrelevant. The use of such evidence, Wimsatt 
and Beardsley believe, is fallacious (1946, pp. 477-478). For Wimsatt and Beardsley, the 
literary work does not communicate an idea that the author had before writing; what the 
literary work communicates is itself. They are therefore not interested in finding out why 
an author intended to write what he or she wrote. The answer, to them, is straightforward: 
if the author succeeded in his or her intentions, the literary work is adequate evidence; if 
he or she failed, his or her intentions did not become effective in the linguistic evidence of 
the text and we shouldn’t bother with them (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946, p. 469). The 
important thing is that literature is; not what its author intended with it.  
In a parallel essay published a few years later, Wimsatt and Beardsley shifted their focus 
from the author to the reader and targeted the notion of what they labeled “The Affective 
Fallacy” (1949). This time the essay’s authors took up a position against impressionistic 
criticism which tries to determine the psychological effects of a particular poem or piece 
of prose on the mind of the reader – an approach to literary criticism which would now be 
labeled as reader-response theory. This form of affective reasoning, Wimsatt and 
Beardsley insist, is inherently subjective and therefore at odds with the New Critical 
method of close reading that strives to be as objective as possible. Literature should be 
studied on the basis of itself, on its own, universal terms, not on the basis of its contingent 
effects on whoever happens to be reading it (Leitch et al., 2001b, p. 1373). Although 
Wimsatt and Beardsley are not blind to the fact that readers in the act of reading are 
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inevitably emotionally engaged with the work and may experience sensations of 
heightened consciousness, vivid imaginations or intense feelings of the aesthetic or 
sublime qualities of the literary work in question, they ultimately believe that it is 
undesirable for the New Critic to take such considerations into account (1949, p. 45). This 
does not mean that the essay’s authors discard feelings and emotions altogether. On the 
contrary, they believe that emotions influence a reader’s evaluation of a literary work and 
may even result in the unique type of non-conceptual knowledge that literature can offer, 
but emotions are simply too vague and verge upon the unconscious – it is, after all, hard 
to be aware of an emotion in itself – and can therefore never be a concern of objective 
criticism (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1949, p. 38). Even if the critic were able to gain 
consciousness of his or her feelings and emotions and adequately describe them, his or her 
job, Wimsatt and Beardsley argue, would still not be to produce a testimony of affective 
responses to a literary work but to bracket off such responses and provide his or her 
readers with a close reading that is as objective as possible (1949, p. 48).  
The argument in “The Affective Fallacy” is basically a creative repetition of that of “The 
Intentional Fallacy” and boils down to reading literature as closely as possible by 
analyzing it as a linguistic ‘fact’, with a clear verbal content and a poetic structure that can 
be objectively determined. The critic must bracket off his or her emotions and rigorously 
focus on the literary text. In everything he or she does, a New Critic must strive for 
objectivity: only by keeping focus on the text can the critic keep away from the dangers of 
subjectivism, intentionalism and impressionism. That this is no easy task has become 
overtly clear from the responses of many post-New Critical theorists who have not 
hesitated to stress that the idea that one could accurately interpret texts without lapsing 
into the intentional fallacy presents so severe a test on the critic that it almost forces his 
or her into the affective fallacy, since the reader of the text is, by default, the only judge 
(Searle, 2005, p. 695). To steer the New Critic away from this critical quagmire, Wimsatt 
and Beardsley formulated, what they call, “the linguistic rule” (1949, p. 33), which is there 
to stabilize responses to a particular word or passage and help the critic to distinguish 
good or objective responses from bad or subjective ones. Good responses are stabilized 
responses, caused by the descriptive or cognitive function of words and are therefore 
universal – regardless of whoever happens to be reading the particular literary work. An 
example might elucidate this. Wimsatt and Beardsley use the word ‘athlete’ to drive home 
their point (1949, pp. 33-34). To them, the linguistic rule for the word ‘athlete’ is that the 
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word is used to denote ‘a person practicing sports’: this is what the word means (in which 
case the meaning of a word is similar to its denotation). In Wimsatt and Beardsley’s theory 
of verbal meaning denotations are regarded as objective linguistic ‘facts’ that trigger 
responses that are independent of emotions, objective, stabile and thus suitable as evidence 
in a New Critical close reading (1949, p. 33). Any reader or critic encountering these words 
can easily determine these facts by consulting the word’s entry in a dictionary. Bad 
responses, then, are unstabilized responses triggered by the suggestive or emotive 
function of words. While ‘athlete’ denotes ‘a person practicing sports’, the word might at 
the same time connote a tall and lean person: this is what the word suggests (in which case 
the suggestion of a word is similar to its connotation). Contrary to denotations, connotations 
are prone to a reader’s personal discretion, imagination and previous knowledge and lead 
to different interpretations. The word ‘athlete’ only has one, fixed, meaning, it may have 
different suggestions: for one reader, the word might suggest a tall and lean person (such 
as a marathon runner), but another reader might think of a small and muscular person 
(such as a shot-putter). When encountering the word ‘athlete’, the only certainty is that 
according to its linguistic rule the word connotes ‘a person practicing sports’, whether 
that person is tall and lean or short and muscular is left unsaid and will always be up for 
debate. Because there is no linguistic rule to stabilize these kind of emotive responses, it’s 
best to keep them out of an interpretation altogether (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1949, p. 33). 
An additional argument for Wimsatt and Beardsley to exclude these responses from 
what they see as the tasks for interpretive criticism, is that they are emotional ‘imports’, 
which find their origin not in the internal evidence supplied by the literary work as a 
linguistic fact, but in the mind of the reader or critic (1949, pp. 34-35).17 The import of 
emotional meaning is a common fallacy, the authors believe, as many readers “project 
feelings at objects themselves altogether innocent of these feelings or of any qualities 
                                               
17 Brooks, whose work I have been discussing earlier, again, differs from Wimsatt and Beardsley. He coins the 
principle of rich indirection to stress the importance of indirect, connotative, meanings for a correct 
interpretation of literature in general, and modern Western poetry in particular. The principle is that in such 
poetry the reader has been burdened with the responsibility of finding meaning: “The reader must be on the alert 
for shifts of tone, for ironic statement, for suggestion rather than direct statement. He must be prepared to accept 
a method of indirection” (Brooks, 1947c, p. 61). For Brooks, analyzing a poem entails more than assessing the 
poem’s direct, denotative, meanings. Connotations too are vital, he argues, as they give the poem “meanings 
which no dictionary can be expected to give” (Brooks, 1947c, p. 59). Contrary to Wimsatt and Beardsley, Brooks 
does not consider these meanings to be imported by readers but thinks they are part of the literary work as a 
linguistic fact and can be unearthed if one reads it with careful and close attention: “this too is part of what the 
poem says, though it is said indirectly, and the dull or lazy reader will not realize that it has been said at all” 
(1947c, p. 59). 
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corresponding to them” (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1949, p. 32). The outcome of either fallacy 
– both the affective and the intentional – is that the literary work becomes diluted by 
external, projected meanings (either authorial intentions or emotional imports) and tends 
to disappear as a clear and pure object of critical judgment (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1949, 
p. 31). The careless application of these fallacies, according to Wimsatt and Beardsley, 
results in the breaking up of the poetic principle of unity, which according to the theory 
of verbal meaning lies inside the poem (de Man, 1971b, p. 24). To keep this from happening 
and preserve the unity of the literary work, the New Critic should bracket his- or herself 
off from the world, suspend his or her own feelings, sensations and experiences, and study 
the literary work in the cold light of intellect. Not only is literary art impersonal; literary 
criticism must be so too. 
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s postwar attempts to purge literary criticism from what were 
in their view the most common fallacies were part of a larger theoretical purification of 
the New Criticism carried out by its practitioners to formulate the purest and most 
‘objective’ formalist method possible. This method formed, in the words of René Wellek, 
“a new body of doctrines, a new systematic theory, a technique and methodology teachable 
and transmissible and applicable to any and all works of literature” (quoted in Graff, 1987, 
p. 161). That new systematic theory had to be independent of such worldly and human 
variables of literary criticism as who does the interpreting, when it is done and from where 
it is done – precisely those constitutive variables on which Said would later ground his 
conceptualization of critical interpretation in Culture and Imperialism (1993, p. 93). Similar 
to what Wimsatt and Beardsley had done in their essays, most New Critics argued what 
critics should avoid if they were to preserve the purity of the literary object and formulated 
their principles ex negativo, in terms and criteria defined by their scholarly opposition that 
was in control of the literature departments (Graff, 1987, p. 145). The result was that, 
while there had of course already been significant differences from the outset between the 
textual approach to literature of the New Critics and the contextual approach of their 
philologist and generalist colleagues, in the latter part of the forties New Critics 
increasingly accentuated and perhaps even added to these differences by explicitly 
distancing their approach from these contextual ones as they formulated a New Critical 
system of beliefs or what Paul de Man had called a “formalist orthodoxy” (1983, p. 230) 
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based on critical dogma’s.18 Brooks too, for instance, not eschewing the religious idiom of 
the critics of the New Criticism, widened the gap between critics and scholars when he 
labeled the latter group to be ‘heretical’ in their approach to literature (see 1947a). Kenneth 
Burke’s Grammar of Motives (1945) equally contributed to the formation of a New Critical 
system by defining the internal relations of literary works in terms of a set of permutations 
and combinations of five interrelated terms: act, scene, agent, agency and purpose. 
Taken together, these attempts indicate that the New Criticism gained influence in 
universities and colleges across the U.S. and caused the dominant mode of research in 
literature for the first time in well over a hundred years to shift from historical scholarship 
to interpretive criticism (Culler, 2011, p. 6). Registering that change, the Modern 
Language Association changed its constitution in 1951 to add ‘criticism’ to its purpose: 
“the object of the Association shall be to promote study, criticism, and research in modern 
languages and their literatures” (Culler, 1988, pp. 6-7). Eight years after Brooks lamented 
New Criticism’s lack of influence in the universities, no one could deny that the situation 
had vastly improved for the movement. The change in the MLA’s constitution indicated 
that by the end of the 1940s and early 1950s the New Criticism had transitioned from 
being an emergent movement that exerted but limited influence to becoming a widely 
accepted institutional practice of research and teaching in literature. But the MLA’s 
constitution wasn’t the only constitution that had changed: Brooks’s purging of ‘heresies’, 
Burke’s formulation of ‘grammars’ and especially Wimsatt and Beardsley’s attacks on 
‘fallacies’ effectively altered the theoretical groundwork of the New Criticism as a whole. 
What used to be an unsystematic but open group of radical amateur critics who performed 
literary criticism as a means of airing a socio-cultural critique of the dominant culture had 
gradually changed into a systematic but closed-off methodology practiced by professional 
critics who systematically severed the ties between literature, society and its public. These 
latter critics had thus come to practice a kind of literary criticism that explicated texts in 
                                               
18 Terence Hawkes equally describes how “by the mid 1950s” the New Criticism “had become, in the English 
speaking world at any rate, an established orthodoxy” (2003, p. 126). I’ve borrowed the phrase ‘critical dogma’ 
from Murray Krieger’s “Critical Dogma and the New Critical Historians” (1958) and Gerald Graff’s Poetic 
Statement and Critical Dogma (1970). According to the latter, the New Criticism, like the autonomous literature 
it celebrated, itself became an autonomous theory rife with dogmatic contradictions that was a law unto itself 
(Graff, 1970, p. 24). The religious imagery these theorists use to describe the state of the New Criticism is telling 
and might explain Said’s judgment of the movement as losing its critical edge. Given his subsequent 
conceptualization of secular criticism as a countermovement to all critical orthodoxies and religious forms of 
thinking (see Said, 1983c), it gives us another possible reason for his reaction to the New Criticism.  
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a vacuum and no longer posed any challenges to the dominant culture. The New Criticism 
had indeed become institutionalized, but at the cost of losing its critical edge. 
But all of this wasn’t going to happen without a fight. To counter the movement’s 
evolution towards an isolated, dogmatic, impersonal and what I would like to call, a 
dehumanized formalism, R.P. Blackmur proposed to break this isolation by getting 
literature back into relation with other than literary objects and reestablish the dialogue 
between literary criticism and “theology, history, politics, and personal experience” 
(Fitzgerald, 1985, p. 122; my emphasis). Blackmur took this dialogue to mean literally and 
it is no accident that in exactly the same year as the publication of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
“The Affective Fallacy” (1949), he conceived and founded the Christian Gauss Seminars in 
Criticism at Princeton, where he was a Resident Fellow in the Creative Writing program. 
The underlying goal of the seminars was not only to invigorate the New Criticism in 
particular but literary criticism in the U.S. in general by keeping up, “during the course of 
three academic years, a running discussion of literature among a small and intent group 
of people who were not only interested but competent, including others besides university 
people, and any of the highest competence who were available” (Fitzgerald, 1985, p. 7). 
The Gauss Seminars were soon dubbed “Princeton’s little conclave” (Fitzgerald, 1985, p. 
69), as the same group of people was expected to attend all seminars, become thoroughly 
acquainted with each other’s works, and discuss literary works from their own personal 
experiences as experts in one field or another (Fitzgerald, 1985, p. 94). 
The seminar series was organized in cooperation with and funded by the Princeton 
Institute for Advanced Study, whose director was J. Robert Oppenheimer, the famous 
theoretical physicist who had been employed in the Manhattan Project to develop the 
atomic bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Now, having witnessed the devastating 
effects of his researches,19 like many of his contemporaries living in what Mark Greif calls 
the age of the crisis of man seemed to look for some kind of redemptive power in literature 
(Fitzgerald, 1985, p. 46; see Greif, 2015, pp. 104-107). In the first year of the seminar 
series, Blackmur used the Institute’s funding to invite four distinguished guests – the 
Romance philologist Erich Auerbach, scholar of drama and mythology Francis Fergusson, 
literary critic Mark Schorer, and poet and short story writer Delmore Schwartz. Each of 
                                               
19 When Oppenheimer witnessed the first nuclear explosion over the New Mexico dessert near Los Alamos, he 
is famously claimed to have thought these legendary words derived from the Hindu Bhagavad-Gita: “I am become 
death, the destroyer of worlds”. Oppenheimer was of two minds about his creation and wrestled with giving 
mankind the possible means for its own annihilation (see Hijiya, 2000). 
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these guests were asked to give six weekly evening seminars about a topic of their choice. 
The form of each individual meeting was the same: an hour’s presentation followed by an 
equal amount of time dedicated to discussion. Blackmur orchestrated these discussions and 
took great care to prevent members from monopolizing the debate with their idées fixes, 
dogma’s and doctrines. In his characteristically provocative yet very respectful way he 
encouraged an open-ended critical debate in which all members could participate (Said, 
2000d, p. 252). There would be no room for the professionalized talk of the New Critics 
who accused other approaches of being ‘heretical’ or ‘fallacious’. 
On the evening of October 6, 1949, Auerbach kicked off the first series. That evening, 
he presented the first of six talks on style in the works of Pascal, Baudelaire, and Flaubert, 
devoting each evening to the close reading of a small passage of text in a style that, similar 
to the one he used in Mimesis (1946), published three years earlier (Fitzgerald, 1985, pp. 
13-14), zooms out of the particular passage to discuss the literary style in relation to the 
worldview of its time. Auerbach’s session was a great success. It was not only attended by 
poets, writers, literary critics or scholars from the humanities, including amongst others 
Ernst Robert Curtius, Auerbach’s tutor at the University of Bonn and now visiting fellow 
of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, but also by physicists including Oskar 
Benjamin Klein and the director of the Institute, Oppenheimer himself (Fitzgerald, 1985, 
pp. 9, 15-17). Robert Fitzgerald’s work about the first two years of the Gauss Seminars, 
Enlarging the Change: the Princeton Seminars in Literary Criticism, 1949-1951 (1985), 
describes the discussion following Auerbach’s presentation on the inaugural evening and 
illustrates how all of these guests, including the physicists Klein and Oppenheimer, 
engaged in a critical debate about the tension of opposites between justice and force in 
Pascal’s Pensées (1985, pp. 14-19). This proves how Blackmur’s Gauss Seminars were 
successful and could have effectively inaugurated a critical countermovement to the 
radicalizing New Criticism that, as we recall well, forbade such wide humanist discussions 
of literature, were it not that the Institute for Advanced Study quietly withdrew funding 
and the seminars were never able to fulfill their potential. 
The success of Blackmur’s Gauss Seminars was therefore short-lived. By June 1950, the 
U.S. was involved in the Korean War and Oppenheimer was again asked to work for the 
U.S. military. With Oppenheimer’s mind occupied with the Korean War, Blackmur had 
lost his strongest backer at the Institute and funding for the Gauss Seminars soon 
diminished, leading to an impoverishment in the literal and metaphorical sense 
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(Fitzgerald, 1985, pp. 50-51). The series continued to run until 1981, and hosted, amongst 
others, a seminar with de Man in 1967 that was attended by Said, who in the build-up of 
publishing Orientalism (1978) had his own seminar dedicated to him in 1977. But because 
of the seminars’ lack of funding by then the idea of the conclave had to be abandoned and 
the Gauss Seminars turned into a yearly lecture series that never had as lively and as 
interdisciplinary discussions as the ones in the first year. As Robert Fitzgerald sums up in 
his account of the Gauss Seminars of 1949-1951: “No sooner were the seminars off the 
ground, so to speak, than one of the outboard engines began to fail” (1985, p. 51). 
Blackmur’s Gauss Seminars signify an important series of events for our understanding 
of Said’s critical practice. First of all, because in an essay about the literary criticism of 
Blackmur, Said singles out Blackmur from amongst the New Critics to laud the fact that 
he was able to create a productive cultural space in these seminars “to absorb the unhoused 
energies of that great generation of refugee European philologists that included Auerbach 
and Curtius” (2000d, p. 259). Said credits Blackmur for giving these energies a direct and 
appropriate role to play in postwar U.S. literary criticism and believes that the net effect 
of the early Gauss Seminars was that European forms of humanism associated with the 
Weltphilologie of Auerbach and Curtius were able to get root in the U.S.. The philology of 
Auerbach is a recurrent theoretical intertext throughout Said’s career and plays a pivotal 
role in his conceptualization of literature and agency in Beginnings (1975a) and Orientalism 
(1978). His intellectual engagement with Auerbach allows him to conceptualize such as 
important notions as ‘worldliness’ to designate the particular, concrete, embeddedness of 
literature in the existential realities of the world, and ‘secular criticism’ as a worldly 
criticism that “must accept the taint and constraint of placement in the world – and even 
perhaps, make a home for itself there” (Robbins, 1983, p. 69). 
Though Said only singles out the philological humanism of the German émigrés, it is 
important to note that this philological humanism found good grounding in American soil, 
which had already been fertilized, so to speak, by the advent of the French existentialist 
movement and its version of secular humanism that had reached the U.S. directly after the 
War in the period 1946-1947. In January 1945, Jean-Paul Sartre had accepted an invitation 
from The Office of War Information to visit the U.S. as a representative of the French 
resistance journal Combat for a period of five months – he was asked by Albert Camus, 
then editor of the journal, to fill in for him (Cotkin, 2003, p. 112). Though Sartre never 
considered the U.S. to be a likely place for existentialism to get root, his first visit did pave 
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the way for existentialism to influence the U.S. intellectual climate at large, as Greif has 
recently pointed out (2015, pp. 65-73). When he returned a year later, this time as the 
celebrated existentialist who had delivered the famous Parisian lecture L’Existentialisme 
est un humanisme (1946) in October 1945, to give similar talks at Yale, Harvard, Princeton 
and Columbia – precisely those universities where Said made his career – and, attesting to 
his status of grand-scale celebrity in the U.S., at Carnegie Hall, an existentialist beachhead 
was established in New York City, where the intellectual scene was taken by storm by the 
humanist ideas of French existentialism.20 Visits from Camus and de Beauvoir sponsored 
by the French Ministry of Culture between 1946 and 1947 to grant interviews to 
American journals and give lectures at American universities – including Camus’s famous 
lecture at Columbia in March 1946 on the question of responsibility for the Holocaust (see 
Cotkin, 2003, pp. 112-113; Greif, 2015, p. 76) – only helped consolidate existentialist 
humanism in the U.S. The influence of French existentialism on the intellectual life and 
popular culture of the U.S. in the 1940s, 1950s and, particularly at its heyday in the 1960s 
was immense – though in spite of the works of Greif, George Cotkin and Ann Fulton still 
underacknowledged (see Cotkin, 2003; Fulton, 1999). The result of Sartre, Camus and de 
Beauvoir’s short but favorable reception in the U.S. is that a significant transfer of ideas 
took place that would change the discourse of man in the U.S. from a politics of universality 
to the politics of responsibility. As we shall see, this form of secular humanist criticism 
would be of paramount importance to Said’s own practice in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography (1966) and is of continued interest to the rest of his career.  
Second of all, Said was inspired by Blackmur’s Gauss Seminars because the discussions 
embodied Blackmur’s concept of literary criticism as amateurism – a concept which I will 
discuss later in more detail. For Said, Blackmur’s seminars stress that anyone, be they 
poets, writers, musicologists, theologists, philosophers, philologists, and other trained 
humanists, or even STEM-scientists, should and could even contribute to the critical study 
of literature and other ideas and values in the public sphere as long as one’s criticism is 
                                               
20 The role of Partisan Review, the journal of the New York intellectual scene, cannot be overemphasized. As 
Greif points out, Partisan Review was paramount in disseminating existentialist ideas in the culture at large: “it 
brought existentialism out of literary and avant-garde circles in the United States . . . and into American 
intellectual life” (2015, p. 70). This effectively changed the position of France in U.S. intellectual life. Where before 
1945 philosophy in the U.S. did not come from France, now it seemed to be the only place it could be found. 
Sartre’s visit seems to have inaugurated the important cultural transfer and one-way exchange of French 
philosophy on American intellectual life of the second half of the twentieth century. My discussion of the role of 
existential phenomenology in Said’s critical practice, illustrates how the work of Said is a late product of this 
postwar transfer.  
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driven by a sincere intellectual care for and honesty toward the object criticized, rather 
than academic self-fashioning, self-aggrandization and disciplinary distinction (Makdisi, 
2007, p. 23). This format would be of seminal influence for Said’s own conceptualization 
of the task of criticism and the role of public intellectuals in a democratic society, as well 
as his own elaboration of the notion of amateurism in later works (1994b, p. x). He himself 
called out to talk about political issues, not in spite of having any specialist qualifications 
but precisely because of that lack of specialization (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2009, pp. 34-
35). Moreover, what Said found so particularly fascinating in Blackmur’s concept of 
amateurism is that it also includes a willful transgression of institutional borders, the 
celebration of interdisciplinarity, resistance to the pressures of specialization, 
professionalization and cults of expertise, all combined with a distrust to doctrinaire 
opinions and the reevaluation of personal experience in criticism (see de Groot, 2010, p. 
207). This, as we will see, is the impact of Blackmur’s New Criticism on Said’s critical 
practice. 
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1.4 The Breaking of Form: ‘Intention’ and ‘Intension’ 
Blackmur’s Gauss Seminars could not prevent that in less than two decades the New 
Criticism had changed to such an extent that it is hard to find much common ground 
between the essays, articles and books published by New Critics in the postwar years and 
the works of their prewar colleagues. In fact, one could say that these two kinds of works 
are so different from each other that both are but ‘New Critical’ in name only. The catalyst 
for and the product of the New Criticism’s gradual march to institutionalization, in which 
the movement had been surrounded by polemical pressures, its members formed its system 
in stark contrast to the opposing contextualizing approaches to literature (Graff, 1979, pp. 
140-143). While before its institutionalization the New Criticism lacked an esprit de système 
and therefore facilitated the inclusion of heterogeneous elements (because there was no 
methodologically grounded possibility of dispute (Krieger, 1963, p. 6)), the system that 
was the outcome of this postwar antithetical system-making was so strongly delineated 
that it effectively excluded more than it could include. In fact, the New Criticism that Said 
was taught in the fifties and early sixties was so sharply delimited that it had become at 
odds with its original principles and that even its founder Ransom started to feel excluded 
from the movement which he had helped to define and shape in the first place. Reflecting 
on the state of the New Criticism, in 1952, he wrote that 
How confidently, twenty years or so past, were some of us offering a new 
‘understanding of poetry’! I will not say, How brashly; for the innovation was real, 
it was momentous; but it was not complete, and now it has bogged down at a most 
embarrassing point. In the academy the verbal analysis has pretty well secured its 
place and tenure, but its end-products are only half-finished. (Ransom, 1952, p. 159) 
Even though Ransom was without any doubt happy to see that the New Criticism had 
become institutionalized, he could no longer identify his close readings of poetry with the 
readings that his fellow New Critics were now producing. He felt that these readings 
indeed attempted to closely read the literary work’s poetic structure and its informing 
principle of unity but, as a result of their authors trying to steer away from lapsing into 
the intentional or affective fallacies, they had become devoid of any form of human 
psychology and were therefore only half-finished. To make them complete, he argued, 
“there would seem to be needed some acknowledgment of the actual warmth and feel, and 
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the powerful psychic focus, with which poetry comes into our experience” (Ransom, 1952, 
pp. 161-162). Banishing emotions (both the author’s and the critic’s) and psychology 
altogether from a close reading makes for a cold reading.  
We would do well to remind ourselves that, in the eyes of the founding generation of 
the New Criticism, literature was seen as a human experience in progress that, because it 
defied the laws of logic, resisted being paraphrased and had to be comprehended or 
experienced first-handedly by the reader. Reading literature involved the meeting of two 
experiences or consciousnesses: the first, unified experience or poetic consciousness of the 
literary work that was intentionally inserted into its structure by the author and, the 
second experience or consciousness of the reader or critic that, if the literary work was 
successful, would come to coincide with the experience of the work during his or her 
engagement with it. The task of the critic was to measure the value of the work, which 
was determined by the amount of experience it contained, by the amount of dissonant 
attitudes and paradoxes that the work was able to fuse in an organic unity (Graff, 1979, p. 
140). A critical interpretation of a literary work was a close reading and evaluation of the 
work’s poetic structure in order to identify, analyze and evaluate its informing principle of 
unity. Such an interpretation was based on a mix of both objective, linguistic and rhetorical 
evidence with subjective, metaphysical and psychological evidence that was often at first 
sight dissonant with and contradictory to that former kind of evidence but through the 
literary work’s use of the language of paradox was fused in a consonant unity (Brooks, 
1947b, p. 13; Tate, 1955b, p. 72).  
To be clear, when these prewar New Critics were looking for psychological evidence 
on which they could base their critical interpretation of the literary work, they were not 
looking for that kind of evidence in the author’s biography or intention that were said to 
be at the basis of the literary work (Culler, 2007, p. 225) – after all, they asserted that there 
is no possible way of knowing the dancer from the dance; of knowing the personal history 
of the author from his or her product (Brooks, 1947d, pp. 155-156). What they did, 
however, was to analyze literature as a manmade product that had an intended, worked-
out structure (the poetic consciousness), dealt with human situations and triggered human 
emotions. As a result, literary experience had to be grasped in psychological terms.  
To be even more clear, even though the early New Critics clearly defined the literary 
work as a manmade product, the experience or poetic consciousness which the work 
contained was not the idiosyncratic experience or mind of its maker (the author) but a 
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collectively shared and depersonalized human experience or common mind (the general 
human energy of the work) (Graff, 1979, pp. 139-140). Even though it is true that the 
founding generation of New Critics sought to depersonalize literary experience, they did 
not banish personality or human subjectivity from their close readings. To say that literary 
art is impersonal, for the prewar generation of New Critics, did not imply that the 
impersonality of literature was similar to the impersonality of science. It meant that 
reading literature offered an “escape from personality” (Eliot, 1920b, p. 53) into a complete 
involvement in the complex fabric of paradoxes, into the multiplicity of point of views, and 
hence of personalities that the literary work was able to fuse (Graff, 1979, p. 140). As we 
have already seen, the New Criticism clearly assigned powerful socio-cultural powers to 
literature and literary criticism. It conceived the reading of literature precisely to be a 
personal act of resistance against the pressures of an industrial capitalist society that 
defined personality in increasingly impersonally hyper-scientific and -rational terms (Graff, 
1979, p. 138; Jancovich, 1993, p. 88). The New Critics argued that the reader’s involvement 
in the literary work could help him or her reestablish the lost connection between his- or 
herself and others and thus alleviate the alienating conditions of modernity. A good 
literary critic, Ransom warned his fellow New Critics, should therefore never forget that 
literature is a means of communication that is the product of a human author, intended to 
be read by a human reader (see also Krieger, 1963, pp. 70-73). These were precisely the 
crucial human aspects of literature on which the New Criticism had founded its idea of 
literary criticism as a form of socio-cultural criticism in the first place. But now his fellow 
New Critics overlooked these human aspects in their close readings when they “tended to 
rest in the amorphous experience which they make of the poem without finding there, or 
seeking, anything to bind it all together or to engage with some notable human concern 
in the reader” (Ransom, 1952, p. 159). Ransom’s voice was echoed in the postwar humanist 
discourse of the crisis of man, which as a result and counterbalance to the cruelties of the 
War increasingly came to accentuate the human aspects of literature and the humanizing 
effects of reading, seeing literature as the paragon of humanity (see Greif, 2015, pp. 104-
105). 
Without analyzing the unifying principle that binds it all together the literary work is 
but the amorphous sum of its parts. This was the outcome of the depsychologized and 
dehumanized approach to literary criticism that increasingly characterized the close 
readings of the postwar period. Such an outcome was precisely the tendency against which 
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Brooks and Penn Warren had warned in “The Reading of Modern Poetry” more than a 
decade earlier, when they argued that the literary work forms a specific unity that “is not 
only greater than, but even different from the sum of its parts” (1937, p. 439). Though 
Brooks and Penn Warren do not use the term, this, of course, is the textbook definition of 
what in experimental psychology is called a Gestalt, namely, a shape, configuration or 
structure which as an object of perception forms a specific whole or unity that cannot be 
expressed simply in terms of its parts. 21  According to them, the New Critic had to 
approach the literary work as “a total organism”, “a unified construct, a psychological 
whole” (1937, pp. 442, 439), incapable of expression in terms of its parts. In order properly 
to determine whether a particular poem is good or bad, the New Critic not only had to 
analyze each constitutive part of the poem – each metaphor, ambiguous phrase, ironical 
expression, or item of poetic imagery – closely but also carefully to evaluate “the relation 
of the parts of the poem to the total intention” (Brooks & Warren, 1937, p. 441). This 
intention, then, is what totalizes the poem, makes it into a global whole with self-
organizing tendencies, and aims to create or, when the poem is successful, creates a 
psychological unity (Brooks & Warren, 1937, p. 442). What binds all the parts of a literary 
work together, what preserves the unity of a literary work, is its humanity. 
Here we discern a crucial difference between the prewar and postwar phases of the New 
Criticism. While this difference may not always be overtly clear when we analyze the 
moments of pure theoretical reflection by postwar New Critics, it becomes more apparent 
when we look at their critical practice. In theory, the postwar New Criticism still 
conceptualized literature as a manmade product, containing a human experience that could 
only be grasped as an organic whole. In the introduction to Wimsatt’s The Verbal Icon, a 
book that also included the fallacy-essays he had written in collaboration with Beardsley, 
we find that “[t]he poem conceived as a thing in between the poet and the audience is of 
course an abstraction. The poem is an act” (1954a, p. xvii). Elsewhere, in Brooks’s “Heresy 
of Paraphrase”, which more clearly than his other works bears the stamp of Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s “The Intentional Fallacy” published the year before, literature is still said to 
                                               
21 It is important to stress that a Gestalt is not only greater than but different from the sum of its parts. As Caroll 
Pratt writes in the introduction to Wolfgang Köhler’s The Task of Gestalt Psychology, it is a common error to leave 
out the word ‘different’ and simply define a Gestalt as “[t]he whole is more than the sum of the parts” (1969, p. 
9). This is a mistake, because the relationship between the parts is itself something that is not present in the 
individual parts themselves (Pratt, 1969, p. 10). Take for instance a bike. If all the parts of a bike are laid out on 
the floor of a bike shop, they still do not make up the bike. Only when the parts are assembled by a bike mechanic 
and they come to take up a specific relation to each other, do the parts become something different, that is, a bike.  
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be a human experience: “a true poem is . . . an experience rather than any mere statement 
about experience or any mere abstraction from experience” (1947a, p. 173). Moreover, 
throughout Brooks’s close readings one still gets the impression that the literary work 
should be grasped in terms of the organic theory according to which the work of art should 
be seen as “a whole in which the parts collaborate and modify one another” (Wellek, 1978b, 
p. 617). In practice, however, as a result of the New Critics zealously overinterpreting 
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s call to purge their methodology from all forms of subjectivism, 
all close readings had to be based on internal evidence to be studied in positivistic manner. 
This meant that Wimsatt hastened to add in his introduction that “if we are to lay hold of 
the poetic act to comprehend and evaluate it, and if it is to pass current as a critical object, it 
must be hypostatized” (1954a, p. xvii; my emphasis).  
Even though Wimsatt clearly formulated in theory that the hypostasis of the literary 
work’s intentional and affective character is a methodological step towards evaluation and 
comprehension of the work, in practice his fellow New Critics were hypostatizing literature 
without comprehending it (de Man, 1971b, p. 25; Palmer, 1969, p. 5). For in order to 
critically interpret a literary work, the postwar New Critic treated the work in question 
as a self-enclosed, concrete reality that was isolated from its author, public and society. 
Then, he or she analyzed the human experience of the literary work in a vacuum, or, as 
Brooks wrote in the essay which I have cited above, without ever going “outside the poem” 
(1947a, p. 164). All traces of human subjectivity had to be banished in a New Critical close 
reading, lest the New Critic be accused of falling in the trap of the intentional or the 
affective fallacies. In short, the postwar New Critics advocated a full-fledged version of 
literary autonomy, which is not wholly unproblematic or even coherent (Graff, 1979, p. 
142). For instance, how could one analyze, interpret and evaluate an experience if the 
literary work was said to be closed-off from the world and the critic was prohibited to look 
for any (latent) political, moral and personal impact of works? More importantly, how 
could literature still be called a manmade product containing a human experience if there 
was nothing human – no authorial intention (‘intentional fallacy’) and no emotional effects 
on the reader (‘affective fallacy’) – it could refer to? 
These contradictions did not escape the notice of Paul de Man. According to him, 
Wimsatt’s formulation that the literary work should be hypostatized in order to allow for 
a critical interpretation did more harm than good and plunged the New Criticism into a 
downward theoretical spiral from which the movement was never able to escape, 
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eventually resulting in what he calls the “failure of American formalism” (1971b, p. 27). 
De Man also stresses that Wimsatt and Beardsley’s attack on the intentional fallacy rests 
on a misunderstanding of the nature of intentionality and, one could even say, is therefore 
a fallacy of its own (de Man, 1971b, p. 24). The flaw in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s reasoning, 
according to de Man, is that it considers the notion of intention in terms of a physical 
model of transfer that defines literary communication as a transfer of a certain psychic or 
mental content from the mind of the author to the mind of a reader – somewhat as one 
would pour wine from a bottle into a glass. In this model, the energy necessary to effect 
the transfer comes from an external source called intention (de Man, 1971b, p. 25). This 
is a crucial mistake, de Man argued, because it ignores  
that the concept of intentionality is neither physcial [sic] nor psychological in its 
nature, but structural, involving the activity of a subject regardless of its empirical 
concerns, except as far as they relate to the intentionality of the structure. The 
structural intentionality determines the relationship between the components of the 
resulting object in all its parts, but the relationship of the particular state of mind of 
the person engaged in the act of structurization of the structured object is altogether 
contingent. The structure of the chair is determined in all its components by the fact 
that it is destined to be sat on, but this structure in no way depends on the state of 
mind of the carpenter who is in the process of assembling its parts. The case of the 
work of literature is of course more complex, yet here also, the intentionality of the 
act, far from threatening the unity of the poetic entity, more definitely establishes 
this unity. (1971b, p. 25) 
De Man feels that Wimsatt and Beardsley’s theory of verbal meaning overlooks the fact 
that because a literary work, like a chair, is a manmade product it possesses a structural 
intentionality that determines all of the constitutive parts of the work in question and 
binds the literary form together. The intention in the literary work is not the particular 
psychological state of mind of the author in the process of writing the work – whether the 
author was in a bad mood when he or she wrote this verse or other is completely irrelevant 
for the total structure of the poem and should therefore not be a concern of criticism. 
Rather, the intention is structural in that it controls, shapes and unifies the poetic 
experience – it makes the literary form coherent – whilst at the same time bestowing on 
it a depth of meaning that is relational and therefore surpasses the mere sum of its 
individual constitutive parts. After all, when writing a poem the author chose to articulate 
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the lines in that particular way, in that particular order, and in that particular relation to 
the other lines constituting the whole poem. The author also intended the particular 
structure of the complex fabric of paradoxes that causes the literary work to transcend the 
level of logic toward a deeper struggle with meaning of which the outcome is the unique 
type of non-conceptual knowledge that the experience of the literary work is said to offer. 
Perceiving this struggle of meaning, de Man believed, should be the concern of all forms 
of literary criticism, formalist or not (1971b, p. 27). But that could only be done if the critic 
analyzed the literary work as a whole whose integrity transcends purely empirical notions 
of coherence (de Man, 1971b, p. 32). De Man sides with the prewar New Critics, in that he 
feels that the literary work should be analyzed as a Gestalt: as a totalized form – the poetic 
structure – from which the constitutive parts could not be isolated or separated because 
they were deeply interwoven by a totalizing principle – the unifying structural intention. 
In short, contrary to what Wimsatt and Beardsley believed, intentionality does not 
threaten the unity of the literary work but is precisely what establishes that unity and 
keeps the literary form together. 
If, during my discussion of de Man, the impression should arise or already has arisen 
that he himself advocates the unity of the poetic form, than this is completely my fault, for 
de Man is closer to Derridean deconstruction than he is to the prewar phase of the New 
Criticism. In everything which he writes he emphasizes that the totalizing principle is not 
some essence of the text, in which he does not believe, but a desire for an organic unifying 
principle that should be located in the aesthetic ideology of the reader, which his own 
method precisely intends to deconstruct (Norris, 2010, p. 94). What I mean to argue by 
discussing de Man’s critique of the postwar New Criticism is that the totalizing principle 
of a text, whether theorized to be a part of the actual text or a desire on the part of the 
reader, it is always experienced as a phenomenon of perception. This is another example of 
how a New Critical approach to literature is to a considerable extent compatible with an 
approach derived from phenomenological models of reading, allowing Said in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966) to combine elements of the New Criticism 
with elements of existential phenomenology. 
Be that as it may, by wanting to defend the province of the literary against the intrusion 
of what they believed to be externally determining psychological elements such as 
intention, New Critics like Wimsatt and Beardsley thought they were preserving the 
formal unity of the literary work as a clear object of specifically critical judgment (see 
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1949, p. 31), whereas in fact they were themselves responsible for breaking it because they 
analyzed literary form by looking at the constitutive parts of the literary work seriatim, 
without taking into account the structural relations between these parts mutually and the 
organic whole. As a result, literary form was broken up into a piecemeal collection of 
unstructured parts. What added to this breaking of form, but what is not discussed by de 
Man, is that because of “The Affective Fallacy” and the linguistic rule posited in that essay, 
postwar New Critics also refrained from interpreting the emotional effects of the literary 
work on its readers, making it virtually impossible to assess the highly praised socio-
cultural disruptive tendency of literature that was caused by the struggle of meaning 
between denotative and connotative meanings (see Brooks, 1947b, p. 6). At the end of the 
1930s, Tate had defined that struggle as a poem’s “‘tension,’ the full organized body of all 
the extension and intension that we can find in it” (1955b, p. 71). In Tate’s essay, 
‘extension’ is the literal meaning or denotation of words, ‘intension’ their suggestive or 
connotative power. According to Tate, the meaning in a poem is constantly kept under 
tension because more often than not extensive meanings logically contradict intensive 
meanings. Yet in the end, the interplay of both meanings nonetheless enrich one another 
and contribute to one unified meaning that gives its reader a deeper insight into the human 
predicament (1955b, pp. 72-73). 22  In order to evaluate and criticize the full meaning 
potential of a literary work, the critic should analyze both its intension and extension as 
two opposing forces that exert equal pressure on each other to create a fragile tension that 
is called the unified meaning – somewhat as a porcelain tea cup at rest between two 
opposing springs of equal force. If he or she were to overemphasize or disregard one of 
these meaning aspects, as the postwar New Critics were doing in the formulation of the 
affective fallacy, the balance of forces in the literary work would be disturbed and the 
tension would snap, shattering the unity of the literary form. 
The unintentional result of the postwar New Critical hypostasis of literature, based on 
a misunderstanding and subsequent suppression of the intentionality of literary form in 
tandem with the rejection of the emotional impact of the literary work on its audience, was 
that both literature as a manmade product and the human experience it was said to evoke 
had been gradually dehumanized and hollowed out. This evolution is reflected in a number 
                                               
22 The metaphor of unity under tension is a popular image encountered in prewar New Critical writings. Brooks 
and Penn Warren described the literary work as a psychological unity in which “not even the simplest metaphor 
fails to violate a logical unity” (1937, p. 442). Logical unity, they believed, is not a necessity to create psychological 
unity. 
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of changes. The most obvious would be that literature had been changed from being a 
human experience into a literary object (de Man, 1971b, p. 25). What followed, was that 
while the prewar New Critics conceptualized literature as a manmade product with an 
intentional structure that gave the literary work of art a formal unity that was unique to 
a living organism, in postwar New Critical writings literature had been reified and turned 
into an inanimate object of the natural world devoid of any such intentionality (de Man, 
1971b, pp. 26-27). Another crucial change was that, because the postwar New Criticism 
no longer considered form in relation to the literary work’s intentional character, its 
practitioners were also no longer able to perceive the specificity of literature or 
convincingly evaluate the quality of the literary work. The New Critical method of close 
reading, which started out as a careful attention to literary form that nonetheless 
transcended the boundaries of narrow formalism into a broader and deeper humanism 
(Berman, 1988, p. 27), was methodologically emasculated and reduced to being a stylistic 
analysis and interpretation of sheer textual surface that prevented the critic from grasping 
the deeper intricacies and human impact of literary works (de Man, 1971b, p. 27). While 
the prewar New Critics sought to evaluate and comprehend the unique power of a literary 
work to restore a sense of community in the context of modern industrial capitalist society 
or, as the Russian Formalist Victor Shklovsky would put it, to comprehend how literature 
was able to defamiliarize reified language and perception by famously making “a stone 
stony” (2004, p. 16), their postwar successors had reified the literary work and turned it 
into something resembling a stone itself.  
This lack of insight in the workings of literary language doubled by a lack of 
understanding of the literary experience were aspects of the New Criticism at which 
Ransom took grave offence. He attacked his fellow postwar New Critics for practicing 
what he believed to be a narrowly formalist approach to literature marked by textual 
interpretations and stylistic analyses of literary works that continuously stressed the 
unique power of the literary experience to transcend the laws of logic, but, in practice, 
were unable to understand that experience and eventually left “the mysteries mysterious” 
(Ransom, 1952, p. 159). Compared to their predecessors, the postwar New Critics were 
increasingly less interested in comprehending literature and more interested in analyzing 
it in an objective, positivistic or technical manner. They had therefore but little interest in 
understanding poetic mysteries, which had been one of the main preoccupations of the 
founding generation of New Critics like Ransom, Tate and Penn Warren, and – to a certain 
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extent – Brooks, and were more like positivistic investigators of what they regarded to be 
autonomous poetic objects (Berman, 1988, pp. 27-32).  
The inevitable result was that the postwar New Criticism looked closely at literature 
but perhaps no longer understood it. In fact, it is not hard to see how the New Critics of 
the postwar phase came to share some remarkable characteristics of the dozens of 
nineteenth-century European travelers in the Orient who were gazing at its monuments, 
cities and peoples: they saw but they did not comprehend. In a fashion that is quite similar 
to many modern Orientalist scholars who, in their attempt to study the Middle-East, 
dehumanized the region and its inhabitants by reducing both of them to what they 
considered to be analyzable and ‘Orientalized’ objects – to be understood in positivistic 
terms as attitudes, trends and statistics – and thereby failing to identify with human 
experience, failing also to see it as human experience (Said, 1978, pp. 291, 328), the postwar 
New Critics had likewise severed their object of study (literature) from its human context, 
by reifying and dehumanizing the literary work of art and solely focusing on the bare 
words on the page. In the eyes of Said, the New Criticism eventually fell prey to a similar 
error of studying manmade objects without taking into account the agency that caused 
these objects to be made. Like the Orientalists which Said criticizes, New Critics 
approached their object of study without discussing the role of their makers, users, and 
the broader worldly context of these objects. The result is that they failed to account for 
human agency and that they failed to see that the literary experience is an intricately 
human experience that deals with a complex living reality and is therefore bound to 
violate, disturb or at least complicate the simple vision produced by a literary analysis 
based on positivistic knowledge – this conceptualization of literature lies at the heart of 
Said’s Orientalism and will be discussed at length in the fourth chapter of this book. 
That error is based on a misunderstanding of the epistemological nature of literary 
interpretation – or interpretation tout court – on the part of the New Criticism. What 
happened could be explained as follows: in the movement’s scrupulous and delicate 
attention to the reading of literary form, driven by the pursuit to analyze that form as 
closely as possible, the New Criticism developed a method of “disinterested objectivity” 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 7) and “objective interpretation” (Graff, 1979, p. 130) that came to lean 
on the positivistic model of understanding of the physical sciences and mistakenly took 
the literary work of art for a natural object of study that is the focus of these latter sciences. 
In doing so, they overlooked the fact that literary interpretation is subjected to the 
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hermeneutic model of interpretation, because, as I have already stressed, the literary work 
of art is in the first place a manmade product possessing a structural intention. Or, in the 
words of de Man, “the critics pragmatically entered into the hermeneutic circle of 
interpretation, mistaking it for the organic circularity of natural processes” (1971b, p. 29). 
This poses a crucial problem with respect to the study of literature: 
Contrary to what happens in the physical sciences, the interpretation of an 
intentional act or an intentional object always implies an understanding of the intent. 
Like scientific laws, interpretation is in fact a generalization that expand the range 
of applicability of a statement to a wider area. But the nature of the generalization is 
altogether different from what is most frequently encountered in the natural 
sciences. There we are concerned with the predictability, the measurement, or the 
mode of determination of a given phenomenon, but we do not claim in any way to 
understand it. To interpret an intent, however, can only mean to understand it. No 
new set of relationships is added to an existing reality, but relationships that were 
already there are being disclosed, not only in themselves (like the events of nature) 
but as they exist for us. We can only understand that which is in a sense already 
given to us and already known, albeit in a fragmentary, inauthentic way that cannot 
be called unconscious. (de Man, 1971b, pp. 29-30) 
What de Man tries to make clear is that interpretation in the physical sciences significantly 
differs from interpretation in the humanities in that the former type of interpretation does 
not aim to understand but to explain its object of study, whereas the latter, if it is to 
successfully penetrate its object, has to understand its intentionality. When a geologist, 
for instance, interprets a particular stone, he or she does not seek to comprehend the stone 
– he does not seek to understand the stoniness of the stone, one could say – but rather 
wishes to analyze the shape and texture of the stone and determine the elements out of 
which that stone is composed – to establish whether the rock is igneous, sedimentary or 
metamorphic, for instance. Then, the geologist will usually expand the range of inquiry 
and use that particular analysis as the primary record to explain the geologic evolution of 
the area in which the stone was found and thus be able to explain the formation of the 
stone in the first place. Unlike the geologist, the literary critic is dealing with manmade 
products. This is not to say that he or she can’t analyze the structural elements out of 
which the literary work is made – rhyme, rhythm, meter, metaphors, figures of speech –, 
but in order to interpret the work fully and more deeply, he or she will inevitably have to 
74 
move beyond narrow formalism, and understand the structural intention of the work to 
elucidate the relationship between these elements as they appear to him or her. Far from 
being something that is added to the literary text, this elucidation is an attempt to reach 
the text, whose full meaning potential was there at the start of the critical process (de Man, 
1971b, p. 30). 
For critics like de Man, it is crucial to realize that literary criticism is the temporal and 
cyclic act of understanding a literary text; it is the process of making explicit knowledge 
that is implicit, and disclosing for the critic what was already in the literary work in the 
first place (de Man, 1971b, p. 31). Contrary to the physical sciences, literary criticism is 
guided by the principle of the hermeneutic circle: its beginning and ending is the literary 
work of art, its form is the making explicit in writing of the interpretative act that brings 
these two together (see also de Man, 1993, p. 71). Contrary to what the postwar New 
Critics would have us believe, literary criticism is always performed by a human 
consciousness (the mind of the critic) that is directed at a human product (the literary 
work). This consciousness has intentionality in that it is oriented at achieving full 
understanding of the literary work in question. It is guided by finding the totalizing 
principle of the literary text (the principle of unity), which, according to de Man, becomes 
clear in the mind of the interpreter during the interpretative act as the work discloses itself 
to his or her critical questioning (1971b, pp. 31-32).23 As such, textual unity never exists 
as a concrete aspect of the text that would be able to coincide with particular, empirically 
demonstrable, textual ‘facts’ as Wimsatt and Beardsley were arguing, but is only 
established in the consciousness of the critic when the hermeneutic circle is full, when the 
mind of critic is joined with the object it analyzes and recognizes a certain amount of 
human energy or life in it. In short, textual unity is a phenomenon of perception. This 
dialogue with the text is the key to understanding a literary work, it is what opens the 
experience of the literary text (Palmer, 1969, pp. 6-7). Yet this was precisely what the 
postwar New Criticism had abolished. Instead of a humanist dialogue, it installed, what 
Richard E. Palmer has called, a scientific “dissection” (1969, p. 6) of the text itself – 
thereby, as we have seen, unwittingly cutting away at the unity of the literary form – 
                                               
23 Again, de Man himself does not argue that the totalizing principle is a part of the text but rather a perception 
and projection even of the reader or critic. In his seminal essay on the rhetoric of blindness, de Man’s makes his 
argument explicit that any such totalizing principle precisely forms a reading’s blindness that enables critical 
insight (see 1971d, pp. 104-105, 109-110, 139). 
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because it believed that it could grasp the literary work of art with an air of disinterested 
objectivity characteristic of the physical sciences. It thereby overlooked that  
the literary work is not a manipulable object completely at our disposal; it is a human 
voice out of the past, a voice which must somehow be brought to life. . . The modern 
critic, of course, pleads for passion – even surrender to the “autonomous being’ of 
the work – yet all the while he is treating the work as an object of analysis. Literary 
works are best regarded, however, not primarily as objects of analysis but as 
humanly created texts which speak. (Palmer, 1969, p. 7) 
By turning the literary work into an object, the postwar New Criticism, reduced 
literature to a specialist and dehumanized kind of ‘form’ that did not oppose the dominant 
industrial capitalist society, but was itself a symptom of that society (Graff, 1979, p. 148; 
Kampf, 1970, p. 638). The New Criticism, in a way, even contributed to that ideology by 
alienating and reifying human beings. After all, Gerald Graff is right to point out that 
“[t]he difference between seeing literature as an ‘experience’ rather than as an ‘object’ 
corresponds to the difference between treating human beings as persons rather than as 
things” (Graff, 1979, p. 131). While the postwar New Critics still assigned ambitious socio-
cultural functions to literature, they had defined it in such a way that made it impossible 
for literature to carry out these functions (Graff, 1979, p. 147). Instead of literature being 
organically tied to society and being able to alleviate the alienation of modernity, the 
postwar New Critics had themselves alienated literature from society and its public, and 
while Wimsatt and Beardsley thought they were proposing a reading which was true to 
the founding principles of the movement – in that the literary text should finally be able 
to speak for itself – they had completely trivialized and silenced literature. The New 
Criticism, it was said, had tamed the radical force of great literature (Culler, 1988, p. 14) 
The consequence of all of this was that literature no longer mattered, nor did the 
criticism that sought to interpret it (Graff, 1979, p. 129). At various conferences 
nationwide, the New Critics increasingly deplored the fact that their students found 
literature irrelevant, but their positivistic and dehumanized conception of literary 
interpretation actually promoted that very irrelevance in the first place (Palmer, 1969, pp. 
6-7). The New Criticism that Said was taught in the late fifties and early sixties effectively 
pushed readers away from immediacy and experience, toward a broken literary form and 
narrow formalism. To Said’s mind, the New Criticism confined literature to language, as 
it made the crucial methodological mistakes to focus on purely linguistic and textual 
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matters and to conceptualize the literary work as a self-sufficient entity whose language 
is ultimately not about experience anymore but about itself (2000e, p. xv). In fact, from the 
way I have been describing the evolution of the New Criticism, it would be hard to disagree 
with Said that the New Criticism, in its self-centered methodological rejection of intention 
and pathos in the form of various fallacies, metaphysically isolated the text from human 
experience and the world (2000e, p. xviii). These relentless attacks on the intentional and 
affective fallacies internally exhausted the New Criticism. In doing so, the practitioners of 
the movement pushed the dehumanized line of thinking set out by Wimsatt and Beardsley 
so far that, in practice, they almost wished away the human subject completely, 
overemphasized the technical aspect of language and in the end even seemed to argue that 
“it is language that writes the poem, not the poet” (Graff, 1979, p. 139) – an outcome none 
of the New Critics believed in theoretically (see Wellek, 1978b, p. 617).  
The consequences of the New Critical model of reading transcend the realm of literary 
analysis into the realm of human agency. The postwar metaphysical isolation of the 
literary text from the worldly human experiences of its author and reader, or the 
suppression of the intentionality of the author and reader, resulted in a suppression of 
human agency. By treating poems as dramatic speeches from an abstract lyrical ‘I’ that is 
dissociated from the concrete historical author to be read by an abstract critical ‘I’ that is 
equally dissociated from the concrete historical critic, the New Criticism came to celebrate 
an inflated concept of absolute, unconstrained, universal, and unsituated agency (Culler, 
2015, pp. 84, 115). By conceptualizing agency in such abstract terms, the New Criticism 
came to celebrate a meaningless notion of agency, that effectively stated that, if agency is 
unsituated, it is by definition nowhere. What the movement did was to confine literature 
to language and thereby sever ‘literature’ from ‘agency’ and the world at large. By 
overemphasizing the technical aspects of language, the New Criticism’s anti-historical 
formalist method had dehumanized literature and, critics like de Man believe, the New 
Criticism was therefore no longer able to make major, original contributions to the study 
of literature (1971b, p. 20).  
While literary critical innovation in the prewar years came from the South, now up-
and-coming literary critics like Said, writing his doctoral dissertation on Joseph Conrad, 
were beginning to look East, across the lecture halls of Cambridge where I.A. Richards 
had once sparked an interest in form, toward continental Europe and its existentialist-
phenomenological methods of reading. These methods of reading would contribute to a 
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broadening of the New Critical approach, seek to rehumanize the study of literature by 
reestablishing the humanist dialogue with the literary work and breaking down the 
metaphysical isolation of literature from human experience. Applying them, would allow 
Said to embed literature more firmly in the world and posit a situated model of human 
agency and reading that stresses that there is no access to literary works that is outside 
the world, outside history, or outside one’s own horizon of understanding. But for him to 
do so, he and his fellow critics first had to make a theoretical clearing by challenging, 
breaking and revising the New Critical orthodoxy.  
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1.5 An Ode to the Fallacies 
The Intentional Fallacy 
Written at a time when the postwar New Criticism had firmly entrenched its beliefs that 
both authorial intentions and the reader’s responses to literary works should be banished 
from the domain of literary criticism, Said’s revised doctoral dissertation Joseph Conrad 
and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966) reads as a humanist dissent from this dehumanized 
formalist approach to literature.24 If not in tone, then certainly in scope, the work is a 
critical reaction to the postwar New Criticism and the reified close readings of its time. It 
seeks to reconnect literature with its human context, with its moment of production and 
reception. Said rehumanizes the literary work of art by stressing, first, that it is not just 
an object but also an expression of human experience and, secondly, that comprehension 
in literary criticism is impossible without reinstating the critic and author as conversation 
partners. Despite Said’s profound interest in form, rhetoric and style, a clear sign of the 
hegemony of the New Criticism, his treatment of all of Conrad’s shorter fiction – a 
collection of thirty short stories and novellas – and the whole preserved body of letters of 
the Anglo-Polish writer – a colossal amount of eight volumes25 – is, from the point of view 
of New Critics working in the vein of Wimsatt and Beardsley, so hopelessly 
anthropomorphic or psychologized that, to paraphrase Harold Aram Veeser, the whole 
book reads as an ode to the New Critical ‘fallacies’ (2010, pp. 28-29). 
Throughout his analyses, Said ‘commits’ the intentional fallacy over and over by 
founding his overall interpretation and judgment of Conrad’s writings on the author’s 
intentions. These intentions do not serve as the ultimate touchstone which Said uses to 
                                               
24 Little has been written on Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. Beyond the initial, and rather negative, 
short review articles written shortly after the book’s publication (Donoghue, 1967; Hewitt, 1968; Hynes, 1969; 
Knapp Hay, 1967; Lodge, 1968; McDowell, 1968; Rose, 1968; Tanner, 1966; Vidan, 1970), most monographs on 
Said either seem to ignore it (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2009; Marrouchi, 2004), or routinely mention and pass over 
it quickly (Kennedy, 2000, pp. 7-8). In this way, all of these studies contribute to the popular image of Said as 
poststructuralist at birth and Beginnings (1975a) as the foundational work that already expresses in nuce all of 
Said’s later critical preoccupations (see Brennan, 1992, p. 75). Lately, there has been a revived but – compared to 
the thousands of pages written on his more well-known works such as Orientalism (1978) – still limited interest 
in Said’s study on Conrad (Hussein, 2002, pp. 19-52; McCarthy, 2010, pp. 14-20; Veeser, 2010, pp. 25-33). 
25 Not all of Conrad’s letters were preserved (Hewitt, 1968, p. 234). Many of his letters to his uncle Tadeusz 
Bobrowski between 1869 and 1894 were destroyed during World War I and are therefore not included in the 
corpus of texts that Said analyzes (see Najder, 2007, p. viii). 
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judge the success of Conrad’s writings – the strongest offence of the intentional fallacy, 
according to Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946, pp. 468-469) – but they function similarly to 
the concept of structural intention in that they establish unity, by governing Conrad’s 
works (1966, p. 28) and determining “the subject of his fiction” (1966, p. 168). While the 
New Criticism increasingly dismissed inquiries into the author’s intentions, stressing that 
the important thing about literature is that it simply is, in Said’s account such inquiries are 
an important aspect of criticism, because an author’s intentions are integral parts of 
precisely that what literature is.  
To understand Said’s main argument, it is important to note that though Conrad has 
now firmly occupied a place within the pantheon of English literature, English was his 
third language only. Having been born in a Polish speaking family and cultural 
environment in the Russian part of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Conrad 
spoke his native Polish and, from his childhood onwards, had a fluency in French (Najder, 
2007, p. ix). However, he only learned to speak English in his twenties when he was 
employed with the British merchant marine (Najder, 2007, pp. 64-65). Having come to 
English relatively late, Conrad never mastered it as well as his first two languages. The 
many examples of Gallicisms or Polonisms in his writing indicate that it always remained 
influenced by his French and Polish (Najder, 2007, p. 342). In fact, Conrad’s biographer, 
Zdzisław Najder, even goes as for to say that his work “can be seen as located in the 
borderland of auto-translation” (2007, p. ix). 
As a result of growing up in different cultural and linguistic environment, Conrad’s 
writing style in English distinguishes him from his contemporary Victorian writers. As 
his reception in the middle of the twentieth century indicates, Conrad’s critics, the 
Anglophone ones in particular, have even often criticized him for writing in a hard-going 
and turgid kind of English that is marked by winding, ambiguous narrative structures, a 
stuttering and often even plainly awkward syntax, and descriptions that are at times 
distractingly adjectival and overrhetorical. F. R. Leavis, the British literary critic and 
founder of the highly influential literary periodical Scrutiny, had argued in The Great 
Tradition that Conrad used that style to draw attention to himself as a self-confident and 
careless writer (1950, pp. 173-226). Said disagrees and opens his work by arguing that 
Conrad was “a self-conscious foreigner writing of obscure experiences in an alien 
language” (Said, 1966, p. 4). In his view, Conrad employed that style to deliberately hide 
himself within this alien language. This view would place Said more in line with Richard 
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Curle, a frequent correspondent and assistant to Conrad in his later years, who also 
produced one of the earliest criticism of the Anglo-Polish writer. Similar to Curle’s 
remarks that Conrad simply had to write in English or he could not have expressed himself 
and that the author therefore firmly belongs to English literature (1914, p. 228), Said 
argues that Conrad’s extravagant style and choice of narrative methods are not the result 
of someone struggling with the English language, but precisely of someone who had 
mastered it and deliberately chose to develop a style that is a reflection of his conscious 
psychology or lived experience (1966, p. 100). Said’s overall argument is that Conrad spent 
an entire career self-consciously creating and promoting an image of himself as an 
experienced sea dog and self-confident storyteller who appeared to be in full control of his 
life and craft, while in reality he was playing to his audience and camouflaging the fact 
that he was deeply insecure and troubled by how both had turned out. This leads Said to 
round up the book’s opening statement: 
Conrad’s prose is not the unearned prolixity of a careless writer but rather the 
concrete and particular result of his immense struggle with himself. If at times he is 
too adjectival, it is because he failed to find a better way of making his experience 
clear. That failure is . . . the true theme of his fiction. He had failed, in the putting 
down of words, to rescue meaning from his undisciplined experience. Nor had he 
rescued himself from the difficulties of his life: this is why his letters, where all of 
these problems are explicitly treated, are necessary for a full understanding of his 
fiction. (1966, p. 4) 
As that last sentence indicates, the innovation of Said’s revised doctoral dissertation 
was that it was the first work to study Conrad’s letters as a whole, meaningful body of 
writing. In what would be considered another breach of the New Critical rule that each 
literary work should be studied as a self-sufficient verbal icon that needs to be evaluated 
in its own terms – which, to the New Critics, means studying literature as literature – Said 
does not only interpret Conrad’s fiction in relation to his intentions, but reads each literary 
work in relation to his other literary works – and (occasionally) to those of others (1966, 
pp. 170-171) – and relates them to non-literary works, the letters. In the rather polemical 
preface to the work, Said attacks Conrad’s biographers and critics for studying his literary 
career and fiction without making proper use of the letters. This is a huge critical mistake, 
he believes, because “Conrad’s letters . . . provide us with an almost embarrassingly rich 
testimonial to the intensity and variety of his intellectual life” (Said, 1966, p. vii). By 
 81 
ignoring these letters or limiting their use and discussions of them to make incidental 
points about Conrad’s thinking, writing or biography, these scholars have ultimately failed 
to grasp the deeper intricacies of Conrad’s fiction. After all, Said firmly believes that “[t]he 
abundant difficulties with which the letters teem are . . . the difficulties of Conrad’s spiritual 
life, so that critics are almost forced to associate the problems of his life with the problems 
of his fiction; the task here, different but related, is to see how the letters relate first to the 
man and then to his work” (1966, p. 5). 
The ultimate goal of the work is “to provide an outline for an integral reading of 
Conrad’s total oeuvre” (Said, 1966, p. viii). Said therefore favors a holistic approach that is 
based on the premise that Conrad’s fictional works can only be fully understood by 
simultaneously studying the letters, because both type of texts, literary and non-literary, 
“form an organic whole” (1966, p. vii). By reading Conrad’s correspondence and literature 
as an ensemble, Said’s conceptualization of literature in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography extends the organic theory of the New Critical literary work of art as a 
Gestalt in which all parts of the literary work are interrelated and interconnected in a 
totalized form in such a way that that totalized form can now be thought of as “Conrad’s 
total oeuvre” (1966, p. viii). Instead of each part of the poem reflecting and helping to 
support the poem’s central paradox in a New Critical account of literature, in Said’s 
account each part or passage from an individual letter, novella or short story is related to 
the rest of Conrad’s works and offers a viewpoint from which the critic can analyze the 
totalized form that is the author’s oeuvre. To be clear, while the term ‘oeuvre’ in the Oxford 
Dictionary of Literary Terms, for instance, is said to refer to “the total body of works 
produced by a given writer” (Baldick, 2015; my emphasis), it has a distinct literary 
connotation which means that in the majority of cases the term is used to refer to the total 
body of literary works produced by a given writer. In Said’s case, however, the term is used 
in its broad sense and designates all texts written by Conrad, not just the literary ones. 
This oeuvre has some remarkable similarities to a Gestalt in that it is other than the sum 
of its parts because it is marked by a certain degree of coherence – “dominant themes, 
patterns, and images” (Said, 1966, p. viii) or a “dominant mode” (Said, 1966, p. 13) – that 
is already present, but not always at first sight visible, in each individual piece of writing 
and, once it has been found through the critical act, illuminates each piece of writing. Said’s 
holistic approach to Conrad is thus inevitably a comparative one in which passages from 
literary works or letters are first examined individually and chronologically, and then 
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compared to others to establish their coherence. This is necessary, he believes, because a 
close reading of an individual passage or a literary work, however valuable in itself, doesn’t 
necessarily result in a full insight about that passage or literary work. In Said’s account, 
critical insight of a certain text predominantly results from establishing coherence 
between texts, which means determining the unifying author’s intentions and identifying 
with the human experience that it expresses.  
Though nowhere fully theorized, in Said’s account we should take coherence to be a 
translation of the concept of a unifying structural intention. This means that establishing 
this kind of coherence is Said’s way of considering form (the surface, or individual pieces 
of writing) in relation to its structural intention (the depth, or the rest of the oeuvre), and 
thus, from what we have already seen in the previous pages, a way of rehumanizing literary 
form and reacting to the ‘wan’ formalist approach of the postwar New Criticism. After all, 
I would like to recall that what de Man had called the “partial failure of American 
formalism” was that its dehumanized theory of reading could no longer reveal the human 
content of art precisely because of “its lack of awareness of the intentional structure of 
literary form” (1971b, p. 27). In addition, Said’s notion of coherence differs from the 
postwar New Critical notion in which literature is analyzed exclusively through the use 
of ‘internal’ linguistic evidence, and, following too strict an interpretation of Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s theory of verbal meaning, coherence is therefore only sought within the text. 
In “The Intentional Fallacy”, Wimsatt and Beardsley had drawn up a formal and 
evaluative distinction between internal or valid and external or invalid evidence for 
determining meaning in literary criticism. Internal evidence is public evidence, available 
in the published work. It is evidence provided by the literary work as a linguistic fact: its 
semantics, grammar, syntax, dictionary meanings, or, in short, “all that makes a language 
and culture” (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946, p. 477). External evidence, by contrast, is 
private or idiosyncratic. It is information found in the author’s (unpublished) journals or 
correspondence that reveals why and how an author wrote a particular work, such as what 
particular historical person did he or she have in mind when writing this verse or in what 
location did he or she write that stanza (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946, pp. 477-478). 
Wimsatt and Beardsley resolutely dismiss this kind of evidence as trivial or uninteresting 
to literary criticism and banish the use of such evidence to the domain of literary 
biography. However, the authors also describe an intermediate, third kind of evidence to 
be found in journals and letters “about the character of the author or about private or semi-
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private meanings attached to words or topics by an author or by a coterie of why he is a 
member” (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946, p. 478). This kind of evidence is not wholly 
uninteresting to literary criticism and, though Wimsatt and Beardsley have a clear 
preference for leaving this kind of evidence out of the equation and solely treating the 
literary work as a linguistic fact, the use of such “biographical evidence need not involve 
intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also 
be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance” (1946, 
p. 478). The crucial word in the quotation is ‘may’, for in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s opinion 
it is a very thin line to walk distinguishing between the second, external type of evidence 
– and the risk of committing the intentional fallacy – and the third, intermediate one. This 
shading into one another gives rise to “the difficulty for criticism” (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 
1946, p. 478) and hence their preference to leave out this kind of evidence altogether. 
Said, however, chooses to walk the line as this intermediate kind of evidence is primarily 
the type of information with which he is concerned. Mind that, unconcerned with being 
accused of intentionalism, he transgresses that line frequently to point out information 
about the exact dates and locations at which certain pieces of writing were written, 
information which Wimsatt and Beardsley would consider to be of the purely biographical 
and intentional kind. In Said’s account, this kind of evidence is however only anecdotal 
and his main argument is built on the intermediate evidence about Conrad’s character, 
beliefs and moral concerns. Throughout his analyses, Said makes clear that Conrad’s 
“fiction is a vital reflection of his developing character” (1966, p. 13; my emphasis) and that 
his letters, too, reveal information of “Conrad’s consciousness of himself in the struggle 
toward the equilibrium of character” (1966, p. 13). Said shows how the fiction and letters 
attest to how Conrad, in the existential balancing act between asserting oneself too little 
and vanishing into “the chaotic, undifferentiated, and anonymous flux of passing time” 
(1966, p. 13) and asserting oneself too strongly that it leads to far-fledged egotism on the 
other end, Conrad eventually became the self-conscious and critical writer who developed 
the unique individuality or character that distinguishes him from his contemporaries 
(1966, pp. 27-28). Said’s treatment of Conrad’s fiction and correspondence reads both type 
of texts as the reflection of patterns that illustrate the development of the author’s self-
assertion which Conrad sought so hard to control in a constantly renewed “deliberate and 
sustained act of will” (1966, p. 22), in short, an intentional process.  
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Though these patterns are present in the text, in Said’s study, coherence is initially 
sought outside of the text, in the unified form that is the oeuvre, which means that textual 
coherence should actually be thought of as a correspondence with other texts (both fictional 
and non-fictional). As such, Said echoes the words of his supervisor, Harry Levin, who had 
argued in the first year of Said as a graduate at Harvard that even though the New Critics 
theoretically maintained the idea that literature does not exist in a vacuum – after all, so 
did Wimsatt and Beardsley too –, in practice they simply put too much stress on 
“coherence, at the expense of correspondence” (1958, p. 158) and had therefore isolated 
literature from any values external to be found in this ‘intermediate’ evidence. The holistic 
approach to Conrad, which Said was to develop in the following years under the 
supervision of Levin, bears likeness to his supervisor’s comment and is based on the 
method of establishing coherence-through-correspondence (quite literally even), the 
critical importance of which I would like to illustrate by an analysis of a passage from 
Conrad’s most well-known novella, Heart of Darkness. 
At the beginning of the narrative when the pleasure ship Nellie lies anchored at sunset 
in the Thames Estuary, the launching place of England's great ships of exploration and 
colonization, the protagonist and narrator Charles Marlow ponders on the idea of 
imperialism. He undermines its rationale and pierces through the myth of imperialism as 
a noble mission civilisatrice, unmasking it as being nothing more than glorified robbery and 
land theft: 
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking away of it from those who 
have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty 
thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only. An idea at 
the back of it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the 
idea – something you can sacrifice to. (Conrad, Heart of Darkness, quoted by Said, 
1966, p. 137) 
In the following pages Said argues that, given the overall ironic tone of Marlow’s recount 
of the journey up the Congo River to Kurtz’ Inner Station, a critic studying Heart of 
Darkness as an autonomous literary object is unable to tell whether this passage should be 
read ironically or sincerely. The question is whether Conrad as a writer endorsed 
Marlow’s ideas and effectively used the character as a mouthpiece to ridicule Europe’s self-
proclaimed civilizing mission in Africa, or whether Marlow’s opinion should be read as an 
ironic statement that is part of the novella’s schizophrenic moral universe and that in 
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reality Conrad himself was more sympathetic to the practices of imperialism and 
colonialism. The key to this question of character lies outside the literary work. Said 
illustrates this by relating the passage to a letter which Conrad wrote to his close friend, 
Scottish politician Robert Bontine Cunninghame Graham on February 8, 1899, a couple 
of days after the publication of the first of the three serial installments that would later 
make up the novella Heart of Darkness (see Said, 1966, pp. 201-203). Conrad begins that 
letter by expressing his gratitude to his friend. He is extremely pleased to know that 
Cunninghame Graham has picked up and shares the central idea of the novella: 
I am simply in the seventh heaven to find you like the “H. of D.” so far. You bless 
me indeed. . . . There are two more instalments in which the idea is so wrapped up 
in secondary notions that you – even you! – may miss it. And also you must 
remember that I don’t start with an abstract notion. I start with definite images and 
as their rendering is true some little effect is produced. So far the note struck chimes 
in with your conviction, – mais après? There is an après. But I think that if you look 
a little into the episodes you will find in them the right intention. (Conrad quoted 
by Said, 1966, p. 201) 
According to Said, the letter to Cunninghame Graham is proof that “Conrad himself was 
evidently involved in” the unmasking of imperialism’s civilizing mission, as “he devotes a 
good deal of agonized reasoning to it” (Said, 1966, p. 137). In the letter Conrad expresses 
a moral view that criticizes imperialism as “the negation of intellectual differentiation” 
(Said, 1966, pp. 137-138). Imperialism monopolizes the entire system of representation 
and organizes the world according to ‘truthful’, dichotomic intellectual categories of 
colonizers and colonized that inhibit empathic identification with the latter: “So sufficient 
is this all-enveloping shadow that one can rest entirely within it, away from any of the 
common rational forms of human hope or regret. Lodged within the obliterating shadow 
of truth, a man feels indifferent to everything outside” (Said, 1966, p. 138).  
Said goes on to point out why it is important to relate the letters to the fiction: 
The letter is mostly in French and, as Conrad himself lamely adds at the end of it, 
often seems incoherent. But when we put the passage from Heart of Darkness next to 
it, a certain degree of coherence does emerge. Since the language and the theme in 
both are strangely similar, the letter and the tale were most probably written in 
emphatic support of one of Conrad’s more compelling beliefs. (1966, p. 137) 
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Studied in itself the letter is too abstruse and incoherent to make much sense; the same 
holds true for the passage from Heart of Darkness because in the entire narrative of the 
novella “little more is said directly about the matter” (Said, 1966, p. 137). But once we 
relate the letter to the passage, a coherence emerges that illuminates both the letter and 
the passage as sincere expressions of Conrad’s moral view. This coherence between both 
type of texts makes it clear that Conrad as a writer and historical person endorsed the 
opinion of his garrulous fictional narrator Marlow and wrote the novella as the (arguably 
still flawed) critique of imperialism and colonialism for which it became known.  
The question of sincerity and authorial intention of this passage in Heart of Darkness 
might at first sight seem rather trivial or at best only interesting to readers concerned 
with the author’s biography. It actually isn’t. In a 1975 lecture, Chinua Achebe famously 
attacked the image of Conrad as a critic of imperialism and Heart of Darkness as a haunting 
psychological critique of the colonizing mission in the Congo Free State. It is precisely on 
account of this anti-colonial critique in combination with the form and style in which the 
narrative is presented, that the novella was hailed as a literary masterpiece and that F.R. 
Leavis, in The Great Tradition, the book to which I have already briefly referred, had 
included Conrad in a list of “great English novelists” (1950, p. 1); a list that also included 
Jane Austen, George Eliot, Henry James and Charles Dickens, all working in the great 
tradition set out by no one other than Shakespeare. First published in 1948, the date is 
significant and helps explain the goal of Leavis’s work. As Mark Greif has recently pointed 
out, after the worldwide totalitarian crisis leading up to World War II – with the nearly 
simultaneous rise of Fascism in Italy, Falangism in Spain, Nazism in Germany, Stalinism 
in the U.S.S.R., and Shōwa nationalism in Japan – and its disastrous outcome with the 
millions of deaths at Nanking, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Dresden, Auschwitz, and Treblinka, 
to name but a few places, intellectuals worldwide were questioning the very notions of 
democracy and the nature of Man (2015, pp. 5-8). “[T]he discourse of the crisis of man” 
(2015, p. 318), as Greif has called it, was soon centered around literature. Not long after 
the war an idea took root that literature “had the obligation to humanize a fallen mankind” 
(2015, p. 104). Following Theodor Adorno’s famous remarks that “to write poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric” (1981, p. 34), by which he meant that there was no possible, humane 
way of responding to the horrors of totalitarianism, which had reified all sectors of society 
including the body, poetry was in deep crisis (see Marx, 2005).  
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Poetry, which had been lauded as the highest form of human imagination at the expense 
of the novel in the decades leading up to World War II by the likes of Paul Valéry and the 
historical avant-gardes in Europe and T.S. Eliot and the New Critics in the U.S. (see Greif, 
2015, pp. 104-105), had done nothing to stop the barbary at Belsen and Buchenwald and 
was now considered to be exhausted and worn out. Poetry had lost its acquired cultural 
authority and literary critics, spearheaded by Leavis in the U.K. and Lionel Trilling in the 
U.S., now put all their hopes in the novel to regenerate mankind, because, in their view, 
the novel “has been of all literary forms, the most devoted to the celebration and 
investigation of the human will” (Trilling, 1948, p. 1280). Because of its still untainted 
aura, the novel was now hailed as the chosen medium to ward off the rise of antihumanism 
and the accompanying “losses of civilization, personality, humanness” (Trilling, 1948, p. 
1280). Intellectuals like Leavis and Trilling spoke in favor of the novel “on behalf of the 
liberating effects that may be achieved when literature understands itself to be literature 
and does not identify itself with what it surveys” (Trilling, 1948, p. 1284). In the discourse 
of these literary critics and the culture at large, the novel as literary genre was directly 
linked to human freedom (Greif, 2015, pp. 108-109) and Trilling even went as far to say 
that  
[f]or our time the most effective agent of the moral imagination has been the novel 
of the last two hundred years. It was never, either aesthetically or morally, a perfect 
form and its faults and failures can be quickly enumerated. . . . It taught us, as no 
other genre ever did, the extent of human variety and the value of this variety. . . . 
Yet there never was a time when its particular activity was so much needed, was of 
so much practical, political, and social use – so much so that if its impulse does not 
respond to the need, we shall have reason to be sad not only over a waning form of 
art but also over our waning freedom. (1955, p. 222) 
As a result, by the midcentury in the US, the novel obtained such an enormous cultural 
authority, which it no longer holds today and perhaps never will again, that it “became an 
agent of a certain kind of humanism associated with the restoration of man” (Greif, 2015, 
p. 104). Within this context, Leavis’s book should be read as a plea for the value of 
literature and the historical significance of the novel against the immoral, antihuman 
systems of totalitarian regimes and societies. After all, the one criterion that unites all the 
novelists included in his book is that “they are all distinguished by a vital capacity for 
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experience, a kind of reverent openness before life, and a marked moral intensity” (Leavis, 
1950, p. 9). 
In all of Conrad’s works and in Heart of Darkness particularly, Leavis had found precisely 
that life affirming criterion, making the novella “Conrad’s art at its best” (1950, p. 177). 
Referring to the literary criticism of Eliot, he lauded the novella’s “overpowering 
evocation of atmosphere by means of ‘objective correlatives’” (Leavis, 1950, p. 174) effected 
by its particular style of “adjectival insistence upon inexpressible and incomprehensible 
mystery” (Leavis, 1950, p. 177). As a result of Leavis’ book, Heart of Darkness became one 
of the most commonly prescribed novellas in English literature departments and therefore 
Achebe’s target of criticism (Achebe, 1977, p. 783). According to Achebe, the anti-colonial 
image of the author is false and from carefully analyzing the celebrated form and style 
which the author uses to portray Africa and its native population he believes it is fair to 
say that “Conrad was a bloody racist” (1977, p. 788). Though Conrad carefully distances 
himself from the moral universe of the novella by filtering the narrative through two 
narrators (the intradiegetic Marlow and a nameless extradiegetic one), Heart of Darkness 
depicts Africa as a metaphysical wasteland devoid of any recognition of the humanity of 
its population and ultimately reduces the entire African continent to serve as the 
background for the disintegration of a single European mind, Mr. Kurtz’ (Achebe, 1977, 
p. 788). Far from being the celebrated bulwark of humanism that allegedly should effect 
the regeneration of mankind, as Leavis read it shortly after the war, Achebe argues that 
the novella in effect dehumanizes Africans and reproduces the grossly inaccurate and 
offensive dominant Western image of Africa as a continent that induces madness, or better 
still, is madness itself (see Loomba, 2005, p. 117). The novella reproduces an imperialist 
image that is inherently Eurocentric, totalitarian and antihuman, and is rooted in a long 
history of Western representations about Africa (Achebe, 1977, p. 792). In sum, all good 
anti-imperialist intentions of the author aside, Heart of Darkness is written from an 
imperialist point of view that doesn’t offer any viable alternatives by which its readers can 
judge the narrative and actions of its characters (Achebe, 1977, p. 787). The novella is 
offensive, racist and demeaning to Africans and should be removed from the canon 
(Achebe, 1977, pp. 788-789). 
Achebe’s stance on Conrad’s authorial intentions in Heart of Darkness has been 
foundational for the field of postcolonial studies and just like Said’s Orientalism has made 
critics aware of how Western fictional narratives reproduce harmful, dehumanizing and 
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racist stereotypes about non-Western cultures and their peoples. The relevance of 
Achebe’s argument for my discussion of Said’s reading method in Joseph Conrad and the 
Fiction of Autobiography is that while Achebe already discusses quite some passages from 
the novella in his lecture, he doesn’t mention the passage quoted above, nor the letter to 
which Said refers. This is important, because even though the coherence which Said found 
between the passage and the letter doesn’t alter the objectionable, dehumanizing way in 
which Africa and Africans are portrayed in Heart of Darkness – and to be clear, I am on firm 
ground with Achebe on this –, it does at least supplement, complete and nuance our 
understanding of the novella. My point is that although Said’s doctoral work on Conrad 
doesn’t explicitly deal with criticizing imperialism in particular and he therefore doesn’t 
draw the conclusion that he would later make about Conrad’s stance on imperialism in 
Culture and Imperialism (1993, pp. 19-31), his analysis of the passage above and the letter 
connected to it illustrates that Heart of Darkness is deeply connected to Conrad’s personal 
lived experience of imperialism26 and that, contrary to what Achebe argued, the novella 
was not meant “to set people against people” (1977, p. 789). Far from dividing people into 
categories and endorsing an imperialist worldview in Heart of Darkness, Said’s comparison 
of the novella to the letter shows that Conrad precisely meant to challenge that worldview 
and its system of representation and wrote the novella “on the side of man’s deliverance 
and not his enslavement” (Achebe, 1977, p. 789). Whether the author succeeded in his 
intentions, is a different question, though. 
 There is a great deal more to say about Said’s analysis of this passage and the related 
letter as well as his stance in regard to Achebe’s interpretation of Conrad. I will return to 
the former in the second chapter of this book where I analyze Said’s conceptualization of 
agency in the works of Conrad, and very briefly discuss the latter in the epilogue to this 
chapter. Suffice it now to say that Said’s ‘commitment’ of the intentional fallacy is a 
necessary methodological step for him to be able to fully grasp Conrad’s literary works 
and the human experience they are said to express. After all, studying both the letter to 
Cunninghame Graham and the passage from Heart of Darkness autonomously inhibits a 
full understanding of each of these texts. However, when they are juxtaposed, compared 
and read as an ensemble, a certain coherence emerges which allows us better to 
                                               
26 In 1890, Conrad spent a couple of months in command of a steamer of a Belgian trading company on the Congo 
River bearing the majestic name Le Roi des Belges (Najder, 2007, p. 159). His personal experiences with witnessing 
the brutal oppression of the native population in the name of commerce and civilization, and subsequent moral 
shock and indignation are said to have directly inspired the narrative of Heart of Darkness (Najder, 2007, p. 163) 
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comprehend Conrad’s literary and non-literary works individually and as parts of a 
totalized form or oeuvre. Said’s critical assessment throughout his study is that Conrad’s 
novellas, as we have seen with the passage in Heart of Darkness, should be regarded as the 
fictionalization or dramatization of the author’s lived experience (1966, p. 125). 
Interestingly, according to Said, this experience is more clearly apparent in the letters, 
because, in comparison with the literary works, they are “informal and personal rather 
than formal or systematic” (Said, 1966, p. 5). Only by reading the letters and fiction as an 
organic whole are we able to discern significant structural homologies between the way 
Conrad experienced his life and the literary form of his stories. The author constantly 
reformulated the various insights and discoveries of his letters in his fiction so that both 
type of texts contain similar dominant themes, patterns and images or what Said calls 
“structures of experience” (1966, p. 12). 
Before I move on to discuss Said’s stance on the affective fallacy in Joseph Conrad and 
the Fiction of Autobiography, an important critical observation should be made about his 
method. As I have just noted, Said attributes a major critical importance to Conrad’s letters 
because he regards these texts to be the clearest or most authentic expressions of the 
author’s lived experience and therefore the most direct access points from which the critic 
can identify the ‘structures of experience’ informing Conrad’s oeuvre. But there is no 
reason to believe that Conrad’s letters offer a more authentic account of his intentions and 
lived experience than his novellas. Just as there is no reason to believe that Conrad only 
manipulated the image of himself to present his readers, as the title of Said’s book suggest, 
with a fiction of autobiography in his literary works and autobiographical essays and not 
in his correspondence (see Said, 1966, p. 120). Why this preference of non-fictional access 
points over fictional or, as Said labels the autobiographical works, “pseudo-fictional” (1966, 
p. 74)? And why does he seem to be suspicious of the claims in Conrad’s fictional works 
only? He offers no satisfying rationale for his choice. One critic has even called this 
preference “a basic fallacy” (Hewitt, 1968, p. 234) in his reasoning. Another was apt to note 
that this might be because Said “trusts the teller, not the tale” (Donoghue, 1967, p. 202). 
Indeed, when comparing the novellas with the letters, Said effectively appears to be using 
a double standard. As he makes clear in the opening pages to the work, the integral reading 
which he proposes “gives new insights into and solutions for the difficulties of the fiction” 
(Said, 1966, p. viii).  
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As a professionally trained literary critic, Said is attentive to what he believes to be the 
ambiguity of literary works: he stresses that literature doesn’t make much sense without 
illuminating critical insights, that it raises questions which beg for solutions, and that it is, 
in short, not straightforward but difficult. With Marlow’s musings on imperialism in Heart 
of Darkness, we have already seen that Said appeals to Conrad’s letters to decipher the 
difficulties or enigma of the fiction. “The great value of the letters”, Said motivates his 
choice, “is that they make such a study possible by disclosing the background of speculation 
and insight that strengthens the fiction” (1966, p. 8; his emphasis). If we interpret Said’s 
choice of words here used to describe the letters, it seems that he takes them at their word, 
reading the letters as truthful, direct statements that reveal or disclose information about 
the author’s background and intentions which is necessary to illuminate the fiction.27 The 
fictional works then are in their turn indirect, ambiguous, revealing or closed and need to 
be cracked open by the critic. In spite of Said’s attempt to distance himself from the New 
Criticism, one cannot help but noticing that such a view of literature is surprisingly close 
to the New Critical view about the language of paradox in which the discourse of non-
fiction is direct and offers easily attainable conceptual knowledge about experience (it 
discloses the background), but literary discourse is marked by all kinds of ambiguity 
(Empson, 1930), paradoxes (Brooks, 1947b) and indirection (Brooks, 1947c) that express 
the complexities and wholeness of that human experience. In fact, there is a balancing act 
in Said’s thought. The distinction which Said’s makes between fictional and non-fictional 
texts on account of their language unearths a penchant for formalism that we should take 
to be the result of the specific American context of his criticism. But the fact that every 
individual imagination – regardless of it being fictional, such as the short stories and 
novellas, pseudo-fictional, such as Conrad’s autobiographical works, or non-fictional such 
as the letters – expresses the same structures of experience that inform the author’s 
oeuvre, is part of an antiformalist tendency in Said’s study that is caused by his use of 
phenomenological models of reading. All of this is a sign that in spite of the work’s ode to 
                                               
27 The structure of Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography reflects that goal. Following an introductory 
chapter that very briefly outlines the methodology of the work (1966, pp. 3-28), in the first part Said discusses 
Conrad’s letters that have been written in the period 1896-1924 in chronological order (1966, pp. 29-83). In the 
second part, Said discusses Conrad’s shorter fiction, building up to an analysis of Conrad’s 1917 retrospective 
novella The Shadow Line (1966, pp. 87-197). The structure of Said’s book on Conrad rhetorically reinforces the 
argument that the letters serve as the necessary background to the fiction.  
 
92 
the intentional fallacy, Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography does not 
wholeheartedly reject all ideas associated with the New Criticism. 
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The Affective Fallacy 
As for the affective fallacy, Said’s study is as clear a challenge to the ban on emotional or 
subjective reasoning in literary criticism as they come. It reacts against the 
institutionalized and professionalized postwar New Critical approach to literature, which, 
as we have seen, erroneously and perhaps even unwittingly tried to apply a positivistic 
method of understanding to the study of literature. Said does so by turning to the works 
of R.P. Blackmur and, to a lesser extent, Harry Levin, as well as some early ideas of the 
New Criticism, when its methodology had not been codified by the fallacy-essays yet. 
To understand Said’s stance, we would also do well to remind ourselves that in “The 
Affective Fallacy”, Wimsatt and Beardsley plead for analyzing literature as objectively as 
possible, which, to them, means founding one’s analysis of the literary work on evidence 
supplied by the literary work as a linguistic fact and decidedly not on the basis of its effects 
on the reader or critic. In the essay the authors define the affective fallacy as “a confusion 
between the poem and its results (what it is and what it does)” (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1949, 
p. 31). Or, as they seem to hint at with their choice of motto to the essay,28 a literary critic 
committing the affective fallacy is like an oenologist studying the properties of wine by 
getting drunk. While getting drunk can be a pleasant state of mind, it also clouds one’s 
judgments and is ultimately an obstacle to a rational and objective criticism of wine. 
Getting drunk as a professionally trained oenologist is amateuristic and so is the use of 
emotive or subjective reasoning in literary criticism, Wimsatt and Beardsley believe. In 
the face of this, Said’s study is a plea for restoring subjectivism in literary criticism. And 
while it is not a plea for getting drunk, it is a plea for at least actually drinking the wine. 
For, even though drinking the wine isn’t part of explaining the properties of wine, it is 
decidedly part of experiencing wine and has to be taken into account if we wish to 
comprehend the whole experience of wine. If we translate the metaphor to literary 
criticism, this means that if one is to comprehend the whole literary experience one cannot 
limit oneself to explaining the objective, linguistic properties of the literary work as an 
object, but one also has to account for the subjective, emotive aspects of the literary work 
as a manmade product. After all, if we have to take home two important lessons from the 
prewar New Criticism it is that literature is a means of aesthetic communication where 
                                               
28 “We might as well study the properties of wine by getting drunk” (Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music 
quoted as motto by Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1949, p. 31). 
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human experience takes the form of literature and that we experience the literary 
experience – or for that matter, any human experience – as much through emotional, non-
conceptual insight as through logical, conceptual knowledge. 
We have already seen that Said tries to determine the author’s intentions in order to 
more adequately define the theme and subject of Conrad’s writings, judge the success of 
these texts, and ultimately attempt to comprehend and identify with the lived experience 
that the total oeuvre communicates. I wish to add that, when doing all of this, Said also 
draws heavily on emotional reasoning by taking his affective and cognitive responses to 
the works in account. To Said’s mind, this needn’t be a ‘commitment’ of the affective fallacy 
yet, because, according to the book’s main argument, these subjective responses are not 
arbitrary or purely idiosyncratic nor signs of unbridled relativism in Said’s criticism – and 
thus, similar to his stance on the intentional fallacy which we have just seen, again no clear 
examples of the affective fallacy (see Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1949, pp. 31-32) – but reactions 
to the text that were precisely anticipated by the author and effected by the intentional 
form and structure of the text or passage in question. Such a stance is quite comparable to 
T. S. Eliot’s notion of the ‘objective correlative’ that was of foundational influence on the 
early New Criticism, in that a particular structure or form elaborated into the literary 
work by its author evokes not just any but a precise, particular emotion or sensory 
experience in the reader’s mind (1920a, pp. 92-93). After all, Said’s main argument is that 
Conrad wrote his literary works in such a way as to present his readers with a rosy image 
of himself as an experienced author who was now as confident and secure a story-teller as 
he had been a steamer captain, an effect Conrad carefully evoked by a “deliberate 
manipulation of motives and poses” (1966, p. 120). This critical assessment of Conrad’s 
authorial image can only be reached by analyzing the author’s intentions in his 
correspondence, studying biographical information, and comparing certain texts and 
passages from literary and non-literary texts with each other, while at the same time 
determining the effects of certain texts or passages on Conrad’s imagined audience. After 
all, it is precisely the discrepancy between the effects or results (the feeling of Conrad as a 
secure and confident seaman and writer) and the experience communicated in the total 
oeuvre (the so-called reality of Conrad as an insecure and tormented soul) or, to refer to 
Wimsatt and Beardsley’s essay, the discrepancy specifically between what the literary 
work is and what it does, that reveals the ambivalences of Conrad’s oeuvre and strengthens 
one’s comprehension of and identification with Conrad’s lived experience. 
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‘Committing’ the affective fallacy is therefore an important part of Said’s critical method 
in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. His argument is that in order to arrive at 
“[t]he accurate grasp of someone else’s deepest concerns” (Said, 1966, p. 5) the critic 
cannot rely solely on logical reasoning but must blend that kind of reasoning with 
emotional reasoning. This becomes partly clear in the preface to the work, where he 
advocates a ‘warm reading’ of Conrad’s total oeuvre in particular and, by extension, 
literature in general, that rejects the postwar New Criticism’s disinterested ‘cold reading’. 
He writes that his holistic approach to Conrad allows him  
to read the tales not only as objects of literature but, with the letters, as objects that 
were of spiritual use and significance to Conrad the man. Such a reading not only 
gives new insights into and solutions for the difficulties of the fiction, but also 
accounts for much of the fiction’s success and power. Finally, I hope that such a 
reading enriches and deepens our admiration for Conrad as an eminently self-aware, 
responsible, and serious artist. (Said, 1966, pp. viii-ix) 
Here, Said argues that a critic cannot simply coolly investigate texts “as objects of 
literature” and dismiss the author’s psychology, but must also read them with empathic 
identification “as objects that were of spiritual use and significance to Conrad the man” in 
order to judge the success of particular works. This makes his approach to literary 
criticism opposed to the one Wimsatt and Beardsley advocate in “The Affective Fallacy”, 
in which they precisely forbid such forms of author-psychology and dismiss emotional and 
cognitive reasoning – the former completely, the latter partially (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 
1949, pp. 41, 44). What makes Said’s criticism even more at odds with Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s is that he explicitly studies the effects of particular passages or texts, arguing 
that certain texts have a “qualified emotional force” (1966, p. 126). He also frequently uses 
emotional or psychological speculation to drive home his point that Conrad’s 
autobiographical writings are to an extent fictional and contribute to the making of an 
authorial persona (see 1966, pp. 67-76, 120-125) and draws upon Schopenhauerian 
philosophy as well as Jungian and, most notably, Sartrean psychology to make his 
overarching theoretical claim that literary criticism should rely on psychology to 
understand the complex and highly personal lived experiences that authorial oeuvres 
communicate.  
In the use of affective reasoning, we can see Said to subscribe to the opinion of Conrad 
writing to Edward Garnett, the English writer, critic and literary editor who introduced 
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Conrad to Ford Madox Ford and thus helped facilitate their famous collaboration which 
would result in the production of three collaborative novels.29 In a letter written on May 
16, 1917, Conrad expresses his mental discomfort, suffering and fear of the psychological 
atmosphere of mass slaughter in the ongoing World War, as well as his disillusionment 
with any moral justification to fight for one’s country. He writes that, in the context of 
death confronting so many individual soldiers on either side of the battlefield, “questions 
of right and wrong have . . . no connection whatever with the fundamental realities of life 
. . . Feelings are, to submit to them we can avoid neither death nor suffering which are our 
common lot, but we can bear them in peace” (Conrad quoted by Said, 1966, p. 75). 
According to Said, the letter illustrates candidly one of the ‘structures of experience’ 
informing Conrad’s oeuvre. It shows how Conrad came to terms with the psychological 
distress of the war and the fact that even though he realized that feelings might lead to 
contradictory and overwhelming sensations that seem impossible to be faced, he believed 
that they cannot and must not be evaded but confronted head on – an insight which the 
author would reformulate in his 1920 novel The Rescue, A Romance of the Shallows (Said, 
1966, p. 75). Confronting his emotions would turn out to be beneficial to Conrad as a 
person and writer. It would in the first place lead to an even greater personal “mastering 
of conscience” (Said, 1966, p. 75) that “would lead him finally to a comprehension of the 
entire experience of the war” (Said, 1966, p. 74), resulting in various literary publications. 
In the end, it would also lead to Conrad’s critical stance toward nationalistic and jingoistic 
thought and the development of a “passionate Europeanism” (Said, 1966, p. 83) in his 
thinking. Conrad’s metaphor is useful to us as we can take it to convey a message to 
literary critics working in the depsychologized vein of Wimsatt and Beardsley. It stresses 
that affective reasoning, next to logical reasoning, is part of our daily experience to make 
sense of the world and is therefore not something which is to be evaded in literary criticism 
and given a scary name like the ‘affective fallacy’, but embraced, confronted and 
approached, albeit in a critical manner. It stresses that experience comes to us as a whole 
and that determining the responses which literature evokes is a difficult but necessary step 
to arrive at a full comprehension of the entire experience of the literary work. 
                                               
29 Tellingly, Said does not discuss or analyze these collaborative novels because it would complicate his model 
of criticism of consciousness too much. Instead of the meeting of two minds, that of the critic and that of the 
author, in the reading of a single-authored novel, the reading of a collaborative novel would result in the meeting 
of at least three consciousnesses, or four even, if we do not rule out the possibility of a collaborative, common 
consciousness. In such a case, it would perhaps be too difficult to tell for the critic whose consciousness he or she 
is encountering and exploring. 
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Said’s stance on the affective ‘fallacy’ in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography 
echoes the ideas of R.P. Blackmur, one of his two senior thesis readers at Princeton who 
was one of the central driving forces for the New Criticism of the 1930s and whom I believe 
to be the single most influential and vastly underacknowledged American literary critic 
on Said’s critical practice. We have already encountered Blackmur and his notion of 
amateurism that lay at the basis for his famous Gauss Seminars in Princeton in my 
discussion of the ‘resistance’ to the postwar New Critical orthodoxy. Now, in a 1935 essay 
that bears the quintessentially prewar New Critical title “A Critic’s Job of Work”, which 
expresses the movement’s founding adagio that literary criticism should in the first place 
be practical instead of theoretical, Blackmur argues that “[c]riticism . . . is the formal 
discourse of an amateur” (1954a, p. 372). As we might recall, Blackmur was expelled from 
high school and never obtained an academic degree either. Though he was therefore 
perhaps the least academically trained of the prewar New Critics, this does not mean that 
he wasn’t educated. Working as a bookseller in a Cambridge bookstore in the mid-thirties, 
he sat in on lectures at Harvard without ever enrolling in a program (Fraser, 2010, p. 36). 
Yet in spite of his rigorous self-learning, having no academic degrees made him feel uneasy 
and unsure about his education and, as his biographer Russel Fraser puts it, when it came 
to this aspect of his life he always remained “absurdly on the defensive” (2010, p. 30). It 
can therefore come as no surprise that Blackmur’s essay of 1935, like Ransom’s essays 
from that period, targets the professional establishment of scholars who enjoyed much 
academic standing and intellectual authority. Instead of their professionalized and, in a 
way, elitist approach to literary criticism, Blackmur values amateurism and the ability (and 
even obligation) to talk about literature without necessarily having full scholarly 
authority. Blackmur’s idea of literary criticism as amateurism is informed by his opinion 
that good literary criticism is “undoctrinated thinking” (1954a, p. 375), whereas bad 
criticism “is governed by an idée fixe, a really exaggerated heresy, when a notion of genuine 
but small scope is taken literally as of universal application” (1954a, pp. 379-380). “For 
most minds”, he goes on to argue, 
once doctrine is sighted and is held to be the completion of insight, the doctrinal 
mode of thinking seems the only one possible. When doctrine totters it seems it can 
fall only into the gulf of bewilderment; few minds risk the fall; most seize the 
remnants and swear the edifice remains, when doctrine becomes intolerable dogma. 
(Blackmur, 1954a, p. 373) 
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To him, the professional scholarship in the 1930s was such intolerable dogma, as it quite 
literally excluded amateur literary critics like him from performing literary criticism. By 
contrast, in the New Criticism as it was taking shape by the likes of Ransom, Tate and 
Penn Warren, Blackmur saw a way to study literature in a critical and scholarly manner 
that was at the same time not abstract and professionalized but practical and amateuristic 
(in the base sense of the word, namely as someone “who loves or is fond of; one who has a 
taste for anything” (OED, 2017a)), therefore suiting his temperament and background as 
an autodidact more. 
Though Said never took a course with Blackmur or even met him in person, he was an 
avid reader of his work and frequently attended his lectures on poetics and modern fiction 
at Princeton (1999, pp. 276-277). There, Blackmur’s classroom performance must have left 
such a huge impression on Said that he developed a profound admiration30 for him, first 
openly expressed in a 1967 review article “Sense and Sensibility” (2000g). In that article, 
Said lauds Blackmur’s unique classroom mode that, to him, demonstrates that a literary 
critic should become thoroughly intimate with the literary work studied in order to grasp 
it fully. In this article and various publications to come, Said consequently takes great 
pains to liberate Blackmur’s criticism from the stifling label ‘New Criticism’ understood 
as detached, linguistic examination or explication of literary works (2000g, p. 17). His 
critical assessment of Blackmur’s literary criticism is that it brings out the primacy of form, 
but a form that is worldly and involved in social history (Palumbo-Liu, 2007, p. 222). He 
therefore locates Blackmur’s work at a place beyond formalism, a place in the U.S. literary 
critical landscape of the mid-1960s that is also occupied by Georges Poulet, the famous 
Belgian phenomenologist whom Said had heard a year earlier at the 1966 famous Johns 
Hopkins conference on structuralism describe the act of reading in equally intimate terms 
as an experience of interiority. In the article, Said does so by explicitly linking Blackmur’s 
criticism to that of Poulet, arguing that in spite of their distinct differences their 
approaches to literature should be seen as compatible: 
                                               
30 Though Said’s stance vis-à-vis the work of Blackmur is quite frankly a stance of admiration, we can occasionally 
find some criticism in his writings on Blackmur’s postwar criticism, which, according to Said, is tied to a sense 
of American responsibility for the postwar world and the dismantling of the old imperial and colonial structures. 
While Said lauds these politics of responsibility in what he in 1986 calls Blackmur’s “most extraordinary essays” 
these politics lead Blackmur to ironically take on a position of authority, resulting in “the astonishing ignorance 
and condescension about the non-Western world in his worst ones” (2000d, p. 261). Blackmur seems to have 
fallen prey to postwar American imperialism, therefore had little sympathy to the postcolonial problems of the 
newly independent states in Asia and Africa and was completely blind to the excrescences of European and 
American colonial rule (Said, 2000d, p. 261). 
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For theirs is an enterprise whose aim is nothing less than the reconstruction of 
experience apprehended from the point of its origin to its incarnation in form, or 
literature. So delicate an undertaking . . . supposes an ultimate talent for closeness 
to the animating experience that goes into literature. . . [B]oth styles reflect the 
care taken in preserving a sense of literature as highly nuanced and as intimate as 
possible. . . . For all their differences then, Poulet and Blackmur are virtuous in their 
devotion to a writer’s experience, and virtuosos in their gift for handling and 
representing experience. (2000g, p. 17) 
In his view, both thinkers resist what he calls ‘the imperialism of criticism’, where critical 
methods become orthodoxies that ultimately disfigure literary works and maim the human 
experiences they contain. “Criticism is notorious for its imperialism carried out in the name 
of understanding”, he goes on to clarify his argument, “method swallowing work, 
argument dividing to conquer and variety colonized into periods and “ages”” (Said, 2000g, 
p. 16). By contrast, Said considers the criticism of Blackmur and Poulet to be “a way of 
living up to and living with literature” (2000g, p. 16). They practice a humanist kind of 
literary criticism that pays careful attention to the individuality and variety of literary 
experiences by showing, each in their own distinct way how “life [is] translated into 
literature” (Said, 2000g, p. 22) – Blackmur with considerably more attention to individual 
works of art than Poulet who primarily and almost exclusively even deals with a writer’s 
total oeuvre. What Said admires about Blackmur’s criticism is its skillful combination of 
intellectual and emotional reasoning, a blend of reason and imagination that makes this 
kind of criticism fundamentally at odds with Wimsatt and Beardsley’s proposed purging 
of the ‘fallacies’ in literary criticism and a universal application of the New Critical method 
of reading (see 2000g, p. 22). 
In “The Horizon of R.P. Blackmur”, an essay published in 1986, Said admiringly writes 
that Blackmur is “the least influential, the least doctrinal, the least serviceable (in the base 
sense of the word) of the New Critics” (2000d, p. 251). Said is particularly drawn to the 
criticism of Blackmur because of the latter’s impatience with and principal rejection of any 
form of criticism founded on intellectual authority or what Said calls “the principle of 
authorization, which took one back all-too-dutifully to Freud, Arnold, Marx, and other 
critical masters for validation and accreditation” (2000d, p. 256). Indeed, as Paul A. Bové 
has argued, Blackmur was constantly preoccupied with the relation between orthodox and 
heretic modes of thinking and built his own method on the subversion of orthodoxy in 
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literary criticism (1984, p. 366). In the 1935 essay to which I referred earlier, Blackmur 
already describes how a critical orthodoxy is formed; he criticizes how the ideas of certain 
thinkers – whom Michel Foucault would call “fondateurs de discursivité” (1994e, p. 804) 
– are attributed a certain dynastic weight and then used as dogma to validate and govern 
a self-enclosed field of specialized knowledge such as literary criticism (Blackmur, 1954a, 
pp. 373-375). Blackmur tried to cultivate his own kind of criticism. He preferred the essay 
over the professionalized article, a penchant that was to inspire Said’s own love for the 
essay as prime medium to express critical thought (Sprinker, 1992), and during the 1930s 
he avoided the professionalized circles of U.S. literary criticism, seeking other, non-
professionalized outlets to express his critical views of literature (Said, 2000d, pp. 256-
257).  
Because of his distrust of professionalized, doctrinal thinking and idées fixes, Blackmur 
was unsurprisingly also one of the first to anticipate the New Criticism’s gradual 
professionalization, institutionalization and accompanying development into a formalist 
orthodoxy after World War II, which he unsuccessfully sought to counter with his Gauss 
Seminars. In the works of such critics as Burke, Empson, Wimsatt and Beardsley, he saw 
the principle of authorization in action and believed that the postwar New Criticism “was 
grinding into a self-centered methodology” (Fitzgerald, 1985, p. 121). To him, the 
movement was changing in the same way that I have outlined in the first parts of this 
chapter. What used to be an open-minded, anti-dogmatic approach to literary criticism 
practiced by critics who, just like Blackmur, may have lacked the many years of formal and 
rigorous academic training of their senior colleagues but did possess a loving and hence 
amateuristic (in the base sense of the word) attention to the formal and textual aspects of 
literature, was evolving through overtly zealous readings of Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
fallacy-essays into a professionalized but increasingly self-centered, dogmatic or doctrinal 
from of thinking that analyzed literary works in a narrowly formalist way and no longer 
payed attention to anything but the linguistic aspect of literary works. The postwar New 
Criticism simply overvalued the role of linguistics in literary criticism and limited the task 
of criticism to a mere linguistic examination of works of art. To Blackmur, however, 
criticism must always be concerned with more than purely the linguistic. In what feels like 
an anticipatory reaction to the kind of depsychologized reading proposed in Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s “The Affective Fallacy”, he writes:  
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Criticism must be concerned, first and last – whatever comes between – with the 
poem as it is read and as what it represents is felt. As no amount of physics and 
physiology can explain the feeling of things seen as green or even certify their 
existence, so no amount of linguistic analysis can explain the feeling or existence of 
a poem. (Blackmur, 1954a, p. 390; his emphasis) 
The passage above is particularly helpful for us to determine Blackmur’s 
conceptualization of literature. It expresses a view in which literature cannot simply be 
grasped as an object in itself, to be subjected to a mere linguistic analysis, but as something 
that comes into existence when it is read and felt, as a concretized aesthetic object that can 
be subjected to a phenomenological analysis. It is a view that sees literature as a medium 
of communication that communicates in the distinct and unique form of the particular 
literary work a certain feeling or force that it gets from outside art (see also Blackmur, 
1977b, p. 197). According to Said, the consistency in Blackmur’s criticism is that 
throughout his career he reads literature “as secular incarnation, a word he used frequently 
to represent the powers of life to reappear in art” (Said, 2000d, p. 250). After all, literature, 
in Blackmur’s view, derives its unique force from its connection to human experience to 
such an extent that one could even regard it as “a criticism of life” (1954a, p. 372). 
Following this line of thinking allows one to reconnect literature to the immediacy of 
human experience and the world. It also allows one to revalue not only the literary work 
of art but literary criticism too, as the latter now (again) becomes a criticism of human 
experience. 
In Blackmur’s view of literature and literary criticism, a literary critic should not only 
examine the words in a literary work (as a linguistic object) but at the same time determine 
the force or impact of these words on readers (as an aesthetic object). He defines this impact 
as words in motion or, in a phrase that also serves as the title of a well-known 1942 essay, 
“Language as Gesture” (Blackmur, 1954b). ‘Gesture’ is the force of language at work that 
not only gives meaningfulness to a literary work (1954b, p. 15) but is of “structural 
importance in poetry” (1954b, p. 6). Defined as such, Blackmur’s concept of ‘gesture’ is 
very similar to the idea of a structuring principle in literature, thought of as a 
psychological whole or Gestalt, which resists being paraphrased and “cannot be articulated 
at all except when delivered within a form” (Blackmur, 1954b, p. 13), which means that 
there are infinitely as much gestures (structuring principles) as there are forms (particular 
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literary works). Blackmur goes on to define the term in words that might as well belong 
to Brooks talking about poetry’s language of paradox: 
Gesture, in language, is the outward and dramatic play of inward and imaged 
meaning. It is that play of meaningfulness among words which cannot be defined in 
the formulas in the dictionary, but which is defined in their use together; gesture is 
that meaningfulness which is moving, in every sense of that word: what moves the 
words and what moves us. (1954b, p. 6) 
‘Gesture’ is what unifies a particular literary work of art and can be analyzed because it is 
felt by the reader in the act of reading. In great works of art, gesture unites content and 
form and is “what happens to a form when it becomes identical with its subject” (Blackmur, 
1954b, p. 6). While gesture can be found in individual passages such as in the repetition of 
the words ‘die’ and ‘sleep’ (and their variants) in Hamlet’s soliloquy, all these smaller 
gestures combine into an over-arching gesture or meaningfulness which distinguishes a 
great work of literature such as Hamlet from other, lesser works (Blackmur, 1954b, pp. 15-
17). Now, in Blackmur’s opinion, a critic’s job of work is to determine the gesture of 
language. Literary criticism is the act of making conscious the preconscious experiencing 
of a literary work’s gesture in the act of reading (Blackmur, 1954a, p. 398). It should 
therefore attempt to make conscious that what it is what we feel when we read a particular 
poem or piece of prose and study “our total recognition of the force that moves us” 
(Blackmur, 1977b, p. 197). 
Though Blackmur’s target of criticism in the 1935 article that started this elaborate 
discussion of his work, is I.A. Richards’s theory of practical criticism understood as the 
judgment of poetry based on the application of an empirical approach (1954a, p. 390), his 
argument about subjective criticism and its recognition of the impact of a literary work on 
its readers, can be extended and applied to the postwar New Criticism. In Blackmur’s, as 
well as in Said’s view in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, literature is 
something of a manmade verbal puzzle or enigma that can be solved by the literary critic 
(see Blackmur, 1954b, p. 3). While it is probably true that Blackmur would consider the 
analytically or positivistically inspired linguistic method of the postwar New Criticism to 
be an excellent approach to examine the technical aspects or literary facts of a work as a 
linguistic object in detail, he would still argue that such an analysis devoid of psychology 
and emotional reasoning is insufficient to solve the entire puzzle of a particular literary 
work as it is unable to discuss the gesture in language or the work as a concretized 
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aesthetic object (1954a, pp. 396-397). As we have already seen, in order to fully explain a 
literary work, Blackmur believes that the linguistic method must be complemented by a 
study of the literary work “as it is read and felt” or what he calls a “direct apprehension” 
(1954a, p. 397) of the work in question. After all, the power of poetry, in his opinion, is 
that it “arrests and transfixes its subject in a form which has a life of its own forever 
separate but springing from the life which confronts it. Poetry is life at the remove of form 
and meaning; not life lived but life framed and identified” (Blackmur, 1954a, p. 372).31 Such 
a view of poetry, and by extension literature, implies that the act of reading is a 
confrontation or meeting of two life-forms or consciousnesses – that of the reader 
confronting the literary work and that of the literary work framed and identified by an 
author. It also implies that literary criticism should be occupied with finding this life “at 
the remove of form and meaning” and that it should therefore leave the narrowly formalist 
path of the postwar New Criticism and move on to a point beyond formalism. From 
Blackmur’s writings, it is not entirely clear how one is to reach this point but the 
movement beyond formalism would seem to involve a reading that is similar to the one 
Said proposes in his revised doctoral dissertation: an empathic identification or intimate, 
‘warm reading’ of literature that rejects the positivistic examination or intellectualist, ‘cold 
reading’ proposed by the postwar New Critics. Such a reading is based on the idea that 
“[t]he light of science is parallel or in the background where feeling or meaning is 
concerned” (Blackmur, 1954a, p. 391). 
Blackmur’s antipositivistic or anti-analytic stance in literary criticism appears to have 
been picked up by Harry Levin, who subscribed to this type of ‘warm reading’ in literary 
criticism and, as Said’s doctoral supervisor, in his turn encouraged and strengthened these 
ideas in Said’s developing criticism, the outcome of which we have already seen in some 
detail. Writing as a staunch humanist at the twilight of the New Criticism and the dawn 
of poststructuralist theories of reading in the 1960s, Levin was looking at once for 
alternatives to the “self-limiting criterion of the New Critics, internal coherence,” that 
would allow “more leeway for the role of personality and for the context of society” (1972b, 
p. 92) and allow him to stay clear of the determinism of Marxist readings of literature and 
                                               
31 Here, the difference which I have outlined between a New Critical conceptualization of experience and its 
existential phenomenological counterpart becomes clear. Blackmur’s idea of poetry as “not life lived but life 
framed and identified” is of course different from the existential notion of le vécu or ‘lived experience’, which as 
the original French term suggests is really ‘life lived’. That is, Blackmur considers the human experience of 
poetry in impersonal and universal terms, whereas existential phenomenologists consider it in personal and 
concrete terms. 
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what he considered to be too radically antihumanist critiques of textuality pronounced by 
the deconstructionists at Yale in the 1970s to come (see 2011a, p. 91). Though Levin 
concedes that a poem is indeed a verbal artifact, he rejects the purist version of the New 
Criticism on humanist grounds, stressing that it is also “a network of associations and 
responses, communicating implicit information and incidentally touching off value 
judgments” (1972b, p. 92). Like Blackmur, he believes that the literary work simply 
absorbs so much external factors and is so convoluted by what the New Critics would 
consider to be extraneous “impurities” (Levin, 1972b, p. 92) that it cannot be studied as a 
pure ‘linguistic fact’, that the New Critical dichotomy between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
evidence (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946, 1949) or ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ criticism (Wellek 
& Warren, 1949) is untenable, and that literary critics should therefore pay the New 
Critical attack on ‘the fallacies’ no heed (1972b, pp. 92-93). 
Levin carries forward the same humanist tradition that we have already encountered in 
his contemporaries Leavis and Trilling. Just like them, he regards literature as a bulwark 
of humanism against dogmatism and totalitarianism. He expresses a humanist credo that 
literature embodies the essence of culture and that literary works should therefore be seen 
as privileged access points to cultural knowledge (Pike, 1988, pp. 29-30). As a humanist, 
he approaches literature holistically and comparatively by investigating the thematic and 
formal properties of literature as well as its historical and social aspects, thus transcending 
the narrow formalism of the postwar New Criticism (Pike, 1988, p. 30). Levin believes that 
the literary critic is obliged to remain truthful to the historical material or documentary 
evidence that he or she can objectively examine in a prescribed methodology, but that 
literary criticism also involves a high degree of imagination on the part of the critic where 
he or she has to engage in a concomitant imagined dialogue – which in some of his texts 
even becomes an almost existentialist “coexistence” (1972a, p. 37) – with the literary work 
in order to comprehend the human experience that it communicates (Garcia, 2014, pp. 
495-496). While this imagined dialogue is a fundamental aspect of his criticism, he does 
not provide us with a given outline or scenario to direct such a conversation, because, to 
him, no prescribed formulas or doctrines such as the ones proposed by Wimsatt and 
Beardsley can define this dialogue, other than that it always remains imprecise because it 
is dependent on the individual literary critic who responds to the literary work and the 
latter’s communicated experience and unique form which elicit this response. The 
fundamental role of imagination and the resulting degree of imprecision in literary 
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criticism is, to refer to a lecture which Levin gave on a visit to the University of Cambridge 
in 1967, the reason Why Literary Criticism is Not an Exact Science, and perhaps never will 
be (see Levin, 1967). Because in Levin’s as in Blackmur’s model of criticism, literary critics 
need to speak at once about an external object (the literary work as a linguistic object) and 
about an internal, mental dialogue (the literary work as an aesthetic object), they would 
do well to return to the movement’s prewar phase and let go of the postwar New Critical 
aspiration to reach the kind of positivistic objectivity of the physical sciences in literary 
interpretation too (Berman, 1988, pp. 16-17). Instead, literary criticism should adopt a 
pragmatic notion of intersubjectivity, according to which critics work with the objectively 
examinable material and use that evidence to engage with the text in an imagined dialogue, 
meeting writers “halfway” (Levin, 2011b, p. 32). The great advantage of this kind of 
comprehension based on a certain degree of biographism, to Levin, is that it allows critics 
to remain “near the core of communicated experience, rather than disporting themselves 
on its peripheries” (2011b, p. 36). 
In the Winter of 1958, a couple of months before Said enrolled as a graduate student at 
Harvard, Levin published a polemical review article of Wimsatt and Brooks’s Literary 
Criticism: A Short History (1957) that caused a short hostile reply from Wimsatt in which 
he didn’t really provide further arguments but dismissed Levin’s critique as “a basic 
difference in critical principle” (Wimsatt, 1958, p. 559). In their book, Wimsatt and Brooks, 
seemingly not content with the institutional situation at the end of the 1950s, presented 
or, as many reviewers saw it (Krieger, 1958; Levin, 1958; Marsh, 1958), reconstructed 
with force the history of literary criticism as a Hegelian dialectic in which seemingly 
chaotic points of view, critical problems and century old debates, dating back to Plato, 
Aristotle, Horace and Longinus, all gradually converged and lead up to a horizontal 
meeting-point in the final chapter where the authors presented their main theoretical 
pronouncement and unified solution to all these historical problems, which, needless to 
say, is also the theoretical basis of the postwar New Criticism (see Wimsatt & Brooks, 
1957, pp. 731-755).  
In the eyes of historicist scholars like Levin, Wimsatt and Brooks’s writing of a history 
of criticism must have been viewed as the final push to further consolidate the hegemony 
of the New Criticism in the American literature departments, in an attempt to take over 
the writing of history itself and thus effectively breaking the white peace where New 
Critics had tacitly agreed to leave their historicist colleagues alone (Krieger, 1958, pp. 162-
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163). According to Levin, Wimsatt and Brooks’s history establishes a tradition and 
antecedent for the New Criticism by presenting the history of literary criticism in such a 
way that “the study of literature is primarily an examination of works of art” (1958, p. 155) 
and that the New Critical “rhetorical inspection” (1958, p. 159) is the logical and correct 
outcome of this history. Levin argues that the authors’ position is based on what he 
believes to be the “doctrinaire opinions . . . forbidding the critic to inquire too curiously 
into the writer’s aim or the reader’s response” (1958, p. 157). In his view, Wimsatt and 
Brooks consistently “play down the emotive and . . . play up the ‘cognitive’ aspects of 
esthetic communication” (Levin, 1958, p. 157) and when it comes to choosing “in the 
putative divorce between knowing and feeling, they adhere to the intellectualist side” 
(Levin, 1958, p. 158). 
 In fact, what Wimsatt and Brooks’s history of literary criticism does, is to promote 
what I have called disinterested ‘cold readings’ of literature that tie in with the argument 
that Wimsatt had earlier made with Beardsley in “The Affective Fallacy” that, in order to 
reach objectivity in literary criticism, the literary experience should be studied exclusively 
in the reified sphere of the work’s cognitive structure (1949, pp. 45-46). This doesn’t escape 
Levin either and it can hardly surprise us that he rejects this narrow kind of formalism 
with which Wimsatt and Brooks’s project is associated in his closing argument and, in a 
move that is quite similar to the one Blackmur suggested well over two decades earlier in 
“A Critic’s Job of Work”, favors a humanist approach to literary criticism that doesn’t 
reject formalism altogether but nonetheless transcends the boundaries of the postwar New 
Critical formalism in order to rehumanize literature and reconnect it with the world:  
When . . . Brooks and Wimsatt appear as proponents of a type of criticism which 
was needed and which has its continuing merits, they command our grateful respect. 
But when in the name of historical survey, they endeavor to subordinate all other 
types of criticism to theirs, occasion must be taken to remind them that history 
transcends those revisionist versions of it which interested parties put forth from 
time to time; that literature is much too various and pervasive a manifestation of 
human experience to be wholly comprehended within the self-confining sphere of 
structure; and that if humanistic studies reject all the tools they have developed in 
common with other disciplines, they will shut themselves off from the present as 
well as the past. (Levin, 1958, p. 160) 
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Levin’s holistic method translates into the one Said developed under his co-guidance in 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography in a number of ways. First of all, just like 
Blackmur’s and Levin’s method, Said’s method still foregrounds literary form by 
examining the rhetoric, style and thematics of Conrad’s works both holistically as 
individual verbal artifacts and comparatively as parts of a larger collection of texts 
constituting an oeuvre. This method also takes peripheral, documentary evidence about 
the author’s life, career, and social context into account and relies on that kind of evidence 
to examine the author’s psychology, moral views, character and intentions, which, 
according to Said, are all of relevance to the study of literature because they have been 
absorbed by the works studied. In doing so, Said pays the dichotomy between internal and 
external evidence proposed by Wimsatt and Beardsley little attention, reconsiders literary 
form as involved in social history and human experience, and reconceptualizes the literary 
work as a manmade product that is a psychological whole or Gestalt. As such, Said 
effectively turns to the founding principles of the prewar generation of New Critics such 
as Ransom and Blackmur and resolutely chooses to ignore the postwar New Critical ban 
on intentional and affective reasoning. 
Said then meets the author halfway, so to speak, through the kind of imagined dialogue 
which Levin professes, in an attempt to come as near to the core of communicated 
experience as possible. This becomes clear in the opening pages to the work, where Said 
defends the primacy of comprehension in literary criticism: 
The literary critic is, I think, most interested in comprehension, because the critical 
act is first of all an act of comprehension: a particular comprehension of the written 
work, and not of its origins in a general theory of the unconscious. Comprehension, 
furthermore, is a phenomenon of consciousness, and it is in the openness of the 
conscious mind that critic and writer meet to engage in the act of knowing and being 
aware of an experience. (Said, 1966, p. 7) 
Here, in the first sentence of the quotation, Said pleads for an empathic kind of reading 
that contrary to the postwar New Criticism, doesn’t merely examine literary works of art, 
but tries to arrive at “a particular comprehension of the written work”. Speaking as a 
phenomenological critic, he approaches the literary work as a phenomenon, as an object of 
perception that comes to us as a whole and therefore has to be comprehended and studied 
in full, as a particular consciousness that cannot be paraphrased or explained by “a general 
theory of the unconscious” or any prescribed approach to criticism such as the postwar 
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New Criticism – an approach that, if we recall Said’s words on ‘the imperialism of 
criticism’, is so delineated that it would swallow up the particular work, colonize or force 
it to fit into a fixed prescribed model of (causal) explanation. The second sentence of the 
quotation above illustrates that Said’s study attempts to rehumanize literature by 
stressing that the literary work of art is more than just a linguistic object or verbal artifact 
and that literary criticism should therefore break free from the self-confining sphere of 
structure or form in order to reconnect with and come as near to the human experience 
communicated in the literary work as possible. The sentence stresses that literary criticism 
is “a phenomenon of consciousness”, an open meeting or dialogue between two equal 
consciousnesses or conversation partners, “critic and writer”. Literary criticism is a 
dialogue in which the critic responds to the literary work of art – hence the ode to the 
affective fallacy – and, like in any dialogue, imagined or not, inquires into the intentions 
of his or her conversation partner, the writer – hence the ode to the intentional fallacy. 
This dialogue is successful when common ground is reached between critic and writer “in 
the act of knowing and being aware of an experience”. 
In conclusion, the quotation above makes it crystal clear that despite Said’s 
‘commitment’ of the affective fallacy, determining his combined affective and cognitive 
responses to the works in question aren’t the end point of his strand of criticism. It also 
makes it clear that in spite of his profound interest in form, the literary work as a focal 
point of a New Critical, stylistic and formal analysis can never be the end point of his 
analysis either. In fact, similar to the prewar New Critics or, for that matter, even closer 
to the more nuanced position of Wimsatt and Beardsley than the one circulating in the 
writings of their colleagues, that kind of analysis is only the beginning of an evaluation 
and comprehension of the literary work. 32 A few pages earlier, Said describes Conrad as a 
writer “hiding within rhetoric” (1966, p. 4), a metaphor according to which Conrad’s style 
and form of his works should be thought of as “a distracting surface of overrhetorical, 
melodramatic prose” (1966, p. 3; my emphasis) that covers a deeper essence, present in the 
text. There lies Said’s prime interest. That deeper essence isn’t Conrad’s precise authorial 
intentions, nor the author’s precise antecedent psychological state of mind – though Said, 
as we have seen in his stance on the intentional fallacy, is genuinely interested in this kind 
                                               
32 I would like to remind that Wimsatt’s remarks in the introduction to The Verbal Icon highlight that the goal of 
his codifying attempts with Beardsley in the fallacy-essays was “to lay hold of the poetic act to comprehend and 
evaluate it” (1954a, p. xvii; my emphasis). 
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of peripheral information – but the agency that precedes all of this, a concept that had been 
all but barred from literary criticism by the postwar New Critics: the authorial 
consciousness.  
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1.6 Epilogue: Contrapuntal Reading 
The New Criticism is an important layer of Said’s theoretical infrastructure. Its continued 
importance for our understanding of his critical practice post-1978 can be found in the 
contrapuntal readings of Culture and Imperialism (1993). Reading that work from the 
perspective of its continued engagement with the New Criticism enhances our 
understanding of its seminal method of ‘contrapuntal reading’, which has become a key 
term in postcolonial studies (see Ashcroft, Griffiths, & Tiffin, 2007, p. 49). The term 
implies a responsive reading to the text so as to reveal the text’s engagement with 
imperialism and colonial practice that may seem only fleetingly addressed in the text itself 
(Said, 1993, p. 51). A contrapuntal reading is resolutely at odds with the postwar New 
Criticism because it analyses the authorial intention and revalues the reader’s response to 
serve as a counterpoint to the text. It stresses that the interpretation of literature “depends 
on who does the interpreting, when it is done, and no less important, from where it is done” 
(Said, 1993, p. 93). A reader from Antigua, for instance, will find different but 
complementary meanings in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park than a reader from England. 
At the same time we should understand a contrapuntal reading as a worldly reading of 
literature that similar to a New Critical close reading of poetry reads novels “carefully” 
and “in full” (Said, 1993, p. 95) with a simultaneous awareness both of the text’s connection 
to the dominant discourse of imperialism and of those counter-hegemonic discourses 
acting against it. Borrowed from Western classical music, Said’s notion of counterpoint 
seeks out the organized and concerted interplay of themes in literary works, the 
intertwinement and overlapping of histories, in which 
various themes play off one another, with only a provisional privilege being given 
to any particular one; yet in the resulting polyphony there is concert and order, an 
organized interplay that derives from the themes, not from a rigorous melodic or 
formal principle outside the work. (1993, p. 51) 
This definition of literature sees the literary work as a totalized form in which different 
but distinct voices are interwoven into a symphonic whole by a totalizing principle found 
inside the work. It carefully avoids hierarchical classification and stresses that the unity of 
the literary work is defined by the specific relation of the themes of the work, making the 
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literary work something greater and different from the sum of its themes – in short, a 
Gestalt. 
Contrapuntal reading is an approach to literature that allows Said to reread Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness with an explicit awareness of the author’s imperial and anti-imperial 
attitudes, without hierarchically classifying one attitude over the other but constantly 
highlighting the paradoxical disjunctions between these attitudes (Said, 1993, pp. 19-31). 
Said’s reading of Conrad is a response to Achebe’s criticism that, according to him, “does 
not go far enough” (1993, p. 167) in emphasizing that Conrad “re-enacts the imperial 
gesture of pulling in virtually the entire world . . . while stressing its irreducible ironies” 
(1993, p. 165). Likewise, Said’s reading of Mansfield Park concludes that Austen was one 
of the loudest voices about liberalism and social equality in the early nineteenth century 
and at the same time deadly silent about the cruelties of slave trade and the functioning of 
British sugar plantations (Said, 1993, pp. 80-97). Said’s contrapuntal readings illustrate 
that seemingly chaotic and mutually exclusive ambiguities of literary works can actually 
be thought together in the historical moments in which these works are embedded as an 
apparent cultural contradiction or a “paradox” (1993, pp. 95, and passim). In this way his 
notion of counterpoint elevates the New Critical notion of paradox and its organic theory 
of unity into the realm of cultural analysis, stressing that “whereas the whole of a culture 
is a disjunct one, many important sectors of it can be apprehended as working contrapuntally 
together” (Said, 1993, p. 194; my emphasis). And so Conrad’s paradox is the paradox of his 
culture, which means that “Conrad could not grant the natives their freedom, despite his 
severe critique of the imperialism that enslaved them” (Said, 1993, p. 30). Austen’s paradox 
is the paradox of her society, where the false consciousness of liberalism allowed staunch 
advocates of liberalism at home to be cruel slave-owners overseas (Said, 1993, pp. 96-97). 
Reading Conrad to be a legitimizer of imperialism and Austen to be a silent supporter 
of the slave trade, does not mean that we must exclude these works from the canon but 
actually enhances our reading and understanding of them. Said’s overall suggestion seems 
to be that an understanding of these novels’ concealed connections to empire, their 
historical affiliations with their real setting, does not diminish the aesthetic quality of these 
novels as the postwar New Critics would argue but makes them even “more interesting 
and more valuable as works of art” (1993, p. 13). In fact, a characteristic of great literature 
is precisely that it wears its historical affiliation, its worldliness, less plainly than bad 
literature (Said, 1993, p. 96). 
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Chapter 2  
Beyond Formalism
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2.1 Introduction: Johns Hopkins, 1966 
From October 18 to October 21, 1966, a group of French-speaking European thinkers 
including Roland Barthes, René Girard, Lucien Goldman, Jacques Lacan, Serge 
Doubrovsky, Tzvetan Todorov, Jean Hyppolite, Jean-Pierre Vernant, Georges Poulet and 
– as a last-minute substitute for the Belgian anthropologist Luc de Heusch – Jacques 
Derrida, gathered in Baltimore at a four day inaugural conference of the Johns Hopkins 
Humanities Center to discuss with their American colleagues their latest work on 
structuralism, a loose umbrella for an array of thought that was widely regarded as 
existentialism’s successor (Macksey & Donato, 1972a, p. xvi; McCabe, 2012). The 1966 
Johns Hopkins conference on ‘The Languages of Criticism and the Science of Man’ was a 
game-changer in American literary studies. The first of its kind to consider structuralism 
as a cross-disciplinary phenomenon, the European speakers addressed multifaceted topics 
from anthropology, classics, philosophy, sociology, psychology, linguistics, history, 
comparative literature and literary criticism. 
The organizing committee headed by the director of the Humanities Center, Charles 
Singleton, had invited a delegation of junior American scholars to attend the symposium. 
The delegation included the 30 year old Said, who had just been promoted to the rank of 
Associate Professor of English at Columbia University in 1965 (see Macksey & Donato, 
2007, p. 324; Said, 1968b). In exactly the same month of the conference he published his 
first monograph Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966), a revision of his 
Harvard doctoral dissertation in which he precisely engaged with the existentialist and 
phenomenological body of thought against which most of the overseas visitors reacted so 
fiercely in Baltimore. In Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato’s book that collected the 
presented papers and verbatim reproduced the discussions that followed (1972c), there are 
no records of Said intervening at the sessions and, in a fit of romantic imagination, we are 
invited to imagine that like most part of the American audience (see Macksey & Donato, 
1972a, p. xvii), he might have been too much in awe of the live performance of the 
European visitors to engage in the discussions. Because the meetings were primarily being 
held in French as a natural language of the participants and the interventions only 
summarily translated into English (Macksey & Donato, 1972a, p. xvii), for Said and his 
fellow junior American scholars it must have been hard to tell whether they were 
attending an international symposium hosted on American soil to inaugurate the 
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Humanities Center at Johns Hopkins’s Milton S. Eisenhower Library or witnessing path-
breaking debates between French speaking theoreticians that radically questioned the 
very foundations of such topics as the autonomy of literature, the status of the human 
subject and human agency at the Collège de France. With nearly all of Europe’s French 
speaking intellectual vanguard present in Baltimore,33 it seemed that, for a short period of 
time in the Fall of 1966, Paris was not situated on the banks of the Seine but on those of 
the river Patapsco. 
It is not much of an exaggeration to say that the famed October conference made a huge 
impact on Said and his American colleagues, junior and senior alike. In the history of 
literary theory, the conference is quite often regarded as the decisive moment at which 
contemporary French thought made landfall in the U.S. and “irreversibly impacted 
American literary studies” (Paradis, 2005, p. 41). The common opinion seems to be that 
the event marks the watershed moment at which French theory was successfully launched 
in the U.S. with the nearly simultaneous emergence of structuralism and, mainly due to 
the interventions of Derrida and de Man at the conference, its transition into 
poststructuralism (Birns, 2014; Leitch, 2010, p. 203; Rabaté, 2002, pp. 38-46). Though the 
conference was unmistakably a seminal event, its importance is quite often inflated to take 
on near-mythical proportions when it is said to have been the single defining moment at 
which – all at the same time – (1) structuralism was introduced to the Anglophone world 
and simultaneously proclaimed dead, (2) poststructuralism began its lightning march 
through American literary departments, (3) Derrida gave birth to deconstruction as a 
critical method of reading in his famous paper on “Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1972) on the final day of the conference and (4), as a 
result of all of this, almost from one day to the next, the hegemony of the New Criticism 
was over (Currie, 2013, pp. 3-4; Daylight, 2011, pp. 1-2; Macksey & Donato, 1972b, pp. 
xi-x). In fact, if we are to believe some descriptions of the symposium, the discussions that 
were held during those four days in October were so important that they are said to have 
single-handedly transformed the New Criticism, triggered the rapid decline of its model 
of reading at the end of the 1960s and inaugurated what has come to be known as ‘the 
                                               
33 The exception was Michel Foucault, who after having published Les mots et les choses (1966) that same year, 
was now fighting, so to speak, a fierce battle with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir on ‘the death of Man’ 
in France (Eribon, 1991, pp. 273-280). Although his work was constantly referred to in the presentations, 
discussions and concluding remarks of the conference, he himself was, in the words of Jean-Michel Rabaté, 
“notoriously absent” (2002, p. 38). 
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golden age of theory’ of the 1970s and 1980s (Currie, 2013, p. 3; Redfield, 2016, pp. 20-
21). 
In that popular narrative, which is told from the perspective of the institutional rise of 
poststructuralism in the U.S. and the so-called Yale Critics34 in the 1970s, the field of 
literary studies in the years leading up to that famed conference is often described as a 
monolithic bloc characterized by a universally accepted New Critical consensus. Looking 
back on the symposium five years later, critics like de Man created the myth that there 
was but little opposition to the New Criticism in the 1950s and 1960s, producing a period 
of American calm (de Man, 1971a, p. 5). In the essay on structural intention that I have 
discussed in the previous chapter he sums up the situation in the field of American literary 
studies prior to the famed Johns Hopkins conference of 1966. According to him, the New 
Criticism was undisputedly the hegemonic critical methodology in American literature 
departments but, as we have seen in the previous chapter, it had evolved into a 
dehumanized formalist approach to literature that had effectively isolated literature from 
history and its human context (1971b, p. 20). While de Man singles out the attempts in 
the 1950s of Romance philologists Erich Auerbach, who was appointed as professor of 
Romance philology at Yale from 1950 to 1957, Leo Spitzer, working at Johns Hopkins 
from 1936 up until his death in 1960, and the Geneva School critic of consciousness 
Georges Poulet, who taught French literature at Johns Hopkins from 1952 to 1957, to 
challenge the New Criticism by reopening its methodology to history and human 
experience, he feels that these critics confined themselves too much to their national field 
of specialization – whatever that may be, given the transnational scope of Auerbach’s and 
Spitzer’s philology – and therefore did not pose much of a serious critical opposition to the 
New Critical orthodoxy (de Man, 1971b, pp. 20-21). De Man concludes that the New 
Critical hegemony was therefore generally left unchecked and the formalist movement 
remained in splendid isolation up until the 1966 Johns Hopkins conference (Currie, 2013, 
p. 34). Now that the tidal wave of contemporary French structuralism – in de Man’s essay 
                                               
34 In 1975 J. Hillis Miller announced his membership of “a new group of critics centered at Yale” (1975, p. 33) 
that also included his Yale colleagues Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman and de Man. To this tetrarchy in New 
Haven, Hillis Miller counted Derrida, who was never a full-time scholar at Yale but heavily influenced the group 
from the margins. These ‘Yale Critics’– sometimes dubbed ‘New Yale Critics’ to distinguish them from their 
New Critical predecessors Brooks, Wimsatt, Penn Warren and Wellek at Yale in the 1950s (Redfield, 2016, pp. 
3-4) – significantly differed from each other (see Hartman, 2004, p. viii) and weren’t seen so much as an actual 
group, but rather as a conceptual entity that became a metonym for ‘theory’ in the U.S. during the 1970s and 
1980s (Redfield, 2016, p. 2). 
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a misplaced synonym for Derridean deconstruction (see De Graef, 2006, p. 41) – had 
reached American shores at Baltimore, it was successfully battering the hitherto 
unchallenged New Critical hegemony and would eventually lead to a “long-awaited 
unification of European and American criticism” (de Man, 1971b, p. 21). 
Though de Man, as I have already noted, is right to point out the New Criticism’s 
mistaken rejection of the intentional structure of literary works and the consequences 
thereof, his view of an unchallenged New Critical orthodoxy is wrong. I am on firm ground 
with Mark Currie, who in his recently published institutional history of deconstruction in 
America rightly challenges de Man’s assessment of the academic situation and argues that 
his view of a calm period in American literary criticism prior to the arrival of European 
poststructuralism is unsupportable. Currie pierces through the popular myth, successfully 
installed by deconstructionist critics like de Man, of the New Criticism as an unchallenged 
critical methodology suddenly disrupted in the late 1960s by what were said to be 
revolutionary ideas from Europe later branded as ‘French theory’ (Currie, 2013, p. 34; see 
also Gelpi, 1987, p. 44).35 According to Currie, there was no such thing as a sudden rupture 
between the New Criticism and the structuralist and poststructuralist theories of reading 
that emerged post-1966. The transition was gradual, not abrupt and de Man’s 
retrospection, Currie believes, is based on false memory combined with a willful revision 
of the past to construct an image of deconstruction as a turbulent, polemical and 
revolutionary approach to literature – de Man speaks about “Gallic turbulence” (1971a, p. 
5) – and Derrida as the single most influential literary critic of the period in America (2013, 
pp. 34-35). To create that image, de Man not only exaggerates the importance of the 1966 
Johns Hopkins conference and the impact of Derrida’s conference paper but also “chooses 
not to recognize, or at least to underplay the presence of polemic and conflict in the United 
States either before or after the end of the New Criticism” (Currie, 2013, p. 34).  
De Man’s exaggeration of the unity of the New Criticism and the downplaying of 
heterodox elements in the movement in the 1960s may well be explained by his own 
institutional context at Yale, which had precisely been such a strong bastion of New 
Critical thought ever since Wimsatt was joined by Wellek, Brooks and Penn Warren at 
                                               
35 For recent accounts of deconstruction in America, I refer to Mark Currie’s The Invention of Deconstruction (2013) 
and Marc Redfield’s Theory at Yale: The Strange Case of Deconstruction in America (2016), to which my account is 
indebted. For a more general history of the impact of ‘French theory’ in the U.S. academic culture, written from 
a French perspective, see François Cusset’s French theory: Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze et cie et les mutations de la vie 
intellectuelle aux Etats-Unis (2003). 
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the end of the 1940s. In 1970, a year before the publication of the retrospective essay that 
would make up the collection of essays of Blindness and Insight (1971), de Man moved from 
Johns Hopkins to Yale. He was appointed as professor in French and Comparative 
Literature to teach with Harold Bloom and Geoffrey Hartman in the newly founded 
undergraduate literature major. Hartman, who had effected de Man’s appointment at Yale 
(Redfield, 2016, p. 25), testifies in his autobiography to how Wimsatt and his fellow New 
Critics were then still relatively easily in control of the Yale English and Comparative 
Literature departments and how Wimsatt even regularly scolded faculty members who 
did not follow the orthodox New Critical theory, which he himself had shaped in the 
previous decades, for diluting the autonomy of the literary object (2007, pp. 93-95). While 
this hostile coercion on behalf of the New Critics may have helped support a strong New 
Critical consensus at Yale (Redfield, 2016, pp. 199-200 n24), Currie goes on to nuance de 
Man’s claims and stresses that the 1966 Johns Hopkins conference did not take place 
against the backdrop of a calm literary critical consensus of any kind but against the 
backdrop of decades of interplay between formalist and historicist approaches to literature 
and history (2013, pp. 35-42). De Man’s distortion of the institutional situation to present 
the New Criticism as a monolithic bloc that had to be combatted by turbulent new ideas 
may well have been part of his own strategy in an institutional battle over the program of 
the new undergraduate literature major and the literature department at Yale in which he, 
Bloom and Hartman were engaged. Wellek’s retirement in 1971 and replacement by Hillis 
Miller, who followed de Man by coming over from Johns Hopkins, the next year in 1972, 
marked an important institutional moment and tipped the balance in favor of the 
deconstructionists at Yale. Bloom, Hartman, Hillis Miller and de Man were joined by 
friendship and had overlapping professional interests (Redfield, 2016, p. 25). When 
Wimsatt died unexpectedly in 1974 and Brooks retired in 1975, this newly established 
tetrarchy in New Haven suddenly occupied considerable institutional space and arranged 
for Derrida to give the first of his soon to become famous annual seminars in 1975 (De 
Graef, 2006, pp. 40-41; Redfield, 2016, pp. 31-32). This event firmly marked the 
deconstructionist victory over the undergraduate program and paved the way for the 
establishment of what has come to be known as the ‘Yale School of criticism’ and the 
gradual identification of Yale with deconstruction, and deconstruction with ‘theory’.36 
                                               
36 The resemblance to the institutional situation of the New Criticism in the 1950s and its authoritative weight 
that caused the very term ‘New Criticism’ to be synonymous to ‘criticism’ itself is striking. 
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De Man’s intentions aside, a more careful examination of the influence of European 
thought on American literary criticism unravels a less Apollonian vision of American calm 
and produces what Marc Redfield, speaking in unison with Currie, has called “a diverse 
and multilayered picture of an intellectually fertile period” (2016, p. 21). By 1966 the 
overall institutional situation in American literature departments was as follows: though 
we may still speak of a hegemony of the New Criticism, through its continually 
oppositional self-definition it had evolved into a critical orthodoxy that allowed New 
Critics to comfortably turn inward, eschewing the vigorous debates about ‘heresies’ and 
‘fallacies’ of the 1940s and 1950s and producing, what Said has called, a self-centered and 
wan approach to formalist criticism. Likewise, historicist critics who had taken up 
exemplary positions in these debates, insofar as they continued to think their approach 
incompatible with the New Critical formalism, had signed what they might have perceived 
to be a white peace with their New Critical colleagues and tacitly continued to perform 
their conventional form of historical scholarship. But the 1950s and 1960s in the U.S. also 
saw a new generation of literary critics come to the forefront that had little interest in the 
earlier quarrels of historical scholarship versus formalist criticism and formally agreed 
that both approaches were complementary (Graff, 1987, pp. 193-194). 37  Driven by 
institutional constraints in which faculty was still appointed to teach courses organized 
according to the periods identified by traditional historical scholarship, postgraduates that 
aspired an academic career had to claim expertise in one historical period or another and 
were encouraged to merge elements of the New Criticism with historical interpretations, 
thus substantially modifying the postwar dominance of the New Criticism (Culler, 1988, 
p. 13).  
These institutional arrangements produced eclectic approaches to literature that were 
compromises between formalist and historicist methods yet, in most cases, without having 
both methods critically engage with one another and achieving some kind of meaningful, 
methodological synthesis. The outcome was that literary programs offered introductory 
                                               
37 Graff describes the institutional situation in a more vivid manner: “The senior “Renaissance man” might 
fulminate privately about the obstreperous young “modernist” in the office down the hall with his impertinent 
opinions about Milton and Shelley and his pretentious and incomprehensible cant about textures, structures, and 
objective correlatives. But his more tolerant department chairman had only to remind the old scholar that he 
personally need have nothing to do with the offensive young man, whose courses in any case were drawing so 
many students into the department that the dean might soon be ready to meet the department’s request for 
another medievalist. When the Renaissance man retired, his replacement was most likely somebody who had 
quietly assimilated the critical methods, with the offensive prejudices smoothed away” (1987, p. 194). 
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courses in which students were expected to study canonical pieces of literature New 
Critically – as autonomous literary objects – but in a determined, chronological order from 
the Middle Ages to the present day, while most graduate courses were heavily historicist 
in their approach and effectively trained experts in a certain historical period (Culler, 1988, 
p. 13; Graff, 1987, pp. 193-194). As eclectic as these courses, in the majority of institutions 
the literary criticism of the period does not remain within the paradigm set out by the New 
Critics, but is the product of a shifting and eclectic methodological overlay “that joins such 
techniques of close reading as attention to imagery with an interest in authors and literary 
history” (Culler, 1988, p. 13). While certainly not all critics were able to pursue both the 
formalist and historicist approach at once without losing sight of the literary work, Said 
was part of a generation of young American literary intellectuals, including among others 
Hillis Miller and Hartman, that succeeded in developing vital new modes of literary 
criticism in the 1950s and 1960s by meaningfully engaging formalist criticism with 
historical scholarship and enriching these approaches with insights from European 
phenomenology and existentialism (see Hussein, 2002, p. 27; Leitch, 2010, p. 137).  
When Said gathered with his colleagues at the Johns Hopkins Humanities Center in 
mid-October of 1966, he belonged to the reigning theoretical avant-garde in the U.S. that 
searched for alternatives to the critically exhausted New Criticism. By the mid-sixties 
these American avant-gardist critics had already found such alternatives in the existential 
and phenomenological philosophical analyses of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, and the phenomenological criticism of consciousness of Georges Poulet and the 
members of the so-called Geneva group of criticism associated with him (Lentricchia, 
1980, pp. 63-64). Having spent a couple of years teaching at Johns Hopkins during the 
1950s, Poulet’s works in particular had already caught on in the U.S. and significantly 
transformed its literary critical landscape before Derrida’s poststructuralism reached 
American shores in 1966 and after (Lentricchia, 1980, p. 65). In the year of the Johns 
Hopkins conference there was even an intense fascination with Poulet’s work amongst 
American avant-gardists and – besides the poststructuralist strains of thought and 
polemics that would make their works famous in the 1970s – the one thing that unites the 
widely differing intellectual careers of Hartman, Hillis Miller, and even de Man with 
Said’s, it is that all of them, in the period leading up to the famed Johns Hopkins conference 
of 1966, in one way or another were deeply engaged with and intellectually formed by the 
work of the Belgian-born phenomenologist (see Lentricchia, 1980, pp. 65, 159). In order 
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to better understand what the American literary critical landscape looked like in the mid-
1960s and to trace the genealogy of Said’s conceptualization of literature and agency, it 
would therefore be better for a moment to shift our focus away from Derrida’s performance 
on the final day of the conference and direct our attention to the first day. In the afternoon, 
the former Johns Hopkins faculty member Poulet addressed the audience in the Milton S. 
Eisenhower Library in English to present his paper on “Criticism and the Experience of 
Interiority” (1972) and talked about his model of criticism that was once so disruptive to 
the American New Criticism but by the time of the conference had “begun to assume the 
safe and comforting look of the last traditionalism” (Lentricchia, 1980, p. 65). 
Taking up where we left off in the previous chapter, in this chapter I will continue my 
discussion of the period leading up to the pivotal year of 1966 in American literary studies 
through the lens of Said’s Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966), his revised 
doctoral dissertation on the Anglo-Polish author’s letters and short fiction published in 
the same year as the Johns Hopkins conference. In the following pages I will discuss 
Poulet’s paper at that conference as a point of departure to study Said’s critical engagement 
with existential phenomenology and his conceptualization of literature and agency in his 
book on Conrad. Just like its successor structuralism, existential phenomenology was not 
a monolithic entity of thought but an umbrella term used to designate to a group of 
thinkers, critical schools or movements of thought with mutually different views about the 
author, the world, language and consciousness. What links all of these views together is 
that all of them propagate a philosophy that starts from the primacy of consciousness 
which is characterized by the principle of ‘intentionality’. In his treatment of Conrad, Said 
therefore in the first place engaged with a philosophy rather than with individual works, 
which is not to say that we cannot define a number of existential phenomenologists whose 
works noticeably make up the theoretical framework of Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography and its views about literature, agency and the task of criticism. 
In this chapter I will therefore present a number of views circulating in existential 
phenomenology about the text, the author, the world, language, and agency that all 
revolve about the centrality of the human subject and its consciousness in thinking about 
literature and culture. I will discuss the mutual differences between these views grouped 
under the banner of existential phenomenology and at the same time discuss Said’s related 
conceptualization of these concepts by closely reading his revised doctoral dissertation on 
Conrad. My discussion is roughly centered around the work of three thinkers that are of 
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paramount importance for Said’s model of reading: Poulet’s model for a criticism of 
consciousness, Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of language, and Sartre’s theory of the 
emotions.  
The outline of my discussion is as follows: while Said’s method of empathetic reading 
at least in terms leans on the models of reading of Blackmur and Levin, it is in practice 
much closer to the criticism of consciousness of Poulet and his ideas about literature as the 
embodiment of an authorial consciousness. However, Said does not share Poulet’s view in 
conceptualizing that authorial consciousness as an atemporal, pure and isolated form of 
consciousness but considers it, similar to Sartre, as a dialectically created, unified and 
highly individual product of an individual consciousness-in-the-world and its dynamic 
encounter with the world. Said’s approach to literature in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography therefore allows for more discussion of the worldly context and is distinctly 
more committed to worldliness than Poulet’s criticism of consciousness, which is why I 
have labeled his method of reading a worldly criticism of consciousness.  
As I go on to discuss Said’s conceptualization of agency, it will become clear how it is 
based on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and Sartre’s theory of the 
emotions. We will see how Said’s combined engagement with the entwined works of 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre leads him to work out a situated theory of reading and agency 
that locates agency in the concrete individual author and critic who are embedded in 
equally concrete and particular situations. Contrary to the universal model of reading and 
agency of the New Criticism, Said’s model highlights the particular choice and 
responsibility of individuals and advocates a politics of responsibility. We should 
understand this aspect of his work from the broader cultural perspective outlined by Greif 
in which he discerns a larger rehumanizing tendency in postwar U.S. literary criticism and 
a general transition from a politics of universality to a politics of responsibility in 
Transatlantic culture (see 2015, p. 78). The importance of Said’s politics of responsibility 
is that it holds authors intellectually responsible and accountable for the worldview 
expressed in their texts, the effects of their writings and the socio-political uses to which 
their knowledge is put. It is this model which Said nuances and elaborates on in Beginnings 
(1975a) and Orientalism (1978). 
In combination with the previous chapter this chapter illustrates how Said’s reading 
method synthesizes European existential phenomenology with the American New 
Criticism in order to develop a specific American model of phenomenology that aims both 
124 
to comprehend experience and evaluate form. Instead of analyzing literary form in the 
analytic, technical and positivistic manner of the New Criticism of the 1950s and 1960s, 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography seeks to evaluate and, more importantly, 
comprehend literary form as the incarnation of the author’s consciousness in order to 
better grasp the deeper intricacies of literature. Its reading method leads to an analysis of 
the literary work as a mental universe where human experience takes shape as literature. 
And while in the previous chapter I have shown how American literary critics like Said 
were already productively challenging the New Critical consensus before the arrival of 
poststructuralism in 1966 and thereby causing significant changes in U.S. literary 
criticism, in this chapter we will more clearly see how Said’s method consists of a 
cooperation between techniques of the New Criticism with methods derived from 
existential phenomenology in an attempt to not only open that New Critical methodology 
to historical considerations, but also to rehumanize literary experience and reconnect it 
with the world. My analysis shows that American critics were actively engaging with 
‘European thought’ before 1966 in a much more profound and lasting way than critics like 
de Man would have us believe (compare 1971a, p. 4). It shows that critics like Said 
effectively pushed literary criticism in the U.S. beyond formalism.  
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2.2 Literature and the Experience of Interiority 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography is “a phenomenological exploration of 
Conrad’s consciousness, so that the kind of mind he had, both in its distinction and energy, 
will become apparent” (Said, 1966, pp. 7-8). It is remarkable how much direct quotation 
from Conrad’s works we find in Said’s work, causing his language to almost effortlessly 
flow over into Conrad’s and vice versa. Throughout Said’s work, one can hardly encounter 
a page without blocks of citations or rapid successions of fragments from Conrad’s letters, 
autobiographical works and novellas. All of this is a consequence of the book’s 
methodology, which it derives from the philosophical and literary critical works of 
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Poulet, all of whom espoused a phenomenological view of 
literature and literary criticism that runs counter to the positivistic objectivism of the 
postwar New Criticism. To begin with, phenomenological literary criticism considers the 
New Critical justification of the literary work of art as a unique combination of linguistic 
properties no longer important but justifies literature as the highest and most vital mode 
of human expression and, consequently, grasps its criticism as the privileged access point 
to study human experience (Lawall, 1968, p. 80). The phenomenological approach to 
literature does not involve analyzing a literary text as the autonomous linguistic object of 
the postwar New Criticism that combines a whole array of verbal subtleties, dictionary 
peculiarities and rhetorical properties, which can all be objectively examined according to 
a model of literary criticism that is close to linguistics, but as a self-contained but in no 
way autonomous mental universe in which a uniquely singular but universally 
comprehensible human experience takes shape as literature (Lawall, 1968, pp. 6-7). 
To get a more precise idea of how phenomenologists conceptualize literature and how 
their models of reading influenced U.S. literary criticism and theory and particularly Said’s 
study of Conrad, it is crucial that we look at the paper which Poulet delivered on the first 
day of the defining Johns Hopkins symposium on structuralism. I will be discussing his 
paper in relation to Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. In the conclusion to this 
section I will highlight the shared tenets of existential phenomenology and (the early 
phase of) the New Criticism, that facilitate the combination of these approaches into an 
American model of phenomenology.  
When Poulet took to the stage on October 18, 1966, he was already being held in high 
esteem by many American literary critics who regarded him as “the contemporary 
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European philosophical muse” (Lentricchia, 1980, p. 65), whose phenomenological 
approach to literature in the mid-sixties was slowly transforming the American literary 
critical landscape and paving the way for American critics to discover the Continental 
philosophy of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Undoubtedly aware of his 
special status in the U.S., the Belgian phenomenological critic appears to have specifically 
designed his paper for an American audience. Not only is it one of the few papers delivered 
in English instead of French – a result of Poulet’s proficiency in English due to his 
previous positions at the University of Edinburgh (1928-1951) and at Johns Hopkins 
(1952-1957) – but it also opens with a severe critique of formalist criticism that to a 
generation of American academics trained in the postwar period undoubtedly must have 
come across as a direct attack on the institutionalized reading practice of the New 
Criticism.  
Poulet’s opening argument is that literary works are manmade objects unlike any other 
and that there is a crucial difference between books and vases, for instance. A vase, he 
argues, invites him to encircle it, take it up, turn it in his hands, look at its form from 
different points of view, and inspect the decorations on its surface (Poulet, 1972, p. 56). 
What intrigues him as onlooker and makes him want to encircle and examine the vase in 
the first place, is finding out what its interior is like “as though looking for the entrance 
to a secret chamber” (Poulet, 1972, p. 57). But all vases, even the most intriguingly 
precious and beautifully sculpted products of skilled craftsmanship, such as the finest 
pieces of Delft Blue pottery or Attic red-figure amphorae of the high classical period, for 
instance, are ultimately spatially enclosed objects with clear and distinct surfaces that deny 
us mental entry, regardless of how much time and effort we spend looking for the entrance 
to a secret interior (Poulet, 1972, pp. 56-57). Vases have no true entrances, save for the 
mouth of the vase, which, if we are to follow Poulet’s view, is not really an entrance but 
only serves as a little space to put flowers in or pour wine into. Vases are closed, Poulet 
argues, and present themselves primarily as exterior objects that dispense with any 
interference from the mind of its onlooker (1972, p. 58). 
The point which Poulet is getting at in the opening lines of his talk in Baltimore, is that 
a vase doesn’t allow you to have the kind of humanist conversation which Said has when 
he reads Conrad’s texts. What characterizes the phenomenon of reading and distinguishes 
it from the phenomenon of looking at a vase, is what Poulet in his talk calls “the experience 
of interiority”, the impression that at the moment you begin reading a book, the book as 
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material object disappears and you are entering or, better still, recreating a mental 
universe that is not wholly your own. The experience of interiority is the feeling that when 
you are reading a book your mind is no longer perceiving the book as a material object in 
itself, “that object wholly object, that thing made of paper” (Poulet, 1972, p. 57), nor as a 
collection of letters strung into words and words strung into sentences, but as something 
beyond matter, form and language: as a quantity of mental images, entities, ideas, and 
significations that do not have a material reality but seem to exist as “interior objects” or 
“subjectified objects” (Poulet, 1972, p. 58) in your own consciousness. 38  While these 
images, entities, ideas and significations are part of your own mental world in that they 
are thought by your consciousness, articulated by your consciousness, experienced by your 
consciousness and are thus in that way also dependent on your consciousness, you are aware 
that these ideas do not originate in your own consciousness but elsewhere. According to 
Poulet, the experience of interiority is the moment at which a reader becomes aware that 
beyond the words of the literary work there is “a rational being, . . . a consciousness, the 
consciousness of another, no different from the one I automatically assume in every human 
being I encounter” (1972, p. 57). It is the feeling that the interior universe of the literary 
work that is constituted by language seems to take place within your own conscious mind; 
that your consciousness behaves as though it were the consciousness of another and that 
while you are mentally pronouncing certain ideas by reading them, another subject, which 
is alien to you, has replaced the ‘I’ of your own subject and is seemingly pronouncing these 
ideas for you – and keeps on doing so for as long as you are involved in the act of reading 
(Poulet, 1972, pp. 59-60). “Reading is just that”, Poulet sums up the first part of his talk, 
“a way of giving way not only to a host of alien words, images, ideas, but also to the very 
principle which utters them and shelters them” (1972, p. 60). 
Poulet’s literary criticism and Said’s doctoral work on Conrad are based on a tradition 
of ideas that goes back to the German arch-phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, who in the 
                                               
38 Poulet remarks that the act of reading is marked by “the disappearance of the ‘object’” (1972, p. 57). I agree 
with Thomas McLaughlin, who argues that is of course nonsensical (McLaughlin, 2015, pp. 43-44). McLaughlin 
points out that Poulet wants his listeners to take his words to mean figuratively, not literally. In what follows, 
Poulet therefore backs away from asserting the actual disappearance of the book as a material object in favor of 
a phenomenological description of the experience of the act of reading. However, he does approach the experience 
of reading and the encounter of a reader with a text almost exclusively in mentalist terms by reiterating the 
assumption that “in order to exist as mental objects they must relinquish their existence as real objects” (1972, 
p. 58). McLaughlin, on the other hand, takes up a position that is closer to existential phenomenologists who 
revalue the role of the body. He stresses that reading is a highly physical act: “In the act of reading, there is no 
question – the book is not “nowhere” it is right in front of my eyes. And it can only exist as a mental object if it 
exists as a material object, accessible to highly disciplined operations” (McLaughlin, 2015, p. 44). 
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first four decades of the twentieth century – first at the University of Göttingen (1901-
1915), later at the University of Freiburg (1916-1933) – elaborated a philosophy of science 
based on the fundamental principle of ‘intentionality’, the realization that human 
consciousness is always about or directed at things, objects, situations or events. Husserl’s 
concept of intentionality has little to do with the New Critical notion of intention, in which 
‘intention’ is synonymous for the author’s design or purpose and, if we follow Wimsatt and 
Beardsley’s reasoning in “The Intentional Fallacy”, is often mistakenly used as an 
authoritative argument to settle the meaning in a poem and evaluate its aesthetic qualities 
(1946, pp. 468-469, 486-487). Rather, intentionality of consciousness – from the Latin verb 
tendere, ‘to stretch’, in combination with the prefix in-, which conveys a sense of direction, 
‘toward’, or location – is a universal characteristic of human behavior and means that to 
be conscious of something is to stretch your mind toward or turn your attention to 
something. It means that human consciousness does not passively receive an object in the 
empirical world but designates a dynamic encounter between object and subject in which 
the latter actively directs its mental energy at the former. It means that if you are thinking 
about New York City, for instance, or about the cost of living there, or about meeting 
someone at Times Square, for that matter, your mind is actively directed toward New 
York City, toward the price of renting an apartment there, or toward the meeting at Times 
Square (see Siewert, 2016). According to Husserl’s theory of consciousness, what is 
present in your consciousness when you are conscious of an object, is not the object itself, 
nor a representation of the object, but the experience of the intentional act that is 
synonymous to your perception of that object (Robert Holub, 1995, p. 291). So to be even 
more precise, if you are thinking about New York City, the cost of living there, and the 
meeting at Times Square, it means that you are actually experiencing the intentional act 
that constitutes such thinking about these objects or situations. To sum up in the words 
of Sartre, who put it so eloquently when he introduced Husserl’s philosophy to his French 
readers in La transcendance de l’Ego and kept on repeating in various texts ever since, the 
first principle of phenomenology is that “toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose” 
(1978, p. 28; his emphasis). Consciousness is always consciousness of something. 
If we apply the principles of phenomenology to the study of literature, it means that 
literary texts cannot be regarded New Critically as things in themselves, which 
independently exist in the exterior world outside of human consciousness, but as 
phenomena intended or actively constituted by the consciousness of the critic (Eagleton, 
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2008, pp. 47-48). The Polish phenomenologist and student of Husserl, Roman Ingarden, 
argues that unlike the hypostatized, autonomous linguistic objects which we have seen 
them to be according to the model of the postwar New Criticism, it is beyond question 
that literary works have intentional structures – here ‘intention’ is used as structural 
intention – and that they depend for their continued existence on the intentional acts of 
consciousness of their author and of their readers – here he refers to the phenomenological 
notion of intentionality (Robert Holub, 1995, pp. 295-296). Think of any literary work, 
poetry or prose. To begin with, it is highly likely that the particular poem or piece of prose 
you are thinking of is a real object that has a determinate spatiotemporal empirical reality 
constituting the literary work as a material object: for instance, an epic poem handwritten 
in iron gall ink on a scroll of papyrus, a novel printed with oily ink on paper, an e-book 
stored as a combination of bits on a Kindle or e-reader, or a poem in squiggles on the sand 
washed up on the shore.39 The literary work is also an object that consists of a unique 
combination of real words and has an absolutely individual, intended, formal and linguistic 
structure that at a precise moment in time originated in the mind of its author and was 
physically or electronically transferred on a medium. The author designed his or her work 
in this particular way and gave it this particular structural intention, which allows us to 
establish that the literary work is dependent on the intentional acts of consciousness of its 
author. However, because of the principle of intentionality, we have to take into account 
that the author at the moment of production was involved in a dynamic encounter with 
the world and actively intending his mental energy at the words he or she was producing 
(and, perhaps irreflectively, at other objects as well). As such, we can say that the literary 
work is the product of the author’s intentionality at the moment of production and is thus 
the objectified or embodied form not only of his or her authorial intentions, understood in 
the commonsensical meaning of the word, but also of his or her total consciousness at the 
                                               
39 I am indebted to Steven Knapp and Walter Ben Michaels for this example. In their seminal 1982 article 
“Against Theory” they come up with the now famous example in which the sea seemingly recreates stanzas from 
a well-known poem of Wordsworth on the sand to argue that as long as we take something to be meaningful, it 
must always be the product of an intentional, conscious agent (Knapp & Michaels, 1982, pp. 727-729). According 
to Knapp and Michaels, we would only consider these squiggles in the sand to be meaningful if we can ascribe 
them to some sort of intentional agent or consciousness, such as the living sea, after we have judged the sea to 
possess a consciousness and thus capable of being an intentional agent. However, if we judge otherwise and deem 
the sea to be incapable of such intentional agency, we would consider the marks on the sand to be accidental, 
nonintentional effects of the mechanical operation of the waves. Because, in this latter case, they are not the 
product of an intentional, conscious agent, they would also become meaningless, Knapp and Michaels argue 
(1982, p. 728). 
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moment of production. This makes the existence of the literary work dependent on the 
intentionality of the author.  
It is also highly likely that the particular literary work you are thinking of is designed 
to be read or activated by a reader. Literature, according to phenomenology, is not only 
the objectified intentionality of its author but also a means of communicating something 
– be it ‘the outpourings of existence’ (de Beauvoir), ‘the lived’ (Sartre), ‘Being’ (Heidegger), 
‘Experience’ (Gadamer), ‘spirituality’ (Béguin), ’obsession’ (Richard) or ‘consciousness’ 
(Poulet) (de Beauvoir, 1963; Ender, 2005, p. 433; Gadamer, 2004). Phenomenology 
upholds the idea that reading a literary work brings the reader into an authentic existential 
contact with its author – an idea which we have already encountered in Said’s description 
of literary criticism as an open meeting or dialogue between critic and writer, but, as we 
will see, that, in the end, is but an illusion. Suffice it to say for now that the 
phenomenological communis opinio, here voiced by Ingarden, is that the moment at which 
the literary work is read or concretized it becomes “an intersubjective intentional object” 
(1973, p. 16). By this, Ingarden means that for its continued existence the literary work is 
also dependent on the intentionality of the reader at the moment of perception, whose 
consciousness in the act of reading is actively directed at the words produced by the author 
and through these words reactivates or reanimates, so to speak, but – and this is crucial – 
does not wholly duplicate the author’s originating acts of consciousness (Robert Holub, 
1995, pp. 296-297). We can therefore say that when the reader is involved in the act of 
reading, he or she is not only experiencing the intentional act that constitutes reading the 
literary work – its narrative construction, and formal and linguistic structure – which is 
the only experience that matters according to the New Criticism, but is at the same time 
also re-experiencing the lived experience of the author at the moment of production.  
However, for Hans-Georg Gadamer, another student of Husserl’s, this does not imply 
that the meaning of a literary work is forever fixed by the author’s intentionality, just 
waiting to be unambiguously discovered and re-experienced by the reader. Thinking about 
what happens when texts that were produced in a particular historical and cultural 
moment are read in different moments, led Gadamer to believe that at any given moment 
in time and place new meanings can be culled from a work that were perhaps never 
anticipated by its author or by the audience to which the text was originally addressed 
(2004, p. 396). This highlights that literary understanding is situational and constrained 
by the cultural and historical context of the author and of the reader, making it impossible 
 131 
to study a literary text New Critically, seemingly in isolation or ‘as it is’ (Eagleton, 2008, 
p. 62). Understanding is a hermeneutic process that takes place in an intersubjective 
dialogue during which the reader’s cultural and historical experiences, knowledge, 
meanings, prejudices, assumptions and expectations or what Gadamer calls the “horizon 
of the present” (2004, p. 304) fuses with “the historical horizon” (2004, p. 306) within which 
the text was placed by its author. The work of Gadamer stresses that literary criticism is 
a living dialogue with the literary work and that readers also bring something to the text 
and are co-creators of its meaning. This hermeneutic dialogue is predicated on the idea 
that there is no access to literary works that is outside the world, outside history, or 
outside one’s own horizon of understanding.  
Three things should be noted. First, all of this “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 
305) is a phenomenon of consciousness of the reader, thereby causing the experience of 
interiority or the illusion that you are entering the work.40 Secondly, the experience of 
interiority itself is finite, meaning that when you close the book, your mind is no longer 
directed at the words on the page but already involved in different intentional acts of 
consciousness. This illustrates that Poulet’s experience of interiority and the subsequent 
encounter with a subjective power at work in the text depends on the temporality of the 
act of reading and that you are only giving way to the consciousness of another while you 
are reading (1972, pp. 59-60). Thirdly, the result of the fusion of horizons lasts well beyond 
the temporal act of reading in that the reader gathers information from the text into his 
or her own horizon of understanding, transforming and expanding his or her horizon for 
a future confrontation with the historical horizon of another text. In this view, literature 
is a form of intuitive knowledge, causing the totality of all that can be thought about by 
the reader at a given historical and cultural moment to widen and the reader to reach a 
                                               
40 As I have already indicated, every literary theory implicitly foregrounds its preferred literary genre tied to its 
methodology. Where poetry is a proxy for literature in the New Criticism, a quick browse through some seminal 
phenomenological texts reveals that the kind of literature that they are concerned with, could now be classified 
as ‘traditional’ literature from the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century, written by ‘white’, 
‘European’ and ‘male’ authors such as Baudelaire, Nerval, Proust, Flaubert, Henry James, Conrad, and Dickens. 
While some of these authors were non-canonical in their cultural and historical moment, they have now been 
firmly established as the canonical authors of Western literature. Contrary to non-Western, experimental 
literature, or works predating modernity, these kind of works easily allow the kind of immersive reading which 
phenomenology propagates and do not really complicate understanding beyond the horizon of these white, 
European and male phenomenological literary critics. Not long after World War II, Simone de Beauvoir stressed 
that phenomenology often takes for granted a normalized white and male subject (1949). The Martiniquan 
psychiatrist Frantz Fanon added shortly thereafter that in order for black people to get by in the world of 
phenomenology they must wear ‘white masks’ (1952).  
132 
more complete understanding of his- or herself. Poulet seems to hint at this third point, 
when, at the end of his talk, he confesses that in some great works of literature the 
experience of interiority can be so powerful that even when you have long finished reading 
the particular work, in your mind there is still a “subject left standing in isolation” (1972, 
p. 72). What he exactly means by this notion of what seems to be an isolated, atemporal 
and ahistorical consciousness and where to find it is not wholly clear from his paper 
presented at Johns Hopkins. He remains rather vague about it and in the discussion that 
followed shortly after the discussants unsuccessfully pressed him to clarify his thought 
(Lentricchia, 1980, p. 75). We therefore have to return to Husserl. 
To Husserl, the first principle of phenomenology – intentionality of consciousness – 
does not rule out the existence of a consciousness that is only conscious of itself: an 
essential, pure, transcendental form of consciousness that contains the universal deep 
structures underpinning each single, individual consciousness and setting out the 
conditions of possibility for human consciousness itself. 41  Husserl argues that by 
rigorously applying the intuitive method of epoché, which involves the systematic exclusion 
and blocking – or what phenomenologists call ‘reduction’ and ‘bracketing’ – of all 
historical and individual presuppositions, a priori beliefs, and the existential lifeworld or 
environing world of the intuiting subject, that subject can come to know the 
transcendental consciousness that stands in isolation from all cultural, historical, social 
and existential fluctuations (Robert Holub, 1995, pp. 291-292). It is important to note that 
even though the phenomenological project gradually evolved into a critique of 
consciousness under the impulse of Poulet and critics of the Geneva school associated with 
him in the 1940s and 1950s, Husserl originally conceptualized phenomenology as a 
descriptive science of consciousness that aims to lay bare and describe the deep structures 
of the transcendental consciousness underpinning the individual consciousness of the 
intuiting subject (Sartre, 1963, p. 140; 1978, pp. 16-17). I would therefore like to stress 
that Husserlian phenomenology is not a form of empiricism that examines the precise 
experience of what it is what you or I feel when we are reading a particular novel. Instead, 
                                               
41 This especially holds true for Husserl’s early publications. In his unfinished book Die Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (1954) and in dozens of unpublished notes collected at the 
Husserl Archive at the University of Leuven that became known only after his death in 1937, Husserl expands 
on his ideas about the transcendental consciousness and, seemingly influenced by his student Martin Heidegger, 
the notions of environing world or existential lifeworld (Umwelt) come to occupy central positions in his thought 
(Robert Holub, 1995, p. 292). 
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it aims to describe the universal essence of novels and the act of reading them, regardless 
of the individual consciousness that does the reading (Eagleton, 2008, p. 49). 
However, to Husserl’s student Martin Heidegger, as well as to the French existential 
phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, whose methodologies are central to Said’s 
study of Conrad, Husserl’s atemporal methodology of epoché and his accompanying notion 
of the constitutive transcendental consciousness that is said to provide the deep structures 
of human consciousness are problematic (Robert Holub, 1995, p. 292). According to them, 
the first principle of phenomenology complicates the absolute bracketing of all prejudices 
and rules out the existence of such an atemporal, pure and isolated form of consciousness. 
Originally published in 1927, Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit is built on the foundation that the 
very essence or the a priori “Grundverfassung” (1967, p. 52) of human existence, that what 
it means to be human, is precisely its being-in-the-world or “das In-der-Welt-sein” (1967, 
p. 53).  
Sartre, who was influenced by Heidegger, makes a similar point when he introduces 
Husserl’s phenomenological project in 1936. He argues that the foundational premise of 
phenomenology – that consciousness is always consciousness of something – implies that 
consciousness cannot be isolated but is always located and embedded within a particular, 
contingent situation that is the lived experience of the intuiting subject: it is always a 
consciousness-in-the-world (Sartre, 1978, p. 13). Moreover, because of this intentionality 
of consciousness, your consciousness, my consciousness, Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, Sartre’s, 
or that of any other human being, is always a consciousness directed at something other 
than itself, at an object that is transcendent or outside consciousness – even when one is 
conscious of being conscious (Sartre, 1978, pp. 24-26). So, according to Sartre, Husserl is not 
wrong in arguing that there is such a thing as a transcendental consciousness, but he is 
definitely wrong in claiming that this consciousness is prior to the consciousness-in-the-
world and constitutes the first and absolute formal structure of consciousness (Sartre, 
1978, pp. 18-19). According to Sartre, Husserl’s transcendental consciousness, or what 
Sartre calls the Ego, is already a spontaneously created abstract object that is the unified 
and individual product of the dynamic encounter between an individual consciousness-in-
the-world and the chaotic lifeworld within which it is embedded or, more forcefully, the 
transcendental consciousness is a projection or a fiction even of our consciousness-in-the-
world, which remains fundamentally existential and nonobjective (Sartre, 1978, p. 37). 
Having turned Husserl’s phenomenology upside down, Sartre goes on to conclude in one 
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of the famous aphorisms that characterize his philosophical style, “l’Ego n’est pas 
propriétaire de la conscience, il en est l’objet” (1978, p. 77). 
Sartre’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenological project in La transcendance de l’Ego is 
an early formulation of one of his most famous aphorisms, which he delivered in a speech 
on October 29, 1945, at the Parisian Club Maintenant that was later published as 
L’Existentialisme est un humanisme (1946). There, he proposes that the philosophy of 
existentialism is based on the tenet that for humans “l’existence précède l’essence” (Sartre, 
1946, p. 17), which is basically a way of saying that there is no essence prior to human 
existence, that there is no a priori human nature, and that there is no such thing as an 
essential, transcendental consciousness underpinning each individual consciousness.42 It 
is also a way of saying that “toute vérité et toute action impliquent un milieu et une 
subjectivité humaine” (Sartre, 1946, p. 12), that there are no truths or morals independent 
of human subjectivity and that every inquiry into human life, such as philosophy and 
literary criticism, has to start from the point of human subjectivity. 
 The existentialist ideas of Sartre underpin the argument in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography, although, according to Abdirahman Hussein, they are not explicitly 
articulated (2002, p. 31). My discussion explicates Sartre’s presence in Said’s treatment of 
Conrad. For, from the way in which Said analyzes Conrad’s authorial consciousness, it will 
become clear that the consciousness which he finds in the letters and short fiction is not a 
Husserlian, pure form of consciousness but a Sartrean fiction, Conrad’s Ego produced by 
Conrad’s consciousness-in-the-world. This conclusion is of paramount importance, 
because if Husserl’s transcendental consciousness is actually an object of the 
consciousness-in-the-world and not the absolute and first formal structure of the latter, 
Said’s existential phenomenological method effectively plunges man back into the world. 
It allows him to break down the metaphysical isolation of the literary text from worldly 
human experience, successfully installed by the postwar New Criticism and its treatment 
of poems as dramatic speeches from an abstract lyrical ‘I’ that is dissociated from the 
                                               
42 Sartre uses this aphorism to argue that at the moment of our birth we are thrown into the world – “jeté dans 
le monde” (1946, p. 37) – and that, due to the lack of any a priori essence to our human existence, we have the 
total responsibility over our existence and painful freedom to fill in our subjectivity ourselves (1946, p. 24). This 
happens in an intentional process that takes place on a daily basis in our dynamic encounter with the world, 
through our intentional acts of improvising, responding and adapting to the changing situations we 
(unintentionally) encounter. To Sartre, it means that “l’homme existe d’abord, se rencontre, surgit dans le monde, 
et qu’il se définit après. L’homme, tel que le conçoit l’existentialiste, s’il n’est pas définissable, c’est qu’il n’est 
d’abord rien. Il ne sera qu’ensuite, et il sera tel qu’il se sera fait” (Sartre, 1946, pp. 21-22). 
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concrete historical author or consciousness-in-the-world (see Culler, 2015, p. 84). Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography combats the postwar New Critical celebration of 
absolute, unconstrained, universal and unsituated agency that it effected by the above 
mentioned dissociation and by relating poems to other poems rather than to worldly 
events (see Culler, 2015, p. 119). As such, Said’s model clears the path for a literary 
criticism that is embedded in the world and by reestablishing the dissociated bond between 
historical author and product, posits a concrete, situated model of agency.  
In this crucial respect, Said differs from Poulet, whose description of a “subject . . . 
standing in isolation” in his paper at Johns Hopkins points toward such a conceptualization 
of the authorial consciousness as a pure and isolated form of consciousness, which Husserl 
isolates through the phenomenological method of epoché. But how and where do we find 
it? The concluding remarks can already put us well on our way. There Poulet hints that 
“at another level” than that of the images, entities, ideas and significations of the literary 
work there is “a subject which reveals itself to itself” (1972, p. 72). He quickly clarifies that 
this subject is not the author as a biographical person but the individual genius of the 
author or the authorial consciousness that is at once visibly present in the work and cannot 
be distinguished from the work in question but at the same time invisibly disengages itself 
from the work and stands alone, almost as a pure self in all of its Cartesian purity 
(Lentricchia, 1980, p. 72; Poulet, 1972, pp. 72, 80). During the discussion he adds that the 
authorial consciousness is “an essence which is only accessible when you have in mind the 
certain totality of the works of the same author” (Poulet, 1972, p. 77), which indicates that 
the level at which this consciousness is to be found transcends the formal boundaries of 
the individual literary work and its objective structures. 
As Geoffrey Hartman point outs in “Beyond Formalism” (1966), an article of which the 
title best frames the critical concerns and aspirations of Said’s generation of U.S. literary 
scholars trained in the postwar period, Poulet locates the authorial consciousness at a place 
beyond form and consequently predicates his phenomenological method on the idea that 
the critic has to look “through form” in order to gain an “unusually intimate access to the 
writer’s mind” (Hartman, 1966, p. 553). Through form, not beyond, for Hartman stresses 
that in spite of Poulet’s image of being a self-avowed antiformalist,43 his criticism does not 
                                               
43 Hartman identifies the same anti-formalist tendency in the criticism of Poulet as we have seen in Said’s 
treatment of Conrad, in which Said does not draw any formal distinction between Conrad’s texts and argues that 
every individual imagination reveals the same authorial consciousness. Likewise, the criticism of Poulet ignores 
“all formal distinctions, as between part and whole, or preface, novel, journalistic comment, obiter dicta” (Hartman, 
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transcend formalism (yet) because it does not reject the principles of formalism understood 
as a method “of revealing the human content of art by a study of its formal properties” 
(1966, p. 542). From Hartman’s article it becomes clear that Poulet’s method is to place 
himself in a writer’s consciousness and enter the mind of the author studied by looking 
through the objective formal structure of the work. The authorial consciousness is what 
really concerns Poulet, not form, as “he does not link it explicitly to the manifest form of 
the work of art” (Hartman, 1966, p. 553). While Hartman, just like Said, lauds Poulet’s 
intimacy and devotion to the author’s mind, he ultimately finds his writings on the subject 
of form to be unsatisfactory. To Poulet, it “does not matter whether he enters that mind 
by door or window or through the chimney: he tells us what he finds inside without telling 
us how he got in” (Hartman, 1966, p. 553). 
Poulet must have anticipated precisely this kind of criticism from his audience in 
Baltimore. In his talk he therefore throws a number of potentially hostile respondents off 
guard by showing them the way to get in. According to him, the authorial consciousness 
should be found beyond “the continuously changing frontiers of form” (Poulet, 1972, p. 
71) and can be accessed not in spite of these linguistic and formal barriers but precisely 
“thanks to the intervention of language” (Poulet, 1972, p. 58). In what seems to be a very 
traditionalist idea of representation, language does not restrict access to the consciousness 
of the author but precisely serves as the entry-point to the author’s mind and should 
therefore function as the starting point of a literary critical undertaking (Lentricchia, 1980, 
pp. 74-75). While many scholars, including, as we will see, Said, gathered at a conference 
on structuralism would get up on their hind legs by just contemplating the idea,44 in 
Poulet’s Johns Hopkins talk, language seems to be a transparent medium that offers access 
to the pure, transcendental consciousness of the author that is stripped of all the objective 
forms the reader has experienced in the process of reading. This consciousness seems to 
be anterior to language and time and “is not entirely explained by its relationship with 
forms and objects within the work” (Poulet, 1972, p. 72). It is irreducible, “no object can 
                                               
1966, pp. 550-551). Moreover, part of Poulet’s anti-formalism is that he makes “no distinction between 
Coleridge’s primary and secondary imaginations. The I AM implicit in every act of consciousness is also the I 
AM revealed in art” (Hartman, 1966, p. 553). 
44 We could image that Derrida, for one, must have done so. A year later he published La voix et le phénomène 
(Derrida, 1967), a work that refutes precisely this transparent idea of language and the concept of a Husserlian, 
transcendental consciousness. The work is regarded to be a foundational work for the method of deconstruction. 
It includes, amongst other things, a long discussion of Husserl’s theory of signs and a critique of Poulet’s notion 
that language is under the final authority of an individual subject (see Said, 1975a, p. 338). 
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any longer express it; no structure can any longer define it; it is exposed in its ineffability 
and in its fundamental indeterminacy” (Poulet, 1972, p. 72). Having expanded his attitude 
toward language, Poulet’s concluding remarks before the discussion are directed at his 
fellow avant-gardist literary critics gathered in Baltimore. They express his belief in a 
move beyond formalism that attempts to sever all ties with objectivity in literary criticism 
and is therefore more radical than the one we have already encountered in the works of 
Blackmur and Levin: “It seems then that criticism . . . needs to annihilate, or at least 
momentarily to forget, the objective elements of the work, and to elevate itself to the 
apprehension of a subjectivity without objectivity” (1972, p. 72; my emphasis). In short, the 
critic must discover at the heart of the text the author as an immediately present, 
unmediated, irreducible and nonobjective entity (Lawall, 1968, p. 81; Lentricchia, 1980, p. 
73; Said, 1975a, pp. 337-338). 
To conclude this section, I’d like to briefly point out that phenomenological literary 
criticism shares some crucial tenets with the early phases of the New Criticism, which 
smoothed the reception of phenomenology in the U.S. and facilitated the harmonization of 
both methods in Said’s revised doctoral dissertation. Similar to the early New Criticism, 
phenomenology does not attempt to study the author’s psychology but the unifying 
principle or structural intention of the literary work – the intentional consciousness that 
determines the work’s arrangements and solves its problems. At the same time 
phenomenological literary criticism subscribes to the New Critical idea that the essence of 
a literary work cannot be paraphrased or expressed other than by the precise form of that 
work (see de Man, 1971c, p. 98). It also illustrates that while literary criticism has an 
objective pole in the study of the work’s structure, literary critics should not fall in the 
postwar New Critical trap of reifying the literary work but consider it in relation to its 
existential context of reception by the critic and of production by the author. As a result, 
literary criticism is at the same time an objective and a highly subjective undertaking that 
demonstrates that “the understanding of forms must not limit itself merely to the 
recording of their objective aspects” (Poulet, 1972, p. 71). In other words, literary critics 
should dismiss the kind of reasoning which we find in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s fallacy-
essays. Through a perception of the object, literary critics should strive to reach and 
apprehend the subjective principle that upholds and precedes this object (Poulet, 1972, p. 
71). As Poulet makes clear in the discussion after his paper, the literary text depends on 
the authorial consciousness in that it is the objectified form of the author’s intentionality 
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and thus a means of preserving an author’s ideas, feelings, and consciousness at the 
moment of production (1972, p. 79). Poulet’s remarks at first sight seem to be similar to 
the argument presented in Wimsatt and Beardsley’s “The Intentional Fallacy”, namely, 
that the author’s intentions are clear from the linguistic evidence of the text (Wimsatt & 
Beardsley, 1946, p. 469). The difference is that where the New Critics hypostatize the 
literary work into an objectivity without subjectivity, Poulet’s criticism momentarily 
suspends all objectivity in order to reach an absolute subjectivity, turning literary criticism 
into a mental act of comprehension in which the critic moves through the literary work to 
reach and understand the author; a move from subject through object to another subject.  
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2.3 A Worldly Criticism of Consciousness 
Now that we have established what phenomenological literary criticism is according to 
Poulet, it is time to look at Said’s version of it. As we do so, it will become clear how his 
method combines Poulet’s method of empathetic reading and Sartre’s stress on the 
embeddedness of consciousness within particular situations with the humanist method of 
‘warm reading’ of Blackmur and Levin and the evaluation of form associated with their 
strand of criticism. Adding the ideas of Arthur Schopenhauer on the formation of 
individuality to the equation, we will see how Said attempts to comprehend and at the 
same time evaluate Conrad’s consciousness that is embedded within the world; or, in other 
words, how he performs a worldly criticism of consciousness. 
We have already encountered a crucial tenet of phenomenological literary criticism in 
Said’s study of Conrad, more specifically in the metaphor which he uses to describe Conrad 
as an author hiding beneath the formal surface of his works. Said consequently 
conceptualizes his task as a critic to make Conrad’s experience “overt and intelligible” 
(1966, p. 7) and help Conrad emerge from his works “as a significantly intellectual and 
spiritual reality” (1966, p. 8). This indicates once more that, in contrast to the formalist 
approach of the New Criticism that considered the formal, stylistic and textual aspects of 
literary works to be the center of literary analysis, phenomenological literary criticism 
grasps these aspects as surface phenomena or organic parts of a deeper totalized form, a 
psychological whole or Gestalt of which the authorial consciousness is both the genetic 
origin and the unifying principle (Eagleton, 2008, p. 51).45 Phenomenological literary 
criticism thus reduces literary texts to incarnations or embodiments of their author’s 
consciousness, which it considers to be the deeper essence of these works and therefore 
the focal point of literary critical analysis (Eagleton, 2008, p. 51). It turns the literary work, 
as Said indicates in Beginnings, into a particular instance of consciousness thinking itself 
(1975a, pp. 337-338). Literary criticism, then, is decidedly no longer the elucidation and 
evaluation of form that it was according to the New Critics but becomes a criticism of 
                                               
45 The authorial consciousness at the same time acts as the center or structural and organizing principle of the 
literary work and as the work’s genetic origin (Hartman, 1966, p. 551). As such, phenomenological literary 
criticism not wholly unproblematically equates the spatial notion of ‘center’ and the temporal notion of ‘source’ 
and fails to account for the fact that these notions are not identical and a very productive tension may indeed 
develop between them (de Man, 1971c, p. 82; Said, 1975a). 
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consciousness or, as the term was first coined in French by Poulet in a preface to Jean-
Pierre Richard’s Littérature et sensation (1954), a “critique de la conscience” (Poulet, 1954, 
p. 9). 
Criticism of consciousness aims to describe the recurrent themes, patterns and images 
of the author’s consciousness, which, as we recall, Said labels Conrad’s ‘structures of 
experience’ that are present in every part of the author’s oeuvre. Indeed, to study this 
authorial consciousness, the phenomenological critic cannot limit him- or herself to just 
focusing on one so-called literary masterpiece or on one genre of texts but has to analyze 
the entire body of texts written by the author, because all of these texts – even what at 
first sight appear to be insignificant writings – are seen as manifestations of the same 
developing authorial consciousness (Hillis Miller, 1963, p. 475; Lawall, 1968, p. 7). A 
crucial note is to be made here. If literature is defined as a manifestation of consciousness 
or an expression of human experience, then a great deal of texts become ‘literary’ by 
definition and are opened to the domain of literary criticism (Lawall, 1968, p. 80). This 
translates into Said’s study of Conrad’s oeuvre in which he disregards traditional formal 
distinctions between fictional, pseudo-fictional and nonfictional, as well as literary and 
nonliterary texts and analyzes such a large number of texts that he is able to conclude that  
[b]etween Conrad’s life, then, and his fiction there exists much the same relation as 
between the two divisions (past and present) of his life. The critic’s job is to seek out 
the common denominator of the two sets of relations. As Conrad’s history of his past 
is to his present, so his historical being as a man is to his fiction. And the only way 
the relation can be articulated is, as I said earlier, to identify certain dynamic 
movements or structures of experience (mechanisms) that emerge from the letters. 
(1966, pp. 11-12) 
That “common denominator” or unifying principle which enables Said to relate the 
(auto)biography to the literary works (and the letters), is Conrad’s authorial consciousness. 
This illustrates that the focal point of Said’s analysis is not Conrad the biographical person, 
nor the formal (literary) work, but that which precedes and links these two together: the 
author’s consciousness embodied in these texts. This consciousness is not something 
which is easily discovered, he adds, but a subjectivity defined by “structures of 
experience . . . that emerge from the letters”. Apart from what I consider to be Said’s naïve 
view about the higher degree of authenticity in nonfictional texts, this is in fact a textbook 
example of how phenomenologists conceptualize the authorial consciousness. We recall 
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from Poulet’s paper in Baltimore that the consciousness that is embodied in the text is an 
existential entity, or as Sarah Lawall makes clear, that it “is neither formal nor 
biographical: the ‘author’ is a literary, created ‘existent’ visible only in the evidence of the 
text” (1968, p. 7). In other words, criticism of consciousness desires just as little to be a 
form of biographical criticism as it wishes to study the author’s psychology or the formal 
aspects of literature. Instead, it aims to be a criticism of the author’s experience visible in 
a text and his or her active consciousness at the moment of production (Lawall, 1968, pp. 
5-6). Or, in the words of J. Hillis Miller, who was one of the first phenomenological critics 
working in the U.S. of the 1960s, it aims to be a “consciousness of consciousness” (1963, 
p. 474).46 
The second and perhaps the clearest tenet of phenomenological criticism in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography that I like to single out, is the work’s opening 
argument that literary criticism should aim for “a particular comprehension of the written 
work” (Said, 1966, p. 7). If it wasn’t so already, it should now become overtly clear that 
phenomenological literary criticism aims to comprehend the literary text studied and the 
authorial consciousness it is said to embody and therefore upholds the premise of an 
empathetic reading as opposed to an exterior judgment based on form (Lawall, 1968, p. 8). 
In such a reading the phenomenological critic has to appeal more to humanist intuition 
and empathetic identification with the text than to a positivistic examination and cool 
detachment (Lawall, 1968, p. 80). He or she has to develop a systematically empathetic 
approach to the literary work that allows him or her to come as close to the text as possible 
and reach a certain degree of intimacy with the authorial consciousness. In the works of 
Poulet, the consciousness of the reader and, a fortiori, the consciousness of the critic have 
to “s’identifier avec une pensée autre que la leur” (Poulet, 1971c, p. 103). Poulet is so 
devoted to the mind of the author he wishes to explore that he pushes this empathetic 
                                               
46 Hillis Miller, who had joined Poulet at Johns Hopkins in 1953, was immensely inspired by the Belgian critic 
of consciousness and the two became close collaborators and friends. In 1959, under close supervision of Poulet, 
Hillis Miller published Charles Dickens: the World of his Novels (1959), a reworked version of his PhD at Harvard 
that was already quite inimical in scope to the New Criticism but now became even more so. The reworked 
version was also the first explicit criticism of consciousness written by an American and made Hillis Miller one 
of the most influential avant-gardist phenomenological critics in the U.S. of the 1960s, before he gradually 
dropped phenomenology in the 1970s in favor of the deconstructive criticism of his colleagues at Yale (Eagleton, 
2008, p. 51; Leitch, 2010, p. 134; Lentricchia, 1980, p. 64). Attesting to Hillis Miller’s status as the leading 
phenomenologist in the US is the inclusion of a chapter on him in Sarah Lawall’s Critics of Consciousness (1968), 
the first monograph to introduce Anglophone critics to the phenomenology of an otherwise exclusively European 
and French-speaking group of critics such as Marcel Raymond, Albert Béguin, Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre 
Richard, Jean Starobinski, Jean Rousset and Maurice Blanchot. 
142 
approach through to such an extreme that we could label his criticism “une critique de 
pure identification” (1971b, p. 256). To reach this point of extreme intimacy, he argues 
that the critic should systematically recreate the experience embodied in the text so that 
the thoughts of the critic come to coincide with the thoughts of the author conveyed in 
the language of his or her texts (Hillis Miller, 1963, pp. 471-472; Poulet, 1971a, p. 9). Or, 
in Poulet’s own words,  
[c]omme tout le monde je crois que le but de la critique est d’arriver à une 
connaissance intime de la réalité critiquée. Or il me semble qu’une telle intimité n’est 
possible que dans la mesure où la pensée critique devient la pensée critiquée, où elle 
réussit à re-sentir, à repenser, à re-imaginer celle-ci de l’intérieur. Rien de moins 
objectif qu’un tel mouvement de l’esprit. (1959, p. 10). 
There is no mistaking that the reconstruction of experience is indeed a highly subjective 
approach to literary criticism that is diametrically opposed to the ideas about objectivity 
of the postwar New Critics and much closer to those about ‘warm reading’ professed by 
critics like Blackmur and Levin – remember also Said’s remarks about the similarities 
between Poulet’s and Blackmur’s methods when it comes to their intimacy with the text 
and their devotion to the author’s experience (see Said, 2000d, p. 17). 
There is however a crucially important difference between Blackmur and Levin’s model 
of literary criticism and Poulet’s criticism of consciousness, which becomes clear when we 
return for the last time to Poulet’s talk at Johns Hopkins. I’d like to dwell for a little on 
Poulet’s metaphor of “giving way” to the consciousness of another and how we should 
interpret it. As we recall, he uses that metaphor at the end of the first part of his talk to 
describe the feeling of interiority experienced during the phenomenon of reading. A few 
moments later he describes the same phenomenon a “strange displacement of myself by 
the work” (Poulet, 1972, p. 62) that in the space of a few sentences turns into an 
“annexation of my consciousness by another” or, more forcefully, into another mind which 
“invades me” (Poulet, 1972, p. 63). Compared to the metaphors of identification and 
coincidence above, which, to be clear, are still the dominant metaphors in Poulet’s 
criticism, the metaphors of displacement, annexation and invasion that he uses in his paper 
in Baltimore, might strike us as rather grim and violent images to describe the act of 
reading. Do such experiences not hinder the reader’s empathy with the annexing 
consciousness and understanding of its human experience? After all, if we think of concrete 
situations of displacement and annexation how much warmth and empathy is one able to 
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muster for an alien mind if one’s own thoughts and feelings are being invaded, displaced 
or annexed by that foreign mind? Do invasion and displacement not lead to hostility and 
active resistance on the part of the reader? Lastly, we might even raise the question that 
such an annexation would result in the complete depravation or loss of the reader’s own 
consciousness, when his or her mind is taken over by another mind that thinks for it.  
Judging from Poulet’s subsequent description of the act of reading and literary 
criticism, this is not the case (1972, pp. 62-67). According to his model, the reader keeps 
hold of his or her consciousness and from the moment he or she becomes a prey, so to 
speak, to what he or she reads, the reader begins to share the use of his or her consciousness 
with “the conscious subject ensconced at the heart of the work” (Poulet, 1972, p. 63). This 
“community of feeling” (Poulet, 1972, p. 63) results in the reader taking the perspective of 
the other consciousness, identifying with it and, eventually, forming a common 
consciousness between him- or herself and the author. Ideally, the end result of all this is 
that a comprehension takes places that, to a certain extent, is similar to the one Said 
describes at the beginning of his study of Conrad in which “it is in the openness of the 
conscious mind that critic and writer meet to engage in the act of knowing and being 
aware of an experience” (1966, p. 7). The difference between Said’s metaphor of a meeting 
and Poulet’s annexation, is that according to Said’s description, comprehension is 
established in the act of meeting the author halfway; a meeting between what should in 
theory be seen as two equally powerful consciousnesses or conversation partners with the 
same amount of agency. In this respect, Said’s methodology at least in terms seems to lean 
more closely on the models of reading proposed by Blackmur and Levin, and Gadamer’s 
‘fusion of horizons’, the latter of which explicitly rejects the formation of such a singular 
horizon (see Gadamer, 2004, p. 305). In practice, however, Said is actually much closer to 
the criticism of consciousness of Poulet, whose model introduces a difference in degree of 
agency between the authorial consciousness and that of the critic. The former takes 
initiative and actively annexes the critic’s consciousness by unfolding its thoughts and 
feelings – what Poulet calls the ‘subjectified objects’ – on the foreground. The latter 
responds to the initiative of the authorial consciousness and more passively records what 
it experiences or feels when it reads. Of course, this has to be taken figuratively, because 
the reader or critic takes the initiative in the act of reading. 
For Poulet, this difference in agency is the very condition of possibility for criticism of 
consciousness, because it causes an affective distance or temporal lag that he describes as 
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“a schizoid distinction between what I feel and what the other feels; a confused awareness 
of delay, so that the work seems first to think by itself, and then to inform me what it has 
thought” (1972, p. 63). This leaves the reader surprised and astonished and makes him or 
her realize that “I am a consciousness astonished by an existence which is not mine, but 
which I experience as though it were mine” (Poulet, 1972, p. 63). According to Poulet, this 
astonished consciousness is the premise of criticism. The consciousness of the critic is that 
of an astonished reader who suddenly becomes aware of the experience of interiority and 
the realization that he or she is temporarily giving way to another consciousness. Poulet 
stresses that because of this awareness, critics have slightly more agency than readers 
(1972, pp. 66-67). He also reiterates that “critical consciousness does not necessarily imply 
the total disappearance of the critic’s mind in the mind to be criticized” (Poulet, 1972, p. 
63). So, to be clear, while Poulet’s model of literary criticism in theory does not preclude 
the idea of active agency for the critic, from the metaphors which he uses – both the 
metaphors of coincidence and annexation – it is clear that there is still a remarkable 
discrepancy in the amount of agency that his model bestows to critics and authors. The 
author is potent and imposing. The critic is humble and must conform to the authorial 
consciousness. 
This aspect of Poulet’s model taken over by Said is important, as the difference in 
agency transcends the realm of literary theory and has far wider human consequences 
because Poulet’s model is highly authoritative and effectively robs the reader of agency in 
the process of creating meaning. There is no Gadamerian intersubjective dialogue in which 
the reader comes into an existential contact with the other and enhances him- or herself 
(see Hillis Miller, 1963, p. 472). Instead, the reader is forced to completely enter into the 
mind of the author, whose mind is the only mind that matters and hence authoritative in 
settling the correct meaning of a text. This is why, as Hillis Miller has argued, “[t]he 
theme of intersubjectivity is rarely treated directly in Poulet’s criticism. To read one of his 
essays is usually to be transported into a consciousness which exists almost as if there 
were no other minds in the world” (1963, p. 472). Contrary to the intersubjective objects 
of Ingarden and Gadamer, Poulet views literature as an intentional object, of which the 
meaning is identical with the intentionality of the author at the moment of production; 
with whatever mental object the author had in mind or intended at that moment (see 
Eagleton, 2008, p. 58). There is but one, fixed field of meaning in a literary text, which is 
delineated by the intentionality of the author. As such, his model coerces readers into a 
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position of obedience that supports the status quo and does not account for a reader from 
different historical, socio-cultural and geographical contexts to fail to identify with the 
authorial consciousness embodied in the text, in spite of all good intentions on the part of 
that reader to be as empathetic to the author’s experience as possible. As we shall later see, 
for Said, this failure of identification produces very productive readings and is the decisive 
moment at which postcolonial criticism – or, though Said is not attentive to this, feminist 
criticism – becomes possible.47 
Let us return to Said’s revised doctoral dissertation, which, as I have argued, analyzes 
an author who is deeply embedded within a particular socio-historical imperial moment 
but does not use what we would now label a postcolonial methodology itself. The reason 
is that, in what is clearly an adoption of Poulet’s method, Said’s method is based on the 
principle of co-mediation and therefore does not read Conrad against the grain but takes 
great effort to reconstruct the author’s experience: “Just as he had to rescue his experience 
for the satisfaction of his consciousness, to believe that he had put down the important 
parts of the truth as he saw it, so also his critic has to relive that rescue, without heroism, alas, 
but with equal determination” (1966, p. 10; my emphasis). From the passage above we 
should take note that Said’s critical project is predicated on the idea that a critic has to 
empathetically recreate the varying steps of an author’s experience in order to fully grasp 
and understand the author’s consciousness. Inspired by Sartre’s phenomenological theory 
of the emotions (1939), he does add that because the reconstructed experience is secondary 
to the original authorial experience, a pure identification of the type that Poulet suggests 
is impossible – but does not draw any ‘postcolonial’ conclusions to this. I would like to add 
that this critical reconstruction entails some serious risks that transcend Said’s remarks 
about the difficulty of recreating Conrad’s experience because of the author’s “combination 
of evasion with a seemingly artless candor in his autobiographical pronouncements that 
poses intricate problems for the student of his fiction” (1966, pp. 10-11). As Abdirahman 
Hussein has rightly remarked, the consequence of the phenomenological method 
associated to Genevan criticism that Said adopts in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography is that it requires him to show more sympathy to the author than to be 
                                               
47 I am not implicitly arguing that the phenomenological method in literary criticism proposed by such critics as 
Gadamer is better. A flaw of this method is that it fails to account for ideology and existing power relations and 
does not take into account that the hermeneutic dialogue is not always conducted between equal partners, but is 
as often as not a monologue by the powerful to the powerless (Eagleton, 2008, p. 64). While Poulet’s model does 
not account for this either, it is actually a more realistic depiction of such unequal power relations. 
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critical of his views (2002, p. 33). While this methodological choice in itself does not 
preclude the possibility of, what Hussein calls, Said’s “radicalized critical engagement” 
(2002, p. 34) with Conrad’s thought, it might nonetheless explain why Said is indeed so 
devoted to identifying Conrad’s authorial intentions and understanding the author’s lived 
experience of imperialism – and, on the face of it, is very successful at it – but ultimately 
fails to identify, describe and criticize Conrad’s dehumanizing and offensive portraying of 
Africans in Heart of Darkness. 
In applying a certain theory to the study of literature, it is as if the critic is using a 
flashlight that allows him or her to direct its focused beam to illuminate certain aspects 
and parts of the literary work studied, to which other theories might not pay attention. 
However, because of its specific focus, the light beam cannot illuminate the entire literary 
work. So, a theory lights up certain aspects of a particular literary work, while inevitably 
leaving others obscured. As Paul de Man has shown, critical insight always comes at the 
price of a certain critical blindness. Moreover, it is precisely at critics’ moments of greatest 
blindness with regard to their critical assumptions that they reach their greatest critical 
insights (de Man, 1971d, p. 109). Said’s greatest insight is the way in which he is able to 
grasp Conrad’s authorial consciousness manifested in the texts; his greatest blindness are 
Conrad’s imperialist representations. This is the price he has to pay for adopting a critical 
method that is designed on the premise that the critic has to co-meditate with the author 
instead of read against the grain. 
Indeed, for while Poulet occasionally, including in his paper at the Johns Hopkins 
conference, stresses that criticism oscillates between either a position of absolute 
proximity and identification with a text or one of absolute distance and non-identification 
(1972, pp. 63, 66-67), the method he generally applies doesn’t allow for too much critical 
distance between the mind of the critic and the mind of the author. Earlier he already 
resolutely rejected any objective approach to the literary work studied, for “ce qui n’est 
pas saisi comme sujet sera inévitablement et erronément saisi comme objet” (1959, p. 11). 
To approach literature as an object dehumanizes it and refutes the premise of 
phenomenological literary theory that literature is the embodiment of consciousness or 
expression of experience (Lawall, 1968, p. 81). According to this theory, a literary text 
“c’est avant tout une réalité vivante et consciente, une pensée qui se pense et qui, en se 
pensant, nous devient pensable, une voix qui se parle et qui, en se parlant, nous parle du 
dedans" (Poulet, 1959, p. 11). The image of the literary work as a humanly created text 
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that speaks is a dominant metaphor in phenomenological criticism (Palmer, 1969, p. 7). It 
conveniently allows the phenomenological critic to draw our attention away from the 
words on the page of the New Criticism – or Conrad’s depictions of Africa – and direct it 
to a living voice and, most importantly, beyond that voice, to the speaker that is the subject 
of the voice (see Lawall, 1968, p. 81). The metaphor of the voice implies that literary 
criticism is a mental dialogue between at least two interlocutors and challenges the 
positivistic separation of subject and object installed by the postwar New Criticism, 
according to which a literary work should be analyzed in strict separation from a 
perceiving subject – the critic whose subjectivity is ruled out by the ‘affective fallacy’ – or 
originating subject – the author’s by the ‘intentional fallacy’. The metaphor, which de Man 
dubs “the phenomenalization of the sign” (1996, p. 111), effectively reinstates the role of 
comprehension in literary criticism. It warns critics that if they are to determine the 
specificity of literature and arrive at that what makes a literary work literary (see Poulet, 
1954, p. 9), literature may never be grasped as an object, “car ce qui doit être atteint, c’est 
un sujet, c’est-à-dire une activité spirituelle qu’on ne peut comprendre qu’en se mettant à 
sa place et dans ses perspectives, bref qu’en lui faisant jouer de nouveau en nous son rôle 
de sujet" (Poulet, 1959, p. 11). According to Poulet’s description of the experience of 
interiority, the author’s consciousness ensconced in the work has to be allowed to relive 
or replay its role as subject in the mind of the critic if the latter wishes to properly 
comprehend the former’s consciousness. He goes on to stress that any approach to literary 
criticism “qui ne veut ou qui ne peut atteindre à la compréhension proprement subjective 
dont je parle, est condamné de ce fait à ne voir et à n’exprimer que le dehors des êtres et 
des choses” (1959, p. 11). Such an approach puts up many objective barriers to 
understanding and limits itself to explaining the ‘exterior’ or ‘surface’ of the literary work 
in question, the outcome of which is that it ultimately fails to come to terms with the 
subjective consciousness in the interior of the work. 
Before we move on, it is imperative to know that Poulet’s "compréhension proprement 
subjective" or the idea that reading literature puts one into an authentic, existential 
contact with a subject, as Said in his treatment of Conrad also sometimes seems to hint at 
(1966, pp. 7, 23, 25-26), is an illusion. To be clear, we have already seen that Said indicates 
that such a proper comprehension of Conrad’s consciousness is very difficult, if not 
impossible (1966, p. 10), but he nonetheless does not to go as far as to argue that it is an 
illusion maintained by literary criticism. This is all the more strange because in La 
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transcendance de l’Ego, a work in which Sartre lays the foundations for his elaboration of 
the phenomenological theory of the emotions that underpins Said’s analysis of Conrad, the 
French philosopher argues that a consciousness can only conceive of itself as a 
consciousness (1978, p. 77). His position is tied to his critique of Husserl’s transcendental 
consciousness in which, as we have seen, he argues that we are always conscious of an 
object. As a result, my consciousness cannot conceive of any other consciousness without 
already conceptualizing it as an object of my consciousness, hence objectifying or 
essentializing this consciousness and blocking my absolute comprehension of it as a subject. 
Or, in the words of Sartre,  
Je ne puis concevoir la conscience de Pierre sans en faire un objet (puisque je ne la 
conçois pas comme étant ma conscience). Je ne puis la concevoir parce qu’il faudrait la 
penser comme intériorité pure et transcendance à la fois, ce qui est impossible. Une 
conscience ne peut concevoir d’autre conscience qu’elle-même. (1978, p. 77) 
This is important, because it shows the existentialist underlying assumption in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, that phenomenology can help us identify and 
comprehend Conrad’s concrete authorial consciousness – his Ego – or lived experience 
described, objectified and essentialized in terms of ‘structures of experience’ that emerge 
from the literary works, but it can never go further, beyond language and perception, into 
the sphere of brute existence to reach Conrad’s nonobjective consciousness-in-the-world. 
Said frequently stresses that what makes Conrad’s texts so fascinating and distinctly 
individual is that “he has lived what he describes” (1966, p. 8). In this, he explicitly takes 
over the Sartrean notion of lived experience or “vécu” (Said, 1966, p. 23), which in Sartre’s 
works becomes a synonym for ‘consciousness’ and designates a writer’s intuitive 
understanding of him- or herself without perhaps ever becoming fully self-conscious 
(Bakewell, 2016, p. 222). Le vécu, Sartre explains, “ne désigne ni les refuges du 
préconscient, ni l’inconscient, ni le conscient, mais le terrain sur lequel l’individu est 
constamment submergé par lui-même, par ses propres richesses, et où la conscience a l’astuce 
de se déterminer elle-même par l’oubli" (1972, p. 108; my emphasis). Le vécu is never 
transparent or easily delineated but heavily inflated and often tricks itself by determining 
itself by forgetfulness. Sartre’s existentialism started as a philosophy of consciousness that 
over the years gradually thickened into a philosophy of experience, a characteristic he 
shares with Merleau-Ponty and that starkly contrasts him from Foucault’s criticism that 
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considers experience as a surface phenomenon (Flynn, 2005, p. 7). Sartre’s 
conceptualization of le vécu stresses that the experience embodied in the language of texts 
is never the Foucaultian product of abstract structures or impersonal forces but a concrete 
and personal interpretation of a historical subject’s dynamic encounter with the world and 
therefore a locus to study individual responsibility and agency within a particular 
contingent situation (Flynn, 2005, pp. 7-8) As such, the notion radically resists rational 
understanding and logical paraphrase but appeals to comprehension. Conrad’s vécu can 
only be comprehended or experienced by the critic Said,48 who seeks his refuge in applying 
Poulet’s method of linguistic duplication, a method according to which the language of the 
critic should be as much as possible in the style and the vocabulary of the author studied 
(Hillis Miller, 1963, pp. 471-472, 477; Poulet, 1961, p. 178). This is why Said’s analysis of 
Conrad makes use of so much direct quotation, the rhetorical effect of which is that readers 
of Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography intuitively comprehend Conrad’s lived 
experience, a comprehension which is strengthened by Said’s clarifying, ordering, 
deepening, and prolonging of Conrad’s language so that the author’s ‘structures of 
experience’ emerge more clearly. In this, it becomes ever so clear in what ways Said’s 
treatment of Conrad is indebted to Poulet’s criticism of consciousness. 
While Poulet’s criticism is principally aimed at the identification with the mind of an 
author, it also goes beyond the mimetic doubling of the authorial consciousness (Hillis 
Miller, 1975, p. 479). The reason is that criticism, for Poulet, is based on two related sets 
of acts that distinguish it from everyday reading: clarification and ordering, and deepening 
and prolonging (Hillis Miller, 1963, p. 475). By this, Poulet means that the literary critic 
should put his or her experience of identification with the authorial consciousness in order 
and clarify it to his or her readers. The critic is hereby driven by the critical imperative to 
provide evidence for an indissolubly unity in the works of the author. Passages from 
different works, written at different periods of times should be set side by side so that the 
critic may discover “in a work before unread, the explicit expression of a connection which 
he had seen to be present latently” (Hillis Miller, 1963, p. 479). The critic may then go 
about deepening and prolonging the language of the author, “that is, define it more 
                                               
48 In the words of Sartre: “Ce que j’appelle le vécu, c’est précisément l’ensemble du processus dialectique de la vie 
psychique, un processus qui reste nécessairement opaque à lui-même car il est une constante totalisation, et une 
totalisation qui ne peut être conscient de ce qu’elle est. On peut être conscient, en effet, d’une totalisation 
extérieure, mais non d’une totalisation qui totalise également la conscience. En ce sens, le vécu est toujours 
susceptible de compréhension, jamais de connaissance" (1972, p. 111; my emphasis) 
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precisely, and . . . prolong it by establishing connections and implications which the poet 
may never have stated explicitly” (Hillis Miller, 1963, p. 478). This is why Said 
systematically relates Conrad’s letters to his fiction to establish a coherence between both 
categories of texts in general and individual texts in particular – think of the passage on 
imperialism in Heart of Darkness and the letter to Cunninghame Graham. Elsewhere, Said 
juxtaposes novellas to illustrate that the “parallelisms between the two tales are 
astounding” and that when these parallelisms “are taken into account, the resulting 
clarifications in tone and meaning considerably strengthen the case for a psychographic 
and philosophic approach to Conrad” (1966, p. 133). By doing this, he is able to prove that 
what at first sight may seem to be an incoherent collection of disparate pieces of writing 
are actually all one by one manifestations of a coherent authorial consciousness that is 
characterized by a firmness of structure: 
All the contents of the bubble of consciousness must be shown to be acting and 
reacting on one another, in reciprocal interchange. The works of an author make up 
a complex, three-dimensional structure, a palace of crystal filling the mind, and 
integrated organically in its interplay of part with part, aspect with aspect. (Hillis 
Miller, 1963, p. 475) 
In the passage above it can be seen that the interconnection of all parts of the authorial 
consciousness is dialectical, which makes its criticism a temporal and sequential act of 
understanding. The use of dialectics by critics of consciousness serves two purposes, the 
first of which is that it is a heuristic model that conveniently defeats “the mutual exclusion 
of words and moments” (Hillis Miller, 1963, p. 476), allowing the integral reading of 
Conrad’s total oeuvre that Said advocates (1966, p. viii). The other is that it “is a way of 
presenting the complexities of the palace of crystal from all its aspects, as though a 
consciousness were slowly revolved, still continuing its own intrinsic movement, until 
finally, through time, time is transcended, and an a-temporal unity is revealed” (Hillis 
Miller, 1963, p. 476). As we have already seen in my discussion of the intentional ‘fallacy’, 
Said does this by clarifying how the Anglo-Polish writer is involved in a continuous, 
intentional process of self-assertion in which his mind, through various “stages in Conrad’s 
developing sense of himself as a man and as a writer” (1966, p. vii) dialectically progresses 
towards a solution in the unity of “his emerging individuality” (1966, p. 9).  
Central to Said’s argument is Arthur Schopenhauer, the German philosopher and 
proponent of the philosophy of humanist pessimism, with its stress on the idea that the 
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material world is either a meaningless and ontologically indifferent environment to human 
agency or a willfully created but ultimately false ‘subjective correlative’, a representation 
or fiction of the world in the mind of the intuiting subject that serves as a prerequisite 
upon which depends all intuitive understanding and experience of that world (Hussein, 
2002, p. 32).49 Schopenhauer’s seminal work Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1859), 
originally published in 1818, is said to have influenced Friedrich Nietzsche and, as Said 
gathers from the British Noble Prize winning author and Conrad’s close friend, John 
Galsworthy, may even have deeply impressed the Anglo-Polish author (Said, 1966, pp. 
102-103). Because of Conrad’s close ties to Schopenhauer’s philosophy and understanding 
of it, Said argues that we should understand Conrad’s lived experience of self-assertion, 
dramatized in his works – which, as we have seen, he dubs Conrad’s “struggle toward the 
equilibrium of character” (1966, p. 13) – in terms of the arch-pessimist’s principium 
individuationis or the principle of differentiation (1966, p. 139). It describes the 
developmental psychic process during which, in the fine balancing act between “either a 
surrender to chaos or a comparably frightful surrender to egoistic order” (Said, 1966, p. 
13), elements of personality and experiences of a person’s life are dialectically synthesized 
and integrated into an indivisible psychological whole or Gestalt that is the person’s sense 
of a self or individuality. Said argues that Conrad consistently reworked his experiences 
in his works and that this “extraordinary synthesizing process” (1966, p. 168) is therefore 
sedimented and visible in the author’s letters, autobiographical works and, most 
importantly, his short fiction. The culmination of Conrad’s self-assertion is to be found in 
his 1917 retrospective novella The Shadow Line, which to Said, “is a reworking of not only 
a single past experience, but also of the whole experience contained in the other works. 
Any attempt to locate his fiction within the matrix of Conrad’s inner life must see The 
Shadow Line as the final, searching re-examination in a long series of dramatizations” 
(1966, pp. 167-168).  
It is important to pause with Said’s remarks that we should read The Shadow Line as 
the culmination of Conrad’s individuation process. These remarks reveal how in spite of 
                                               
49 For a more thorough examination of the role of Schopenhauerian philosophy in Said’s argument in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, see Abdirahman Hussein’s Edward Said: Criticism and Society (2002, pp. 
32-48). For more information on the ‘subjective correlative’, see R. Raj Singh’s Schopenhauer: A Guide for the 
Perplexed (2010, pp. 16-19). Schopenhauer’s ‘subjective correlative’ may not without good reason remind us of 
T.S. Eliot’s ‘objective correlative’. For a recent study of the Schopenhauerian genealogy of Eliot’s objective 
correlative, see the work of Aakanksha Virkar-Yates (2015). 
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the holistic claims of his method that stress that all works must be seen as manifestations 
of the same authorial consciousness conceptualized as a firm palace of crystal, Said 
nonetheless singles out a particular novella, evaluates and judges that work to be a better 
manifestation of that authorial consciousness than other works written by the same 
existential writer. Such remarks are theoretically at odds with a model of criticism derived 
from Poulet and highlight the American air of his approach to phenomenological literary 
criticism that infuses a phenomenological comprehension of experience with a New 
Critically inspired evaluation of form. They also make clear how Said is closer to Sartre’s 
ideas that two or more texts written by the same existential author may nonetheless 
contain slightly different Ego’s dependent on the dynamic encounters between the 
existential author’s consciousness-in-the-world and the different worldly situations in 
which it found itself. They indicate how his approach to Conrad’s consciousness is 
evaluative and worldly; or in short, a worldly criticism of consciousness.  
In Said’s account the evolution of Conrad’s literary career is intricately connected to 
the author’s individuation process, in which change from one discernable phase to the next 
should be grasped within the framework of Said’s dialectical model, as a succession of 
“dialectically created, unified gestalts of lived experience understood phenomenologically 
and existentially” (Hussein, 2002, p. 49). Moreover, from the use of Schopenhauer’s 
philosophy to criticize Conrad’s authorial consciousness, it is once more clear that the 
consciousness which Said finds embodied in the works of Conrad is decidedly not Poulet’s 
abstract, Husserlian, pure and isolated form of consciousness but a concrete, Sartrean Ego 
that is spontaneously created and intended (in the base phenomenological sense of the 
word) by Conrad’s consciousness-in-the-world. This interpretation adds a second and 
more fundamental layer to the meaning of Said’s title that well transcends the basic and 
more straightforward interpretation that Conrad deliberately created a rosy 
autobiographical image of himself as a confident author and seaman. The acknowledgment 
of this Sartrean intertext in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography is an argument 
for considering Conrad’s self-assertion or, for that matter, simply all formations of an 
individuality, fictitious, regardless of how much self-conscious control someone is able to 
retain over this process. It stresses that the authorial consciousness which is the focus of 
phenomenological literary criticism is never the authentic consciousness of the author as 
a historical person but an essentialized fiction created by the author’s historical 
consciousnesses-in-the-world. 
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The net result of all these critical acts – linguistic duplication, clarification and 
ordering, deepening and prolonging – is that they allow Conrad seemingly to emerge in 
Said’s study to once more play the role of a conscious subject of action as an immediate 
presence apparently “in the process of living” (1966, p. 13). In this, Said resolutely rejects 
the dehumanizing rational discourse of the postwar New Critics but keeps hold of the 
humanist and highly psychological language of paradox in literary criticism associated 
with the works of Empson and Brooks.50 As a work that exemplifies the method associated 
with Genevan criticism of consciousness, bar some important differences on what that 
consciousness is supposed to and how it relates to the world in which it is embedded, it 
stresses that the study of literature deals with the study of personal human experiences 
(see Richard, 1954, p. 13) and must therefore be rooted within the more primordial and 
encompassing modes of understanding that come from the critic’s being-in-the-world – 
indeed, a very Heideggerian or Sartrean conceptualization of literary criticism. Unlike the 
study you are reading, Said’s model of understanding in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography does not make use of a dense theoretical framework of concepts, but uses 
what Veeser calls a “bluntly straightforward” apparatus criticus, “the kind of thing 
eighteenth-century plain-stylists like Hugh Blair and Horne Tooke would have 
applauded” (2010, pp. 27-28). This model of understanding is not an objective, positivistic 
kind of knowing that flees away from personal existence into an unworldly theoretical 
realm of concepts but is a worldly, humanist encounter with a lived experience that calls 
forth the critic’s own experience with his or her being-in-the-world (see Palmer, 1969, p. 
10). It subscribes to the ideas of, amongst others, Merleau-Ponty who argues that “[l]a 
science manipule les choses et renonce à les habiter” (2010b, p. 1591). Indeed, if Said 
remembered one lesson from the institutionalized form of New Criticism that he was 
taught, it is that critics should be aware of what he dubs the ‘imperialism of criticism’. 
They should take great effort not to dehumanize literature in the process of criticizing it 
and displace its living voice by abstract theoretical laws. My analysis has shown that Said 
shares with Poulet and his fellow critics of consciousness a penchant for humanism and 
keeps hold of the category of the subject. Like Poulet’s, his early critical practice is even 
                                               
50  Criticism of consciousness at times collapses not only the traditional distinction between literary and 
nonliterary texts but, as a result of the duplication of the author’s language by the critic, the distinction between 
literature and criticism too. As Poulet poetically writes, criticism of consciousness is the purest form of criticism: 
“Il n’est pas de plus pure. Il n’en est pas de plus littéraire. Littérature de la littérature, conscience de la conscience. 
Elle correspond exactement dans le domaine de la critique à ce que Mallarmé a réalisé dans un plus haut domaine, 
celui de la poésie” (1954, p. 9). 
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founded on the critical imperative that one at all costs – even it may cause one to be 
uncritical at times – should respect and preserve as much as possible the living voice or 
subjectivity of the literary work (see de Man, 1971c, pp. 100-101).51 
  
                                               
51 In September 1966, a month before he addressed the audience in Baltimore, Poulet attended a conference on 
contemporary French literary criticism at Cérisy-la-Salle, a small town in Normandy. In a discussion following 
a talk by Gérard Genette, Poulet admitted his biggest literary critical concern: “Je veux sauver à tout prix la 
subjectivité de la littérature” (Poulet quoted by Genette, 1967, p. 251). 
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2.4 Joseph Conrad and the Labyrinth of Incarnations 
As this discussion draws nearer to the conceptualization of agency in Joseph Conrad and 
the Fiction of Autobiography, we will see how the world in which Conrad’s consciousness is 
located is a labyrinth of incarnations. The author’s works express both his intentionality 
as a speaking subject and the environing world as it is lived and perceived by Conrad. This 
view on language, is the result of Said’s intellectual engagement with the phenomenology 
of perception of Merleau-Ponty, whose concept of ‘idiom’ allows Said to link Conrad’s 
individual expressions to the collective lifeworld of the author. As I discuss the parallels 
which Said draws between Merleau-Ponty’s view on language and R.P. Blackmur’s notion 
of language as gesture, we will see how in Said’s theoretical framework the works of 
Blackmur link Poulet’s criticism of consciousness to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
perception. In Said’s worldly criticism of consciousness literary works have a semantic 
thickness about them that firmly locates them in the world. 
Said’s conceptualization of agency in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography is 
inseparably entwined with his view on language, which, as becomes clear in the passage 
that features as the opening motto to the work, he derives from the French existential 
phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty: 
Language surrounds each speaking subject, like an instrument with its own inertia, 
its own demands, constraints, and internal logic, and nevertheless remains open to 
the initiatives of the subject (as well as to the brute contributions of invasions, 
fashions, and historical events). (Merleau-Ponty, "The Metaphysical in Man" quoted 
as motto by Said, 1966, p. 2) 
The view on language expressed in the passage above underpins Said’s entire treatment 
of Conrad. Surprisingly it is the first and final time that Merleau-Ponty is explicitly 
mentioned throughout the work but as a motto, Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on language, 
set out the paradigm of that treatment. In the motto, the French philosopher posits the 
centrality of the human subject in thinking about language and gives voice to the same 
anti-scientism that we have encountered in the paragraph above, in which he attacks 
positivistic models of understanding for manipulating and dehumanizing their objects of 
study. Here, he targets a determinist model of understanding in linguistics that, to him, 
puts too much emphasis on mechanistic explanation, causality and sociologism at the 
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expense of contingency and metaphysics, presenting language as a natural object and 
leading scholars further and further away from what Sartre calls le vécu, ‘the lived’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2010c, p. 1336; Said, 1967a, p. 54). 
Merleau-Ponty was an avid reader of Husserl.52 His conceptualization of language 
creatively combines Husserl’s later philosophy with the linguistics of Ferdinand de 
Saussure, a combination which, in Said’s assessment, makes him a trailblazer for the 
structuralist movement in France (Said, 1967a, p. 65). Merleau-Ponty was a longtime 
friend of Sartre’s with whom he co-founded the influential existentialist journal Les Temps 
Modernes. He shares Sartre’s focus on situated thought and action, the precedence of 
existence over essence, and the primacy of subjectivity in all inquiries into human life. 
Originally published in 1947, Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of language echoes 
Sartre’s seminal postwar speech L’Existentialisme est un humanisme (1946), in that it 
concerns itself with concrete situations, rejects determinism while keeping a sense of 
determinacy (see Sartre, 1943, pp. 561-564), and revalues the role of contingency and 
metaphysics in thinking about language because “nous apercevons indissolublement la 
subjectivité radicale de toute notre expérience et sa valeur de vérité” (Merleau-Ponty, 
2010c, p. 1343).53  
Though the terminology which Merleau-Ponty uses at times has a very lofty air, his 
existential phenomenological philosophy is actually very down to earth. Inspired by 
Heidegger’s in-der-Welt-Sein, he describes human consciousness in very mundane terms 
as an “être-au-monde” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 491). Likewise, language is an 
unmistakable part of the world. It is not some inert fact of nature but something which is 
constantly lived, experienced and modified by a speaking subject who, in the motto to 
Said’s work on Conrad, is put right at the center of the existential lifeworld, the culture or 
situation within which its consciousness is embedded. There, at the heart of its lifeworld, 
                                               
52 At the eve of World War II, Husserl’s unfinished works and unpublished notes were smuggled outside of 
Germany, where they were in danger of destruction by the Nazis because Husserl was born in a Jewish family, 
and brought for safekeeping to the University of Leuven. In 1939, Merleau-Ponty was one of the first to travel 
to the Husserl Archive at the University of Leuven to study these notes. He found himself deeply impressed by 
Husserl’s unedited writings on the Umwelt or ‘environing world’ (Robert Holub, 1995, pp. 292-293), which he 
considered to be Husserl’s most important contributions to philosophy and on which he consequently built his 
seminal work Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). For a sweeping account of the transfer of Husserl’s notes 
from Freiburg to Leuven, see Sarah Bakewell’s At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being and Apricot Cocktails (2016, 
pp. 125-130). 
53 Compare with Sartre’s argument that "nous entendons par existentialisme une doctrine qui rend la vie humaine 
possible et qui, par ailleurs, déclare que toute vérité et toute action impliquent un milieu et une subjectivité 
humaine” (1946, p. 12). 
 157 
the speaking subject finds itself surrounded by a series of concentric circles of human 
expression that correspond to each other and to language (Said, 1967a, p. 66). Language, 
particularly the creative language of literature, gives to that lifeworld or environing 
world54 a certain semantic thickness or density of meaning to human experience, “c-est-à-
dire le pouvoir, propre au langage, de signifier, comme geste, accent, voix, modulation 
d’existence au-delà de ce qu’il signifie partie par partie selon les conventions en vigueur” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2010a, p. 1388).  
To understand Said’s understanding of the work of Merleau-Ponty it is important to 
highlight and pause over the word geste, the French equivalent of the English word 
‘gesture’. In “Labyrinth of Incarnations: the Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty” (1967a), a 
long review article that was published a year after Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography, Said draws parallels between Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of 
language and R.P. Blackmur’s interest in ‘gesture’ (1967a, p. 60). ‘Gesture’, we recall, is 
central to Blackmur’s thinking about literature and designates the meaningfulness of 
words that cannot simply be expressed by their denotative or referential function. 
‘Gesture’ is that what is directly apprehended or felt by users of the language, the affective 
dimension or semantic thickness of language that makes readers feel (in the literal sense 
of the word) that they are reading a complex human expression. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty 
writes that in the act of reading “les mots ne viennent pas toujours toucher en moi des 
significations déjà présentes. Ils ont le pouvoir extraordinaire de m’attirer hors de mes 
pensées, ils pratiquent dans mon univers privé des fissures par où d’autres pensées font 
irruption" (2010a, pp. 1388-1389). Creative language gives a certain thickness, sensibility 
or flesh even to the "univers d’idées” (Merleau-Ponty, 2010d, p. 1774) that is expressed in 
the literary work. This thickness is not some literary embellishment but a necessity, 
Merleau-Ponty believes, because it makes these ideas accessible to our understanding 
which happens as much with our senses as with our minds. It also causes a feeling of 
existential contact with the sensibility of another, almost as if the reader is touching the 
author, which makes the act of reading an experience of intersubjectivity or, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, an experience of intercorporeity (2010d, pp. 1774-1775). Reading 
literature therefore gives him a unique bodily pleasure that derives from the almost carnal 
                                               
54 Merleau-Ponty borrows the term from Husserl’s unedited notes, stored at the archives in Leuven, where this 
existential lifeworld is more aptly called the Umwelt (Beyer, 2016; Said, 1967a, p. 63). The German prefix um- is 
used to denote a circular motion, ‘around’ or ‘about’, and in combination with the noun Welt comes to denote a 
‘surrounding world’ or literally an ‘around-world’. 
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experience of contact with the incarnated thoughts of another reanimated in the act of 
reading. “Society, then”, Said notes, is a collection of incarnated thought and becomes 
a true labyrinth of incarnations . . . the richness of which it is possible to suggest in 
written language. A ‘labyrinth’ because of a complexity that has no discernible end 
or beginning, and an ‘incarnation’ because implicit gestural language and outward 
expression are inseparable, united as man himself is in an indissoluble bond between 
body and soul. (1967a, p. 67) 
In Merleau-Ponty’s view, culture is a manmade environing world of meaningful entities 
or a labyrinth of incarnations that, according to the motto, “surrounds each speaking 
subject” but “nevertheless remains open to the initiatives of the subject”. The speaking 
subject is thus a conscious, intentional and free agent or subject of action that uses 
language as an instrument to bring about change in its environing world, add to its 
meaningfulness and shape discourse. Though language is instrumentalized in this view, it 
does not mean that language is a completely malleable instrument to be shaped by the 
speaking subjects as he or she pleases. Language is shared with other speaking subjects, 
who all possess their own intentional consciousnesses, and as such remains an ever 
intersubjective phenomenon, “an instrument with its own inertia, its own demands, 
constraints, and internal logic”. Though language is open to the intentional acts of 
individual speaking subjects, there is always a surplus of meaning that is beyond control 
of the individual, because language is equally susceptible “to the brute contributions of 
invasions, fashions, and historical events”, to the brute facts of existence or obstacles that 
on the face of it limit the speaking subject’s agency but are actually the conditions of 
possibility to talk about such agency in the first place – “sans obstacle, pas de liberté” 
(Sartre, 1943, p. 564).55 This makes it clear that linguistic expressions also always express 
something other than what its author consciously or, to be more precise, reflective-
consciously intended: next to the intentional acts of the author they contain parts of the 
environing world within which the consciousness of the author is embedded. Moreover, it 
illustrates that the environing world is both a place of free, human interaction and at the 
same time exerts a force of determinacy on each speaking subject, motivating that subject 
                                               
55 This is the so-called existentialist ‘paradox of freedom’, according to which human freedom is what it is on 
account of its limits, not despite them. Or, in the words of Sartre, “il n’y a pas de liberté qu’en situation et il n’y a 
de situation que par la liberté. La réalité-humaine rencontre partout des résistances et des obstacles qu’elles n’a 
pas créés; mais ces résistances et ces obstacles n’ont de sens que dans et par le libre choix que la réalité-humaine 
est" (Sartre, 1943, pp. 469-470). 
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to interact with the world and with other speaking subjects in it (see Husserl, 1989, p. 
234). Culture thus sets out the conditions of possibility for all human thought and action. 
In Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), a work that gave Merleau-Ponty prominence 
as the leading French existential phenomenologist of his generation, the argument that I 
have just outlined is discussed under the conceptual banner of perception. The focus on 
perception is a way of stressing that human existence is always situated within worldly 
situations and of studying the immanent meanings embedded in human, lived reality, as 
opposed to discussing abstract, universal and ‘unsituated’ theory (Said, 1967a, pp. 54-56). 
Said sums up the French existential phenomenologist’s position in a passage that reveals 
the crucial influence of Merleau-Ponty on his elaboration of ‘worldliness’ in publications 
to come (McCarthy, 2013b, p. 75): 
Merleau-Ponty’s central philosophical position, insofar as one can be articulated for 
him, is that we are in and of the world before we can think about it. Perception, to 
which he devoted his major philosophical labors, is a crucial but complex process 
that reasserts our connection with the world and thereby provides the basis for all 
our thought and meaning-given activity. (1967a, p. 57) 
All of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical endeavors to a certain extent revolve around 
language. They show how perception is the starting point for all meaning and truth and 
how language is crucial to this process. His argument is that the brute facts of existence 
come to us as a chaotic whole and overwhelm us. To come to terms with this utterly 
chaotic and meaningless existence, the basic human coping mechanism is to give meaning 
to it by the discerning or perceptual creation of Gestalts, meaningful wholes against a 
background (Said, 1967a, p. 58). According to Said, Merleau-Ponty’s most important 
contribution to philosophy and literary criticism is this more realistic reworking of 
Sartre’s often-quoted aphorism that we are condemned to freedom (see Sartre, 1943, p. 
565). The work of Merleau-Ponty  
illustrates that we are condemned to meaning; in all its aspects, our life is our way of 
giving meaning to the brute fact of existence. . . Merleau-Ponty speaks of the world’s 
prose, by which he does not mean that we are a tabula rasa on which the world 
writes, but that we express the world, its sense and non-sense, what is visible and 
what we experience even if it is invisible – for expression and gesture are the basic 
human prerogatives. (1967a, p. 60) 
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This process of meaning-giving is ‘perception’, a concept which Merleau-Ponty uses to 
designate “cette communication vitale avec le monde qui nous le rend présent comme lieu 
familier de notre vie" (1945, pp. 64-65). By this, he means that we constantly invest our 
lived reality with meanings and values that essentially refer to our own bodies and our 
sense of ourselves; to make sense of the unfamiliar environing world, we constantly 
reinterpret it in relation to the familiar. The environing world in which we are embedded 
is not some abstract world of thought, but a visceral world that we communicate with, 
inhabit and understand as much with our body as with our mind: “Le monde est non pas 
ce que je pense, mais ce que je vis, je suis ouvert au monde, je communique indubitablement 
avec lui" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, pp. xi-xii; Said, 1967a, p. 61). The result is that all 
meaningfulness of the environing world presents itself to the individual speaking subject 
in egocentric aspects, as if that subject’s mind and body were truly the center of the 
labyrinth of incarnations or the universe which these meaningful entities orbit in 
concentric circles, whereas these meaningful entities precisely derive their meaningfulness 
from their shared intersubjective use (Said, 1967a, p. 63). The natural tendency of 
perception and the intended meanings and values that come with it, is to cover their tracks, 
so to speak, and gain a certain amount of naturalness about them (Toadvine, 2016). This 
leads to a point where they gradually install themselves as truths, prejudices and 
unquestionable beliefs about the world, the result of which is that the subjectively lived 
reality is increasingly perceived as an objective reality that becomes taken for granted and 
estranges the subject from its original lived experience. To Merleau-Ponty, it is therefore 
the task of the philosopher to apply the phenomenological method to “revenir au monde 
vécu en deça du monde objectif” (1945, p. 69), or, as Said sees it, “to rediscover experience 
at the ‘naïve’ level of its origin, beneath and before the sophisticated encroachments of 
science” (1967a, p. 57).  
To do so, we must study the principal mode of expression of human experience which 
is language in use or what Said in his revised doctoral dissertation calls “the idiom of 
Conrad’s rendering of his experience” (1966, p. 7). By ‘idiom’ Said refers to the words and 
images that Conrad uses to express and give meaning to his lived experience as well as 
the vocabulary and rhetoric of his mind’s engagement in partnership with existence (1966, 
p. 9). The idiom provides Said with evidence of what Conrad’s consciousness was conscious 
of, his perception of his environing world or, in other words, the author’s perceptual 
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creation of Gestalts. This leads us back to the motto of Said’s revised doctoral dissertation, 
a passage that is also cited in the article devoted to Merleau-Ponty a year later: 
[Language] must surround each speaking subject, like an instrument with its own 
inertia, its own demands, constraints, and internal logic, and must nevertheless 
remain open to the initiatives of the subject (as well as to the brute contributions of 
invasions, fashions, and historical events), always capable of the displacement of 
meanings, the ambiguities, and the functional substitutions which give this logic its 
lurching gait. Perhaps the notion of Gestalt, or structure, would here perform the 
same service it did for psychology, since both cases involve ensembles which are not 
the pure manifestations of a directive consciousness, which are not explicitly aware 
of their own principles, and which nevertheless can and should be studied by 
proceeding from the whole to the parts. (Merleau-Ponty, "The Metaphysical in 
Man" quoted by Said, 1967a, p. 65) 
There are a few crucial differences between this version of the citation and the version that 
serves as the motto to Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. The addition of the 
verb ‘must’ in the first sentence makes this version more peremptory in tone but, more 
importantly, this time the citation is not broken off after the parenthesis but extended and 
quoted in full, including the crucial second sentence (compare with Merleau-Ponty, 2010c, 
p. 1337). But let us begin with the sentence with which to a certain extent we are already 
familiar. The added part of the sentence after the parenthesis makes it clear that language, 
to Merleau-Ponty and to Said, is more ambiguous and unstable than in the previous 
version and could well be an addition in response to Poulet’s talk in Baltimore a couple of 
months earlier, in which he presented language as a stable and transparent medium that 
gives access to some pure consciousness. By quoting Merleau-Ponty’s sentence in full, Said 
stresses more clearly than in his revised doctoral dissertation that even though language 
is open to the initiatives of the individual speaking subject, it is very hard to see such a 
transparent, direct and causal relationship between a linguistic utterance and the mind of 
the subject from which it originated.  
From de Saussure’s linguistic model, Merleau-Ponty adopts that language is diacritical 
and has its own logic and rules (Said, 1967a, p. 65). A sign does not directly refer to objects 
but marks a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs. The relation between 
Conrad’s lived experience and his idiom to express it is therefore indirect. Moreover the 
citation makes it clear that both the initiatives of the speaking subject and the invasions of 
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the brute facts of existence can influence language and cause “the displacement of 
meanings”. As such, language throws us off of reaching the pure directive consciousness 
of the speaking subject but leads us somewhere else, as the second sentence that marks the 
clearest and most important difference between both versions of the citation indicates. 
From this sentence, we gather that language leads to a Gestalt or structure of experience 
that is not the pure manifestation of a directive consciousness but an ensemble that also 
includes references to the environing world or culture within which the directive 
consciousness of the speaker is embedded. Said then goes on to clarify that “each 
individual’s own idiom is an indirect language that does not refer to objects but to a 
complex structure . . . which is the total lived and organized reality of whoever uses the 
language” (Said, 1967a, p. 65). 
All of this makes clear that the study of literature in the work of Merleau-Ponty and of 
Said is both the study of embodied authorial consciousnesses that has taken shape in 
literary and other texts, and the study of the semiology of a given culture (Said, 1967a, pp. 
65-67). Said’s analysis therefore shows how Conrad’s own emotional and philosophical 
problems are related to the problems afflicting many Europeans at the turn of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century and the period leading up to, during and after World 
War I. This dual focus is clearest when Said analyzes Conrad’s wartime writings, in which 
he illustrates how “Conrad’s first few letters from England after his trying journey from 
the Continent reveal him to be gravely troubled by the seriousness of the war” (1966, p. 
67). He argues that “the paralyzed anxiety that seemed to enslave the minds of 
noncombatants in the war” can be readily observed in Conrad’s idiom and is reflected in 
the author’s “habitual vocabulary of extreme irreality – nightmares, ghosts” (Said, 1966, 
p. 67). Conrad’s lived experience is clearly determined by his cultural context and though 
“[h]is experience, as both man and writer, is unique in English literature” (Said, 1966, p. 
196), he is nonetheless a creature of its time and place. His greatest achievement, Said 
concludes the work, “is that he ordered the chaos of his existence into a highly patterned 
art that accurately reflected and controlled the realities with which it dealt” (1966, p. 196); 
a lived reality that is organized to such an extent that Said is able to discern significant 
structural homologies between Conrad’s cultural context and his own, idiosyncratic 
dynamic structures of experience. In words that refer to Merleau-Ponty, this structural 
homology illustrates how the events of the Great War should be seen as a “public 
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incarnation of his private struggles” (Said, 1966, p. 196; my emphasis) and that Conrad’s 
texts are to be located in the labyrinth of incarnations that make up his culture.  
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2.5 Agency and Criticism: a ‘Comedy’ with Serious 
Consequences 
How does one act within a labyrinth of incarnations? How does one change the 
constellation of the labyrinth? In other words, what is the concept of agency that informs 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography? As I have indicated, Said builds his theory 
of agency on Sartre’s theory of the emotions that is inextricably connected with Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. Originally outlined in Esquisse d’une théorie des 
émotions (1939), in the course of a year Sartre would rework, expand and systematize his 
outline for a theory of the emotions into a phenomenological psychology of the 
imagination in L’Imaginaire (1940), that three years later would in its turn provide the 
basis for his most well-known existentialist philosophy L’Être et le néant (1943). As such, 
Sartre’s theory of the emotions forms the basis for his existentialist, secular humanism 
that defines human existence as a condition of fundamental freedom (Sartre, 1943, p. 559). 
The painful consequence of this condition of freedom to which we are condemned or into 
which we are thrown, is that we have the total responsibility over our existence and the 
world of which we are inescapably a part (1943, p. 639). A product of the discourse of the 
crisis of man, Sartre’s existentialism safeguards the autonomy of choice and responsibility 
of individuals by advocating a theory of human agency in which all actions are defined as 
the choices of individual consciousnesses and therefore by definition intentional choices 
(1943, p. 508). As a result, the principle of intentionality of consciousness that is the 
grounding principle of human existence is the same principle that grounds all human 
agency, which means that being is equaled to acting and that we only stop acting when we 
stop being – “cesser d’agir, c’est cesser d’être” (Sartre, 1943, p. 556). There is, in short, no 
escaping our individual agency, there is no escaping our obligation to choose (Sartre, 1943, 
p. 561). That is the ethical imperative tied to this conceptualization of agency. 
Sartre’s theory of the emotions is the key to understanding Said’s view on agency in 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography and the whole period studied here. Said’s 
engagement with Sartre’s theory of the emotions, the implications of which I have briefly 
discussed above, is arguably the most important critical contribution to literary studies in 
his revised doctoral dissertation and lays the foundation for his critical practice in such 
works as Beginnings (1975a) Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993). As my 
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discussion of this theory of the emotions in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography 
progresses from a discussion of grapes to the complex situation of imperialism, we will see 
the far-reaching consequences of this conceptualization of agency for our understanding 
of the interactions between individuals and determining systems of thought like 
imperialism – and, by extension, Orientalism. In order to fully grasp the dimensions of 
Sartre’s theory, I will approach that theory from the perspective of the theory of cognitive 
dissonance in social psychology. This will make clear the role of cultural discourses like 
imperialism and Orientalism in that theory. At the end of this section I will discuss Said’s 
reading of Conrad and the conclusions he draws about critical thinking as a constantly to 
be renewed cycle. By discussing the role of Nietzsche in thinking about language and 
truth, and of Georg Lukács in thinking about the critical consciousness as motor of change 
and resistance to the status quo, I highlight how all of these intertexts harmonize with the 
Sartrean framework of Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. 
The Sartrean theory of agency that informs Said’s reading of Conrad is an empowering 
view of agency that emphasizes the possibility of human activity in the face of such 
impassive systems of thought. In the following pages it will become clear how Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography is committed to a secular humanist project that 
safeguards the authority, choice and freedom of individuals and posits the ethical 
imperative of resistance to determining systems of thought. It advocates a politics of 
responsibility which holds individual authors responsible for their choices and the socio-
political uses to which their knowledge is put. And though Said stresses, like Sartre, that 
there are always worldly limits to one’s agency or choices, the combination of Sartre’s 
theory of the emotions with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception is a way for 
Said to highlight the role of individual human agency in the process of perception or 
meaning-giving to a particular situation in one’s lifeworld. 56  The rationale for Said’s 
combination can be found in his empathetic reading of Conrad. 
Just as it is in the oeuvre of Merleau-Ponty, language is an important theme in Conrad’s. 
In what seems to be a trademark of Said’s method, he backs his claims again by referring 
                                               
56 In L’Être et le néant Sartre argues that even when the possibility of physical interaction with the world seems 
inexistent, individuals always have the freedom of intentionality which is a psychological form of action: “Ainsi 
ne dirons-nous pas qu’un captif est toujours libre de sortir de prison, ce qui serait absurde, ni non plus qu’il est 
toujours libre de souhaiter l’élargissement, ce qui serait un lapalissade sans portée, mais qu’il est toujours libre 
de chercher à s’évader (ou à se faire libérer) – c’est-à-dire que quelle que soit sa condition, il peut pro-jeter son 
évasion et s’apprendre à lui-même la valeur de son projet par un début d’action” (1943, p. 564). Sartre’s model of 
agency collapses the distinction between intention and action. 
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to Conrad’s correspondence – this time to a letter of Conrad addressed to Hugh Clifford 
on October 9, 1899, in which he writes: 
Words, groups of words, words standing alone, are symbols of life, have the power 
in their sound or their aspect to present the very thing you wish to hold up before 
the mental vision of your readers. The things ‘as they are’ exist in words; therefore 
words should be handled with care lest the picture, the image of truth abiding in 
facts, should become distorted – or blurred. (Conrad quoted by Said, 1966, p. 96) 
The passage above illustrates a rather truculent and naïve belief in the direct referential 
function of language, which at other times in Conrad’s oeuvre is alternated with a radical 
skepticism and distrust of “the falsifying powers of what he once called ‘the crafty tracery 
of words’” (Said, 1966, p. 96). By comparing the letter to passages from Conrad’s fiction, 
Said is able to establish that the Anglo-Polish author fictionalized his authorial experience 
and critical attitude about language in such works as Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim (1966, 
pp. 87-119). Both stories are told by the same fictional narrator Charles Marlow and 
dramatize the problematic relation between the past and the present. Traumatic events 
that have taken place in the past require illumination in the present, where varying degrees 
of obscurity, difficulty and loneliness linger on. In both novellas past and present are 
brought together in a long extended narrative moment where former thoughtless 
impulses are exposed to reflection in the present: the search upstream for Kurtz and the 
haunting experience of imperialism in the Congo Basin in Heart of Darkness, and the 
abandonment of a ship in distress by the crew including the young seaman Jim in the Red 
Sea in Lord Jim (Said, 1966, pp. 93, 99). 
Conrad’s method of narrative presentation is to bring the past in causal relationship 
with the present, which Said considers to be an autobiographically inspired therapeutic 
attempt “to rescue meaning for the present out of the obscure past” (1966, p. 99). However, 
the establishment of such a causal relationship, to see past and present as a continuous line 
of causally interrelated events, is unremittingly frustrated in the novellas: “Marlow, who 
wants his friends to see the outside and not the inner kernel of events . . . becomes quite 
invisible to his audience while, at the same time, the story he tells becomes increasingly 
obscure. Both story and teller seem to recede into an almost transcendent heart of 
darkness” (Said, 1966, p. 95). According to Said, this is “the central and gripping paradox 
of Conrad’s method” (1966, p. 95), by which he means that attempts to comprehend a 
present situation by finding a causal relation with situations in the past fail. Likewise, all 
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of Conrad’s attempts to explain the impulsive and hence obscure events taken place in the 
past through a clear and reflective description lead one further away from explanation into 
the dark and chaotic events themselves. The problem is that language always falls short 
and fails to fully describe the action. Now, from the work of Merleau-Ponty we gather that 
language has a habit of falsifying and ordering a reality that resists such order. It 
fictionalizes by putting a shiny varnish on something chaotic, bleak and dark. According 
to Said, Conrad has a similarly radical attitude towards language. From the way in which 
the Anglo-Polish author thinks about language in his fictional works, Said argues that he 
treats language as a “fraudulent machinery of social camouflage” (Said, 1966, p. 99) – terms 
which the author reserves for talking about the allegedly ‘noble’ civilizing mission of 
modern European imperialism. And yet despite this criticism, bearing in mind Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, it is the basic human condition to look for meaning. 
We are even condemned to meaning and Conrad knew very well that, like the seaman Jim 
who in retrospect tries to explain to Marlow why he abandoned both the steamer Patna 
and its passengers, we have “no choice but to employ words” (Said, 1966, p. 96). 
The plots of Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim exemplify what Said believes to be the core 
idea of Conrad’s fiction: that retrospection takes place after the action but that such 
retrospection often comes to no avail as “the action becomes even more foreign and 
inscrutable to the harried mind” (Said, 1966, p. 87). According to Said, this retrospective 
mode of Conrad’s narrative method is a sign of the author’s immense insight into his lived 
experience that gave him an “admirably unerring command of conscious human 
psychology” (Said, 1966, p. 100). At this point in his analysis, Said draws an analogy 
between Conrad’s narrative method and Sartre’s outline for a phenomenological theory of 
the emotions that allows us to grasp the conceptualization of agency in Joseph Conrad and 
the Fiction of Autobiography. The establishment of this analogy exemplifies Said’s critical 
engagement with Conrad’s oeuvre (Hussein, 2002, p. 34), an engagement that is perhaps 
made difficult but certainly not precluded by his empathetic model of criticism of 
consciousness. 
The analogy which Said establishes highlights how Conrad’s writings provide vivid 
examples of Sartre’s theory of the emotions. The first part of the analogy between Conrad 
and Sartre can be seen in their shared views about the nature of understanding. Sartre’s 
theory of the emotions is a psychology based on the phenomenology of Husserl and, 
because it is set on comprehending consciousness, makes for a well-suited theoretical 
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framework for Said to apply in his own criticism of Conrad’s consciousness. As a result of 
this focus on consciousness, Sartre’s theory rejects the prevalent psychoanalytical model 
of psychology that introduces a hierarchy according to which the study of the 
unconsciousness is deemed to yield more important insights in conscious human behavior 
because the unconsciousness is said ultimately to determine consciousness. Instead, Sartre 
favors a phenomenological approach to emotions in which emotions are seen as 
phenomena of consciousness and studied as signifiers of which the signified is to be found 
in the structures of consciousness itself (1939, pp. 36-37). Sartre’s theory grasps emotions 
as organized types of human consciousness that are an immediate and spontaneous way of 
apprehending and acting in the world within which consciousness is embedded (1939, p. 
12.). “L’émotion n’est pas un accident", Sartre explains, "c’est un mode d’existence de la 
conscience, une des façons dont elle comprend (au sens heideggerien de ‘Verstehen’) son 
‘Être-dans-le-monde’" (1939, p. 62). So rather than studying emotions as passive facts, he 
studies emotions as organized forms of human existence that actively express a person’s 
total lived reality – similar to the phenomenological study of Gestalts (Sartre, 1939, pp. 16-
17).  
The psychological model that Sartre envisions is therefore a phenomenological study 
of emotions as phenomena in themselves, of which the comprehension ultimately leads to 
a more complete comprehension of our own being-in-the-world. Psychoanalysis, on the 
other hand, studies emotions as passive results of an active unconsciousness. It thereby 
cuts off the signifier from the signified and sets up an external, causal relation between a 
present effect (conscious behavior/emotion) and a past cause (unconscious motif for this 
behavior/emotion), and thus ends up studying something wholly other than emotions 
(Sartre, 1939, p. 35). While this determination of the consciousness by the unconsciousness 
is not at issue in Said’s or Sartre’s study, Conrad’s choice of narrative method illustrates 
how the establishment of a determining relation between a past cause and a present effect 
is hypothetical at best and often frustrates a particular comprehension of the present. One 
cannot comprehend and explain at the same time, for, as Sartre makes clear, “[c]’est la 
contradiction profonde de toute psychanalyse que de présenter à la fois un lien de causalité 
et un lien de compréhension entre les phénomènes qu’elle étudie. Ces deux types de liaison 
sont incompatible" (1939, p. 37). A psychological theory like Sartre’s that is aimed at 
comprehension and affirms the signifying character of emotions must find the signified in 
the consciousness itself or end up falling in the determinist trap of psychoanalysis (1939, 
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p. 37). Likewise, a literary critic like Said hoping to gain critical insight into a particular 
literary work must distinguish between a causal and a comprehensive model, keeping hold 
of the latter and rejecting the former, and keep in mind that “an analysis of a hypothetical 
cause does not logically make the effect comprehensible” (1966, p. 7).57  
The second part of the analogy, which concerns us here the most, is between Conrad’s 
narrative method and a phase in Sartre’s theory of the emotions. 
‘Men,’ Conrad wrote to Mrs. Sanderson on March 17, 1900, ‘often act first and 
reflect afterwards’. The implications of this simple remark take us directly into the 
rich and confusing world of Conrad’s short fiction. There, action of any sort is either 
performed or witnessed without accompanying reflection or interpretation, as if the 
overriding and immediate sensation of action done to, by, or in front of one crowds 
out the informing work of the reason. (Said, 1966, p. 87) 
The phase which Sartre elaborates, begins with an objective reality, which is whatever 
feels should be grasped as an object by an intentional consciousness but, as we recall from 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of human perception, is actually too difficult to grasp as it is 
(Said, 1966, p. 100). In Sartre’s example, which he derives from one of Aesop’s fables, the 
objective reality is a bunch of high-hanging grapes that present themselves in my 
intentional consciousness as ripe and succulent and needing to be picked (1939, pp. 44-45). 
An action follows. I stretch out my hand to try to reach the bunch of grapes, but I fail 
because the grapes are beyond my reach. This causes an unbearable tension between my 
initial intention or potentiality (me wanting to pick the grapes) and the objective reality 
(the grapes that are unreachable) that becomes a motif for me to foist a new quality on the 
bunch of grapes that would resolve the conflict and ease the tension. Just like in the world 
of Conrad’s short fiction, the immediate sensation of the tension and my impulse to solve 
it overrides any accompanying reflection: “Je hausse les épaules, je laisse retomber ma 
main, je murmure ‘il sont trop verts’ et je m’éloigne” (Sartre, 1939, p. 45). According to 
Sartre, this type of emotional behavior does not really act upon the object but ‘magically’ 
                                               
57 We have already encountered the lines following this citation at the end of my discussion on the affective 
fallacy in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography and Said’s stance on the ‘imperialism of criticism’ related 
to it. The particular Sartrean intertext of this passage offers a more precise reading of Said’s remarks that “the 
critical act is first of all an act of comprehension: a particular comprehension of the written work, and not of its 
origins in a general theory of the unconscious” (1966, p. 7; my emphasis). As Said indicates in the preface to the work, 
the goal of his reading of Conrad that is set on comprehending consciousness is precisely to “balance the current 
view of him as a writer of ‘mythic’ or ‘unconscious’ fiction” (1966, p. ix). 
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– i.e. irreflectively – confers a new quality on that objective reality (the grapes are suddenly 
‘green’) without actually changing anything about the structure of that objective reality 
(the grapes are as ripe and succulent as they were before) (1939, p. 45). At the end of my 
encounter with the grapes, the objective reality has not changed but my perception of that 
reality has (see Sartre, 1939, p. 43). I have given a new meaning to a situation in my 
lifeworld. 
“En un mot”, Sartre wraps up his example of the grapes, “dans l’émotion, c’est le corps 
qui, dirigé par la conscience, change ses rapports au monde pour que le monde change ses 
qualités. Si l’émotion est un jeu c’est un jeu auquel nous croyons" (1939, p. 44). Sartre’s 
remarks imply that our relation to the world is as much determined by our body as our 
mind; as much by what we feel as by what we think. As such, he speaks in unison with 
Merleau-Ponty, whose philosophical elaboration of perception highlights the important 
role of our body in our comprehension of the world (Mazis, 1983, pp. 191-195). Perception 
is established affectively and intellectually. The last sentence illustrates that at the end of 
my encounter with the high-hanging bunch of grapes I have thoroughly convinced myself 
that the grapes were green and unripe from the very beginning, or I would experience 
that same unbearable tension anew and have to look for different ways to solve the tension. 
In my encounter with the grapes, I have thus performed, what Sartre calls, a little 
“comédie” (1939, p. 45) in which I have started to believe. As his use of direct speech “ils 
sont trop verts” to describe the way in which one persuades oneself of the veracity of this 
‘comedy of perception’ suggests, we find ourselves in line again with Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception and its stress on the importance of gestural or performative 
language in perceptual experience and the establishment of truths. “Truth”, Said writes 
about Merleau-Ponty’s work, “is based on what is real – and that is our perception of the 
world: perception becomes ‘not presumed true,’ but may be ‘defined as access to truth’” 
(1967a, p. 58). Sartre’s theory of the emotions illustrates how language is a way of 
imposing certain new or persistent schemata on the world that make it seem as if by ‘magic’ 
the objective reality has changed without our intervention. In the exemplary, quite trivial 
situation of the grapes, “cette comédie n’est qu’à demi sincere” (Sartre, 1939, p. 45) and 
though I have convinced myself of the veracity of my perception, I somehow know it not 
to be true. However, if we pursue Sartre’s kind of thinking about emotions a little further 
and apply it to less trivial situations in Conrad’s oeuvre, we come to realize the potential 
sincerity of emotional behavior and its impact on critical thinking as we draw some 
 171 
important conclusions that relate to perception, truth, and agency. From Sartre’s theory 
of the emotions, Said wants us to take note that “[b]etween a mind’s version of appearance 
and the so-called reality there can be no correspondence” (1966, p. 35), that therefore (1) 
perception is a fiction of reality, (2) that this fiction is without much reflection experienced 
by the subject as an unquestionable truth, (3) that truth disguises itself to be objective, 
natural and eternal but is actually subjective, manmade and established post-factum, and 
(4) that all of this is an intentional but irreflective process of an active consciousness-in-
the-world. 
Conrad’s equivalent to the objective reality of the bunch of grapes is what Said calls his 
“initial scrutiny of the present” (1966, p. 100); the action is his authorial attempt “to grasp 
a situation in the present in such a way as to render it in direct, causal relation with the 
past” (1966, p. 100). As we have seen, in Conrad’s fiction such attempts unremittingly fail, 
which causes an unbearable tension that is similar to the one sketched in Sartre’s example. 
However, instead of foisting a new quality on the object, which in Conrad’s case would 
mean the impossible wish for “the object simply to disappear” (Said, 1966, p. 100), the 
unbearable tension elicits a different irreflective response that, as Sartre writes, “consiste 
à nier l’objet dangereux avec tout notre corps, en renversant la structure vectorielle de 
l’espace où nous vivons en créant brusquement une direction potentielle, de l’autre côté" 
(Sartre, 1939, p. 46). And so to solve the conflict Conrad denies the object (the present) by 
turning to another object (the past), to the obscure events themselves narrated by Marlow 
(Said, 1966, p. 101). Conrad’s response as a writer is thus to abandon his initial intentions 
of establishing a causal link between past and present in favor of establishing an associative 
link between both. He thereby irreflectively imposes an emotional structure on the 
narrative of (many of) his novellas in which a quality of sadness and gloom associated with 
the disastrous episodes from the past engulfs the narrative moment in the present. The 
clearest example of this emotional structure is the narrative ring composition in Heart of 
Darkness, in which the beginning and end of the novella are situated in the same sad and 
gloomy narrative moment. “The air was dark above Gravesend”, Conrad writes at the 
opening to the novella, “and farther back still seemed condensed into a mournful gloom, 
brooding motionless over the biggest, and the greatest, town on earth” (Conrad, 2006, p. 
3). This atmosphere of sadness and gloom persists throughout the novella and lingers on 
into the last sentence where “the tranquil waterway leading to the uttermost ends of the 
earth flowed sombre under an overcast sky – seemed to lead into the heart of an immense 
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darkness” (Conrad, 2006, p. 77). And so to resolve the conflict and ease the tension, Conrad 
imposes a new meaning to a situation in his lifeworld, the consequences of which are more 
far-reaching than those of the ‘comedy’ of the grapes. 
Said points out the implications of Conrad’s choice of narrative method by explicitly 
linking the kind of sad and gloomy associative relationship between past and present that 
the author establishes in Heart of Darkness to Sartre’s theory of the emotions. “La tristesse”, 
Sartre describes, is a type of emotional behavior that “vise à supprimer l’obligation de 
chercher des nouvelles voies, de transformer la structure du monde en remplaçant la 
constitution présente du monde par une structure totalement indifférenciée” (1939, p. 47). 
In other words, sadness is a state of passivity and acquiescence in one’s situation. So 
according to Said, Marlow acts as a ventriloquist for Conrad who irreflectively chooses 
not to act upon the objective reality of the present but overridden by the immediate 
sensation of the unbearable tension decides to fold back upon himself and change his 
perception of the object. In this way, Conrad foists an undifferentiated quality or structure 
on the object and chooses to pacify himself, to not take up his responsibility about his 
situation, to seemingly give up on his agency and to act in what Sartre would later call 
mauvaise foi or ‘bad faith’ (see Sartre, 1943, pp. 85-111). More importantly, if we accept the 
premise that reading literature is an intersubjective and even intercorporeal experience, it 
takes strong willpower and non-identification on the part of the reader not to follow the 
rhetoric of Conrad to fold back upon oneself and to take up this position of indifferent 
passivity too. “Autrement dit”, Sartre goes on to write about sadness in his outline for a 
theory of the emotions, 
faute de pouvoir et de vouloir accomplir les actes que nous projetions, nous faisons 
en sorte que l’univers n’exige plus rien de nous. Nous ne pouvons pour cela qu’agir 
sur nous-mêmes, que nous ‘mettre en veilleuse’ – et le corrélatif noématique de cette 
attitude c’est ce que nous appellerons le Morne : l’univers est morne, c’est-à-dire : à 
structure indifférenciée. En même temps cependant, nous prenons naturellement la 
position repliée, nous nous ‘blottissons’. (Sartre, 1939, p. 47) 
Sartre’s remarks on human will and representation connected to activity and passivity 
bring us to the heart of Said’s analysis of Conrad’s writings. In fact, they even bring us to 
the core thematic of Said’s critical practice in general. Passivity, as Harold Aram Veeser 
argues, is a major if not the most important theme not just in Said’s revised doctoral 
dissertation but in all of his works (2010, pp. 29-30). I strongly agree with Veeser and 
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would like to explicitly support his remarks that Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography marks the start of “Said’s long campaign to defend human will” (Veeser, 
2010, p. 29) against paralyzing, indifferent passivity.58 Conrad’s passive authorial stance 
is countered by Said’s activist approach to secular criticism. Said responds by calling to 
action victims of colonialism, imperialism and Orientalism, one by one divisive worldviews 
that disseminate equally divisive ideas that the ‘colonized’ and ‘Orientals’ are indifferent, 
backward, “passive, fatalistic ‘subject races’” (1978, p. 105) whose regions “ought to be 
annexed or occupied by advanced powers (1978, p. 207). He calls on them to challenge and 
resist the underlying beliefs of these paralyzing, hegemonic worldviews, to combat 
indifference and acquiescence in the status quo, and to actively stop the dissemination of 
these ideas through the production of a counter-discourse. While it would take him 
another decade to formulate these ideas in Orientalism, we can see part of them in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography and his application of Sartre’s theory of the 
emotions. 
The formative impact of Sartre’s theory of the emotions on Said’s budding critical 
practice cannot be overemphasized. It is therefore crucial that we fully grasp the 
implications of Sartre’s theory by approaching it from another domain, social psychology. 
Doing so allows us to see more clearly the intersubjective, socio-cultural dimensions of 
that theory, which are less emphasized in Sartre’s 1939 outline that focuses on the 
existential individual. Understanding these dimensions allows us more easily to 
understand the critical potential of that theory in Said’s discussions of Orientalism to come 
(1978). In 1957, the American social psychologist Leon Festinger systematized the kind 
of thinking outlined by Sartre to elaborate a theory of what he calls ‘cognitive dissonance’ 
(1962). According to Festinger, cognitive dissonance is the experience of mental tensions 
that result from the existence of dissonant or non-fitting relations between the perceptual 
experience of our lived reality or an element of that reality, and our appropriate cognitive 
elements – knowledge, opinions, or beliefs about one’s environment, oneself, or one’s 
behavior that are considered to provide a truthful map of reality (1962, p. 3). Just like the 
unbearable tension that needs to be resolved in Sartre’s theory of the emotions, cognitive 
                                               
58 The clearest example of Said’s concern can be found in “Traveling Theory” (1983e) in a discussion of the 
intellect or subject in the works of Georg Lukács: “he shows the increasing retreat of the subject into passive, 
privatized contemplation, gradually more and more divorced from the overwhelmingly fragmented realities of 
modern industrial life, Lukacs [sic] then depicts modern bourgeois thought as being at an impasse, transfixed 
and paralyzed into terminal passivity” (1983e, p. 231). 
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dissonance is a state of mind that must be reduced or eliminated, for “the reality which 
impinges on a person will exert pressures in the direction of bringing the appropriate 
cognitive elements into correspondence with that reality” (Festinger, 1962, p. 11). Because 
persons do not have complete control over the information that reaches them or the events 
that happen in their lifeworld – the so-called brute facts of existence – cognitive dissonance 
is “an everyday condition” (Festinger, 1962, p. 5). Moreover, because perception is a 
complex process in which many cognitive elements at any given time are relevant to any 
given experience, all experiences have a manner of dissonance in them and “some 
dissonance is the usual state of affairs” (Festinger, 1962, p. 17). The everydayness indicates 
that the existence of dissonance isn’t problematic in itself (Festinger, 1962, pp. 16-17). It 
is only experienced as such if certain cognitive elements that are considered to be very 
important or essential even to a person are in a dissonant relation with that person’s lived 
reality. 
In short, Sartre’s theory of the emotions provides us with a model for everyday human 
behavior, about which Festinger’s approach to social psychology in its turn lays down a 
couple of ground rules. First, the state of dissonance causes psychological discomfort that 
exerts a pressure to alleviate the dissonant state of mind and attempt to achieve 
consonance by producing consonant or fitting relations among our cognitions. Secondly, 
when dissonance is already present, we will generally try to avoid situations and 
information that would likely increase the state of dissonance (Festinger, 1962, pp. 3-4). 
In all this, it is important to note that cognitive dissonance is experienced gradually, in 
degrees on a spectrum that ranges from unbearable to hardly noticeable (Festinger, 1962, 
p. 16). As a rule of thumb, “[t]he presence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce 
or eliminate the dissonance. The strength of the pressures to reduce the dissonance is a 
function of the magnitude of the dissonance” (Festinger, 1962, p. 18). Or in simpler terms: 
a strong presence of dissonance exerts strong pressures to reduce it. According to 
Festinger, cognitive dissonance might exist because of what someone has come to expect 
about an objective reality (such as the expectation of picking grapes), what one has learned 
about one’s environment through past experiences or formal education, or what is 
considered to be appropriate or usual in a social group, society or culture (1962, pp. 14-
15). The latter two categories highlight important aspects of cognitive dissonance and 
Sartre’s theory associated with it: cognitive dissonance is often the result of culture and 
education. 
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Festinger’s framework identifies two types of responses to cognitive dissonance, both 
of which highlight the primacy of perception. The first and most common response is to 
make one’s perception consonant with reality, then to adjust one’s pre-held belief about 
reality and to make one’s action consonant with this adjusted belief (Festinger, 1962, p. 
19). For example, a person whose sense of self is to an important extent defined by the 
belief that one should practice a healthy and active lifestyle, including practicing sports 
such as running and cycling, but who has the habit of smoking, will, upon reading 
information that smoking causes health problems and reduces one’s stamina to run or 
excel in cycling, experience cognitive dissonance between the cognitive element of ‘being 
a healthy person’ and the behavioral cognitive element of ‘performing harmful and 
unhealthy actions’. In order to eliminate this dissonance, the hypothetical smoker might 
decide to quit smoking. While this person might earlier not have given smoking much 
thought or might even have used to belief that ‘smoking is harmless’, he or she has now 
adjusted his or her belief to ‘smoking is harmful and unhealthy’ in correspondence with 
his or her perception of reality (the information). This is actually a very common and 
mundane situation of empirical learning, in which a perception of reality (information 
about smoking) causes one’s belief and action to change in accordance with the perception. 
In addition, this person might also change his or her situation, decide to join a group of 
likeminded people who are also trying to quit smoking and even quit his or her job in a 
bar where until recently the person used to smoke after his or her shift, thus effectively 
changing his or her social and physical environment. The condition for this change of 
situation is that the person needs to have sufficient agency and control over his or her 
physical and social environment (Festinger, 1962, p. 20). 
If such control is lacking – as Sartre’s encounter with the high-hanging grapes or 
Conrad’s flight into the past illustrate – or if a certain cognitive element that causes 
dissonance is considered to be very important because of the person’s self-definition or –
image, persistent past experiences, education, social group, society or culture, there is a 
great amount of resistance or psychological pressure that makes it seem very difficult or 
impossible even for a person to change this certain cognitive element and bring it into 
correspondence with reality. In situations like these we are wont to respond in a different 
way to eliminate the cognitive dissonance. Instead of making our particular cognitive 
element consonant with our perception of reality, we alter our perception to make it 
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consonant with this particular cognitive element (Festinger, 1962, pp. 18-23). This is the 
type of response which Sartre calls the ‘magical’ alteration of reality: 
Lorsque les chemins tracés deviennent trop difficiles ou lorsque nous ne voyons pas 
de chemin, nous ne pouvons plus demeurer dans un monde si urgent et si difficile. 
Toutes les voies sont barrées, il faut pourtant agir. Alors nous essayons de changer 
le monde, c’est-à-dire de le vivre comme si les rapports des chose à leurs potentialités 
n’étaient pas réglés par des processus déterministes mais par la magie. (1939, p. 43) 
The immediate sensation of an unbearable tension, caused by the dissonance between the 
perception of reality and the particular cognitive element or pre-held belief, which for 
many reasons may be very important to someone, overrides reflection and forces the 
earlier perception of reality to be brought into correspondence with the cognitive element. 
As Sartre’s frustrated would-be grape-picker illustrates, this change of perception is often 
accompanied by a post-factum change in intention that is consonant with the adjusted 
perception, the result of which is that “à travers un changement de l’intention, comme dans 
un changement de conduit, nous appréhendons un objet nouveau ou un objet ancien d’une 
façon nouvelle" (Sartre, 1939, p. 44). This type of response clearly illustrates how affective 
behavior is, as Sartre explains, "une transformation du monde" (Sartre, 1939, p. 43). Our 
situation has magically been altered and consonance between cognitive elements is 
achieved. When we approach Sartre’s theory of the emotions from the perspective of social 
psychology, we are better able to grasp its implications when it comes to agency. Sartre’s 
theory of the emotions shows how affective or emotional behavior is our primary way of 
apprehending and acting in the world (Sartre, 1939, pp. 38-39). It emphasizes that when 
the possibilities of individual human agency appear to be slim or almost impossible, there 
is always a way for individuals to choose and act. Emotional behavior is a means of agency 
in a situation where such agency appears to be denied, it is a way of coping with situations 
that seem unbearable. In Sartre’s model of agency, and hence in Said’s, individual subjects 
always keep hold of a certain degree of agency, irrespective of the particular situation 
within which they are embedded. 
Like Sartre, Festinger emphasizes that the chances that a person will succeed at 
reducing or removing the dissonance are slim, unless he or she beliefs in the veracity of 
the cognitive equilibrium to the objective reality – whether empirically or ‘magically’ 
established. This is why Sartre’s would-be grape-picker performs the little comedy to 
rationalize his change of intention by pointing out that his original perception of the object 
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reality must have been wrong and dissonant with the objective reality (the grapes are 
‘green’), whereas we have seen that this is a fiction created by his own intentional 
consciousness (see Festinger, 1962, p. 2). In addition, another common behavior to reduce 
dissonance is to look for information that is consonant with and supportive of one’s pre-
held belief. Our hypothetical smoker might, for example, find that the process of giving up 
smoking is too painful to endure and decide to persist in his or her habit of smoking. To 
reduce the cognitive dissonance that is caused by his or her encounter with information 
that smoking is harmful and unhealthy, imprinted on the packets of cigarettes that he or 
she carries around and smokes every day, the addicted smoker might convince him- or 
herself that the information on the packets must be wrong by actively searching for 
opinions, studies and facts that question the veracity of this information and support and 
strengthen the view that smoking is harmless and not as bad for one’s health as others 
claim (Festinger, 1962, pp. 6, 21). The more opinions and studies one is able to find in 
support of one’s view or the more authoritative these particular studies seem, the less 
dissonance one experiences and the more one beliefs that one’s perception is in fact 
truthful. 
The example above illustrates the social or cultural determination of perception. It 
leads us back to the work of Merleau-Ponty and its emphasis on how the meaningful 
entities that orbit a speaking subject (in this case, ‘smoking is harmless’) derive their 
meaningfulness from their shared, intersubjective use. Perception and hence ‘truth’ are to 
a great extent intersubjective. At any given moment in time and place, certain ‘truths’, 
schemata and beliefs circulate in a particular social group, society and culture. They are 
taught in schools or at home – to name but the most obvious places – and transmitted, 
repeated and reiterated in all kind of cultural artifacts such as literary texts. These 
schemata are necessary coping mechanisms to deal with the constant state of dissonance 
that is inherently part of our everyday perceptual experience. Because of their widespread 
cultural repetition and intersubjective use, they gain a certain cultural strength or stability 
about them that exert pressures on individual speaking subjects to bring their actions, 
perceptions and even speech in a consonant relation with them. Hence, Said argues, 
Conrad’s profound interest in language throughout his oeuvre.  
According to Said, the Anglo-Polish author intuitively came to know all of this and 
apprehended that language is a tool for ‘magically’ altering reality to produce order and 
consonance, “an excellent example of what Sartre would call refuge from an unbearable 
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situation” (1966, p. 131). In Conrad’s oeuvre the establishment of order through language 
seems to be opposed to truth, in that the achieved cognitive equilibrium is not necessarily 
truthful to the objective reality but rather “fraudulent” (Said, 1966, p. 99) and consonant 
with the pre-held beliefs and schemata of characters. Therefore, the key question that 
occupies the author in both his letters and short fiction is: “does the mind seek order or 
truth?” (Said, 1966, p. 112). In his letters Conrad frequently reflects on his process of self-
assertion or individuation, through which he as a historical person and author ethically 
and psychologically locates himself into a social order (Said, 1966, p. 109). His novellas 
quite often depict situations in which a “dramatic role is forced upon what is past, or 
difficult, or ungraspable, in order to coerce it into a more amenable relation with the person 
who does the forcing” (Said, 1966, p. 104). Elsewhere, an “object is created in spite of its 
own independent reality . . . in order to restructure an unbearable situation” (Said, 1966, 
p. 108). Characters force other characters into clear roles or pigeon-hole them to keep at 
bay “that gray world”, that constant state of dissonance, “which in Heart of Darkness is 
identified as the realm of neutrality just between life and death” (Said, 1966, p. 107). What 
characters in that novella repeatedly desire is “an enlightened, orderly, and formal 
explanation for peculiar disaster” (Said, 1966, pp. 111-112); light and order at the expense 
of darkness and truth. But, as we have seen, no causal relationship can be established 
between events causing such rational explanation to fail. Thus, Said concludes once more, 
Conrad’s fiction is a reflection of his consciousness, of his unique insight into what Said 
calls the structures of experience, which he sometimes dubs ‘the mechanism of existence’ 
– a collection of returning situations in a person’s existence that appear to be mechanical 
in the way in which they return and unfold. Said describes how writing for Conrad 
functioned as a “laboratory of his mind” (Said, 1966, pp. 29-30) to ponder upon agency and 
action. Through his craft as a writer Conrad was able to develop his habitual insight into 
the mechanism of existence, which, as Said understands it, he felt as “an unrestful 
submission to the complexities of life . . . not as a fait accompli but as a constantly renewed 
act of living, a condition humanisé and not as a condition humaine” (1966, pp. 5-6). And in all 
of this, he saw the pivotal role of language. 
In “Conrad and Nietzsche” a paper which Said delivered at a conference celebrating the 
fiftieth anniversary of Conrad’s death in 1974, he argues that Conrad shares with the 
German philologist a “radical attitude towards language” (1976a, p. 66). In his fictional 
works Conrad combined narrative representation with philosophical elaboration and, 
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especially in Heart of Darkness, arrived at a number of the same conclusions about language 
and truth that were formulated by Nietzsche (Said, 1976a, p. 69). Nietzsche became most 
famous for shattering the almost exclusively rational, intellectualist or Apollonian image 
of ancient Greek culture, professed by eighteenth-century art critics such as Johann 
Joachim Winckelmann and passionately defended against Nietzsche at the end of the 
nineteenth century by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. In his seminal work Die 
Geburt der Tragödie (1872), Nietzsche stressed the irrational, affective and Dionysian 
aspects of ancient Greece which embrace the chaotic and irrational nature of lived 
experience. Likewise, in most of his essays he reflected on language and its affective or 
irrational aspects. He constantly returned to what Said calls “the connection between the 
characteristics of language as a form of human knowledge, perception, and behavior, and 
those fundamental facts of human reality, namely will, power, and desire” (1976a, p. 66). 
In the essay “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn” (1960),59 written in 
1873 just shortly after his work on the Dionysian birth of tragedy but unpublished in 
Nietzsche’s lifetime, he asks the following question: 
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, 
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use 
seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one 
has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without 
sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, 
no longer as coins. (1966, pp. 46-47) 
This particular passage is a recurring passage in Said’s works of the period 1966-1978, as 
it is cited both in Beginnings (1975a, p. 39) and Orientalism (1978, p. 203). In words that 
strike us as very familiar, Nietzsche describes here how perception is the basis for 
meaning-giving and truth, how certain subjective ideas or meaningful “illusions” that were 
once grounded in a particular perceptual experience and correspondent to reality, are 
transmitted, repeated and gradually established as objective “truths” that “in no way 
correspond to the original entities” (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 144). As such, Nietzsche would 
                                               
59 The first passage I cite is from Walter Kaufmann’s translation in The Portable Nietzsche, which only contains 
an abridged version of Nietzsche’s essay (1966). I cite this version of the passage because it is the version cited 
by Said. For an unabridged and slightly different translation, see Ronald Speirs’s version “On Truth and Lying 
in a Non-Moral Sense” (1999). This is also the version of Nietzsche’s essay I cite in the remainder of this study. 
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find himself in agreement with Merleau-Ponty’s critique of the objective world of science 
that encroaches on lived experience (see Said, 1967a, p. 57). Language objectifies, makes 
common or even betrays such experience, and estranges the subject from its original, 
individually lived experience (Said, 1976a, pp. 67-68). Like Merleau-Ponty, Nietzsche 
emphasizes how perception covers its tracks, how certain meaningful entities gain an 
amount of naturalness about them through which they seem “firmly established, canonical, 
and binding” (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 146). ‘Binding,’ indeed, for language is connected to 
power, to Schopenhauer’s ideas of will and representation. Nietzsche describes human 
history as a battle of metaphors or interpretations, in which certain metaphors gain the 
upper hand, forcefully dislodge other interpretations, become dominant and take their 
place, from which they exert pressure on individual speaking subjects to make their 
perception, action and speech consonant with the victorious “army of metaphors, 
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms” (1999, p. 146). Said is drawn to the work of 
Nietzsche because it treats language “as a tyrannical epistemological system” (1976a, p. 
67) that controls human knowledge and ‘truth’, which is that what can be said and thought 
at a given time and place in history. For, as Nietzsche argues, to be truthful means using 
the “customary metaphors, or to put it in moral terms, the obligation to lie in accordance 
with firmly established convention, to lie en masse and in a style that is binding for all” 
(1999, p. 146). And so Nietzsche shows how in literary texts dominant ideas are 
transmitted and repeated in the same conventional language, albeit in slight variations, 
“in exactly the same way as a dream, if repeated eternally, would be felt and judged entirely 
as reality” (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 149). “In short”, Said sums up Nietzsche’s philosophical 
position, “every utterance is a controlled, disciplined, rule-coordinated variation on some 
other utterance. While it is unique to human beings, language is an order of repetition, of 
creative repetition, not of original speech” (Said, 1976a, p. 67). 
Nietzsche’s attitude on language is shared in common with Conrad and though the 
latter is a good deal less explicit about it, there is ample of concrete evidence for this in his 
short fiction (Said, 1976a, p. 66). We already saw how at the beginning of Heart of Darkness 
the narrator Marlow muses on imperialism, which he believes is not the truth but merely 
an idea at the back of it that is imposed on others and nothing more than an exalted cover-
up to camouflage the debased practice of land grabbing, exploitation and occupation of 
overseas regions belonging to people with a slightly different complexion than Europeans. 
Now, according to Said, Conrad’s radical attitude towards language becomes clear from 
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the way in which he lets his readers experience in Heart of Darkness, amongst other 
novellas, that imperialism is a tyrannical epistemological system that forces characters to 
think, speak and act in consonance with its beliefs, which these characters feel or 
experience as ‘truths’. In a process that is similar to the one described by Sartre and 
Festinger, Conrad’s characters impose an imperialist worldview on the objective reality. 
Their perception translates into action, which means the brutal commercial exploitation 
of the Congolese population, including the administering of corporal punishment, 
flogging, torture and decapitation of what they consider to be ‘rebellious’ Congolese ivory 
suppliers. “In spite of the obvious injustice done to those upon whom one’s idea can be 
imposed”, Said goes on to describe the underlying process of thought that rationalizes 
these characters’ actions, “it is important to understand that the reason an individual 
imposes his idea is that he believes he is serving the truth” (Said, 1966, p. 140). Upon 
questioning an agent of the Belgian trading company in the Congo why Kurtz gruesomely 
adorns his home with impaled heads of his Congolese victims, for example, Marlow gets 
the following response: “I had no ideas of the conditions, he said: these heads were the 
heads of rebels. I shocked him excessively by laughing. Rebels! What would be the next 
definition I was to hear?” (Conrad, 2006, p. 58). It does not occur to Kurtz or any of the 
other agents that the reason why these Congolese supply them with less ivory than 
expected, could be because of anything other than that they are rebels and actively 
sabotaging the trading company. Nor do they give it much reflection. Conrad shows how 
imperialism is a conditioned reflex that delineates his characters’ frame of thought and 
action. 
To Said, responses like these illustrate Conrad’s belief that imperialism works like a 
‘knitting machine’ which 
knits us in and out – thought, perception, everything. In accordance with its devilish 
activity, men become the machine’s efficient servants, existing under its strictures, 
colonizing whatever is dark and different from them. The machine is responsible not 
only for the creation of assertive individualities, but also for the false ‘light’ with 
which these individualities illuminate, reform, and reorder everything. (1966, p. 139; 
my emphasis) 
Said’s description of Conrad’s notion of the knitting machine can be understood in the 
light of Ashis Nandy’s ‘imperialism of categories’, a term which the Indian clinical 
psychologist uses “to describe the ability of some conceptual categories to establish such 
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complete hegemony over the domain they cover that alternative concepts related to the 
domain are literally banished from human consciousness” (Nandy, 1995, p. 54). Indeed, the 
cultural strength of imperialism in Conrad’s cultural moment was that its conceptual 
categories had achieved a hegemony over human consciousness, defining even the 
formation of individuality or subjectivity. The sheer cultural strength of imperialism made 
it well-nigh impossible for Conrad’s characters in Heart of Darkness or, for that matter, 
most Europeans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, who were confronted 
with a perceptual experience that was dissonant with their pre-held imperialist beliefs, 
precisely to adjust these beliefs and make them consonant with their original perception 
of reality. Instead, to reduce cognitive dissonance they irreflectively alter their perception 
of reality in order to make it consonant with the imperialist worldview and beliefs. And so 
reality is illuminated and a false order is imposed on it. 
Apart from highlighting once again that the experience of cognitive dissonance is such 
an important aspect of our being-in-the-world and motivation for action, the passage 
above makes for a fine example of Sartre’s phenomenological psychology or Festinger’s 
theory of cognitive dissonance. Identifying and understanding this Sartrean intertext 
allows us to fully grasp Said’s conceptualization of agency in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography and his treatment of imperialism in that work, “for”, as Said argues, 
“despite the perils of imperialism, the process was a necessity for coping with the internal 
darkness and the external world” (1966, p. 140). Or to put it in Nietzschean terms, the 
‘army of metaphors’ associated with imperialism, according to which human reality must 
be strictly divided in terms of ‘colonizers’ and ‘colonized’, ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ peoples, 
‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ nations, had won the battle of interpretation in Conrad’s 
cultural moment. These metaphors had deeply lodged themselves into the consciousness 
of many Europeans as ‘truths’ and were now the dominant, canonical, and binding way for 
Europeans to think, talk, and write about non-Western peoples. Apart from conditioning 
thought and language, imperialism as a set of ideas prepared for colonialism. It motivated 
Europeans to act in accordance to its ideas, to go out and colonize in the name of empire 
and help shine the light of civilization and progress on the darkness of ‘barbaric’ peoples 
such as the Congolese, for, as Said writes, “an imperialism of ideas . . . easily converts into 
the imperialism of nations” (1966, p. 140).  
Imperialism was such an all-encompassing hegemonic system of thought that it 
controlled Europe’s entire system of representation, including, as Chinua Achebe has 
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shown, that of Conrad’s very own novella. And so, though Conrad is openly critical of 
imperialism, he is nonetheless a creature of its time. His authorial consciousness is still to 
an extent determined by the imperialist worldview, rhetoric and discourse that he actively 
sought to criticize. This leads to a situation in which Conrad describes the gruesome 
excrescences of imperialism in the Congo Basin but, as Achebe has shown, still depicts the 
Congolese in the ‘obligatory’ or ‘binding’ stereotypical, offensive and dehumanizing way 
associated with imperialism. During the so-called ‘Scramble for Africa’, imperialism had 
consolidated such a total hegemony over human consciousness that it was simply 
impossible for Conrad to think of any concrete alternatives to it, though he may actively 
have intended to look for them. And though Conrad doesn’t offer an alternative worldview 
to imperialism, his critique of imperialism in action connected to his radical attitude 
towards language do lead Said to draw some important conclusions about representation, 
truth, and critical thinking that would be formative for his explicit criticism of Orientalism 
(1978) and imperialism (1993) to come.  
Said’s phenomenological exploration of Conrad’s consciousness illustrates how the 
Anglo-Polish author continually underlines the discrepancy between the chaotic and 
disorderly contingency of human existence and the orderly ideas which are imposed on it. 
His analysis shows how Conrad treats culture as a conventional system of illusory 
meaningful entities to cover a radically unstable reality. The author’s radical view of 
language, which Said locates in a tradition of European literature and thought that 
includes such thinkers as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, ultimately 
proves the precarity of seemingly stable body of ideas like imperialism. In Said’s view, 
Conrad’s oeuvre emphasizes how all human activity, including the author’s very own 
individuation process, is a constant but precarious victory over nothingness and 
dissonance. It illustrates that self-assertion is the active product of a long and renewed act 
of differentiation against the passivity of “undifferentiated darkness” (1966, p. 147). While 
Conrad’s metaphor of the knitting machine warns that this process can and does have 
grave consequences, self-assertion is a necessity of human existence because everyone, 
Said believes, “must have ideas by which to live” (1966, p. 147). Conrad’s characters are 
constantly trying to find such ideas by which to live and define their individuality or 
subjectivity in their own terms. Said describes how every single one of them tries to escape 
“the clutches of the monstrous knitting machine . . . [wishing] he could be an Odysseus, 
adventurously carving his destiny according to the profound inner needs of his 
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individuality” (1966, p. 36). But “the extent to which human infection by the machine has 
spread” (Said, 1966, p. 99) is enormous and most, if not all of them, end up failing and 
submitting themselves to the false order and “manufactured delusion” (Said, 1966, p. 36) 
of the knitting machine that is imperialism (Said, 1966, p. 150). 
These remarks on representation, truth, and thought lead us to a crucial passage in 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography to understand Said’s critical practice. 
To Conrad ‘thought’ apparently designated the process whereby a human self-image 
is elevated into an idea of truth that inevitably seeks perpetuation. Beneath its 
rational articulation, however, the idea is only a man’s desire for protection from the 
impinging confusions of the world. Immediately after the intellectual organization 
of the world according to an idea, there comes the expedient devotion to the idea, 
which in turn breeds conquest according to the idea. (Said, 1966, p. 138) 
Here, Said defines Conrad’s philosophical position about ‘thought’ in terms of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and Sartre’s theory of the emotions. According to 
him, we should interpret ‘thought’ as a process where a particular idea that was once 
grounded in perceptual experience is decontextualized and elevated into an idea of 
objective ‘truth’ that is without much reflection perpetuated and creatively repeated in all 
kinds of actions. As such, the idea becomes an intersubjectively constructed meaningful 
entity or hegemony that occupies a central position in a culture and puts pressure on 
individuals to irreflectively alter their perception in accordance to this idea. The idea 
motivates them to impose a linguistic structure of differentiation on the world, organize 
the world, and act accordingly. But such an objective ‘truth’ that on the face of it seems to 
be universal and eternal is on the back of it a contingent and precarious response to the 
everyday mental condition of dissonance that characterizes all human experience. The 
process whereby an idea is elevated into ‘truth’ is thus the result of a common human 
“desire for protection against the impinging confusions of the world”, a coping mechanism 
to reduce or eliminate cognitive dissonance. So Conrad shows how it is an all too human 
behavior to magically (in the Sartrean sense of the word) alter reality, to cover up the 
disorder and darkness of everyday human existence by orderly and illuminated ideas. 
But Conrad doesn’t merely describe the process of perception in his oeuvre. He also 
provides his readers and critics with an important outline for critical thinking:  
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But the moment a man begins to examine the idea itself, he slowly begins to negate 
the distinctions he had organized for viewing the world: encircled by its own work, 
the intellect has no positive, objective criterion for evaluation. All the structures of 
its differentiated organization of the world disappear, and the cycle begins again. 
(Said, 1966, p. 138) 
When an objective ‘truth’ like imperialism is subjected to criticism and examined closely 
– like Marlow does in Heart of Darkness – it appears to be nothing more than a 
conventionally agreed upon system of organization for which there is “no positive, 
objective criterion for evaluation”. ‘Truth’ is thus a manmade fiction in which we choose 
to believe and by which we choose to live, a state of achieved consonance between an idea 
and our perception created by our consciousness to protect itself from a destabilizing 
sensation of reality. Criticism then is an action that precisely seeks out this destabilizing 
experience. It is a laborious and constantly to be renewed cycle where we should become 
self-conscious of the process of perception and the establishment of stable ‘truths’. At 
moments of cognitive dissonance, when an unbearable tension causes a crisis in our 
consciousness that exerts pressure on us to solve it, we should not let the immediate 
sensation of action override our reflection but resist the sensation, pause and self-
consciously reflect. Contrary to Conrad’s characters, we should reflect first and act 
afterwards. We should ask ourselves the same key question that occupies Conrad 
throughout his career as an author, whether we seek order or truth, and subject our 
perceptual experience to a critical examination to discern whether it is in correspondence 
with reality or consonant with our pre-held beliefs and, hence, the status quo. We should 
not be afraid to follow Merleau-Ponty’s lead, to rediscover our lived experience beneath 
the encroachments of ‘science’ and ‘truth’ and question our so-called unquestionable beliefs 
(see Said, 1967a, p. 57). In this, we should strive to make our subjective experience coincide 
as much as possible with the objective reality, which often means the constant negation, 
adjustment and alteration of our previous structure of differentiated organization of the 
world. In short, criticism is a mode of living, an unfinished cycle that constantly begins 
anew. 
Though Said does not refer to Sartre at this point in his work, what he describes here 
as Conrad’s ‘cycle of criticism’ that serves as an ethical guide for action in a particular 
historical situation, is in line with Sartre’s theory of agency. In L’Être et le néant (1943) 
Sartre describes how a historical situation, in which someone has been born and to which 
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someone has grown thoroughly accustomed so that one does not have the need to envision 
alternatives to that particular situation – or cannot even envision such alternatives –, can 
suddenly feel unbearable when one comes to critically examine the situation and grasp the 
determining constraints of that situation on one’s freedom and, equally important, when 
as a result of this critical examination one comes to envision alternatives to that situation 
(1943, pp. 509-510). From that particular moment of critical estrangement onwards, that 
once so normal situation becomes unbearable not because it is unbearable but because we 
decide or perceive it to be so. Or in the words of Sartre: “c’est à partir du jour où l’on peut 
concevoir un autre état de choses qu’une lumière neuve tombe sur nos peines et sur nos 
souffrances et que nous décidons qu’elles sont insupportables” (1943, p. 510). According to 
Sartre, criticism leads to estrangement, which forms the basis for action and provides us 
with the ethical imperative to overthrow an oppressing situation. 
This view about criticism leading to action informs Said’s work on Conrad, in which he 
presents himself as a dialectical thinker who defends the idea that criticism should be as 
dynamic as the structures or mechanisms of existence that characterize our being-in-the-
world (see Sim, 1994, p. 6). In this, Said does not refer to Sartre but echoes the work of the 
Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukács, whose Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein (1923)60  he 
briefly refers to at the beginning of his own work (see 1966, p. 12). Where Lukács as a 
Marxist is of course interested in class consciousness and therefore stresses the agency of 
groups or classes of people, Said takes up an existential phenomenological approach that 
is actually closer to Sartre’s because it is “more concerned with the individual” (1966, p. 
12) and highlights individual human agency by concentrating on the personal situation of 
Conrad. However, despite their difference in focus, both Lukács, Sartre and Said share the 
basic idea of historical materialism “that men perform their historical deeds themselves 
and that they do so consciously” (Lukács, 1968, p. 50). Moreover, as a result of his 
treatment of Conrad, Said comes to share Lukács’ belief that moments of crisis in a system 
– whether that system is modern capitalism with Lukács or modern imperialism with Said 
– are the moments at which individual human agency becomes most visible, an individual 
can momentarily escape some of the determinist forces of the system and change that 
system from within (see McCarthy, 2013b, p. 85; Said, 1983e, pp. 230-232). With Lukács, 
critical consciousness is the consciousness that is given rise to by the crisis in modern 
capitalism, which stems from the awareness of certain basic structures of modern 
                                               
60 Lukács (1968) History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. 
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capitalism, such as the reification or commodification of workers, and the realization of the 
place that one takes up within the system or the class to which one belongs – hence Lukács 
equates critical consciousness to class consciousness (1968, pp. 171-172). In History and 
Class Consciousness, Lukács argues that class consciousness leads to self-understanding, 
which introduces the element of self-consciousness or reflection in a situation and thereby 
already alters that situation, preparing the way for proper, carefully planned and directed 
historical and social change (Lukács, 1968, pp. 168-169; Sim, 1994, p. 11). “Crisis, in short”, 
Said sums up Lukács’ position in his seminal essay “Traveling Theory”, “is converted into 
criticism of the status quo” (Said, 1983e, p. 232). 
Likewise, in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography moments of crisis lead to 
criticism. This is clearly a Lukácsian motif that, as my discussion of Sartre’s L’Être et le 
néant makes clear, harmonizes well with Said’s reading of existential phenomenology and 
Sartre’s theory of agency. As Conor McCarthy makes clear about Said’s reception of 
Marxist thought from Beginnings onwards, “crisis has become a moment of opportunity, 
of dialectical analytical thought, or, as Said sees it, criticism” (McCarthy, 2013b, p. 85). I 
strongly agree with Conor McCarthy who in tandem with Timothy Brennan is one of the 
few critics to stress the influence of Lukács on Said’s critical practice, though neither of 
them discuss Said’s revised doctoral dissertation (Brennan, 2013; McCarthy, 2013b). My 
discussion shows how Said’s engagement with Lukács takes place from his doctoral 
dissertation onwards and is facilitated by the Sartrean theory of agency underpinning that 
work. This dual perspective allows us to see more clearly how Said sees moments of crisis 
as moments at which an individual experiences cognitive dissonance and feels the 
unbearable tension which Sartre talks about. Such moments are, indeed, moments of 
opportunity for reflection or criticism to change one’s pre-held beliefs, adjust them in 
consonance with the perceptual experience of reality and thus gradually, one step at a time, 
change the status quo of hegemonic systems of thought like imperialism. At these 
moments, individual human consciousness becomes aware that it has the power of 
responding in a reflective and directed manner to the experience of dissonance, and thus 
of overthrowing the false ‘truths’ that govern human existence. Criticism, for Said, is the 
product of a consciousness-in-the-world and should be conceptualized not as a Sartrean 
‘magical’ or textual alteration of reality, nor “as an avoidance of reality but as a 
revolutionary will completely committed to worldliness and change” (Said, 1983e, p. 234). 
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2.6 Epilogue: Structures of Attitude and Reference 
The continued importance of existential phenomenology for Said’s critical practice beyond 
the period 1966-1978 becomes most clear in Culture and Imperialism (1993). There Said 
defends the notion that “there is an irreducible subjective core to human experience” (1993, 
p. 31) which is nonetheless accessible to analysis. The privileged access point to human 
experience is literature. Because a literary work speaks of a “particular, concrete 
experience”, which is uniquely singular and resists rational understanding and logical 
paraphrase, the critic is obliged “to read and analyze, rather than only to summarize and 
judge” (Said, 1993, p. 76). The underlying idea of the work is that the experience of 
imperialism must be comprehended or felt. 
In this work, the pivotal notion of structure of experience – or mechanism of existence 
– that characterizes an author’s being-in-the-world resurfaces as the “structure of attitude 
and reference” (Said, 1993, p. 52). To be clear, we should in the first place understand this 
notion to be a translation of Raymond Williams’s seminal phrase “structure of feeling” 
(1958, p. 87) which the Welsh Marxist elaborates to describe the way in which everyday 
life, feelings, subjectivity, or, in short, lived experience are structured in cultural products 
such as novels (Said, 1993, p. 52). From reading Williams’s The Country and the City (1973), 
it already becomes clear how a structure of feeling is tied to the phenomenon of perception, 
because it is the articulation of a “conscious way of seeing and showing” (1973, p. 158). 
Said’s translation only intensifies that link with the phenomenology of perception by his 
choice to split the term ‘feeling’ by translating it in two terms, ‘attitude’ and ‘reference’. 
We should understand Said’s structures of attitude and reference as articulations of an 
author’s attitude and reference, by which I do not mean to posit a meaningless circular 
tautology, but, rather, wish to argue that these structures articulate the author’s perception 
of the world. They articulate the way in which an author relates to the world, how he or 
she perceives, feels and experiences that world and his or her way of differentiating and 
organizing it. Said uses the term to talk about the way in which geographical distinctions 
“appear in the cultural languages of literature, history, or ethnography, sometimes 
allusively and sometimes carefully plotted, across several individual works that are not 
otherwise connected to one another or to an official ideology of ‘empire’” (1993, p. 52). 
Structures of attitude and reference are analyzable entities that articulate the 
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intersubjective referential framework upon which authors rely to make sense of the 
unfamiliar environing world that is ungraspable as it is. Said’s analyses in Culture and 
Imperialism make clear how ‘the familiar’ for an author like Camus, for instance, was the 
French imperial experience that took for granted the idea of “Western dominance in the 
non-European world” (1993, p. 173). And though Camus, just like Conrad, sought to rebel 
from imperialism, he was unable to fully detach himself from this authoritative referential 
framework as the cultural pressures to bring his actions, perceptions and writing in a 
consonant relation with the imperialist framework were too great. And so beneath 
Camus’s celebrated superstructure of the absurd, the structure of attitude and reference is 
imperialist. Novels like L’Étranger and La Peste are about the deaths of Arabs and confirm 
and consolidate the priority of the French imperial experience (Said, 1993, p. 181). This 
highlights the importance of Said’s work on perception in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography as a key to our understanding of his critical practice. 
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Chapter 3  
Beginning Anew
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3.1 Introduction: Columbia, 1967 
In 1963, a couple of months before he received his PhD at Harvard in January 1964, Said 
was hired as an Instructor in English at Columbia University. Reflecting on his early 
period at Columbia in a conversation with Tariq Ali in 1994, Said likes to think of himself 
as a Dorian Gray, a person with two identities (Ali, 2006, pp. 4-5; see also Said, 1976b, p. 
35). On the one hand, there was his identity as a professional teacher who went about his 
business on the Morningside Heights campus teaching and giving lectures on English 
literature and, apart from his revised doctoral dissertation on Conrad’s oeuvre and a 
lengthy book chapter on Nostromo (Said, 1965), didn’t publish all that much work (see Said, 
1968b). A few years later, in his memoir Out of Place, Said describes those first years as a 
continuation of “the unpolitical years of my education” at Princeton and Harvard, a time 
marked by “the assumption of disengaged teaching and scholarship at Columbia” (Said, 
1999, p. 293). But there was another character existing and gradually building up within 
himself, he adds, a character connected with the disappearing worlds of his upbringing and 
youth in Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine for which, as he tells Ali, there was simply no place 
in the “essentially a-political” (Said quoted by Ali, 2006, p. 72) environment at Columbia 
at the time. In fact, he goes on to tell how in those early New York years “I had effectively 
severed my connection with Egypt, Palestine no longer existed. . . . And I really didn’t 
think about myself as anything other than somebody who was going about his work” (Said 
quoted by Ali, 2006, p. 72). He tells how he was successful at keeping both characters 
separated from each other. Until, in the early morning of June 5, 1967, the Third Arab-
Israeli war broke out. 
In response to the apparent mobilization of Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces, the 
Israeli Air Force launched a massive preemptive airstrike that disabled nearly all Egyptian 
airfields and caught the majority of the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian Air Force before 
it got airborne. From the Israeli perspective, the operation was a massive success. It 
hindered the Arab coalition’s Air Force operations for the duration of the war and 
established Israeli air supremacy over the entire theater of war, leaving Arab ground forces 
vulnerable to Israeli air attacks. As a result of this, the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, 
dubbed the ‘Six Days War’, had already tipped over in Israel’s favor from the start. 
Following two days of heavy ground fighting in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, on 
June 7, the United Nations Security Council called for a ceasefire that was immediately 
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accepted by Israel and Jordan. On June 8 Israel and Egypt agreed on a ceasefire and two 
days later, on June 10, Syria also signed a ceasefire agreement with Israel. The June War 
of 1967 resulted in a lightning victory for Israel over its neighbors. Moreover, though 
Israel did not start the war to conquer territories (Sand, 2014, p. 241), in the course of its 
victory it had annexed territories in the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza 
Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank – marking the beginning of the so-called 
Occupied Territories, the ongoing military occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel 
during and in the aftermath of the 1967 conflict.  
When formal hostilities were over, the United Nations appointed a Special Committee 
to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people living 
in the occupied territories, which received reports of the demolition of thousands of 
Palestinian and Syrian houses and even the destruction of entire villages by the Israeli 
authorities in the Hebron area and the Jordan Valley, although it could not provide the 
General Assembly with evidence to corroborate (UNGA, 1971, §57). The Special 
Committee also reported on the expulsion and deportation of Palestinians and Arabs from 
the Israeli occupied territories as well as the Israeli destruction of refugee accommodation 
in refugee camps that were established after the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948 (UNGA, 
1971, §48). As a result of the hostilities of June 1967, up to 325,000 Palestinians and 
Syrians were either forcefully displaced by the Israeli authorities or fled from their villages 
– some of them for the second time in two decades (Bowker, 2003, p. 81; Gerson, 1978, p. 
162; Morris, 1999, pp. 328-329). But the majority of the Arab population in the Israeli 
occupied territories remained in their homes, and in the postcolonial world of the 1960s it 
was impossible to carry out a mass scale transfer of people (Sand, 2014, p. 243). Israel’s 
response was one of collective punishment, oppression, refusing to grant a status of full 
citizenship to the Arab population living in the Occupied Territories, and what is now by 
many historians considered to be a form of institutionalized apartheid.61 In combination 
with this, Israeli authorities implemented an active settlement policy that was aimed at 
consolidating important strategic lands. As Shlomo Sand argues, it was no coincidence 
that the first Israeli settlement was established in the for the region strategically 
important Golan Heights within a month after the conclusion of the fighting in June 1967 
                                               
61 The consensus among scholars about this is overwhelming. See, for instance, the work of Ageel (2016); Carey 
(2001); Chomsky and Pappe (2015); Finkelstein (2001); Geva (2016); Hass (2002); Morris (1989); Pappe (2007, 
1999); Piterberg (2001); Reinhart (2002); Rogan and Shlaim (2001); Sa'di and Abu-Lughod (2007); Said (1979); 
Said and Hitchens (2001); Sand (2010, 2014); Shlaim (1990, 2000, 2009); Sternhell (1998). 
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(2014, p. 243). In the months and years thereafter, many Israeli settlements followed in 
other Israeli occupied regions – a colonial practice of settlement that goes on to this very 
day (Sand, 2014, pp. 243-245). On December 23, 2016, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted Resolution 2334 in which it once more condemned “the construction and 
expansion of settlements, transfer of Israeli settlers, confiscation of land, demolition of 
homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians, in violation of international humanitarian 
law and relevant resolutions” (UNSC, 2016, p. 1). The resolution stresses that a cessation 
of all Israeli settlement activity is necessary for the stability of the region and the 
possibility of peaceful coexistence of Israelis and Palestinians. The Security Council 
approved the resolution with all members of the council in favor of the resolution, save for 
the U.S. which abstained from voting. 
In this chapter, I will map the influence of Said’s politicization in the aftermath of the 
Six Days War of 1967 on his literary critical practice. I will begin this chapter by briefly 
discussing Said’s writings about overtly political topics shortly after the war and his 
discursive positioning in those writings and in retrospective interviews. This will 
illustrate the way in which he accentuates his agency as a critic and retrospectively builds 
up to the formation of an insurrectionary critical self-consciousness in the introduction to 
Orientalism – which I will discuss in the next chapter. In this chapter, I will discuss Said’s 
call to political history and a broad, humanist and historical form of textuality in 
Beginnings: Intention and Method (1975a), which he establishes by contrapuntally combining 
the works of two seemingly oppositional critics: Erich Auerbach and Michel Foucault. And 
while Said’s model of criticism in his revised doctoral dissertation advocates a highly 
ethical model of reading that is also to a certain extent political, his engagement with 
Auerbach and Foucault would lead him to profess an even more self-conscious politicized 
model of criticism. Beginnings should therefore be read as a political allegory; its method 
as a form of cultural politics. My reading of Said’s intertexts and the way in which he puts 
their creative energies to use, stresses that his model of criticism outlined in Beginnings 
paves the way for his analysis of the archive of Orientalism and critique of imperialism, in 
Orientalism (1978). It will become clear how Said’s model of criticism in Beginnings is the 
product of his continued intellectual engagement with humanist models of reading derived 
from existential phenomenology (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Poulet), the New Criticism 
(Blackmur) and philology (Auerbach). This intellectual engagement is perhaps the central 
underlying theme in Said’s literary critical career from his revised doctoral dissertation on 
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Conrad to the posthumously published works Humanism and Democratic Criticism (2004a) 
and On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain (2006).  
Beginnings was one of the first works to introduce Foucault’s theories and insights to 
an American audience and at the same time incorporate those theories into its own 
theoretical framework. As a result, Said is most commonly associated with the work of 
Foucault – also because of the latter’s importance to the argument of Orientalism. In the 
first two sections of this chapter I will nuance the commonly held image of Said as an 
American adept of Foucault by discussing Said’s ‘meditative’ method in Beginnings which 
is based on the works of Blackmur and the cycle of criticism outlined in his treatment of 
Conrad, as well as on the philology of Auerbach. It will become clear how Said envisions 
what many would consider to be ‘old-fashioned’ and seemingly outdated humanist 
approaches to literary criticism, highly relevant to the present postcolonial situation. 
As I discuss the importance of Foucault to Beginnings in the last two sections of this 
chapter, it will become clear how Said’s intellectual engagement with Foucault’s work on 
discourse leads him to produce a theory of literature and agency which infuses the 
Foucaultian notion of discursivity with a centrality of subjectivity, derived from Said’s 
commitment to a humanist project. Said’s theory stresses that authority is always nomadic, 
because it is dependent on the balancing act between either a powerful assertion of will by 
the existential writer or a total submission to the pressures of discourse. Said’s 
conceptualizing of authority as nomadic is an example of how Beginnings should be read 
as a political allegory, because it counterbalances what Said considers to be an 
overdetermining view of agency by Foucault, in which the authority of discourse always 
gets the upper hand of individual writing thereby making resistance to a discursive 
formation impossible. 
My analysis highlights how despite of what its title might suggest, Beginnings is 
continuous to Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography and in tandem with that work 
provide an important part of the theoretical foundations of Said’s approach to literary 
criticism in Orientalism. My discussion highlights that Beginnings does not mark a 
theoretical rupture in Said’s literary critical career (compare Hussein, 2002), nor the 
poststructuralist zero-point of his method of criticism (compare Brennan, 1992), but at the 
most a ‘beginning anew’ in his model of criticism. And that beginning anew, according to 
Said’s discursive positioning, took place on the morning of June 5, 1967. 
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It is an understatement to say that the Six Days War was a traumatic event in the lives 
of many hundreds of thousands displaced Palestinians and Syrians who in the aftermath 
of the war found themselves scattered across the Palestinian territories and neighboring 
countries, as well as in the lives of their countrymen who were now living under the 
military occupation by a foreign power. Tremors of “[t]he earthquake of 1967” (Khalidi, 
2008, p. 45), as the Palestinian-American historian Rashid Khalidi calls the traumatic, 
crushing Arab defeat and the subsequent Israeli occupation of Palestine in that year, were 
also felt overseas. The June war of 1967 profoundly affected the life of many members of 
an entire generation of Arabs and Arab-Americans living in the U.S, including Said. The 
war was a watershed event in Said’s personal and professional life. It shocked him. For, as 
he describes his reaction to the events, “I was in New York at the time and I was 
completely shattered. The world as I understood it and knew it had completely ended at 
that moment” (Said quoted by Ali, 2006, p. 73). For Said, it had the consequence of further 
politicizing him. The ‘Dorian Gray period’ of the early years at Columbia, as he likes to 
think of it, in which he strictly separated his political character as a concerned Middle 
Easterner and his professional character as an American literary critic, was over. Both 
characters were merged. He began to appear on television and radio shows to openly talk 
about politics in the Middle East and for the very first time he began to be in touch with 
other Arabs and sympathizers of the Palestinian cause (Ali, 2006, p. 73). In the aftermath 
of the war, he befriended critics like Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, founder of the Arab-American 
University Graduates in 1968, as well as Noam Chomsky and Eqbal Ahmad, vocal 
supporters of the Palestinian cause who were also actively involved in the anti-Vietnam 
protests in the U.S. that year. During the Summer of 1970, while on a visit to Amman to 
attend the Palestinian National Council (he would not be an official member of the council 
until 1977), he met Yasser Arafat, one of the founders of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization which was created to be a political representative for the Palestinian people 
in exile and in the Occupied Territories (Said, 1996, p. 67). By the events of Black 
September later that Summer in Jordan and Lebanon (Said left the country before), he was 
completely involved in the Palestinian resistance movement and what he calls “the 
struggle for Palestine” (Said, 1999, p. 293). 
The most obvious sign of the impact of the Six Days War of 1967 on Said’s academic 
career is that in the aftermath of the war he began, for the first time, to write and publish 
about overtly political topics. During the war, he became aware of the many 
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misperceptions about Arabs circulating in U.S. public discourse that, according to him, lay 
at the basis for an unwavering support for Israel and a decidedly unsympathetic view 
towards Arabs, even at places of higher education like Columbia University (Veeser, 2010, 
p. 7). Norman Finkelstein describes how after the events of June, 1967, discussions of the 
Holocaust entered the American public discourse for the very first time, marking the 
beginning of what he polemically calls the ‘Holocaust Industry’, the exploitation of the 
memory of the Nazi Holocaust by Jewish American elites in favor of commercial, financial 
and political gains as well as to further the interest of an Israeli state (2003, pp. 16, 26). 
American Jews ‘discovered’, so to speak, the state of Israel and Zionist feelings were 
kindled everywhere in the U.S. public discourse (Finkelstein, 2003, p. 21). Moreover, 
impressed by Israel’s overpowering force in the war, for the first time since its 
establishment in 1948, Israel began to figure centrally in U.S. foreign strategic planning 
(Finkelstein, 2003, pp. 17-18). American military and economic support in the aftermath 
of the war turned the state of Israel into a proxy for U.S. power in the region, changing 
‘Israel’ into a synonym for ‘Western civilization’ surrounded by the threatening, barbaric 
hordes of Arabs in the Middle-East (Finkelstein, 2003, pp. 20-21). This illustrates how 
essentially one-sided the circulating representations of Arabs were in U.S. public 
discourse. There was no space for nuance, discussion nor acknowledgment even of the 
history of Israeli belligerence towards its Arab neighbors. In a dynamic of blaming the 
victim, the dominant view in U.S. public discourse portrayed Arabs as an unruly bunch of 
madmen whose inherently belligerent nature threatened the existence of the state of Israel 
and all attempts at peaceful coexistence with Jews in the Middle-East. They therefore had 
the defeat coming and deserved to be displaced and exiled from their native homeland. 
Bill Ashcroft writes how during the short time span of the war Said “discovered the 
astonishing power of the press, the enormous capacity of that power to produce knowledge 
and the helplessness to which the subject of representation is condemned” (2007, p. 75). 
Veeser adds that Said wanted to combat that helplessness and empower these subjects of 
representation, a group which includes anyone from Morocco to Afghanistan, and Said 
himself. He wanted to correct the dominant stereotypical view and extract a nuanced, 
human image of the Arab from the myriad of one-sided, hostile dehumanizing 
representations (Veeser, 2010, p. 51). In the aftermath of the war, Said therefore decided 
to methodically examine the representations of Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians in 
Western culture and public discourse. This examination lead to the writing of “The Arab 
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Portrayed” (1970a), Said’s first essay about openly political topics, originally published in 
1968 and commissioned by Abu-Lughod, that testifies to the very existence of Palestinians 
as humans, with a history, culture and right to self-representation and self-determination.62  
In the essay and in various publications to come, Said describes how in Western 
journalism and scholarly writings a negative image of Arabs is constructed and repeated 
in such a way “as to evade any discussion of history and experience as I and many other 
Arabs have lived them” (2000a, p. 563). He stresses that the dominant representation of 
Arabs in the West is an essentialized, hostile and dehumanizing one that does not 
correspond to a lived experience, or any form of concrete human life whatsoever. Said 
thereby pursues the line of thinking about language, truth and representation set out in 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography to examine how language produces 
distortions and misrepresentations that are creatively reiterated in cultural products such 
as literature and come to function as meaningful fictions, textually constructed realities or 
‘truths’ that come to be experienced as an ‘objective’ reality. In this way, “The Arab 
Portrayed” in nuce describes what would later become the central theme of Orientalism: 
If the Arab occupies space enough for attention it is a negative value. He is seen as 
a disrupter of Israel's or the West's existence, or in another view of the same thing, 
as a surmountable obstacle to Israel's creation in 1948. Palestine was imagined as an 
empty desert waiting to burst into bloom, its inhabitants inconsequential nomads 
possessing no stable claim to the land and therefore no cultural permanence. (Said, 
1970a, p. 5) 
In this pivotal passage, of which the first sentence is word for word copied in Orientalism 
(1978, p. 286), Said describes how the dominant Western representations underplay or 
even downright reject the cultural presence of Palestinians on the land which they inhabit, 
how their culture is deemed unimportant, backward and inferior to that of the West, and 
how, as a result of all this, their cultural permanence is effaced and they are denied the 
right to the land which they inhabit. What Said is arguing here, in a way, is that writing 
is capable of actual displacement – in addition to being a practice of figural displacement in 
                                               
62 Shortly thereafter, in 1968-1969, Said wrote “The Palestinian Experience” (1994a), an essay in which he 
reiterated these claims. This essay should also be read as a response to the emerging discussions of the Holocaust 
in American public discourse. Said’s argument is that the Palestinian experience of the Nakba is the result of the 
Jewish experience in the Shoah. The essay is rife with indignation that in finally discussing Jewish suffering in 
the Holocaust, American elites are blind to the deeply entwined Palestinian suffering (see also Said, 1979, pp. 56-
114). 
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Beginnings (1975a, p. 22), an idea we will later see in more detail. I would like to add that 
because of the one-sidedness of representation, in which the West speaks for the 
Palestinians and essentializes them by defining their identity in a negative, stereotypical 
way (“inconsequential nomads”), Palestinians are hereby denied the fundamental human 
right to speak for themselves and define their identity in their own terms. What these 
Western representations effectively do is deny Palestinians what Said would later call the 
“Permission to Narrate” (1984) . This realization, though originally not formulated until 
Orientalism (1978), is of paramount importance to Said’s approach to literary criticism in 
his writings in the aftermath of the Six Days War. It would incite him to reconceptualize 
his model of reading from his revised doctoral dissertation into a more political model that 
bestows upon the critic more agency, more freedom and a right to speak for his or her 
own. 
This is all the more strengthened by an increasing realization that these meaningful 
fictions are not mere accidents of perception, which might still be the impression from 
reading Said’s conclusion about language and representation in Joseph Conrad and the 
Fiction of Autobiography, but the systematic, default way in which the West perceptually 
comes to terms with all that is foreign, different or other. “By the early seventies,” he tells 
Ali in the 1994 interview,  
I began to realize that the distortions and misrepresentations were systematic, part 
of a much larger system of thought that was endemic to the West’s whole enterprise 
of dealing with the Arab world. It confirmed my sense that the study of literature 
was essentially a historical task, not just an aesthetic one. I still believe in the role 
of the aesthetic; but the ‘kingdom of literature’ – ‘for its own sake’ – is simply wrong. 
A serious investigation must begin from the fact that culture is hopelessly involved 
in politics. My interest has been in the great canonical literature of the West – read, 
not as masterpieces that have to be venerated, but as works that have to be grasped 
in their historical density, so they can resonate. But I also don’t think that you can 
do that without liking them; without caring about the books themselves. (Said 
quoted by Ali, 2006, pp. 9-10) 
The passage above is fundamental to understand Said’s approach to literary criticism, as 
it directly and indirectly demonstrates a couple of key characteristics of that approach: (1) 
that individual representations are the products of a larger system of thought and 
representation, (2) that literature is as much an aesthetic as a historical product, connected 
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to a particular time and place, (3) that therefore it cannot simply be studied as an 
autonomous practice, neither as an isolated verbal artifact in the postwar New Critical 
fashion nor as the product of an atemporal and ahistorical transcendental consciousness of 
phenomenology, (4) that culture is interrelated to real power relations and worldly 
politics, and (5) that in order for the critic to explain the cultural embeddedness or 
semantic thickness of literature, the critic has to be thoroughly intimate with the work 
studied, has to care about literature (Ali, 2006, pp. 4-5; Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2009, p. 2; 
Kennedy, 2000, p. 45; Khalidi, 2008, pp. 45-46; Said, 1976b, p. 35; 1996, pp. 66-67).  
The passage also illustrates that what Said has identified as the shared concern of 
Conrad and Nietzsche is also a key theme in his own critical practice: that language, and 
hence literature, is never neutral – even when it explicitly claims to be so – but always in 
one way or another connected to power. In addition, it unearths Said’s penchant for what 
has come to be regarded as the canonical literature of the West: Kipling, Camus, Austen, 
Swift, and most notably Conrad, authors which feature prominently throughout Said’s 
career. Yet he stresses that as much as these works are admirable in that they can 
communicate a certain human experience with universalizing claims, these works are 
manmade products that can exclude, reify and dehumanize the experiences of another 
person or groups of persons. Literary gems are never flawless and while literature is often 
regarded as a paragon of humanity, it is also capable of denying that humanity to others. 
These ideas would become the kernel ideas of Said’s elaborated examination of the relation 
between the Arab world and the West in his 1978-1981 trilogy Orientalism (1978), The 
Question of Palestine (1979), and Covering Islam (1981), and its sequel Culture and Imperialism 
(1993). By then Said had gradually become more self-consciously political and evolved into 
the ‘Edward Said’ we now remember: a household name in literary theory and one of the 
most renowned public intellectuals of the last quarter of the twentieth century, known for 
his intellectual charisma, advocacy of justice, relentless criticism and political engagement 
(see Ashcroft, 2007; Marrouchi, 2004; McCarthy, 2013a, p. 8; Veeser, 2010) – an image 
which he in the many moments of self-conscious narration and discursive positioning in 
interviews and writings gave even more authority himself. 
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3.2 Humanism as a Technique of Trouble 
The Six Days War also had a profound, albeit it at first sight less visible impact on Said’s 
more ‘traditional’ literary criticism. In the Winter 1967-1968, he began writing an essay 
on “Beginnings” (1968a) in literature, literary criticism, philosophy and other fields of 
thought. The essay would be revised and extended to become the kernel essay of his 1975 
namesake book, which provides a more historical exploration of the notion of beginnings 
and the functions it had in Western literature and culture from John Milton’s Paradise 
Lost, through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to the present. Not just limited to 
presenting a historical overview, Beginnings is a literary-philosophical inquiry into the 
conditions of possibility for individuals to intervene in literature, literary criticism, and 
the worldly affairs of the socio-political sphere (Hussein, 2002, p. 66). It is a work of ethics 
in which Said reflects on inaugural gestures or beginnings in creative and academic 
writing (if such distinction truly exists). Beginnings builds on Said’s earlier treatment of 
Conrad to devise a theoretical groundwork that opens up or inaugurates, so to speak, a 
theory of praxis or change. It devises a theoretical framework to conceptualize how 
individuals should act ethically in situations that are beyond their full control. Its main 
underlying question is how an author or critic is to approach the sheer existing mass of 
writing and the production of knowledge so as to carve a way for one’s own. What is 
approached as the problem of individuation and authorship in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography, the issue of an individual author taking responsibility for the socio-
political uses to which his or her knowledge is put – that is, does one submit to Conrad’s 
knitting machine or resist it? – is now taken up as the problem of beginnings (Milz, 2005, 
p. 825). Said asks how it is possible to begin again without repeating the same mistakes 
that lead to the historical submission to the ideas and worldviews of the knitting machine 
of Western civilization. The work therefore constitutes a call for the production of 
knowledge that is aware of its historical and cultural limitations, all the while being critical 
about its underlying ideologies but at the same time deeply committed to worldliness and 
change. In line with the Lukácsian conclusion in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography, Beginnings asks: how to produce a counter-hegemonic critical self-
consciousness that paves the way for genuine systemic change? How to change the critical 
consciousness in literary criticism? In short, how to begin anew? 
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A question of this magnitude has no immediate answer to it. In order to be answered, 
it even begs a number of interrelated preliminary questions. “Where, or when, or what is 
a beginning?” (1968a, p. 36; 1975a, p. 29), Said asks at the start of the kernel essay. What 
happens when one begins to write? What does it mean to begin? Is there a privileged point 
of beginning in literary criticism? How does one even identify a beginning? Where should 
one begin to study beginnings? Is a beginning the same as an origin? Is there a certain 
state of mind that accompanies a beginning? Is there a particular method or a logic to a 
beginning? What is the importance of the beginning of a literary work? Is the beginning 
of a particular work its real beginning or is there always something anterior to it? Can 
there be an absolute point of origin, a zero point of beginning in literature and thought? 
Can a beginning be radically discontinuous or is it always continuous with something 
previous? Is every beginning at all possible, permissible and thinkable? Are there perhaps 
certain rules that constrain beginnings? Can there be such thing as an unintentional 
beginning? These are the questions that occupy Said in what he calls his “Meditation on 
Beginnings” (1975a, p. 28). 
Said’s methodology in Beginnings should be afforded closer critical attention than it has 
so far received. Just like the lot that fell to his treatment of Conrad, Said’s meditation on 
beginnings has received very little attention by scholars who are mostly drawn to Said’s 
most famous works, such as Orientalism (1978) and Culture and Imperialism (1993). This 
lack of any serious critical attention is all the more surprising when we take into 
consideration that the publication of Beginnings was a major critical event. The book was 
the very first to win the Lionel Trilling Memorial Award in 1976 and in the Autumn of 
that year a special celebratory issue of Diacritics was dedicated to Beginnings that included 
four review articles (Donato, 1976; Hillis Miller, 1976; Riddel, 1976; White, 1976) as well 
as an interview with Said in which the interviewer praised him to be at the forefront of the 
“critical avant-garde” (1976b, p. 30) in the U.S.. In the handful of works that do discuss 
Beginnings, the book’s argument is rarely approached from Said’s preceding work on 
Conrad but generally in hindsight, from the viewpoint of his more well-known works that 
followed it. Moreover, in those discussions Said’s methodology in Beginnings is also quite 
often passed over too quickly or, again, considered almost exclusively from his more 
poststructuralist-inspired works (Bhatnagar, 1986; Brennan, 1992; Clifford, 1988; 
JanMohamed, 1992; McCarthy, 2010, 2013b; Veeser, 2010). The exception to this is 
Hussein’s Edward Said: Criticism and Society (2002), which is one of the most authoritative 
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and complete examinations of Said’s oeuvre and includes a lengthy two chapters long 
analysis of Beginnings (2002, pp. 53-146). Hussein’s analysis provides a highly nuanced and 
compelling interpretation of Said’s method in Beginnings that really stands out. And 
though it examines Beginnings in relation to Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography 
by which it is able to unveil some crucial tenets of Said’s critical practice that escape most 
other analyses of his works, I still believe that it does not go far enough when it comes to 
grasping the work’s method. To be clear, Hussein is right in arguing how Said’s method 
in Beginnings is highly idiosyncratic as to deliberately resist pigeonholing (2002, p. 85). He 
is also right in stressing how the work is to a great extent a philosophical exercise that 
brings to a high point the critical concerns inaugurated by Said’s treatment of Conrad 
(Hussein, 2002, pp. 63-64). In addition, Hussein’s analysis shows that though Beginnings 
may not be about overtly political topics such as Zionism, Orientalism or imperialism 
which Said often treats in other works, it nevertheless does have a great “interventionary 
potential” (2002, p. 65).  
However – and here we have arrived at my critique of Hussein – his analysis is too 
much focused on explaining Said’s method “at the philosophical level” (2002, p. 15), 
creating the impression that Beginnings is first and foremost a book produced by a trained 
Continental philosopher, rather than the work of an American literary critic with a PhD 
in comparative literature. This impression is all the more strengthened by Hussein’s 
explicit choice to label Beginnings “a philosophical (rather than, say, political) ‘call to arms’” 
(2002, p. 65), a sentence which, to me, also suggests that while Hussein mentions the socio-
political context in which Beginnings is produced, he does not take into account enough 
the worldliness of Beginnings and how it should be read as a political allegory in the post-
1967 period. In response to Hussein’s analysis, I would like to stress how Beginnings should 
in the first place be read as a work of literary criticism that aims to develop a highly 
politicized method of reading that is deeply committed to worldliness and change. The 
methodological point of departure of Beginnings is Said’s preceding treatment of Conrad; 
its goal is to open up a discursive space that allows the production of Orientalism in the 
first place, and Said’s other writings in the long term (see also Bhatnagar, 1986; Brennan, 
1992; Hussein, 2002).  
My reading of Beginnings is that it constitutes a theoretical attempt to open up a 
discursive space that allows for individuals to play initiating roles in the field of thought 
that is literary criticism. Similar to Hussein, I give Beginnings considerable critical 
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attention because it is truly pivotal point in Said’s literary critical career that is continuous 
with his earlier work but at the same time revises some of his earlier conclusions and 
models to begin anew. In Beginnings Said creates his own authority and right to speak as 
an individual literary critic in order to facility or make possible the Olympian task of 
constructing counter-hegemonic knowledge, an intellectual project which he set out in 
such works as “The Arab Portrayed” and that came to its first high point in Orientalism. 
Beginnings produces itself the conditions of possibility for Said’s own work by elaborating 
on the theoretical plane already opened up by Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. 
Beginnings should therefore also be grasped from the literary critical perspective that 
informs Said’s revised doctoral dissertation, which I have outlined at length in the 
preceding chapters: the creative merge of a humanist Anglo-American New Criticism with 
an equally humanist European existential phenomenology. In Said’s meditation on 
beginnings, this blend of theories is combined with new theoretical intertexts from, 
amongst others, Erich Auerbach and Michel Foucault. This eclectic combination – a 
trademark of Said’s – makes his method in Beginnings a hard to grasp product of a number 
of balancing acts of theories from differing schools of thought, as diverse as the Anglo-
American New Criticism, European existential phenomenology, Romance philology and 
French poststructuralism. As eclectic and chaotic this theoretical mix might be, there is 
however a key to understanding this method, which lies in Said’s peculiar choice for the 
term “meditation” to describe it. As I go on to argue in the following pages that Said’s 
choice of method is as deliberate as is his choice for the essay as the preferred genre to 
carry out this meditation, it will become clear how both are well-thought metacritical 
choices that are to a great extent connected to his politicization in the aftermath of the Six 
Days War, making Beginnings one of Said’s most politicized works of literary criticism. 
Beginnings should be read as a political allegory; its method of criticism as a form of 
cultural politics (see White, 1976). It is the literary critical response to the state of 
paralysis and inactivity in the minds of Palestinians and Arabs worldwide caused by the 
crushing Arab defeat in June 1967 and the traumatic events in the aftermath of the war. It 
responds to that socio-political situation by calling to action, in that its method of 
meditation is a self-consciously empowering approach to literary criticism that allows for 
more individual creativity, freedom and agency on the part of the critic. To clarify my 
argument, it is important to note that, to begin with, the notion of meditation loosens the 
necessity of methodological rigor that more commonly used terms like ‘study’, ‘analysis’ 
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or ‘examination’ imply (see Riddel, 1976, p. 14). Though the method, just like any other 
method of criticism, has of course its downside and blind spots, the benefit or insight of 
applying a meditative structure to his work is that it allows Said to establish a synthesis 
of differing inaugural passages or reflections on beginnings from literature, literary 
criticism, philosophy and other fields of thought, written at different times, in different 
places and by different authors; discuss the underlying conceptualizations of beginnings 
in Western intellectual culture; and then proceed to conceptualize a revised model for 
literary criticism himself that is decidedly more political than the approach to criticism of 
consciousness used in his revised doctoral dissertation. A look at Beginnings unravels how 
not just the kernel essay (Said, 1968a) but nearly all of its chapters were published earlier 
as stand-alone essays: an essay on Conrad’s Nostromo (Said, 1965), one on the humanism 
of Giambattista Vico (1967b), another on the problems of beginning in the novel (Said, 
1970b), a book chapter on two crucial concepts ‘molestation’ and ‘authority’ in narrative 
fiction (Said, 1971b), a synthesizing view of structuralism (Said, 1971a) and two essays 
dedicated to the work of Foucault (Said, 1972, 1974). Apart from unraveling Said’s clear 
preference for writing essays and collecting them in his major publications, it also shows 
how meditation as a method is inextricably connected to the essay as genre and practice 
of writing, which is as mobile and as heterogeneous a style of exposition that resists the 
rigidity and clear distinctions that characterize the professional research article. 
In Said’s style of exposition, it is not hard to see the formative influence of Blackmur 
whose love for the essay and disdain for the professionalized article to express critical 
thought inspired Said (Sprinker, 1992). Hussein is therefore right to construe Said’s choice 
for the meditative essay in Beginnings to Blackmur’s critical endeavors (2002, p. 66). His 
original observation is that Said’s intellectual project is rooted on the metacritical level in 
a dialectical and philological model of what Said himself, borrowing a metaphor from 
Blackmur, frequently calls “a technique of trouble” (Hussein, 2002, p. 4; Said, 1975a, p. 
283; 2004a, p. 77). This method is an open-ended and dramatic (in the prewar New Critical 
sense) technique of criticism that deliberately seeks out the complexity and seeming 
inconsistencies of literary subjects in order to subvert, complicate or resist contested 
knowledge (Hussein, 2002, p. 4). Rather than offering answers, the method raises even 
more questions as it constantly rethinks and revises its results, suspending certainties. 
Hence, Beginnings is marked by the interrogatory style which I have tried to evoke by 
reproducing its preliminary questions at the start of this discussion. Since Hussein 
 207 
established the presence of this Blackmurrian intertext in Said’s method of criticism, it has 
been picked up and reiterated quite a few times (Abraham, 2014; Rubin, 2003). In an 
excellent article, Andrew Rubin connects it to Said’s “intellectual dexterity that constantly 
works through the internal tensions, irreconcilabilities, and discontinuities of the literary 
subjects he examines” (2003, p. 871), a spirit that permeates all the way though to Said’s 
posthumously published works. I would like to add that Said’s methodological affiliation 
with Blackmur’s humanist approach to formalism in Beginnings has another, major critical 
importance that ties in with the empowerment that is one of the goals of Said’s method in 
the socio-political sphere. As Hussein has stressed, Said’s model of criticism in Beginnings 
affords considerable strength and conceptual focus to individual human agency (2002, p. 
15). In this way, at the metacritical level already, Beginnings calls individuals to action by 
creating the very conditions of possibility to do so.  
In the metacritical presence of Blackmur, Beginnings shows itself to be continuous to 
the theoretical line established in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. But 
according to Hussein, Beginnings also marks an important discontinuity with Said’s revised 
doctoral dissertation in that it supposedly drops Schopenhauer’s will philosophy and 
existential phenomenology altogether, both vital to the argument in Joseph Conrad and the 
Fiction of Autobiography (2002, pp. 66-67).63 I do not agree with Hussein and wish to 
emphasize that Said’s method of reading in Beginnings is still to a great extent connected 
to both kind of intertexts. Let me begin with the latter intertext, existential 
phenomenology. The most obvious sign of its continued importance is also to be found in 
Said’s choice of the meditative essay as his preferred approach to literary criticism. In my 
reading of it, Said’s preference of the essay is not just a willful affiliation with the work of 
Blackmur, but also with that of Merleau-Ponty, whose style of exposition Said emulates. 
“For,” as he writes in 1967 about the French existential phenomenologist in words that 
are equally applicable to his own intellectual career, “he disdains point-by-point logic, 
preferring instead to explore his theme laterally and obliquely, in a manner strikingly 
reminiscent of R.P. Blackmur’s” (Said, 1967a, p. 60). Indeed, the essay’s composition 
consists of a series of heterogeneous ideas that can be circled and approached obliquely in 
a single text without a fixed center. Meditation as method and the essay as genre allow 
                                               
63 To be clear, Hussein does mention the influence of phenomenology in general on Said’s method, just not its 
existentialist worldly variant. According to him, the phenomenological idea of ‘intentionality’ connected to the 
works of Husserl still makes up the spine of Said’s work on beginnings (2002, pp. 98, 128). 
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Said to move from one idea to another organically, to sweep his readers of their feet, 
thereby performing the very displacement of writing that is one of the central themes in 
Beginnings (see Marrouchi, 1991, p. 73; Said, 1975a, p. 22). Yet there are two sides to the 
coin, and the benefit of Said’s method is at the same time its downside. The least which we 
could say about the meditative structure of Beginnings is that it turns the book into a work 
that is hard to fathom. It is a difficult, at times unfocused and disorganized work of 
criticism, seemingly structureless, improvisational, self-contradictory and without much 
methodological rigor – but certainly not without method – that circles around its topic and 
waits for the right moment to tackle it in a style of creative repetition, through hit-and-
run tactics rather than in a frontal assault (see Marrouchi, 2004, p. 43; Veeser, 2010, pp. 
111-112). The result, according to Jonathan Culler, is that though Said “repeatedly 
rambles into confusion, he is always able to surprise with a striking comment, to provoke 
thought with an interesting quotation” (1978, p. 582). 
And so Said frequently sweeps his readers off their feet by offering them more than once 
a confusingly innumerous list of illustrations from a wide and impressive range of 
writings. In the course of half a page, for instance, he provides a discussion of Nietzsche 
on Homer connected to Oscar Wilde on the aesthetic, Freud on Moses, back to Nietzsche 
on Dionysus and Zarathustra, to Marxism on ideology and class, Lucien Goldman on the 
potential consciousness, and then back to Freud’s Moses and the Hexateuch, only to end 
this dizzying enumeration by falsely apologizing: “I do not wish this list of illustrations . . 
. to stand for a rigorous methodological critique: that is not what I am doing. I am really 
circling around a very acute problem faced by any researcher whose primary evidence is 
textual” (Said, 1975a, p. 58). Yet this is precisely what he is doing: enumerating and 
circling around textual evidence that after some time begins to gather density and scope, 
begins to acquire a sheer mass and cultural presence that it comes to present itself to Said 
and his readers as an increasingly acute problem that begs for a critical treatment. After 
this circling motion, he moves in to strike with a large synthesizing comment that puts 
the problem he is treating in questions imploring for answers in the following way: 
To what extent is a text itself not something passively attributable, as effect is to 
cause, to a person? To what extent is a text so discontinuous a series of subtexts or 
pre-texts or paratexts or surtexts as to beggar the idea of an author as simple 
producer? If the text as unitary document is more properly judged as a 
transindividual field of dispersion, and if – as Darwin, Marx and Freud respectively 
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read natural history, economic history, and psychological history as textual fields of 
dispersion – this field stands as the locus princeps of research, where does it begin if 
not in a ‘creative’ or ‘producing’ individuality? (Said, 1975a, p. 58) 
In this crucial passage and in the following sentences he defends the power of the 
individual by arguing that between a text and its individual author there is “a beginning 
connection” (1975a, p. 59). To be clear, one should not understand Said to be speaking in 
a naïvely old-fashioned humanist tone, postulating a critical position that defends the 
primacy of the authorial intention in interpreting literature understood in terms of what 
the New Critics attacked as the ‘intentional fallacy’. Rather, his words are those of a critical 
humanist schooled in a wide range of contemporary literary theory who presents the core 
idea of his work that to begin understanding a text, “is to begin to find intention and method 
in it – not, in other words, to reduce a text to a continuous stream of words emanating 
from a disembodied causal voice, but rather to construct the field of its play, its dispersion, 
its distortion” (Said, 1975a, p. 59). As we will see, the author is important in Said’s model 
but his or her importance does not lie in being some contingent and passive antecedence 
to the text but in his or her power to actively initiate the discursive act of writing, by 
providing the text with an intention and method which the critic has to reconstruct.  
I have already said too much (or perhaps still too little) about this passage. I will soon 
return to the stance on authorship and writing that it expresses, as well as explain the 
concepts of ‘intention’ and ‘method’. For now, I have singled out this passage and the 
preceding list to point out Said’s highly idiosyncratic style of exposition and the 
methodological purposes it serves. In fact, I would like to call Said’s meditative approach 
to literary criticism a guerilla style of criticism that deliberately does not follow a 
preexisting prescribed model of explanation and exposition but approaches its topic in an 
oblique and idiosyncratic way to strike wherever possible and to produce large 
synthesizing remarks when the opportunity arises. In this way, because it is unsystematic, 
hardly delineated and often ends in the aporia that is characteristic of existential 
phenomenology, Said’s method avoids succumbing to what, as we recall, he calls the 
‘imperialism of criticism’ (see 2000g, p. 16). Though critics like Hussein exclusively link 
this intellectual spirit to the work of Blackmur (2002, p. 55), my position is that Said also 
invokes the creative energies of the existential phenomenological thinkers upon which he 
builds his argument in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography.  
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What every critic of Beginnings overlooks, is that Said’s meditative method in that work 
is connected to his earlier remarks on perception, language and truth indebted to the work 
of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre (and Nietzsche). Said’s choice of applying a meditative 
structure to Beginnings precisely effects its readers to adopt, at the metacritical level, his 
view on critical thinking and perform the cycle of criticism outlined in his treatment of 
Conrad, as the method of Beginnings provokes them to pause, reflect, rethink, and 
constantly begin anew. Said’s method therefore explicitly raises question upon question 
and seeks out the heart of Conrad’s proverbial darkness and chaos instead of the false light 
and order. In this way, Said’s method is thus effected at the subversion and complication 
of dogmatic modes of thought and merges more clearly than Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography, the creative energies of existential phenomenology with a humanist New 
Criticism in attempt to change the critical consciousness in literary studies. It builds on 
the theoretical space opened up by Said’s treatment of Conrad and more forcefully 
promotes a mode of undoctrinated thinking that transcends stifling intellectual categories 
and breaks down universal ideas, theoretical orthodoxies, false stabilities, and what 
Blackmur calls “intolerable dogma” (1954a, p. 373). This, I believe, begins to capture more 
fully Said’s humanism as a technique of trouble. 
But there is more to it. The other major continuity that Hussein overlooks between 
Said’s treatment of Conrad and his work on beginnings, is the continued, albeit implicit, 
importance of Schopenhauer and his philosophy of will that finds fertile ground in the 
work’s continued existential phenomenological undertone. As I have briefly hinted at in 
the start of my discussion of Beginnings, the thematic of individuation and authorship in 
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, connected to the work’s critical engagement 
with the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is translated and adapted to become 
the central ethical theme of authorial responsibility in Beginnings. From my analysis of 
Said’s criticism of Conrad’s consciousness it became clear how Said considers Conrad in 
his process of self-assertion or individuation to be deeply inspired by the philosophical 
work of Schopenhauer (see Said, 1966, pp. 102-103). His analysis of the process unveils 
how, for him, Conrad is an author who represents the idea of human activity and 
intellectual responsibility in the face of paralyzing and oppressing systems of thought like 
imperialism.  
As we recall, the process of self-assertion designates the balancing act between a 
paralyzing surrender to chaos or an equally paralyzing surrender to egoistic order (Said, 
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1966, p. 13). This idea is extended in Beginnings, reworked and taken up as the problem of 
beginning in literature, literary criticism and thought. One way in which this becomes 
clear, is that Said in the opening pages to the work foregrounds the category of authorial 
intention in literary criticism, stressing that it should not only be applied to talk about 
harmony, equilibrium and consciously intended meanings in a work of literature but also 
to talk about its discord, conflict, inconsistencies and non-meanings. ‘Intention’, he argues, 
is anterior to the work and “includes everything that develops out of it, no matter how 
eccentric the development or inconsistent the result” (Said, 1975a, p. 12). In 
phenomenological terms, intention is a reflexive act of consciousness that provides the 
work with a beginning which makes possible a certain inner continuity or the work’s field 
of play, but – and this is crucial – it cannot delineate the work’s entire field of play, its 
dispersion and its distortion (Said, 1975a, pp. 47-48). In a clear reference to Paul de Man’s 
reading of Derrida (1971d, p. 106), Said uses intention to designate the interplay between 
a work’s blindness and insight, between what it says and what it leaves out (1975a, p. 13). 
The implication here is that the intention in a work (of literature or literary criticism) 
makes possible that work’s greatest insights, by providing that work with a certain 
direction in which it moves or what Said calls a ‘method’. Hence the overall argument of 
Beginnings, which is perfectly captured by its subtitle, that every beginning, every human 
undertaking in literature and in its criticism already implies both an “intention and 
method”. Now, by raking up Nietzsche’s famous words on truth as a mobile army of 
metaphors (see 1975a, p. 39) – Said cites the same passage in Beginnings as in the essay on 
“Conrad and Nietzsche” (1976a) – his implication is that individual authors and critics are 
responsible for what they produce, even when they irreflectively reproduce the dominant 
images and ‘truths’ of their time. Moreover, even though they cannot oversee all the socio-
political uses to which their writing is put or will be put in a certain culture at a certain 
time, by being the proximate initiating force of the discursive act of writing and providing 
the work with an intention and method, individuals are intellectually responsible and 
accountable for the effects of their writings. This stance on authorship is also the 
underlying stance of authorship in Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism. It sets the 
continued ‘Conradian’ tone of Beginnings and those other works: there is no place for 
individuals to escape their intellectual burden of responsibility, hide behind deterministic 
claims and act in bad faith. 
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3.3 A Philology of the World 
My discussion has so far indicated how Beginnings should be read as a continued 
elaboration of some of the kernel concerns of Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. 
Moreover, it shows that though Beginnings is formally a work about reflections on 
beginnings and inaugural passages in literature and contemporary literary theory, it is the 
work of a humanist literary critic who is essentially concerned with human agency and 
will (see Culler, 1978; White, 1976). Indeed, from Said’s elaborated mediation on 
beginnings, it is hard to refrain from considering the activity of beginning as a human 
activity that can be so daunting and overwhelming to the mind confronted with it that 
that mind might easily fold back upon itself into a state of paralysis and passive inactivity 
– a lasting concern of Said’s that becomes clear in the questions occupying him throughout 
his work. In the third chapter on “The Novel as Beginning Intention” (Said, 1975a, pp. 79-
188), he seems to ask: how does one as a novelist approach the seemingly infinite amount 
of novels written before so as to write something new? How does an author locate him- or 
herself vis-à-vis a literary tradition? The fourth chapter on “Beginning with a Text” (Said, 
1975a, pp. 189-276) asks precisely what its title suggest: how does one as a literary critic 
‘begin with a text’? Where does one start analyzing a complex phenomenon that is a 
literary text? What does one select as the privileged point of departure for a literary 
critical analysis? The fifth and most densely theoretical chapter “Abecedarium Culturae: 
Absence, Writing, Statement, Discourse, Archeology, Structuralism” (Said, 1975a, pp. 
277-343) offers some in depth discussions of the works of contemporary structuralist and 
poststructuralist such as Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Louis 
Althusser and, most notably, Michel Foucault, whose attempts to come to terms with 
language, writing, and thought have stressed the arbitrariness and instability of seemingly 
stable categories like ‘structure’ and the ‘human subject’. If there is anything that can 
group the various, diverse and not wholly unproblematic attempts of these French 
speaking philosophers, it is that all of them, in their own distinct ways, have professed a 
view of Man that deprives the individual subject of “the power wholly to appear as mover, 
founder, or origin of a field of knowledge” (Said, 1975a, p. 52) by locating that power in 
abstract and deterministic antihumanist categories like ‘class’, ‘system’, ‘language’, 
‘history’ and ‘discourse’, to name but a few. What Said makes clear in that chapter, is that 
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the emerging structuralist and poststructuralist theories of reading precisely rob 
individual authors and critics of their intellectual responsibility and the power to begin. 
This makes clear how Said’s meditation on beginnings should not only be read as a 
highly acute and timely intervention in the socio-political sphere but also in the domain of 
literary criticism. And so as much as Beginnings is a response to the events of the Six Days 
War of June 1967 and its aftermath in the socio-political sphere, it is also the product of 
the famed Johns Hopkins conference of October 1966 and the institutional situation in the 
American academy of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the kernel essay, Said sums up the 
poignant situation in literary criticism to which his work responds, while at the same time 
offering an excellent definition of the problem that concerns him:  
If a field of knowledge comprises a wide-ranging array of ‘events’ governed by 
impersonal rules; if this field cannot be rationally understood in terms of the genetic 
concepts formerly exemplified by heroes, founding fathers, continuous temporal 
narratives, and divine ordinance . . . then what power is left to the individual freely 
to act, to intervene, to motivate, when he wishes to effect a rational beginning for a 
course or project in that field? (Said, 1975a, p. 52) 
Said’s answer to that question is the concept of ‘beginning’, which expresses the power for 
the individual to initiate or begin the intentional activity of creating new meaning and 
non-meaning, the activation of a creative human energy to assert one’s self in a moment 
of will. Said’s answer to his immediate intellectual milieu and the emergence of 
antihumanist theories of reading is humanism as a technique of trouble. 
 These remarks bring us to my last but most substantial point of criticism of 
Hussein’s account of Beginnings, which pertains to considering Said’s work as an 
intervention in the specific field of literary criticism. For, even though Hussein’s account is 
in many other ways excellent and sets a benchmark in the study of Said’s work that in 
scope supersedes the works of Timothy Brennan, Aamir Mufti and Bruce Robbins, one by 
one highly nuanced and original interventions to advance our understanding of Said’s 
works, it overlooks the fact that Said produced Beginnings as a work of literary criticism 
and not, say, as a work of philosophy. The reason for this, I believe, is that Hussein 
nowhere acknowledges the formative influence of Erich Auerbach on Said’s methodology 
and his subsequent attempts to conceptualize a politicized model of reading literary texts 
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in particular.64 This is all the more surprising for in the kernel essay of Beginnings, “A 
Meditation on Beginnings”, which Said began writing in the Winter 1967-1968, Auerbach 
features prominently and a trained eye might easily unveil how Said self-consciously 
affiliates himself with the Romance philologist. The argument which I would like to 
present is that Said finds part of his answer to the emergence of poststructuralism and its 
antihumanist critique of textuality not just in the abstract philosophical works which 
Hussein mentions throughout his analysis but in the concrete readings produced by 
Auerbach. After all, it can be no coincidence that Said in his kernel essay uses the plural 
“meditations” (1968a, p. 46; 1975a, p. 68) to describe Auerbach’s synthesizing method in 
Mimesis: dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur (1946).65 This choice of 
word, at least in name, links the method of Beginnings to that of Mimesis, a monumental 
work of humanist literary scholarship written by Auerbach in exile in Istanbul between 
1942 and 1945. Mimesis, as its subtitle suggests, presents a theory of representation that 
spans the history of Western literature from the Homeric poems down to the modernist 
novels of Virginia Woolf and Marcel Proust. And though such a theory might at first sight 
seem to be so far removed from the reality of the post-1967 context of Beginnings, it is 
equally the product of the traumatic experience of displacement and a political response to 
inhumane practices carried out against minority groups (Rubin, 2003, p. 867). In fact, from 
Said’s remarks in Beginnings and those in the introduction which he wrote for the fiftieth 
anniversary edition of Auerbach’s magnum opus, it becomes clear how he reads Mimesis 
essentially as a political allegory to transcend structures of domination and coercion as 
well as a bulwark of humanism in antihumanist times (Said, 2003). The philology of 
Auerbach would inspire him to reconceptualize his own method of literary criticism and 
elaborate in Beginnings some of the theoretical underpinnings of his more overtly political 
Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism. And so though Beginnings does not explicitly deal 
with politics in the explicit way that “The Arab Portrayed” does, it led a reviewer of 
                                               
64  Brennan, Mufti and Robbins have precisely examined the importance of Erich Auerbach’s philological 
approach to comparative literature on Said’s critical practice from Beginnings to the end of his career. In this 
respect, the work of Timothy Brennan (1992, 2004, 2006, 2013) by far provides the most complete account. To 
determine the particular importance of Auerbach’s philology of Weltliteratur on Said, see also Robbins’s Secular 
Vocations: Intellectualism, Professionalism, Culture (1993), as well as the essays of Mufti (1998) and Ned Curthoys 
(2007). Finally, for a reconsideration of Auerbach’s influence on Said in favor of Leo Spitzer’s, see Emily Apter’s 
Translation Zone (2006). 
65 Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (2003). The edition I will refer to is the fiftieth 
anniversary edition of the English translation, to which Said himself wrote the introduction. 
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Beginnings in the special issue of Diacritics dedicated to it to conclude that Said was one of 
the most politically engaged literary critics of his generation (White, 1976, p. 8). 
To understand what makes Beginnings a politically engaged work of literary criticism 
is to link it to Mimesis, a work that, apart from its originating contexts, paradoxically 
appears to be as apolitical and unworldly as they come. ‘Paradoxically’, indeed, because 
Mimesis is a work of literary criticism that unlike any other shows how literature and its 
criticism are two equally down-to-earth practices, two historical enterprises located in a 
particular time and place, written by a particular person (see Auerbach, 2003, pp. 573-574). 
The answer to what makes Auerbach’s theory of the representation of reality in Western 
literature so political, lies in the work’s method which is based on the concept of 
Ansatzpunkt, Auerbach’s very own conceptualization of beginnings (Mufti, 1998, p. 105). 
More than the exilic circumstances of Auerbach’s writing in Istanbul, who sought refuge 
there from the Nazis, (Said, 1983c),66 the formative influence of Auerbach on Said’s model 
of criticism comes down to that concept of Ansatzpunkt or point of departure for literary 
criticism that features prominently in Said’s meditation on beginnings (1975a, pp. 68-75). 
Said was well acquainted with Auerbach’s Ansatzpunkt, because shortly after the June war 
of 1967, while in the process of writing the first version of the kernel essay of Beginnings, 
he co-translated Auerbach’s “Philologie der Weltliteratur” (1952) into English (1969). 
That essay is a key essay of Auerbach’s, in which he provides a retrospective analysis of 
his own historical synthesizing view of Western literature in Mimesis written a decade 
earlier that famously has no methodological foreword or introduction and includes only a 
short perfunctory epilogue that intentionally fails to explain his method fully (2003, pp. 
554-557).67 In “Philology and Welliteratur”, he at first rejects the possibility of establishing 
                                               
66 The specific originating context of Auerbach’s writing in Istanbul has been a focus of Emily Apter’s “Global 
Translatio: The ‘Invention’ of Comparative Literature, Istanbul, 1933” (2003) and Kader Konuk’s East West 
Mimesis: Auerbach in Turkey (2010). Contrast their work to Abdul JanMohamed’s, who argues that Mimesis “could 
have been written in any other part of the non-Occidental world without significant difference” (JanMohamed, 
1992, pp. 98-99). 
67 According to Alex Woloch, this lack of metacritical reflection has led many critics in the so-called Golden Age 
of Theory of the 1980s 1990s to undervalue the theory and method of Mimesis (2014). He singles out the writings 
of prominent critics of that period such as Stephen Greenblatt, Frederic Jameson, and Said, who have all at one 
moment in their careers expressed their admiration for Mimesis but, in his view, have all at the same time misread 
that work as if it were to have no theoretical method. The result of such undertheorizing, he writes, is that 
Mimesis has become “particularly invisible . . . in terms of method; as a book that we might not simply admire . . . 
but analyse, situate and incorporate into the work that we do” (Woloch, 2014, p. 113). In his article, Woloch goes 
on to analyze the method of Mimesis. While I do not wish to comment on Greenblatt or Jameson, my reading of 
the Auerbachian method in Beginnings should serve as a counterpoint to Woloch’s critical intervention, as it 
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such kind of synthesis merely by the encyclopedic collecting or fact gathering of literary 
texts; literary production is simply too copious, too diverse and too vast to be taken in 
directly (Auerbach, 1969, p. 12). Instead, it must be taken in indirectly or obliquely, if you 
will, through what he calls an Ansatzpunkt, a specific point of departure within the form 
and language of the literary work studied, a beginning that can serve as a guiding handle 
by which the whole work can be seized (Auerbach, 1969, pp. 12-13; Said, 1975a, p. 77). 
The Ansatzpunkt thus serves as a carefully selected entry point for the critic’s perceptual 
need to enter into the unified whole or Gestalt that is the literary work. The 
conceptualization of the Ansatzpunkt as oblique way into the literary fabric illustrates how, 
for Said at least, Auerbach’s method can be considered to be a conceptual counterpart to 
Blackmur’s and Merleau-Ponty’s oblique approach to literary criticism. 
Let us examine Auerbach’s Ansatzpunkt and the political consequences for literary 
criticism more in detail. “The point of departure”, he writes, “must be the election of a 
firmly circumscribed, easily comprehensible set of phenomena whose interpretation is a 
radiation out from them and which orders and interprets a greater region than they 
themselves occupy” (Auerbach, 1969, p. 14). A good Ansatzphänomen, as Auerbach calls it, 
is a concrete and precise (rather than an abstract and generalizing) textual detail such as 
“semantic interpretations, rhetorical tropes, a syntactic sequence, the interpretation of one 
sentence, or a set of remarks made at a given time and in a given place” (1969, p. 14). A 
word like figura, for example, at first sight appears to be a single, insignificant term in the 
verbal reality of the literary work, a mere recurrence among other terms in many Latin 
texts from late antiquity to the Christian Middle Ages (Auerbach, 2003, pp. 72-76; see also 
Auerbach, 2014a). However, in the temporal act of criticism, it becomes clear how that 
particular word figura, unlike any other word from that particular period, is an important 
recurrent term that has a certain semantic thickness about it, how it is a term that “is fully 
embedded in the historical period . . . and will thereby link itself to the regulating inner 
movement of the period being studied” (Said, 1975a, p. 68). In Auerbach’s compelling 
reading, figura is a unique word that expresses the conception of reality in late antiquity 
and the Christian Middle Ages (2003, p. 555).  
According to Said, we should grasp Auerbach’s treatment of figura as a clear example 
of how an “Ansatzpunkt turns into a problem that asks the reason for its persistence. Nihil 
                                               
shows that Said does not undertheorize Mimesis but precisely analyzes, situates and incorporates its method into 
his own work. 
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est sine ratione. And persistence will give the critic the opportunity to view a literature, or 
a so-called period, as information amenable to study, as information in need of 
interrogation” (1975a, p. 69). Without us realizing, we have already seen an emulation of 
Auerbach’s method in Beginnings. By enumerating and offering a myriad of examples of 
beginnings and inaugural passages, Said circles around his material until what he calls “an 
acute problem” seemingly presents itself to him begging for questions and a synthesizing 
treatment. What Said says about Auerbach, could mutatis mutandis equally said about him: 
“he therefore does not take time to explain his ideas methodologically but lets them emerge 
from the very history of the representation of reality as it begins to gather density and 
scope” (2003, p. xxii). By selecting this persistent problem – Said’s beginning, Auerbach’s 
figura – as a particular point of departure for their research, both critics are posing 
questions to the material under scrutiny and are actively involved in a dialogue with the 
text, its author and the historical period to which it belongs. The Ansatzpunkt thus emerges 
as a privileged entry point into the fabric of history, as a verbal unit that has the unique 
explanatory power of synthesis (Said, 1975a, p. 69).  
The synthesizing power of an Ansatzpunkt in the hands of a prolific critic like Auerbach 
becomes ever so clear in the first chapter of Mimesis – which is perhaps also the book’s 
most read chapter (2003, pp. 3-23). The chapter opens with a close reading of the scene of 
Odysseus’s homecoming in Ithaca described in book 19 of the Odyssey, in which Odysseus 
enters his palace disguised as a beggar so as not to be recognized by his wife Penelope 
whose faithfulness after nearly two decades of absence Odysseus wants to test. When his 
housekeeper and old nurse Euryclea kneels to wash his feet, she recognizes Odysseus by 
the scar on his thigh, at which she drops the washing basin in amazement and is about to 
cry out were it not for Odysseus who manages to restrain her with hushed threats. 
Penelope, distracted by the foresight of the goddess Athena, has observed nothing 
(Auerbach, 2003, p. 3). Surprisingly for a modern reader like Auerbach, at this tense 
moment of recognition and crisis the story is suspended and a lengthy description of well 
over a hundred verses of the origin of the scar follows before the epic poem returns in a 
rather leisurely fashion to the pivotal scene in the palace, completely undoing the tension 
(2003, pp. 4-7). From a purely aesthetic point of view this raises questions. And so in search 
of answers, Auerbach’s close reading of the Homeric scene leads him to discuss the 
elaborate and detailed style of clarification in the epic poem and the accompanying 
worldview that this Homeric device of elaboration expresses. To illustrate the historical 
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embeddedness and what he considers to be the ingenuity of the Odyssey, Auerbach then 
proceeds to compare its style and worldview to those of the Old Testament, which 
describes equally epic events. However, it does so in a remarkably contrasted style of 
realism that antithetically to the Homeric poems omits many details and lengthy 
descriptions that are irrelevant for the events of the story so as not to distract from the 
events themselves (Auerbach, 2003, pp. 7-11). From this comparison, Auerbach establishes 
that there are two styles of realism at play in these texts: the elevated style of Homer 
appropriate to the sublime events of human experience, and the low style of the Vulgate 
suited for the contingency of human existence (Ankersmitt, 1999, p. 58).  
The underlying rationale of Auerbach’s treatment of the Odyssey and The Old 
Testament is simple yet crucial: “What is essential to Auerbach’s meditations is the critic’s 
willingness to begin with the proper instrument of discovery, forged from the language of 
the period being studied” (Said, 1975a, p. 68). And so the professionally trained Romance 
philologist Auerbach provides as much as possible close readings of excerpts in the 
original language of the text – Latin, Occitan, French, Italian, Spanish, and English – to 
be as deeply immersed in the language of the work so as to find an Ansatzphänomen that 
has a strong enough centrifugal radiation about it so that with interpreting the 
phenomenon, he at the same time gets access to the whole literary work and to the world. 
This makes Mimesis a work of criticism that is concerned with form and totality, a concern 
that it shares with the Marxist literary criticism of Georg Lukács (Prendergast, 1988, p. 
25). For, as Auerbach makes clear, in dealing with a concrete Ansatzpunkt, the critic deals 
not only with literature but with literature’s connection to world history (Weltgeschichte) 
(1969, pp. 14-15). The close readings which Auerbach produces in Mimesis are therefore 
symptomatic readings that treat a particular isolated literary form in relation to the 
totality that is the concrete socio-historical reality within which the form is embedded, the 
effect of which is that the seemingly isolated knowledge of a particular passage is given 
the explanatory, synthesizing force of being knowledge that pertains to reality (see Lukács, 
1968, p. 8). At first sight this seems to be a rather naïve and simplistic view of knowledge 
in which the role of thought in reconstructing the literary text and the past seems to be 
squared with reality. But Auerbach shares with Lukács a similar conceptualization of 
knowledge that rejects the simplistic idea expressed in the Marxist reflection theory, that 
a literary text unambiguously reflects the totality within which it is produced, and hence 
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that the knowledge of a particular text is by definition the knowledge of a reality (see 
Lukács, 1968, pp. xvii-xxv).  
Rather, the overall methodological point of Auerbach’s humanism, which is derived 
from the philology of Giambattista Vico,68 is that human history and literary texts must 
be re-examined from the point of view of the maker (Said, 2003, pp. xii-xiii). And so, 
Auerbach provides readings of Homer and Dante, to name the most exemplary and well-
known, in which he tries to relive their authors’ lived experiences so as to advance his 
understanding of the texts and the worldview of these texts, all the while being very well 
aware that the shortcoming of his humanist kind of knowledge – and, for that matter, all 
human knowledge – is that “the line between actual events and the modifications of one’s 
own reflective mind is blurred” (Said, 2003, p. xiii). Mimesis is a work of humanist 
scholarship that is fully aware that the readings which it presents are not readings of 
reality but, as the phrase in the subtitle of the work suggests, “the representation of reality”. 
It shows how each culture – Homer’s, Dante’s, Proust’s, Woolf’s – at any given moment 
in time and place has its own system for seeing and then articulating reality (Said, 2003, p. 
xiii). 
Here we have arrived at the core humanist ideas which draw Said so much to the work 
of Auerbach: that literature is a complex manmade reality which expresses the dominant 
images, ideas and viewpoints for articulating reality. Hence, in literature we can discern 
how human consciousness lives its world and comes to term with reality; not reality in 
itself but those perceptual fictions which a human consciousness feels and judges to be 
reality. For, Auerbach’s main theoretical argument, excellently exemplified by his 
discussion of the Odyssey and the Vulgate, is that questions of style are not merely aesthetic 
concerns but very much related to questions of social and historical processes, of 
worldview and human consciousness. The underlying hypothesis of Mimesis is that art 
expresses the lived experience of a particular historical period (Porter, 2014, p. xliv). By 
taking Odysseus’s scar as starting point for his interpretation of Homer’s world, Auerbach 
                                               
68 The philosophical endeavors of Vico are absolutely central to Auerbach’s work as critic and philologist. In 
1924, Auerbach translated Vico’s Scienza Nuova in German (Vico, 1924) and provided an important introduction 
(Auerbach, 1924). In the years thereafter, he wrote relentlessly on Vico. Apart from the innumerous mentions 
and references to the Neapolitan philosopher throughout works as Mimesis (1946) and Dante als Dichter der 
irdischen Welt (1929), he dedicated many essays and articles to Vico’s philology (Auerbach, 1949, 1958, 2014b, 
2014c, 2014d, 2014e). For examinations that discuss the link between Auerbach and Vico, see (Bahti, 1981; 
Bremmer, 1999; Breslin, 1961; Meuer, 2007; Wellek, 1978a). For the conceptual links between Said and Vico see 
especially the work of Brennan (1992, 2005, 2014). 
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illustrates how in his method an Ansatzpunkt is always more than just a gateway to 
studying the particular literary work from which it is derived. As James Porter writes in 
the introduction to Auerbach’s collected essays, the study of literature (under the rubric 
of a concrete scene or a salient detail) functions as the starting point or beginning to chart, 
grasp and explain the evolution of human consciousness embedded in the world (2014, pp. 
xiii-xiv). Said fully shares that view of literature. As we have seen in his treatment of 
Conrad, the concrete style, metaphors and images (or what Said labels Conrad’s ‘idiom’) 
which he uses in his texts serves as the point of departure for Said to understand the 
author’s lived experience and authorial consciousness. The Ansatzpunkt is a 
methodological concept that serves as a concrete “gateway to forms of thought, feeling, 
and expression” (Porter, 2014, p. xiii). It turns the seemingly apolitical discipline of 
philology into a highly politicized mode of reading that is deeply committed to 
worldliness. And though philology quite literally means ‘a love for words’, we should, 
according to Porter’s, consider Auerbach’s philology “not of the word but of the world” 
(2014, p. xlv). From what I have been arguing about Said’s approach to literature, the same 
holds true for it. 
From reading Auerbach’s organic prose in his chapter about the Odyssey and the Old 
Testament, the impression could arise that finding an Ansatzphänomen is a relatively easy 
or straightforward task of criticism. It seems that all the critic has to do is to read the text 
and the phenomenon will present itself to him or her. The truth is far from it. Finding a 
proper point of departure requires great critical skill, active rereading and being deeply 
immersed in the language of the object studied. In Said’s view, Mimesis derives its force 
from Auerbach’s active engagement with his material and his philological immersion in it: 
“His chapter 1 is not the result of an empty chore – ‘compare and contrast Homer and the 
Old Testament’; rather, Auerbach seems to have asked himself why Homer’s text wanders 
verbally in a way that Genesis does not” (1975a, p. 69). But though the selection of an 
Ansatzpunkt requires a certain creativity of the critic, such a point of departure may not 
simply be “imposed on a theme from the outside, but ought rather to be an organic inner 
part of the theme itself” (Auerbach, 1969, p. 15). For Said, this is clearly connected to the 
individual agency of the critic who needs to have a certain assertive power “before an 
innocuous verbal ‘point’ can turn into a privileged beginning of a critic’s journey” (1975a, 
p. 72). In the critical process, the critic must keep a fine balance between critical distance 
and proximity to the text, between speaking for the text and allowing the text to speak 
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for itself. Said translates this into a critical position where the critic must at the same time 
be intimate enough with the text and show respect and love even for the organic unity and 
integrity of the text, in a manner that is similar to Blackmur and Poulet and not to the 
postwar New Criticism according to which a critic becomes too fastened on a text and 
“makes the text something that is continuous with his own discourse; he does this first by 
discovering, then by rationalizing, a beginning” (1975a, p. 71). 
In a remark that might well remind us of his critique of ‘the imperialism of criticism’, 
Said goes on to elaborate this idea by pointing out that the critic must be aware not to 
turn his or her criticism into a form of cannibalism which “swallows resisting works, 
passes them into passages that decorates its own course, because it has found a beginning 
that allows such an operation” (1975a, p. 71). In this kind of imperialist or cannibalistic 
criticism, 
the beginning resembles a magical point that links critic and work criticized. The 
point is the meeting of critic and work and it coaxes the work into the critic’s prose. 
In finding a point of departure invariably in the meeting of his criticism with the 
text criticized, is the critic merely refinding his vision, his biases, in another’s work? 
(Said, 1975a, p. 71; my emphasis) 
I have highlighted the words “magical point”, which reminds us of Sartre’s theory of the 
emotions and the way in which a reality is magically – that is, irreflectively – altered so as 
to be in consonance with one’s (pre-held) beliefs. Though Said does not refer to Sartre’s 
outline for the emotions in Beginnings, we should nonetheless interpret his words in a 
Sartrean way. The argument which Said is advancing here is similar to his argument about 
critical thinking in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, namely that the critic 
may not impose certain persistent schemata, “his vision, his biases”, on the literary work 
criticized but remain as ‘truthful’ to the work’s ‘objective reality’ (in the Sartrean, not in 
the New Critical sense of the word). The literary critic beginning with a text must be 
aware of the cycle of criticism described by Said in his treatment of Conrad. He or she 
must be aware that the selection of a beginning can put too much severe discipline on the 
mind criticizing that wants to think everything through, arranging the literary work in 
his or her critical discourse in such a way that that work is forced to fit into a prefixed 
schema outlined by that beginning. Literary criticism must know that when one is in the 
“caverns of another’s, an author’s, mind at work” (Said, 1975a, p. 75), one must respect the 
dissonance one experiences. Criticism must respect “Conrad’s darkness, seemingly at bay 
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yet ever closer to springing forward and obliterating mind and light” (Said, 1975a, p. 74). 
It must respect the direction within which the work of literature moves. And so, as Said 
links this to the work of Blackmur: “Literature is . . . the old truepenny fellow in the 
cellarage who never stops walking up and down. Criticism keeps the sound of his footsteps 
alive in our reading, so that we understand both the fury in the words and the words 
themselves” (Blackmur, 1977a, p. 303; Said, 1975a, p. 75). Criticism must not reify 
literature but respect its humanity, its intention and method, in order to fully understand 
both the human experience and the language of the work.  
The importance of the work of Auerbach on Said’s own method is that it teaches him 
that literary criticism is an activity that requires a certain formal intention on the part of 
the critic, the formulation of a beginning hypothesis tied to the acute problem of the 
Ansatzpunkt that needs to be tested and confirmed in the method of the work of criticism 
(1975a, p. 70). Said merges the creative energies of Blackmur, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and 
Auerbach into his own politicized model of criticism which stresses that a literary critic 
may not rationalize his or her choice of beginning in a post factum manner whereby he or 
she makes the beginning consonant with the outcome. Rather, he or she must be guided 
by the material itself and the directions in which it guides him or her; must be guided as 
much as possible by the intention and method of the literary text. The critic must work like 
Auerbach in Mimesis, without a fixed sense of purpose, without all too strict a method or 
direction of his own, without a system nor a shortcut to his conclusions, and especially 
without an orthodoxy of theories and concepts imposed on the text from the outside (Said, 
2003, p. xxxii). He or she must select and arrange the material in such a way that, in the 
words of Auerbach, the critical discourse does not reify the literary phenomenon but 
“allows the individual phenomenon to live and unfold freely” (2003, p. 572). Indeed, the 
strength of Auerbach’s approach to literature is that even though its intention is to provide 
a synthesis of literature, its method “does not depend on preexisting categories or at least 
is not a mere rearrangement of them. The point of such synthesis is precisely not the reify 
the whole” (Mufti, 1998, p. 106). By emulating this method, Said’s own method in 
Beginnings allows him to conceptualize a model of reading that is able to be critical to the 
texts studied and at the same time to respect the individuality of these texts. 
Lastly, the importance of Auerbach on Said’s reconceptualization of literary criticism 
in Beginnings can be seen in what may at first sight seem to be a passing remark in his 
discussion of Auerbach’s method. Said argues that Auerbach’s preference of the term 
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Ansatzpunkt, which means as much as ‘point of departure’, over the German Anfang, which 
is the equivalent of the English ‘beginning’, is significant. According to Said Ansatzpunkt 
has a more transitive connotation than Anfang and is therefore a term that stresses the 
constitutive or constructive role of the critic who, from the material that is present to him 
or her, intentionally selects the point of entry to his or her object of study and thereby 
retains a sense of freedom or agency in dealing with it (1975a, p. 68). As a result of this, 
the critic is able to transcend certain persistent structures of domination and coercion by 
showing how every beginning is but a construct, the product of a particular human activity 
preceded by a “beginning intention”, the purposeful production of meaning and non-
meaning (Said, 1975a, pp. 12, 56).  
From this, it becomes clear that the Auerbachian model of criticism in Beginnings is a 
model in which the critic has decidedly more agency than the critic in Said’s previous de 
facto model of criticism of consciousness derived from Poulet in Joseph Conrad and the 
Fiction of Autobiography. This model in Beginnings is not only decidedly more politicized, it 
also comes to lean more closely – both in theory and in practice this time – on the models 
of reading proposed by Blackmur, Levin and Sartre that presuppose two conversation 
partners with more or less the same amount of freedom. Moreover, in this model both 
critic and author must respect each other, must respect their mutual right to speak. The 
importance of this theoretical moment cannot be underestimated, because for the first time 
in Said’s career as a literary critic, his model of criticism and reading literary texts 
presupposes the critic to have a right to speak for his or her own by creating the discursive 
space within which individuals are able to play initiating roles in a certain field of thought. 
That this important theoretical stance in literary criticism is also a highly important 
political stance, almost goes without saying. For, in the context of the Israeli occupation 
of Palestine and the institutionalization of Israeli apartheid, as well as the imaginative 
misrepresentation of Arabs, Muslims and Palestinians in Western journalism and 
scholarly writings, this basic human right to speak is on a daily basis precisely denied to a 
particular group of people. In this way, Beginnings can and should be read as a political 
allegory that does not only philosophize about the conditions of possibility to intervene in 
the worldly affairs of politics and the pressing socio-political situation created by the 
events of the Six Days War and the Israeli occupation of Palestine, it already intervenes 
by reconceptualizing a model of reading that allows individuals to do so. This is how 
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Beginnings creates its own authority to begin the production of counter-hegemonic 
knowledge. This is Said’s humanism as a technique of trouble. 
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3.4 Nomadic Authority 
“What is a beginning?” (Said, 1975a, p. xv). Though we have discussed the methodology 
of Beginnings at length and have therefore been able to establish how a literary critic is to 
begin, we still haven’t addressed this seemingly simple and straightforward four-word 
question that sparked Said’s entire book project. What contributed to the major success 
and critical reception of Beginnings is that it was one of the very first works produced by 
an American literary critic to provide a panorama and synthesis of French-influenced 
structuralism and poststructuralism, all the while stressing that the use of such umbrella 
terms to designate what one could call a group consciousness is dangerous, if not 
intellectually wrong, because such terms are used to domesticate various, diverse and not 
wholly reconcilable attempts to come to terms with language, writing and thought 
(Macksey & Donato, 1972b, p. x). And yet, the importance of considering this generation 
of French thinkers as a group in a work on beginnings is that, according to Said, “these 
critics have made the problem of beginnings the beginning – and in a sense the center – 
of their thought” (1975a, p. 281).  
In addition to this – and this is the aspect of Said’s work on which I would like to focus 
in the following pages – Beginnings was one of the first works to not only introduce to an 
American audience but at the same already adapt and incorporate in its own theory the 
works of Michel Foucault. Soon after the publication of Beginnings, Said was considered to 
be “Foucault’s most prestigious and vocal supporter in the United States” (Carroll, 1978, 
p. 721). Because of this Foucaultian influence, many of the reviewers in the Autumn 1976 
issue of Diacritics considered Beginnings to be a pioneering work of criticism and in the 
interview included in that special issue the interviewer introduced Said as the leading 
figure of the critical ‘avant-garde’ in the U.S. – a well-intended compliment that Said 
nonetheless vehemently attacked by stressing the equally formative influence and 
revolutionary potential of such ‘arrière-gardist’ thinkers as Blackmur and Levin (1976b, 
pp. 30-32). In his review, Hayden White discusses many of Said’s theoretical intertexts 
but considers Foucault to be “the master theoretician” (White, 1976, p. 12) of the work. 
And while J. Hillis Miller notes that is too much of a generalization to characterize 
Beginnings simply as a Foucaultian work of criticism, his suggestion nevertheless seems to 
be that the work’s politicized model of criticism is almost exclusively the result of Said’s 
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creative exposition of Foucault’s avant-gardist literary critical work (Hillis Miller, 1976, 
pp. 1-2).  
While I agree with White and Hillis Miller that the theoretical presence of Foucault is 
of crucial importance to our understanding of Beginnings, I have already indicated how the 
book’s politicized model of reading is equally the product of a continued engagement with 
the creative energies of existential phenomenology, Blackmur’s New Criticism and 
Auerbach’s philology. From my discussion of Said’s intellectual dialogue with the work of 
Foucault in Beginnings, it will become clear – more clearly than ever in this study – that 
Said is deeply committed to a humanist project that defends both the primacy of the human 
subject in thinking about language and writing, and of human activity in the production 
of culture. And while Said is deeply sympathetic towards Foucault’s intellectual project, 
he approaches him from these humanist models of reading and therefore does frequently 
clash with the French thinker’s more antihumanist conclusions when it comes to 
discussing human agency, activity and the role of determinism in thinking about language, 
writing and thought. All this feeds my argument that while the influence of Foucault on 
Beginnings – and by extension on Said’s critical practice – should certainly be recognized, 
it should at the same not be overinflated. We should read Beginnings as essentially a 
humanist response to the antihumanist theories of Foucault. To clarify my argument and 
to grasp Said’s theory of beginnings that recuperates Foucault’s insights into a humanist 
project, what better point of departure is there than to finally ask ourselves: what is a 
beginning?  
The humanist undertone of Said’s project already becomes apparent from the very 
outset when he offers his first definition of a beginning: “the beginning is the first point 
(in time, space, or action) of an accomplishment or process that has duration and meaning. 
The beginning, then, is the first step in the intentional production of meaning” (1975a, p. 5). 
According to this phenomenological definition, the beginning of a work initiates the work’s 
intention which in its turn determines the work’s method, the direction or field of play within 
which the literary text digresses and disperses. But, as we have seen, Said at other times 
argues that the intention already emerges at the beginning and that therefore the intention 
can also be said to be the enabling condition for the work to begin. If these formulations 
appear deliberately circular, self-confirming or complicated even, then this is correct 
(Hillis Miller, 1976, p. 4; McCarthy, 2010, p. 59). In fact, much of this circular logic has to 
do with Said’s definition of intention as “an appetite at the beginning intellectually to do 
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something in a characteristic language . . . that always (or nearly always) shows signs of 
the beginning intention in some form and is always engaged purposefully in the 
production of meaning” (1975a, p. 12).  
And so from both definitions we gather that the beginning starts the intention and the 
intention becomes clear at the beginning. Confusing as this may be, Said shows some more 
clarity of thought when he goes on to introduce a crucial difference between a beginning, 
which has an active connotation and pertains to intentional human actions, and an origin, 
which has a more passive connotation, is mostly used to talk about divine topics and should 
therefore be avoided in discussing human activity (1975a, pp. 5-6). This distinction helps 
us further establish that a beginning is in the first place a worldly human activity, an 
intentional act of consciousness carried out by an existential individual (a writer) whose 
consciousness-in-the-world is actively and purposefully directed at the production of 
meaning (1975a, p. 48). From this, it is clear how the phenomenological category of 
intentionality is still the philosophical spine of Said’s theory of beginnings (Hussein, 2002, 
p. 128). In fact, highlighting the intentionality of a beginning and defining ‘beginning’ and 
‘intention’ in such a way that both concepts are inextricably entwined, leads Said to 
conclude that a beginning is “not only a kind of action; it is also a frame of mind, a kind of 
work, an attitude, a consciousness” (1975a, p. xv; my emphasis). Indeed, the impression from 
reading Said’s meditation on Beginnings is that a beginning is not just an action but a 
consciousness which provides the text with an intention. Hence, ‘intention’ here comes to 
echo the notion of structural intention or structure of experience from Joseph Conrad and 
the Fiction of Autobiography, which concomitantly makes a ‘beginning’ a consciousness 
engaged in the act of structurization (see Said, 1975a, pp. 66-67). 
Just as the individual literary critic is important in selecting a proper point of departure 
according to Said’s Auerbachian model of criticism, so is the existential writer in Said’s 
theory of beginnings because he or she has the power to initiate and structure writing. 
Individuals clearly have an amount of agency and can leave a determining imprint on the 
production of literature, and by extension, culture. The literary critical identification of a 
beginning with an existential writer rather than, say, with a particular set of determining 
conditions, such as a Zeitgeist or, as Foucault would argue, a discourse, is an intentional 
act of criticism “in which designating individual X as founder of continuity Y (a movement, 
say) implies that X has value in having intended Y” (Said, 1975a, p. 32). While Said realizes 
that such a position might be considered conservative and reactionary even in the academic 
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field of literary studies post-1966 when structuralist and poststructuralist theories of 
reading were increasingly downplaying the impact of individuals on literary production 
in favor of determining systems such a language, he goes on to defend the political 
importance and literary critical consequences of his choice: “Although there are other ways 
of identifying beginnings, this one avoids the passivity of ‘origins’ by substituting the 
intentional beginning act of an individual for the more purely circumstantial existence of 
‘conditions’” (1975a, p. 32). What this act of criticism does is to empower individuals by 
building a theoretical plane that allows them to play meaningful, initiating roles in the 
production of knowledge. It sees individual writers as producers, inventors and beginners 
who set forth written statements. What it also does is to combat ways of analyzing 
literature as a kind of dehumanized form produced by an impersonal voice, and see it as a 
humanly intended production of meaning.  
It is almost needless to say that, here, Said takes up a humanist stance in literary 
criticism that defends the human value of literature and the role of authors. His way of 
conceptualizing beginnings treats individual writers as persons who matter because it 
attributes a certain authorizing power to a particular person in designating him or her as 
an author of a particular text, as someone who plays an initiating role in the production of 
literature and gives a particular text an inaugural logic, certain explicit and implicit rules 
of pertinence and a basic sense of direction vis-à-vis an existing discursive formation (Said, 
1975a, p. 83). To be explicit, Said’s position is that individual writers give existence to 
their writing and have a right of possession but that  
[e]very sort of writing establishes explicit and implicit rules of pertinence for itself: 
certain things are admissible, certain other not. I call these rules of pertinence 
authority – both in the sense of explicit law and guiding force (what we usually mean 
by the term) and in the sense of that implicit power to generate another word that 
will belong to the writing as a whole. (1975a, p. 16) 
What these words make clear is that even though Beginnings is not about overtly political 
topics, it should nonetheless be read as a political allegory that, as White sees it, is 
“centrally about the concepts that have their special relevance to modern concerns in the 
political domain, concepts such as authority, tradition, deviancy, revolution, and above all, 
power” (1976, p. 8; my emphasis). Said’s theory of beginnings is a theory about power and 
its public uses and in the passage above, in which authority is equated to force and power, 
we can see how the concept of power appears in this conceptualization of beginnings. Said’s 
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argument is that a beginning authorizes, that it makes possible or allows what follows and 
excludes what doesn’t (1975a, p. 17). A beginning controls the continuity of its course or 
method. A meditation on beginnings should therefore be situated within the broader field 
of thought circumscribed by such terms as “innovation, novelty, originality, revolution, change, 
convention, tradition, period, authority, influence, to name but a few” (Said, 1975a, p. 6). These 
terms not only once again highlight the work’s highly politicized mode of reading, they 
also indicate that Said’s mediation on beginnings is certainly not limited to the field of 
literary studies in the narrow sense of the word but is concerned with the problem of 
power, authority and change in the world. It is a theory of praxis, a mediation on the larger 
role of human agency and will in language, writing and thought. 
And though, as Frank Lentricchia argues, Said’s remarks on the authority of individual 
writers might at the time incidentally have warmed the hearts of traditionalist, old-
fashioned humanist scholars who approached the emerging structuralist and 
poststructuralist theories in the U.S. with a great deal of skepticism – after all, the book 
did win the Lionel Trilling Memorial Award –, he is wrong in arguing that they should 
“be read as traditionalist nostalgia for the good old truths of humanism” (1980, p. 162). 
Empowering individual authors by attributing to them a certain authoritative weight in 
speaking about their texts does not mean the restoration of a traditionally intentionalist 
idea of authorship espoused by the predecessors of the New Criticism, in which the 
individual author keeps hold of all the authority of a text and his or her originality as a 
creative genius to reorder tradition, effect discontinuity and change, or, in short, to begin 
is boundless. From my discussion of Said’s methodology, we have already established that 
Said is critical to those so-called good old truths of humanism when in the name of 
humanism and social justice he also bestows a right to speak and authority to the critic or 
reader, hence, respectfully limiting the absolute authority of the individual author.  
Said’s elaboration of ‘authority’ and his critique of humanism in Beginnings, is sparked 
by the following question: “To what extent is a text not something passively attributable, 
as effect is to cause, to a person?” (1975a, p. 58). From my discussion so far, one might be 
forgiven for thinking that if the text is not passively attributable, Said then actively 
attributes it to a person in what could be labeled as an act of empowerment. On the 
contrary, in his view, attributing all the force or power of a particular text to the prior 
existence of something else, an agency or set of circumstances, is of limited value 
(McCarthy, 2010, p. 61; Said, 1975a, pp. 23-24). If the text is to be actively attributed, than 
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less to a person than to an activity, that of writing (White, 1976, p. 9). To make his point, 
he quotes Conrad having written in an essay that “A book is a deed, . . . the writing of it is 
an enterprise” (Conrad quoted by Said, 1975a, p. 24). According to Said, we should not 
take Conrad to be claiming aesthetic autonomy for writing but rather to be speaking in 
unison with French structuralist and poststructuralist critics that writing itself is a 
worldly event, a human activity or form of action in the world. Writing, as we have already 
seen with the works of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, is an ethical act, a performance and 
“[t]o begin to write, therefore, is to work a set of instruments, to invent a field of play for 
them, to enable performance” (Said, 1975a, p. 24). And so in Said’s theory of beginnings, 
the text is above all the product of a beginning, which is the intentional act of producing 
meaning and non-meaning in writing. And while writing is certainly initiated by a 
concrete individual who in beginning to write gives to the text a beginning intention or 
experience – and therefore retains an amount of authority in determining the text’s 
meaning and can be held responsible for the uses to which his or her text is put –, Said’s 
position is that writing itself also produces a meaning that derives most of its authority not 
from its relation to an antecedent author nor from representing some prior reality but 
from its relation to other writing and its capacity to unsettle or displace such prior realities 
or ‘truths’ (White, 1976, p. 10). 
With this, we have arrived at the problem of language in Beginnings and the book’s main 
Foucaultian argument that “writing is a form of displacement” (Said, 1975a, p. 22). This 
violent, displacing function of writing becomes most clear in the rhetorical device of 
quotation, used in imaginative as in academic texts. According to Said, the seemingly 
simple rhetorical device of quotation symbolizes how a particular text derives some of its 
meaning from its adjacency, complementarity and correlation to other texts that stand 
there in a certain discursive field as an ever-encroaching force threatening to displace the 
present writing. “As a rhetorical device,” Said goes on, 
quotation can serve to accommodate, to incorporate, to falsify (when wrongly or 
even rightly paraphrased), to accumulate, to defend, or to conquer – but always, even 
when in the form of a passing allusion, it is a reminder that other writing serves to 
displace present writing, to a greater or lesser extent, from its absolute, central, 
proper place. (1975a, p. 22) 
What Said is arguing here is that writing itself is power; that, to a considerable extent, 
writing creates its own authority by affiliating itself to certain texts and committing 
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violence to others with which it willy-nilly shares a discursive field. In this respect, it is 
good to think of writing as a cosmos, “because within the discontinuous system of 
quotation, reference, duplication, parallel, and allusion which makes up writing, authority 
– or the specific power of a specific act of writing – can be thought as something inclusive 
and made up, if you like, for the occasion” (Said, 1975a, p. 23).  
If we were to draw some kind of antihumanist conclusions from this and claim that if 
writing creates its own authority by establishing intertextual relationships with other 
writing then the so-called authority of the individual author who is said to have produced 
the writing is but a void concept. Said would stop us. He would correct us and add that 
what he has just described is a case in which the anterior authority of an individual author 
“is thus minimized” but that such authority “can never be eliminated entirely” (1975a, p. 
24). As this system of quotation illustrates, writing X can open up a discursive space for 
writing Y to derive its authority from, add to the authority of writing X and generate its 
own authority by adopting a relationship of complementary, correlation and continuity to 
writing X. In a feedback loop, writing X is thus given more authority by writing Y, which 
in its turn then derives more authority from that increased authority of writing X to which 
writing Y has itself contributed, and so on. This dynastic characteristic of writing, which 
Foucault describes as the establishment of “fondateurs de discursivité” (1994e, pp. 804-
806), effectively turns the majority of writing not into originality nor into sameness but 
into an order of creative repetition of existing writing with only the addition of slight 
variations or difference to admit its own instances – a very Nietzschean conceptualization 
of literature, indeed (Said, 1975a, p. 12; see Said, 1976a, p. 67). But in order to produce new 
meaning, in order to begin anew, writing has to produce true difference in a discursive 
field or inaugurate what Said calls “a deliberately other production of meaning” (1975a, p. 
13). The otherness of this meaning is precisely derived from the discontinuous relationship 
which the present writing takes up in a certain discursive field in relation to earlier and 
adjacent writing. At this point in Said’s theory of beginnings, the centrality of the human 
will or authority of an individual writer comes into play – a characteristic of his method 
that distinguishes him for the work of Foucault, whose conceptualization of individual 
subjects versus the system rules out precisely this possibility. For, Said’s argument is that 
such deliberately other produced meaning is essentially the result of an authorial position 
– what he in Orientalism would label a strategic location (1978, p. 20) – where an author 
strategically and willfully places his or her writing alongside other writing instead of in a 
232 
dynastic line of descent. “A beginning”, he sums up the implications of his theory, “. . . is a 
problem to be studied, as well as a position taken by any writer” (Said, 1975a, p. 13). And 
so for Said, every beginning comes with what he calls “a burden of responsibility” (1975a, 
p. 66). The act of beginning appeals to the individual human will and implies an ethical 
choice for the individual author: does one continue or begin anew? 
While Said’s use of such terms as ‘complementarity’, ‘adjacency’, ‘correlation’ and 
‘discontinuity’ are references to Foucault’s work on discourse (Said, 1975a, pp. 289-290), 
by labeling writing as a form of displacement he is equally describing Nietzsche’s human 
history as a battle of metaphors and interpretations in action. This shouldn’t surprise us, 
because both Foucault’s and Said’s intellectual projects are rooted in a Nietzschean 
tradition of critical thinking (see Foucault, 1994d). The difference between both is their 
respective emphasis on one of either two major constituents of Nietzsche’s work: human 
will and anonymous discourse (Bové, 1986, p. 23).69 Foucault exclusively focuses on the 
latter, from a conviction that allocating too much authority with the individual subject and 
assigning a leading role to intellectuals in general reproduces the dynastic power relations 
characteristic of a disciplinary society (Bové, 1986, pp. 23-24), Said also considers the 
interplay of texts as an anonymous and transsubjective process but nonetheless keeps 
emphasizing the role of human will and bases his analyses on the privileged nature of the 
individual critical consciousness (Bové, 1986, pp. 27-30; see also White, 1976, p. 8).70 His 
description of writing as displacement illustrates this double focus. On the one hand, Said 
describes literary and academic production – or, in short, the production of knowledge – 
as an anonymous discursive battlefield in which certain texts constantly seek to elbow 
each other aside, push other texts and the experiences or knowledge which they are said 
to convey from their absolute, central place in a discursive field into the margins of that 
field.  
                                               
69 Paul A. Bové’s Intellectuals in Power: A Genealogy of Critical Humanism (1986) provides an excellent comparative 
discussion of the works of Nietzsche, Foucault and Said. While he singles out the differences between Said and 
Foucault, he only takes into consideration Said’s differences from Foucault in Orientalism and later works, leaving 
out the pivotal work Beginnings (Bové, 1986, p. 27). 
70 This is not to say that Foucault doesn’t allow intellectuals to play a role in society. On the contrary, the 
intellectual has an important, powerful, political function to play in specific, local struggles (Foucault, 1980b), 
just not in the generalist-intellectual sense embodied by existentialist intellectuals like Sartre who frequently 
spoke on public matters of general interest (Baert, 2015, p. 156). Said’s view of the intellectual is at odds with 
Foucault’s. By stressing the amateurism of intellectuals, by which he means that intellectuals should also be 
allowed to speak on matters that transcend their specialized knowledge, and believing that every intellectual has 
the moral obligation to ‘speak truth to power’, he clearly ranks himself in the Sartrean camp. This will become 
more clear in the final sections of the next chapter. 
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As such, writing can effectively exclude and marginalize other writing, experiences and 
knowledge. It can produce culture by displacing and doing violence to prior, adjacent 
experiences and systems of representation (White, 1976, p. 10). In this way, certain texts 
(and not others) achieve hegemony over a discursive field and then from their central 
position come to produce the very knowledge or reality that they appear to describe by 
exerting constant pressure on individual speaking subjects to make their perception, 
action and speech in consonance with the victorious writing – until new writing pushes 
the embattled writing from its central place in a discursive field, and so on. But on the 
other hand, his conclusions have implication for the behavior of individual subjects and 
the role of intellectuals in society. For, the implications of all this for literature, literary 
criticism and thought in general, is that writing, both imaginative and academic, cannot 
be seen as just some innocent leisure activity performed in ivory towers, so to speak, but 
must be seen as a highly politicized and worldly activity or performance (in the linguistic 
sense of the word) that in such contexts as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is capable of 
actual displacement and violence. And so a literary critic asking him- or herself what point 
of departure to select for analyzing a poem, an author pondering about how to begin his 
or her novel, or a journalist reporting on events at the West Bank, should be aware of his 
or her authorial position and realize that a particular beginning can set in motion a series 
of displacements. He or she should be aware of how  
[w]ords, therefore, stand at the beginning, are the beginning, of a series of 
substitutions. Words signify a movement away from and around the fragment of 
reality. . . The net result is to understand language as an intentional structure 
signifying a series of displacements. Words are the beginning sign of a method that 
replaces another method. (Said, 1975a, pp. 65-66) 
And while individual writers cannot possibly hope to understand where this complex 
series of substitutions will ultimately lead to, they have initiated or produced the writing 
and can thus be held responsible for its worldly uses. Whether their choice of beginning 
is taken reflectively or irreflectively and whether it is a choice to continue or begin anew, 
in Said’s model of authorship, there is no escaping from the responsibility of that choice. 
Said’s stances on authorship and authority in Beginnings are to a great extent elaborated 
in response to Foucault’s seminal “Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?” (1994e), originally published 
in 1969, and his ideas about ‘discursivity’ – that is, the conditions of possibility and the 
rules of formation of texts or what Foucault calls a ‘discourse’ (Said, 1975a, p. 34). In that 
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seminal text Foucault is said to posit an antihumanist idea of authorship that tries to think 
of literature and culture without the conceptual category of the human subject. He 
therefore precisely complicates and radically questions the idea that an author as an 
empirical subject is the producer or originator of a text’s meaning and thus responsible for 
the socio-political uses to which that text is put (Foucault, 1994e, pp. 789-790). To be 
clear, in Foucault’s context, ‘subject’ means the subjectivity that defines human identity. 
It is the intentional human consciousness of phenomenology, the humanist existential 
subject of Sartre, or the speaking subject that we have encountered in the context of 
Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of language. According to Foucault, this subject 
should not be given centrality, priority or authority in our reflections on language, writing 
and thought because as an analytical concept it simply cannot cope with the complexity of 
discourse and draws attention away from the real underlying concerns of criticism 
(Foucault, 1970, p. xiii; Said, 1975a, p. 293). His poststructuralist position is opposed to 
Said’s in that, according to Foucault, the subject cannot be the beginning of human 
thought or activity; it cannot determine the structure of a text or originate the act of 
structurization in language because it is itself already an enigmatic structure of language 
(Said, 1975a, p. 286). What Foucault is saying is that the human subject is not the producer 
of language, but that it is precisely a product of language. As a result of this, the subject 
cannot begin nor begin anew for it is always already begun. Foucault’s philosophical 
endeavors can best be described as efforts to think through the ordered production of 
cultural phenomena, such as literary texts, without necessarily taking recourse to the 
category of a human subject to explain that production (Paras, 2006, p. 28). While the 
human will is central in Said’s critical project, in Foucault’s it is relegated to the margins.  
In L’Archéologie du savoir (1969), published in the same year as his text on the author, 
he takes up a position against the kind of humanism professed by Said that tries to find 
beginnings in language and thought by locating that beginning in the human 
consciousness of the originating subject (1969, pp. 22-23). Indeed, Foucault’s rise as a 
prominent philosopher should be seen in tandem with his fierce criticism of Sartre and the 
existentialist movement in France, which was at the height of its cultural hegemony in the 
1950s and 1960s (Paras, 2006, pp. 19-21).71 In what could be seen as a way of clearing a 
                                               
71 For a history of the decline of existentialism in France and the rise of not just Foucault but of structuralism 
and poststructuralism in France in general, see Patrick Baert’s The Existentialist Movement: The Rise of Sartre as 
a Public Intellectual (2015, pp. 135-157) and especially François Dosse’s two volumes on L’Histoire du structuralisme 
(1992a, 1992b). 
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discursive space for his own works to fill, Foucault reacted against his existential 
phenomenological predecessors and combatted the idea that existence precedes essence by 
turning the order of things upside down. His position is that human subjects do not give 
meaning to their surroundings, but that such meaning is but the surface effect of a deeper 
system of thought that precedes all human existence (Paras, 2006, p. 29). And so, his 
philosophical position, is that “[a]vant toute existence humaine, toute pensée humaine, il 
y aurait déjà un savoir, un système, que nous redécouvrons” (Foucault, 1994a, p. 515). It 
is the true task of criticism to discover and alter this system of thought. 
This leads Foucault to open his conférence on the author by polemically declaring that 
to him it doesn’t matter who is speaking: “Qu’importe qui parle?” (1994e, p. 789). For him, 
an author’s name like ‘Joseph Conrad’, for instance, does not refer to a concrete existential 
individual who needs to be thought of in psychological and biographical terms and is said 
to be the real producer and originator of a text like Heart of Darkness. Rather, ‘Joseph 
Conrad’ is simply an ontological principle of a text, a linguistic construct or discursive 
label to which a certain text, a collection of texts, or the in Foucault’s eyes highly 
problematic idea of an ‘oeuvre’ is attached so as to limit this collection of writing, to 
exclude other texts from it and thus to give the collection a special unity and meaning that 
distinguishes it from other texts or collections of texts (S. Burke, 1998, p. 107; Foucault, 
1994e, pp. 797-798; Hart, 2000, p. 65). Foucault’s critique of the subject is to let go of the 
idea of an individual as the author of his or her own works and to argue that authors are 
concepts created to explain the incongruities found in certain collection of texts, enabling 
functions in a certain discourse at a certain time and place. What does it matter to know 
that a particular text is the product of an existential individual who also wrote other texts, 
if such knowledge doesn’t really help us reach, rediscover and understand the preceding 
determining system of thought? “The painful truth that needed to be embraced”, Eric 
Paras sums up Foucault’s position on the author, “was that men were the wholly 
interchangeable speakers of systems of thought that transcended them” (2006, p. 35). And so 
Foucault’s conceptualization of authors sees texts as products of an impersonal voice, a 
tyrannical epistemological system that speaks through them. What therefore matters to 
Foucault is not who is speaking certain words in a text, but what impersonal forces allow 
these words (and not others) to be spoken in this text in the first place (Foucault, 1969, 
pp. 170-171; see also Said, 1974, p. 34).  
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For Foucault, the role of individuals in the production of texts is negligible in respect 
to those immanent rules of formation that govern such production at a given historical 
period and place (S. Burke, 1998, pp. 65-66). He is not so much interested in ideas in 
themselves, but in the conditions of possibility of these ideas or what he in Les mots et les 
choses (1966) and L’Archéologie du savoir (1969) calls the épistèmè, a set of moving 
constraints that establishes and entirely determines the outer limits to what individuals 
regard as knowledge and perceive as objective reality or ‘truth’ at a certain time and place 
(Foucault, 1966, p. 179; see also Said, 1975a, p. 284). He is interested in the ‘archive’, the 
first set of unwritten rules and laws of that which can be said and in what form it can be 
said; that what groups different statements or texts together into what he calls a 
‘discourse’, a specialized mode of utterance to be differentiated from other modes of 
utterances (Mills, 2003, p. 64; see also Said, 1974, pp. 34-36). The establishment of an 
entire machinery of determinist concepts allows Foucault in Les mots et les choses (1966) to 
present a history of thought in which individuals and their works are entirely subordinate 
to impersonal determining forces. He argues that ideas are the product and not the motor 
of history and takes up a position that does not allow for a certain interplay between 
personal actions and impersonal forces – a position which by contrast we can find in the 
works of many Marxists – but argues that no one, not even a critical individual like 
Conrad, for instance, can escape epistemic determination (S. Burke, 1998, pp. 62-63). In 
fact, as Said makes clear, according to Foucault the épistèmè is such a determining 
tyrannical system of thought that it is unavailable for understanding by any individual 
living in its epoch (Foucault, 1969, pp. 249-250; Said, 1975a, p. 295; White, 1994, p. 56). 
Hence, there is no such thing as a properly critical individual like Conrad.  
And yet Foucault already believes it liberating to let go of such stifling 
anthropomorphist categories as ‘author’ and instead analyze texts as anonymous 
statements that need to be neutrally observed and weighed in relation to other statements 
– within a single discourse and between different discourses, and without taking recourse 
to a biographical entity to judge or explain them – in order to discover the rules of 
discourse, that is, the underlying rules that make a given statement possible and true at 
one time and not at another (Foucault, 1969, p. 38; Paras, 2006, p. 34). The true political 
task of the critic is not to debate about and try to change the content of discourse without 
first having delved deeper and reached those underlying rules: “Le problème n’est pas de 
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changer ‘la conscience’ des gens ou ce qu’ils ont dans la tête; mais le régime politique, 
économique, institutionnel de production de la vérité” (Foucault, 1994c, p. 114). 
This makes it clear that Foucault’s project – whether it examines the history of 
madness, medicine, physics, biology, psychology or sexuality – is always aimed at the 
unmasking of seemingly universal truths while being deeply committed to worldliness and 
change. And even though his methodology could be labelled as antihumanist in that it 
posits the primacy of impersonal forces over human existence, Said is right to point out 
that Foucault’s project serves “a particularly humanizing purpose” (1975a, p. 313). That 
there is a logic inherent in the production of knowledge that is no longer dependent on 
the human subject, does not mean that such notions as the épistèmè, ‘archive’ and ‘discourse’ 
aren’t manmade (Said, 1975a, pp. 313-314). They are, and there is a concept of man that 
underlies Foucault’s method and project (Agamben, 2005, pp. 80-81; Carroll, 1978, p. 721; 
Davies, 2008, pp. 141-142). Only, that concept is not the individual Cartesian cogito of 
phenomenology as the one and only measure of things who is the grounding center of 
knowledge and, given enough time and opportunity, is able to reach infinite possibilities 
and think all things through. As such, Foucault considers it to be intellectually unfair to 
hold individuals responsible for the workings of a language game which they can barely 
understand nor control. His argument is that only by letting go of such categories as the 
‘human subject’, ‘author’ and ‘oeuvre’, one is able to truly understand how societal 
struggle, the toppling and establishment of coercive and dominating systems of thought 
takes place in discourse when certain statements come to dominate and exclude large 
masses of other statements and, in short, what Said calls the displacement of writing takes 
place (see Foucault, 1971, p. 12).  
In its commitment to change, in its introduction of radical new theories and research 
methods to replace existing ones, and in its complication and fundamental questioning of 
what one could call the pre-held beliefs, critical orthodoxies and dogma’s of humanism, 
Foucault’s method and project profoundly appeal to Said. In Beginnings Said shows himself 
to be deeply sympathetic to Foucault’s predicament by arguing that in order to rethink 
the subject and its relations to the world, humanism may well have to engender its own 
opposite and approach its problems from an antihumanist point of view. Said understands 
that Foucault’s stance is one of opposition to the hegemonic systems of thought he hopes 
to break down, that because he does not in any way want to fall into the trap of 
irreflectively continuing the dynastic discourses against which he as an oppositional critic 
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is struggling and, in short, to radically begin anew, he therefore has to renounce the ideas 
and toolboxes of humanism and devise his own analytical toolbox (see Bové, 1986, p. 35). 
In fact, Said acknowledges that Foucault’s project is to challenge humanism’s hegemony 
over thought and even goes as far as to write that “Foucault is, to use one of R.P. 
Blackmur’s phrases, a technique of trouble” (1975a, p. 283). From all what we have seen 
about Said’s emulation of Blackmur’s method in Beginnings and his critical praise for the 
Princetonian autodidact, whom he in the Diacritics interview even calls “the greatest 
genius American criticism has produced” (1976b, p. 32), we should take these words to be 
the highest compliment conceivable in Said’s mind. In fact, these words show that though 
Said ultimately does not follow Foucault in his antihumanist conclusions and method, he 
regards the French thinker as a highly critical humanist.72 This seems to be a recuperation 
of Foucault’s methods into a humanist project. For as Said’s use of metaphors like ‘genius’, 
not just in the Diacritics interview but everywhere throughout his oeuvre, suggests, he 
continues to fall prey to a form of ahistorical idealism and does not renounce all of 
humanism’s conceptual tools (Bové, 1986, p. 27).  
As a convinced humanist who does not really radically question humanism and its 
claims of justice and resistance, Said considers the greatest threats of applying Foucault’s 
methods all the way through to be paralysis and failure of judgment, political quietism and 
passivity. His implied argument is therefore, as Bové shows, that it is better to use the 
power and authority that humanist models of reading bestow to individuals for 
progressive reasons rather than to abandon them completely (1986, pp. 32-34). Said’s 
rationale for this choice is an ethical one, of human activity within a constraining situation: 
that critics must remain ever critical and realize that though their concepts are inescapably 
flawed, they must nonetheless to do their best with the tools at hand. As Rashmi Bhatnagar 
argues, his position as a literary critic fighting for the human rights of his fellow-
Palestinians means that Said remains deeply committed to humanism (1986, p. 16). His 
fight is one of social justice, of individual intellectual responsibility in opposition to 
brutality and dehumanization (Bhatnagar, 1986, p. 16; Hussein, 2002, p. 24). This is 
precisely why he does not want his own literary criticism to contribute to this 
                                               
72 Whether this indicates that Foucault ultimately fails in his critical attempts to combat the hegemony of 
humanism, I leave to other critics. See, for instance, the work of David Carroll who in analyzing a ‘crypto-
subjectivity’ in Foucault’s archeological work also mentions Said’s ‘defense’ of humanism in Foucault (1978), or 
Paul A. Bové’s statements that, in its opposition to humanism, the work of Foucault is severely limited in its 
revolutionary potential and critical capacity as it becomes “paradoxically dependent for its own authority on the 
hegemonic humanistic discourse” (1986, p. 3). 
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dehumanization of individuals and why he persistently returns to an author like Conrad, 
who – though his representations are flawed – represents reason and humanity in the face 
of oppression. Said links humanism to activity and agency, antihumanism to passivity. It 
is to this argument of passivity that I will now turn. 
Though Said swears allegiance to the nomenclature of humanism, his intellectual 
engagement with Foucault in Beginnings leads him to produce a theory of discontinuity 
and beginnings that offers a critique of humanism. Apart from discussing, adapting and 
recuperating Foucaultian concepts for its own use, Said’s theory is founded in Foucault’s 
conceptualization of ‘discursivity’ and the realization that all words, all writing, and all 
texts inevitably stand in an intertextual relationship to other words, writings, and texts 
(1975a, pp. 298, 351). Foucault is an important intertext to understand Beginnings and 
Said’s following works – especially Orientalism in which Foucault’s concept of ‘discourse’ 
is a fundamental concept to grasp the workings of Orientalism. The importance of 
Foucault for Said’s critical practice lies in the fact that he reaffirms Said’s ideas about the 
worldliness of literature, that the writing of texts is a worldly event that is not only set in 
a particular time and place but also in a particular textual and linguistic context that 
determines this writing. “La vérité”, Foucault writes about the production of ‘truth’, “est 
de ce monde; elle y est produite grâce à de multiples contraintes” (1994c, p. 112). And 
while Said does not explicitly use Foucault’s terms in talking about literature and the 
production of knowledge, he does take over the French thinker’s central argument that 
imaginative and academic texts (a discourse) fill up an activated space (the épistèmè) and is 
controlled, regulated and ordered by a set of unwritten rules (the archive) that may escape 
the individual’s apprehension but can and must be examined by the critic, whose political 
role is to examine in the depths of discourse the ways in which ‘truth’ is ultimately 
delineated by anonymous systems of thought.  
It should be clear by now that Foucault’s philosophical endeavors are important for 
Said’s meditation on beginnings, as they show how all human activity is inextricably 
bound up in language or discourse and that “the relationship between discourse and 
speaker is governed by rules that antedate the speaker’s appearance and postdate his 
disappearance” (Said, 1975a, p. 299). This leads to Said’s realization that beginnings 
always takes place in a discursive field that is always already begun and will continue to 
exist after the present writing is introduced in it. Moreover, as there are many determining 
forces at work on a particular act of writing at any one moment in time and place, radical 
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discontinuity, reversal or change of direction – or, in short, beginning anew – in a 
discursive field is extremely difficult if not neigh-impossible (1975a, pp. 34-35). For Said, 
the work of Foucault stresses that the problem of beginning is the problem of writing’s 
relationship to a sheer mass of previous writing and knowledge that stands there as an 
intimidating force that exerts enormous power on the present writing to conform to this 
mass of writing. This effectively turns the whole problem of beginnings, in its most 
contemporary form of thought, into “a problem of discursivity” (Said, 1975a, p. 18). 
What Foucault is trying to demonstrate by his remarks on the formation of discourse 
and by reducing individual authors to complex discursive author-functions, is that 
discourse produces its own texts and authors and that therefore power or authority is thus 
“a property of discourse and not of writing (that is, writing conforms to the rule of 
discursive formation)” (Said, 1975a, p. 23). It therefore hardly matters who speaks, for it 
is always more or less the same we are hearing. In Foucault’s model, writing “is considered 
a controlled play of forces dispersed in a textual space that is created by the writing and 
that does not exist before it” (Said, 1975a, p. 282). That means that writing does not convey 
a prior lived experience or authorial intention but is an activity in itself that conforms to 
other writing. According to Foucault, biographical facts and information about an ‘author’ 
will therefore not significantly change the meaning of the texts that are attributed to him 
or her (1994e, p. 797). Whatever meaning we make from a particular text is from 
discursive conventions or linguistic codes that are endlessly relational or intertextual: 
“Words stand for words which stand for other words, and so on . . . an infinite regress of 
truths permanently hidden behind words” (Said, 1975a, pp. 280-281). The rules and 
limitations of discourse make writing conform to other writing and extend authority to 
one another (Foucault, 1994e, p. 807). And while Said, to a considerable extent, takes over 
Foucault’s ideas on the discursive constraints of writing, for him – and here we have 
arrived at his fundamental critique of Foucault – it clearly matters who speaks. It clearly 
matters that Heart of Darkness, for instance, is the product of Joseph Conrad, the Anglo-
Polish author born in a Polish speaking family in the Russian Empire whose critical self-
consciousness as an outsider – first in the French merchant navy then in England as a 
seaman and writer – and lived experience of colonialism as captain of a steamer in the 
Congo basin and other places around the world provoked in him an active comprehension 
of how imperialism as a system of thought works in dominating thought, language and 
perception (Said, 1986, pp. 49, 62). And though Said argues that writing also produces its 
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own authority from its discursive intertextual relations, it is initially Conrad who gives 
authority to it in the intentional act of consciousness that is beginning to write. For, a 
beginning is an irreflectively or reflectively conscious authorial position in relation to a 
discourse, an assertion of human will that initiates, structures and thus authorizes writing. 
The result of it, is the introduction of a particular text in the discursive field. This makes 
it clear that Said does not follow Foucault’s author-function all the way through but still 
considers authors as empirically personalized concepts, that is, as active persons rather than 
as passive functions. But this rejection does not mean that Said equally dismisses Foucault’s 
ideas on discursivity or the formation of discourse altogether. It just means that Said’s 
deep and sincere committed to the principles of humanism stands in the way of him letting 
go of the category of the subject and its central place in thinking about language, writing 
and thought. Instead, Said attempts to actively think through the possibility of discursive 
formation with subjectivity. 
Said’s answer to Foucault’s ‘discursivity’ and the realization that every writing is 
always to a considerable extent determined by forces outside it, is that “authority is 
nomadic: it is never in the same place, it is never always at the center, nor is it a sort of 
ontological capacity of originating every instance of sense” (1975a, p. 23). Turning 
nomadism into a metaphor for authority, his position is that for each text authority is 
located in a different place. The reason is that authority is dependent on what appears to 
be a balancing act in the beginning between a powerful assertion of will by the existential 
writer on the one hand and a submission or surrender to the epistemic pressures and 
constraints of discursive formation on the other. In either case, the authority of writing 
can never exclusively be attributed either to the existential writer or to discourse. In Said’s 
model it is always a particular and unique mixture of both that depends on the magnitude 
of the author’s assertion of will and the pressures of discourse: the stronger the assertion, 
the stronger the authority of the existential writer on the writing; the weaker the 
assertion, the more easily that the pressures of discourse force the individual writing to 
conform to discourse. This makes two things clear: (1) that writing freed from all 
constraints is a noble dream but (2) that writing is overdetermined neither. The metaphor 
is important, and should be read as a political allegory that theoretically opens up a way 
for all “inconsequential nomads” (Said, 1970a, p. 5), not just Palestinians, to regain 
authority and the permission to narrate. It is a crucial theoretical gesture to begin anew.  
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3.5 Authority and Molestation 
This tension between invention and restraint, or the relationship of individual writing 
versus transindividual discourse is captured in the book’s third and most elaborate chapter 
“The Novel as Beginning Intention” (1975a, pp. 79-188). There, Said discusses the 
transition from the great classical novel to the modernist novel, by using two concepts 
that, to him, are useful in our understanding of novelistic forms and the Western novelistic 
tradition in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: ‘authority’ and 
‘molestation’ (1975a, pp. 82-83). By now, we have already established at length what Said 
means by the former term: the power of writing that results from an intention or creative 
desire by an author at the beginning to forge change, modify and continue existing 
meanings or produce new or renewed ones in writing. And while the allocation of 
authority with the individual writer is a theoretical gesture that does not in itself 
guarantee that these writers produce new or renewed meanings, when discussing 
literature he seems to reserve the term ‘authority’ to speak exclusively about the power of 
individual writers with “the desire to create an alternative world, to modify or augment 
the real world through the act of writing” (1975a, p. 81). Said illustrates how this desire 
to invent is tied to a worldview according to which in the period in Europe that covers the 
lives of Defoe to Dickens and Balzac the world is gradually secularized and therefore 
increasingly perceived as being incomplete, in need of change and full of gaps which 
aesthetic objects such as novels are allowed to fill in (Said, 1975a, p. 82). Said describes 
how he sees this motive to be correlated to the historical worldview of Europe in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that therefore similar individual 
authority cannot easily be found in other novelistic traditions around the world.  
To make his point, he briefly compares the European novel to writings produced in 
Arabic, which leads him to conclude that while Modern Arabic literature includes novels, 
they are almost entirely of the twentieth century. This leads him to write that the 
historical, European desire to change or augment the real world by writing “is inimical to 
the Islamic world-view” (Said, 1975a, p. 81). In Islamic writing epistemic determination 
and discursive constraints on literary production were so great that “no action can depart 
from the Koran; rather each action confirms the already completed presence of the Koran 
and consequently, human existence” (Said, 1975a, p. 82). He adds that more novelistic 
Islamic  
 243 
stories like those in The Arabian Nights are ornamental, variations on the world, not 
completions of it; neither are they lessons, structures, extensions, or totalities 
designed to illustrate either the author’s prowess in representation, the education of 
a character, or ways in which the world can be viewed and changed. (Said, 1975a, p. 
81) 
And while invention as a literary motive can be discerned at an earlier historical moment 
in the Western novelistic tradition than in Islamic writing, just like in Islamic writing, it 
has been met with what Said calls ‘molestation’, a term that designates the way in which 
the existential writer is pressured from brute facts of existence, epistemic determination, 
adjacent discourses, and the archive that determines what can be said, what not, and if it 
can be said then also in what particular form it can be said. ‘Molestation’ is the writer’s 
realization or consciousness that writing is a worldly activity that takes place within the 
constraints of other writing, thought and institutions and that therefore his or her 
authority to begin or invent is never complete nor seamless but always in one way or 
another ‘molested’ (Said, 1975a, p. 84).  
There is a great deal to say about Said’s analysis of the great classical novel as “a literary 
form of secondariness” (1975a, p. 93) in which characters who are otherwise lost in society, 
such as “orphans, outcasts, parvenus, emanations, solitaries, and deranged types whose 
background is either rejected, mysterious, or unknown” (1975a, pp. 92-93) are given an 
alternative life and able to begin anew, as well as about the ways in which according to 
Said the classical and modernist novels represent human existence and experience in such 
a way that the novel became one of the major cultural institutions in Europe that shaped 
the idea of the self (see McCarthy, 2010, pp. 63-66). In this study, I wish to single out 
Said’s argument about the transition from the classical to the modernist novel that should 
be read in relation to his critique of Foucault’s model of determination. Said’s argument in 
Beginnings is that, in the novelistic tradition of the West, authority and molestation “are 
at the root of the fictional process” (1975a, p. 84) but that they “ultimately have conserved 
the novel because novelists have construed them together as beginning conditions, not as 
conditions for limitlessly expansive fictional invention” (1975a, p. 83). His argument is 
that by the late nineteenth century molestations, which should be seen as the conditions of 
possibility that set the material, mental and discursive context within which a novelist is 
able to begin in fiction, were increasingly experienced by novelists as absolute constraints 
of possibility. To understand this thesis, it is important to know that throughout the 
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chapter, Said describes how in the nineteenth century the novel was gradually exhausting 
itself and by the move from the classical to the modernist novel in the late nineteenth 
century, the sheer amount of novels produced had given the novel as genre such an 
enormous cultural authority and discursive presence in the West that one could speak 
about the ‘novel as institution’. Through the feedback loop in which writing creates its 
own authority, by conforming to other writing, then extending authority to that writing, 
and then deriving even more authority from that writing, the novel had come to produce 
its own discursive restraints.  
In a critique that echoes his stance on the formalist approach to literature of the postwar 
New Criticism, Said goes on to describe how this institutionalization of the novel had for 
effect that modernist novelists increasingly approached the novel no longer as a possibility 
but as a molesting institution, and concerned themselves with form in itself rather than 
with creating an alternative world, or modifying the existing world through the act of 
writing. And so where classical novels present narratives in which characters are able to 
begin anew in a secondary life thanks to the authority of the novelist who takes up a quasi-
paternalist role in relation to his or her characters, modernist novels like Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness, Henry James’s What Maisie Knew or Ford Maddox Ford’s The Good Soldier 
present narratives that have increasingly turned inwards in a narrative method where 
puzzling actions are reconstructed but remain ungraspable for the retrospective narrator, 
thereby frustrating, in the case of Heart of Darkness, for instance, the traumatized 
protagonist-narrator Marlow’s attempts at beginning anew (Said, 1975a, p. 151). And even 
though Conrad’s retrospection in Heart of Darkness provides his readers and critics with 
valuable insights about the workings of modern human consciousness as well as about ‘the 
knitting machine’ of modern systems of thought, the problem with him and his fellow 
modernist novelists, according to Said, is that “the retrospection is performed as a form of 
discursive retrospective supplement to the event-as-action” (1975a, p. 151). This created 
a paradox in the novelistic tradition of the West in which the novel as genre responded to 
the world and its molestations by retreating from the world in its own form, forsaking its 
former function as active modifier of reality, and forcing itself to take up a new cultural 
function of passive supplementary – a change in the novel that comes to a high point with 
James Joyce’s 1922 novel Ulysses and its “very difficult art whose connections with reality 
are seldom obvious” (Said, 1975a, p. 151). And so we could say that precisely at a historical 
moment when the secularization of society was gaining momentum, the Western 
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modernist novel in form and function came to lean more closely on the religious Islamic 
writing of the Middle Ages. 
We have seen how in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography Said argues that in 
Heart of Darkness the protagonist-narrator Marlow responds to the world by taking up a 
state of passivity and gloomy acquiescence in his situation. By establishing an analogy 
with Sartre’s theory of the emotions, Said draws conclusions about Conrad’s agency as a 
writer from this, that is, that Conrad irreflectively chooses not to act upon the objective 
reality but to fold back upon himself, to pacify himself and to not take up his responsibility 
about his situation. Said’s argument now seems to be of a much greater magnitude that 
the entire late-nineteenth-century modernist novel took on such a passive state to the 
world. “The problem”, he goes on,  
is the author-novelist himself, upon whom the pressure of the novel as institution 
weighs heavily. The novel’s paternal role . . . appears to be increasingly a formal one. 
Authority gives way to repetition, as mimesis gives way to parody and innovation 
to rewriting. Each new novel recapitulates not life but other novels. It is not much 
to say . . . that the late-nineteenth century phase of the novel which I have been 
discussing can be characterized as one in which narrative loses the sense of 
beginnings with which it had commenced. And this because the author now 
considers himself as much a creation as is his writing. (Said, 1975a, pp. 151-152) 
The passage above describes how the problem of the modernist novel in the late nineteenth 
century and its change of cultural function can be explained by the increasing restraints 
of the novel as institution on the mind of the individual author-novelist, but that the 
experience of such worldly molestations on the modernist author’s consciousness cannot 
be seen as an excuse because it is ultimately the responsibility of the individual author-
novelist to have chosen to given in to those pressures and produce self-inwardly, 
retrospective formalist literature. From the way in which Said describes the late-
nineteenth-century modernist novel and its intertextual play, it is hard to refrain from 
considering the modernist novel as a textbook example of Nietzsche’s definition of 
literature as creative repetition, of writing as rewriting. What Said seems to be arguing 
by describing how the modernist novel “recapitulates not life but other novels” is that such 
modernist novelists are the product of individual writers who exert too little will of their 
own and thus in the intentional act of beginning (irreflectively or reflectively) take up 
authorial positions in which they conform to the authority of discourse, thus diminishing 
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the quasi-paternalist authority of their classical predecessors to an increasingly formal 
one. Said’s argument therefore seems to be that the quintessential modernist author-
novelist takes up an authorial position in which he or she comes to embody Foucault’s 
author-function, that is, an author who renounces his or her own authority as existential 
writer and acquiesces in or interiorizes, so to speak, the idea that discourse produces not 
only texts but authors and that therefore the authority of a writer is “as much a creation 
as is his writing”. In this way, I think, Said’s description of the move from the classical to 
the modernist novel is also an implicit critique addressed to Foucault’s antihumanist model 
of determination and the danger of passivity that adopting such a model of agency entails. 
For while Said is enthusiastic about Foucault’s intellectual project and its technique of 
trouble as a critique of humanism and an attempt to reveal the operations of power, he is 
remarkably less positive and even pessimistic about what he calls Foucault’s “philosophy 
of decenterment” (1975a, p. 378) and its arguments on epistemic determination, linguicity 
and the insignificant role of the subject in the production of knowledge. And yet Foucault 
himself was always very optimistic about this. In opening his conférence on the author by 
asking the audience what does it matter who speaks, Foucault in a way anticipated the 
response that he would give to Lucien Goldmann in the question-and-answer session after 
the lecture. There Foucault assured Goldmann, who had argued in Le Dieu Caché (1955) 
that every literary work is the structured expression of a worldview that is the collective 
product of real subjects responding to an equally real objective situation (see Williams, 
1971, pp. 12-13), that his reduction of the author to a discursive function did not mean the 
loss of all subjectivity and human activity without which literary production, according to 
Goldmann, would become void, uninteresting and impossible even. “Définir comment 
s’exerce la function auteur n’équivaut pas à dire que l’auteur n’existe pas", Foucault replied, 
at which he ironically implored Goldmann to put away his handkerchief, “. . . Retenons 
donc nos larmes” (1994e, p. 818). As Giorgio Agamben argues, Foucault’s point is that the 
analysis of authors as discursive functions does not mean the dismissal of subjectivity from 
his thinking but should be seen as a radical theoretical gesture to open up new and more 
productive ways to more clearly see the workings of the individual subject in literature 
and in the production of knowledge, while at the same time being able to see the 
determining forces that work upon an individual subject that identify and constitute him 
or her as auteur of a certain text or corpus of texts (Agamben, 2005, pp. 80-81; Foucault, 
1994e, p. 817). The living subject, Agamben argues, is at the heart of Foucault’s thinking 
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but it is never present in a work of literature except for in the objective, discursive 
processes that constitute it (2005, p. 81). But Foucault’s remarks did not persuade the 
author of Le Dieu Caché nor the author of Beginnings, who, in his discussion of Foucault’s 
theories seems to side with Goldmann and does not follow Foucault’s optimism about “so 
bleak and antisentimental a view of man” (Said, 1975a, p. 287) 
“The drama of Foucault’s work”, Said beliefs, “is that he is always coming to terms with 
language as both the constricting horizon and the energizing atmosphere within and by 
which all human activity must be understood” (1975a, p. 284; emphasis added). According 
to Said, the problem of Foucault is that by positing the primacy of the “historical a priori” 
(1975a, p. 284) of the épistèmè and its determining force on the archive that in its turn 
regulates and acts as a formidable censor on discourse and writing, he is arguing that all 
individual writing is already pre-informed, pre-structured and pre-ordered and individual 
intention is effectively domesticated by the system. Moreover, if the authority of individual 
writers to initiate new or renewed meanings in literature exists solely because of its 
approval by discursive formation in advance, then the whole idea of an author beginning 
a deliberately other production of meaning and of change in a discursive field is precluded. 
In fact, such a view even robs individual authors of their products, because if everything 
is already prestructured by the rule of discursive formation, then all new, other produced 
meanings were already thought possible by the épistèmè and were already outlined in the 
discursive field, awaiting, seemingly as dots to be connected, to be filled in by writings. 
Then discourse and not the individual author is the real producer of texts and knowledge. 
What underlies Foucault’s analyses, is a conceptualization of agency that turns the 
conditions of possibility of human activity, the situations that cause creative responses, 
into the absolute, outer limits or constraints of such activity. In this way, Foucault has, at 
least according to Said, incarcerated man within a linguistic system, the effect of which “is 
that man as we know him is dissolved” (1975a, p. 286). His argument is that Foucault’s 
antihumanist methodologies make us lose our grip completely on man, as we can no longer 
see its products. If one is to follow Foucault’s idea of the author-function, then “man is 
dissolved in the overarching waves, in the quanta, the striations of language itself, turning 
finally into little more than a constituted subject, a speaking pronoun, fixed indecisively 
in the eternal, ongoing rush of discourse” (Said, 1975a, p. 287).  
The implicit argument in Beginnings is that this dissolution of man in discourse is 
mirrored in the move from the classical to the modernist novel. Said cites none other than 
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Conrad, who has his narrator Marlow in Heart of Darkness describe Kurtz as “just a word 
for me” (2006, p. 27) and then later has him continue to say: 
I made the strange discovery that I had never imagined him as doing you know, but 
as discoursing. I didn’t say to myself, ‘Now I will never see him’ or ‘Now I will never 
shake him by the hand,’ but, ‘now I will never hear him.’ The man presented himself 
as a voice. Not of course that I did not connect him with some sort of action . . . That 
was not the point. The point was in his being a gifted creature, and that of all his 
gifts the one that stood out preeminently, that carried with it a sense of real presence, 
was his ability to talk, his word – the gift of expression, the bewildering, the 
illuminating, the most exalted, and the most contemptible, the pulsating stream of 
light, or the deceitful flow from the heart of an impenetrable darkness. (Conrad, 2006, 
p. 47) 
While Said offers no explanation of this passage and chooses to let it speak for itself, I 
would like to indicate that we should read Marlow’s words as a warning of the 
methodological consequences of applying Foucaultian discourse analysis. In my view, 
Foucault’s discourse analysis is a highly original methodology that shows us that there is 
no such thing as an isolated work of literature because every text is connected to an infinite 
horizon of other words, speeches, texts and discourses, and therefore produces a kind of 
intertextual meaning which the individual author cannot possibly hope to foresee and over 
which he or she therefore has no full control. The benefit of Foucaultian discourse analysis 
is that it is able to analyze how the content and form of a literary text is determined by a 
larger, underlying system of thought that has its rules and laws of formation; “an 
impenetrable darkness” to most approaches to literature, but penetrable by discourse 
analysis. However – and this is a position I share with Said – it only allows us to 
conceptualize individual subjects as “discoursing” and not “as doing”, by which I mean that 
it regards individual subjects as interchangeable speakers of a system of thought, robbing 
them not only of their individual voice but also of the possibility of agency.  
Having cited Conrad, Said presents his argument about Foucault’s conceptualization of 
discourse in what is the key passage in understanding the position which his own critical 
practice takes up in relation to that of Foucault – not just in Beginnings but in Orientalism 
too. While Said is deeply sympathetic to Foucault’s intellectual project because of its 
radical attempts to unmask seemingly universal truths, and to lay bare and criticize the 
dominating and coercing workings of underlying systems of thought, Foucault’s 
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positioning of discourse over speaking subjects makes him feel uneasy, because it means 
that language becomes the first and final frontier of all thought, a tyrannical feedback 
system “in which man is the speaking subject whose actions are always converted into 
signs that signify him, which signs he uses in turn to signify other signs, and so on to 
infinity” (1975a, p. 288). Said’s ultimate argument is that by turning the relationship 
between discourse and individuals upside down, language in the work of Foucault has 
achieved “a position of mastery over man, language has reduced him to a discursive 
function. The world of activity and of human experience stand silently aside while language 
constitutes order and legislates discovery” (Said, 1975a, p. 288; emphasis added). I have 
highlighted the words “activity” and “human experience”, two crucial terms that define 
Said’s view on literature and his related conceptualization of agency. In fact, my entire 
discussion of Said’s critical practice so far has revolved around precisely these two terms. 
I have stressed that, for him, literature is the manmade product of a human activity set in 
and responding to a particular worldly situation, and that the literary work is not just a 
linguistic object in which language refers to itself and other linguistic objects but the 
expression, conveyor and shaper of a particular human, lived experience. 
The main issue which Said has with Foucault’s work is that while the French thinker 
frequently acknowledges changes in épistèmès by selecting and contrasting highly 
significant but discontinuous moments in history,73 like most structuralists, he does not 
seem to be concerned with explaining how and why these epistemic changes happen. The 
fact that they have happened and that there are differences between different épistèmès, is 
more important than explaining the way in which these differences came into being (Said, 
1975a, p. 315). While Foucault is certainly no structuralist, his work equally doesn’t 
seriously account for change and force, for “the powerful and sometimes wasteful 
behavioral activity of man” (Said, 1975a, p. 335). Foucault doesn’t show “why structure 
structures: structure is always revealed in the condition of having structured, but never . . 
. in the condition of structuring, or of being structured, or of failing to structure” (Said, 
1975a, p. 337). It is Said’s conviction that the cause for this is Foucault’s dominantly 
                                               
73 Foucault’s approach is most clear in the introduction to his 1961 history of madness, a study that largely 
revolves around two distinct moments in history with two equally distinct treatments of madness: “Dans 
l’histoire de la folie, deux événements signalent cette altération avec une singulière netteté: 1657, la création de 
l’Hôpital général, et le ‘grand renfermement’ des pauvres; 1794, libération des enchaînés de Bicêtre” (1961, p. 10). 
The former moment is marked by a blind repression of madness in an absolutist regime, the other by the 
progressive discoveries of positivistic science. Foucault’s goal is to note the difference, not what caused these 
epistemic changes. 
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linguistic apprehension of reality that permits language to be a truly totalitarian and 
tyrannical system of thought because it regards the human subject as the byproduct or 
structure of language and no longer as its central producer. Because in Foucault’s model 
speaking subjects are inscribed in a discursive situation that is at any one moment in time 
and place always already begun and will continue to be under way even long after the 
disappearance of the individual speaking subject, “man now lives in a circle without a 
center, in a maze without a way out” (Said, 1975a, pp. 315-316). These words might well 
remind us of Said’s conceptualization of language and culture in Joseph Conrad and the 
Fiction of Autobiography that is based on the existential phenomenological works of 
Merleau-Ponty. According to that conceptualization, the individual speaking subject is 
also surrounded by concentric circles of language but the difference is that it finds itself 
not in a maze but in a labyrinth of incarnations. And though the difference between 
conceptualizing language and culture as a maze or a labyrinth might at first sight seem 
rather small and trivial even, it is crucial and unravels Said’s position versus Foucault. For 
while a labyrinth is similar to a maze in that, as we recall Said’s description from 1967, it 
is “a complexity that has no discernible end or beginning” (1967a, p. 67), unlike a maze, a 
labyrinth does have a center. That center is the human subject or “linguacentric man” 
(Said, 1967a, p. 55) who, similar to in Foucault’s model, may also have no choice but to use 
language, at least in this model the human subject stands in the center, at the beginning 
of thought and activity. And even though in this view of language, language still has its 
own constraints and own logic that makes it possible to generate its own meaning and 
exert determining constraints on speaking subjects – just like in Foucault’s 
conceptualization of discourse – it nevertheless does not work in an overdetermining way 
and always remains open to the intentions of individuals who can use these constraints 
productively.  
And so Said’s meditation on beginnings is a response to Foucault that highlights that 
beginnings are not just constructs – the Auerbachian intertext of Beginnings – but also the 
result of an individual speaking subject’s authorial position versus a determining – but by 
no means overdetermining – system. Said argues that individual authors must select a 
beginning by being creative with the given rules of a linguistic system, with the “burdens 
and confusions” (1975a, p. 73) of a labyrinth, not a maze. This is Said’s way of stressing 
that a beginning – be it a new work of literature, literary criticism, or a work in any other 
discursive field – is always the product of an interplay between the deeper laws or the 
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internal constraints of discourse working on the individual speaking subject and the 
individual creativity of that subject (1975a, pp. 52-56). This is how Beginnings opens up a 
discursive space that frees individual human intention from its domestication by a system 
of thought, creating the possibility of beginnings, that is, the intentional, conscious 
production of meaning (see 1975a, pp. 319-320). Though Said’s model takes into account 
the myriad of constraints or molestations working on individual speaking subjects, it still 
treats literary texts as the embodiment of authorial consciousnesses or lived experiences 
of their authors – a sign of the continued importance of Poulet and the criticism of 
consciousness. In this way, contrary to Foucault’s, Said’s can account for change, for 
individual texts and personal voices in a discursive field by introducing the possibility of a 
certain distance between discourse and individual articulations thereby finding an answer 
to the problem caused by a decentered linguistic apprehension of the world that allows for 
“no tone, in Richards’s sense of the word, in any statement, no sense of an individual voice 
that is its own final authority, since . . . the whole world is contained within a gigantic set 
of quotation marks” (Said, 1975a, p. 338). And so in contrapuntally combining the creative 
energies of Foucault with a continued engagement with those of Blackmur, Poulet, 
Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Nietzsche, to name but a few, Said’s Beginnings does not just 
present a politicized model of reading and a theory of praxis, but a humanist defense of 
literature in antihumanist times, an ode to that “solitary, crystalline perdurability we feel 
and know in a poem, the condition of its exile from the communal sea of linguicity” (1975a, 
p. 338). 
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3.6 Epilogue: Philology and Democratic Criticism 
Said’s posthumous Humanism and Democratic Criticism (2004a) proposes a return to 
philology as a strategy for revitalizing the humanities. Earlier, in Culture and Imperialism 
(1993) Auerbach’s reading of Dante in Mimesis (2003, pp. 174-212) served as an inspiration 
for Said’s coining of the term ‘contrapuntal reading’.74 Now, in Humanism and Democratic 
Criticism, Said presents a compelling argument for the continued relevance and enduring 
value of the philology of Auerbach, Ernst Robert Curtius, Leo Spitzer, and Richard Poirier 
in a political context post-9/11 and an institutional context in which the antihumanist 
methods of reading associated with Derrida’s deconstruction and Foucault’s discourse 
analysis have become the hegemonic forms of scholarship in the humanities. 
The same tension that I have identified between Said’s engagement with Auerbach and 
Foucault in Beginnings resurfaces in Humanism and Democratic Criticism, in which he posits 
philological humanism “as a useable praxis for intellectuals and academics who want to 
know what they are doing, what they are committed to as scholars, and who want also to 
connect these principles to the world in which they live as citizens” (2004a, p. 6). Said 
invokes Auerbach again to plead for a model of criticism in which the critic has creativity, 
freedom and agency as opposed to what he considers to be a quietistic poststructuralist 
model. In Said’s view, philology is a much needed counterforce to poststructuralism and 
its decentered linguistic apprehension of the world that displaces or demotes the individual 
to a status of illusory autonomy supported by a whole sets of ideologies (2004a, pp. 9-11). 
Contrary to this, philology defends the value of “the individual particular, without which 
                                               
74 According to Auerbach, Dante is unique in the history of Western literature because he is the first medieval 
vernacular author whose style can be described as a special form of juxtaposition or parataxis which Auerbach 
labels “contrapuntal” (2003, p. 178). The ‘genius’ of Dante is that the connection between scenes “is no mere 
juxtaposition but the vital relationship of counterpoint, of the sudden breaking in of something dimly foreboded. 
The events are not . . . divided into little parcels; they live together, despite their contrast and actually because 
of it” (Auerbach, 2003, p. 180). Dante’s style of realism merges the elevated style of Homer and the low style of 
the Vulgate into a style of earthly historicity that speaks of “sensory experience of life on earth – among the most 
essential characteristics of which would seem to be its possessing a history, its changing and developing” 
(Auerbach, 2003, p. 191). Similarly, the ambiguities which Said analyzes in Heart of Darkness, Mansfield Park, 
L’Étranger or La Peste can paradoxically be thought together not in spite of their contrast but because of it. 
Likewise, Said’s ‘worldliness’ is partially inspired by Auerbach’s notion of the ‘earthly’ or, in German, irdisch, 
which designates the particular, contingent, concrete, secular context within which literature is embedded (2003, 
p. 193; see also 2007). Again, Auerbach is contrapuntally connected to Foucault, who serves as the inspiration 
for the textual aspect of Said’s worldliness thesis according to which texts are bearers of authority (Hussein, 
2002, pp. 182-183). 
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there can be no real literature, no utterance worth making and cherishing, no human 
history and agency fit to protect and encourage” (Said, 2004a, p. 80). It firmly locates the 
human subject in the center of its lifeworld and teaches us that language is not impassive 
and incarcerating but activating and empowering (Said, 2004a, pp. 59-60). Philology, in 
short, selects the individual particular as a beginning – a highly important theoretical 
gesture, indeed. In addition, in times in which the cultural authority of the humanities is 
in a rapid decline because of institutional pressures in the academy (see Greenblatt, 2003), 
philology gives them a much needed raison d’être as it defends the idea that literature 
matters because it is not just one of many similar discursive statements but “provides the 
most heightened example we have of words in action and therefore is the most complex, 
rewarding . . . of all verbal practices” (Said, 2004a, p. 60). 
Said proposes a humanist model of literary criticism that it is secular, open-ended, self-
critical, liberating, and produced in the interests of democracy (2004a, pp. 21-22). The 
guiding principles of Said’s democratic criticism are the philological values of sympathy and 
self-knowledge, which turn literary criticism into a constantly to be renewed process of 
formulation and interpretation whose subject matter is our own self (Said, 2004a, pp. 93, 
116). The relevance and value of philological humanism in democratic societies post-9/11 
is that it is different from the hegemonic approaches to literature that derive their 
methodologies from Derridean deconstruction or Foucaultian discourse analysis who “end 
(as they began) in undecidability” and therefore advocate “reductiveness, cynicism, or 
fruitless standing aside” (Said, 2004a, p. 66). For Said, the close readings of Spitzer and 
Auerbach are truly enlightening and emancipatory because they begin with the taking up 
of responsibility for one’s reading, with a critical choice and ethical imperative that “as 
citizens we enter into a text with responsibility and scrupulous care. Otherwise why 
bother at all?” (2004a, p. 67).
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Chapter 4  
An Orient of  Dissonance
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4.1 Introduction: Stanford, 1975 
In the period 1975-1976 Said had the luxury as an academic to take some time off from 
teaching at Columbia University and focus on research and writing. He was the recipient 
of a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford 
University and spent the period there to write up most of the chapters that would make 
up Orientalism (1978). Having read about Orientalism for a number of years since the Third 
Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 initially made him aware of the myriad of hostile, 
dehumanizing and demeaning misrepresentations circulating in the U.S. public sphere, 
events spiraling out of control in Lebanon in that same period 1975-1976 made the issue 
of writing a full-scaled and methodical examination of the way in which the West 
culturally, politically, intellectually and morally came to terms with the Middle-East, its 
societies and its peoples all the more pressing. 
In the Spring of 1975 minor violence in Beirut between Maronite Christians and 
predominantly Muslim Palestinians erupted in an all-out conflict between militias of the 
Phalange – a right-wing Christian Democratic political party mainly supported by 
Maronite Catholics –, the Lebanese National Movement – an alliance between leftist, pan-
Arabist and Syrian nationalist factions, that was later supported by the Palestine 
Liberation Organization of Yasser Arafat – and the ever-weakening Lebanese national 
government that sought to maintain order. The spark that set of the unfortunate series of 
events was the so-called ‘Bus incident’ in April 1975, when over twenty Palestinians 
traveling by bus through the Ain-el Rammaneh district in Beirut were ambushed and 
killed by Phalangist militiamen as a reprisal to earlier skirmishes and exchange of fire 
between the Phalange and PLO sympathizers (Weinberger, 1986, p. 147). The conflict 
reached its first grim high point on December 6, 1975, a day infamously known as ‘Black 
Saturday’, when in response to the killings of four Phalange members, Phalangist militias 
reacted with what can only be described as a massacre in the streets of Beirut, murdering 
two hundreds of Muslims on the basis of identity cards, causing in its turn Muslims and 
Palestinian militias to retaliate killing hundreds of Christians (Harris, 2012, p. 236). In 
this vicious spiral of violence, on January 18, 1976, Phalangist paramilitaries captured 
Karantina, a city slum in East Beirut inhabited by Palestinians, Kurds and Syrians, that 
was controlled by militias of the PLO (Chomsky, 1989, p. 171). When Phalangists entered 
the slum, they expelled the inhabitants and killed more than one thousand people (Harris, 
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2012, p. 236). This act of violence caused the PLO to officially join the conflict and an all-
out war erupted that would drag Lebanon into a fifteen-year spiral of violence and civil 
war. Two days later, on January 20, 1976, as a reprisal to the Karantina massacre the PLO 
retaliated with a massacre of its own in Damour, a Maronite town south of Beirut, killing 
twenty Phalangist militiamen and every single one of the more than 500 villagers 
(Chomsky & Said, 1999, pp. 184-185; Fisk, 2001, pp. 99-100; Harris, 2012, p. 236). The 
events in Lebanon in 1975-1976 set in motion more than a decade of violence, internal 
conflict, foreign interventions, a military invasion by Israel, a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, and more reprisal massacres 
and mass killings – of which the most infamous are undoubtedly the 1982 massacres at 
Sabra and Shatila of Palestinians and Shiite Muslims perpetrated by the Phalange, then 
allied with the Israeli Defense Force (Fisk, 2001, pp. 382-383). The Lebanese civil war 
would last until 1990, eventually cause the death of at least 100,000 people and the 
displacement of another 1,300,000 in Lebanon and its neighboring countries (Harris, 2012, 
p. 235). 
Witnessing most of the events from a safe distance in newspapers, television and radio 
news while writing Orientalism at Stanford, the Lebanese civil war intensified Said’s 
politicization. In 1977, before the book’s publication, he was elected as an independent 
member without political affiliation to the Palestine National Council, the legislative body 
of the PLO that acted as a representative of the Palestinians in Israel, Lebanon and the 
diaspora – a significant political gesture that, given the PLO’s open use of violence and, 
frankly, terrorism, Said at all costs wanted to downplay by labelling it as “nothing more 
than symbolism” (Said quoted by Salusinszky, 1987, p. 128). But compared to that of the 
1967 June War, the impact of the 1975-1976 events in Lebanon on Said’s academic writing 
at first sight seems rather insignificant. And yet there are many traces of it. In Columbia 
University’s Rare Book and Manuscript Library there is a short unpublished piece written 
in September 1975 by Said as a reaction to the breakout and the early stages of the 
Lebanese civil war, called “The Sorrows of Lebanon” (1975b). In the essay, Said lamented 
what he called the ongoing crisis of representation in Lebanon, in which none of the three 
parties “represents either a decisive majority of people and power or a decisive majority of 
ideas” (1975b). According to Said, the ongoing conflict is justified. It “is about who will, 
and has a right to, speak for the Arab future” (1975b) but its violence drags the country 
into a quagmire of passivity, where the country waits to be dictated by Egypt, usurping 
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Lebanon’s right to speak for its own, pressured by its neighbor Syria, or invaded at will 
by Israel “only for destroying the Arab realities of Palestine” (1975b). And while Said’s 
lamentations have never been published, the sorrows of Lebanon are at the heart of 
Orientalism which opens with a brief but important passage on the Lebanese civil war, 
turning Lebanon’s crisis of representation into a metaphor for the whole problem of 
Orientalism. 
The Ansatzpunkt of Orientalism, if you will, to methodically examine Western 
representations of the Middle-East, its cultures, societies, peoples, religions, and 
languages is a short remark made by a French journalist on a visit to Beirut in 1975-1976, 
who reminisces on Nerval’s and Chateaubriand’s voyages en Orient and lamentingly 
contrasts their early-nineteenth descriptions of Beirut with the city’s unrecognizably 
gutted downtown area in the present. Said seems to have asked himself why, while faced 
with the impinging reality of a war-torn Beirut and the ongoing experiences of suffering 
by its population, the sorrows of Lebanon seem to be invisible for the journalist who only 
has an eye for his experience of a disappearing Orient of his beloved French travel writers, 
once depicted as “a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, 
remarkable experiences” (Said, 1978, p. 1). “Perhaps it seemed irrelevant,” Said goes on to 
describe the problematic of Orientalism, 
that Orientals themselves had something at stake in the process, that even in the 
time of Chateaubriand and Nerval Orientals had lived there, and that now it was 
they who were suffering; the main thing for the European visitor was a European 
representation of the Orient and its contemporary fate, both of which had a 
privileged communal significance for the journalist and his French readers. (1978, 
p. 1) 
There is something at work here that makes the French journalist value his own 
communal Western experience of aesthetic loss as more important than those of the people 
in Beirut living, suffering and actually losing their lives to the ongoing spirals of violence. 
There is something that overrides the journalist’s seeing of these experiences even. Said 
famously defines that ‘something’ as ‘Orientalism’, that is, “a way of coming to terms with 
the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience” 
(1978, p. 1). 
Published in 1978, Orientalism is the first work of a 1978-1981 trilogy in which The 
Question of Palestine (1979), and Covering Islam (1981) are respectively the second and third 
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installments. Orientalism is by far the most theoretical of these three and lays the 
theoretical foundations for the analyses in those other two. It combines and brings to a 
high point the line of thinking set out by Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography 
(1966), “The Arab Portrayed” (1970a) and Beginnings (1975a). The link with the middle 
work is perhaps the most obvious: Orientalism is a study of the relation between the Arab 
World and the West that examines and criticizes the dominant and persistent 
representations of Arabs circulating in the West while explicitly addressing the links 
between such demeaning representations and concerns of geopolitical interest. It 
illustrates how in Western representations an Orient is constructed or ‘Orientalized’ as a 
special place of European interest. The Orient is an idealized place of opulence, richness, 
sensuality, sexual desire, splendor, magic, despotism, irrationality, weakness, 
backwardness and mass-mentality as well as the ancient source of Europe’s civilizations, 
languages and the place of Europe’s oldest and most prestigious colonies. It is Europe’s 
cultural contestant and “one of its deepest and most recurrent images of the ‘Other’” (Said, 
1978, p. 1). 
As these assumptions and recurring images illustrate, the Orient is truly idealized in 
Western imagination, which leads Said to conclude early on  
that the Orient is not an inert fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as the 
Occident itself is not just there either . . . as both geographical and cultural entities – 
to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as 
‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’ are man-made. Therefore as much as the West itself, the 
Orient is an idea that has a history and a tradition of thought, imagery, and 
vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two 
geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other. (1978, pp. 4-
5) 
What Said describes here is how Orientalism is a symptom of imaginative geography, of 
how a space is created and endowed with certain qualities with an imaginative or figurative 
value. The process of imaginative geography works similar to what the French 
phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard writes about a house in La poétique de l’espace (1958), 
to which Said refers (1978, pp. 54-55). Bachelard illustrates how the objective side of a 
house is far less important than the emotional qualities that we attribute to it and which 
we value, experience and feel in that house as a humanized space. Inside, a house can feel 
‘homelike’, ‘haunted’ or ‘magical’, for instance; from the outside it can be ‘leering’, 
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‘imposing’ or ‘keeping watch over its surroundings’, to name but a few attributed qualities 
(Bachelard, 1958, p. 48). Likewise, Orientalist history and geography as Said analyzes 
them in Orientalism are instances of such imaginative knowledge because in the Western 
consciousness the Orient was always “something more than what appears to be merely 
positive knowledge” (Said, 1978, p. 55).75 
This of course also ties in with Said’s earlier work on perception in Joseph Conrad and 
the Fiction of Autobiography. For in Orientalism he illustrates how the perception of “a brute 
reality” (1978, p. 5) is imbued with imaginative meaning through recurrent imageries, 
ideas, idioms, and vocabulary articulated in a discourse. These Orientalist images then 
inform, override and sometimes even stand in the way any objective knowledge about the 
region and its people. It is important to note that these images primarily stand in a 
consonant relation with each other and not necessarily with a reality of some sort. 
Orientalism then works in such a pervasive way that this idealized but ‘fictional’ Orient, 
the Orient of imaginative geography, is without all too much reflection perceived, felt and 
experienced as the true Orient by nearly every author he discusses. In Orientalism as a 
scholarly discourse, as we will later see in more detail, that manmade ‘truth’ is then 
disguised as objective knowledge. In fact, Said’s ‘Conradian’ argument is that the Orient 
of Orientalism is not the product of a veridic discourse but truly a magical place – in 
Bachelard’s or more precisely in Sartre’s sense of the word. That is, the Orient of 
Orientalism is an imaginative place, a reduced and schematized perceptual fiction of a real 
location, with real peoples, real customs and real lives that are all far more complex than 
anything that is said about them in Western discourse – not some Oriental essence but an 
objective reality that is too difficult to grasp as it is (Said, 1978, p. 273). But this real Orient 
is beyond Said’s scope of study. What interests him is “the sheer knitted-together strength 
of Orientalist discourse” (1978, p. 6), the ‘false light’ of Orientalism and how it illuminates 
Western consciousness and perceptual experience, how it works as a ‘knitting machine’ 
that, we remember Said saying about Conrad’s metaphor, “knits us in and out – thought, 
perception, everything” (1966, p. 139; my emphasis). And so, he goes on to state the intention 
                                               
75 For an outline of the formative influence of Orientalism on the discipline of human geography, see Michael 
Frank’s “Imaginative Geography as a Travelling Concept” (2009). The article discusses the role of Bachelard in 
Orientalism and argues that Said’s text is much closer to Bachelard than it is to Foucault (Frank, 2009, p. 71). 
While Bachelard’s poetics of space does indeed serve as a way for Said to illustrate Orientalism, attributing more 
theoretical weight to Bachelard than to Foucault highly overinflates the importance of the French 
phenomenologist’s work and distorts Said’s argument all too much. 
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of his study, “the phenomenon of Orientalism, as I study it here deals principally not with 
a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of 
Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient . . . despite or beyond any correspondence, or 
lack thereof, with a ‘real’ Orient” (Said, 1978, p. 5). 
What links Orientalism to Beginnings, is that in the former work the latter work’s 
intellectual project and its model of criticism that not only attempts to read, analyze, and 
criticize hegemonic systems of thought but also combat them comes to fruition. Orientalism 
is an attempt to change the critical consciousness and, in short, to begin anew. Moreover, 
Said’s preferred method of humanism as a technique of trouble can be readily discerned in 
Orientalism, in that the work refuses to offer clear-cut answers to the complex questions it 
raises but repeatedly thematizes the complex web of Orientalism. Take, for instance, Said’s 
opening gambit of defining Orientalism in a threefold manner. According to Said, 
Orientalism is an interdependent constellation that should all at the same time be regarded 
as (1) an academic discipline with doctrines and theses about its object of study, the Orient 
(1978, p. 2), (2) a general style of thought based on the presumably true starting point that 
there is an ontological and epistemological difference between an ‘Orient’ and an ‘Occident’ 
(1978, pp. 2-3); and (3) a corporate institution for dealing with the Orient, “a discourse” 
(1978, p. 3) or “a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over 
the Orient” (1978, p. 3). While the whole work is a continuation of Beginnings in general, 
these latter remarks make it particularly clear that Said’s in-depth reflections on 
‘authority’ and ‘discourse’ in his meditation on beginnings are of continued importance for 
our understanding of Orientalism. For what is rather abstractly approached as the problem 
of authority and beginnings is now picked up as the highly acute problem of resistance to 
the determination of the system of thought and its discourse that is Orientalism. Said’s 
theory of beginnings which is built on Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse combined 
with a humanist focus on individual subjectivity, in attributing authority and individual 
intention to existential writers, informs the analyses of Orientalism. We should therefore 
understand Said’s Orientalism as an attempt to put his theory of discursivity with 
subjectivity to practical use in analyzing the workings of Orientalism and devising a 
theory of resistance, of humans speaking back to a dehumanizing discourse. 
While Said frequently comments on concerns of personal interest and does not eschew 
talking about his personal life in interviews, one can hardly find references to his personal 
situation in his more traditional academic work. And while my overall argument of this 
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study is that worldly events have a profound impact on Said’s literary critical practice, as 
they provide his theories and insights with a personal rationale and motivation, unlike 
such thinkers as Foucault (1994b, p. 748) and Raymond Williams (1973, pp. 2-3), he 
seldom thematizes this personal involvement himself. It is therefore exceptional and at 
first sight even surprising that at the end of the introduction to Orientalism he writes that 
[m]y own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. 
The life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. 
There exists here an almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not exist, 
and when it is allowed that he does, it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental. The 
web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology 
holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which 
every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny. (1978, p. 27) 
I have singled out this passage because it sums up the most important cultural 
ramifications, ideological workings and personal repercussions of Orientalism as a system 
of thought. In a reference to Antonio Gramsci’s work on hegemony, it describes how 
Orientalism in the West is supported by an almost unanimous consensus that causes there 
to be little to no resistance to it. Moreover, just like in “The Arab Portrayed” (1970a), Said 
describes here that an Arab Palestinian in the West is either politically inexistent or seen 
as a nuisance or an obstacle. The image that Said draws of an Arab Palestinian in the West, 
is that of a demeaned, bothersome, reified, alienated and passive subject. 
But the importance of this passage to our understanding of Orientalism lies not just in 
its content but in the personal tone in which it is written; in the fact that in this passage 
Said avows his personal involvement and very summarily sketches his very own lived 
experience as an Arab Palestinian living and working in the U.S.. What he does, is to 
describe the ways in which he himself experiences and feels the ideological workings of 
Orientalism as a form racism, stereotyping, imperialism and dehumanization, as a 
punishment that forces himself – and all other Arabs or Muslims – into a state of political 
invisibility and passivity. Especially this latter inhibiting effect on individuals is of 
paramount importance for Said. Passivity is one of the primary intellectual concerns of 
Said’s writing in the period leading up to Orientalism and perhaps of his entire career, as 
well as the ultimate reason why he rejects Foucault’s model of determination and agency 
in Beginnings in favor of a model that combines Foucault’s insights on determining 
constraints but with a strong focus on individual human activity and intellectual 
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responsibility. All of this, I believe, explains why in a reference to Foucault he adds: “The 
nexus of knowledge and power creating ‘the Oriental’ and in a sense obliterating him as a 
human being is therefore not for me an exclusively academic matter. Yet it is an intellectual 
matter of some very obvious importance” (Said, 1978, p. 27; his emphasis). 
Said’s autobiographical passage is not only a ventilation of his anger nor merely an 
introductory critique of the passivity and paralysis caused by Orientalism but already the 
first of a series empowering theoretical gestures to combat it. In notebook 11 of the Prison 
Notebooks, Gramsci writes: “The starting point of critical elaboration is the consciousness 
of what one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process to date 
which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory” (1971, p. 
324). A few pages earlier in the introduction to Orientalism, Said cites Gramsci’s remarks 
on the inventory of traces in the Prison Notebooks, adding to Gramsci’s remarks his own 
translation of a part of the Italian text that is left out in the English version, that “therefore 
it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory” (Gramsci quoted by Said, 1978, 
p. 25). Gramsci’s Marxist argument is that every human individual is the product of an 
ensemble of various hidden relations (1971, pp. 352-355). In order for an individual to 
change these relations, alter them and thereby change his or her own situation, he or she 
first has to discover them and compile an inventory of them. Only when the material 
conditions are recognized, inventoried and analyzed is the active subject able to transform 
reality through willed and meaningful action (Bobbio, 1979, pp. 34-35). The Gramscian 
intertext in Orientalism is a key text to understanding its theory of agency and resistance, 
which are made possible through the concept of ‘hegemony’ and the pivotal roles which 
Gramsci attributes to intellectuals in revolutions and historical change. In the final section 
of this chapter, I will analyze Said’s engagement with Gramsci at length.  
The argument which Gramsci presents in the Prison Notebooks is similar to Lukács’ idea 
of class consciousness formulated earlier in 1923, which we have already encountered in 
my discussion of agency in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. According to 
that idea, the self-conscious realization of the class to which one belongs or an awareness 
of the basic determining structures at play in modern capitalism, such as reification, causes 
a moment of crisis that already brings about an objective structural change and prepares 
the way for a willed systemic change (1968, pp. 171-172). And though such knowledge or 
self-understanding in itself isn’t enough to change and overthrow the conditions of 
modern capitalism, in Lukács’ model of revolution it is the prerequisite of such change 
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because at that precise moment of class consciousness the passive object of knowledge at 
one and the same time becomes the active subject of knowledge (1968, pp. 2-3).  
This is precisely Said’s intention in the introduction of Orientalism. For, by describing 
his own lived experience and noting how ever since he was a child growing up in the 
British colonies of Palestine and Egypt he was persistently aware “of being an ‘Oriental’” 
(Said, 1978, p. 25), he is effectively describing how since his youth he has been constituted 
and is still daily reconstituted as an ‘object’ of Orientalism as an overwhelming discourse. 
His subsequent attempt “to inventory the traces upon me” (Said, 1978, p. 25) should be 
read from this combined Gramscian and Lukácsian perspective as an attempt to form an 
insurrectionary critical self-consciousness (McCarthy, 2013b, pp. 88-89). By becoming a 
subject of knowledge as the producer and writer of Orientalism, Said attempts to inaugurate 
insurrectional act of creating of non-coercive, non-dominative and non-essentialist 
knowledge that, referring to Raymond Williams’s project in Culture and Society (1958), will 
actively contribute “to the ‘unlearning’ of the ‘the inherent dominative mode’” (Said, 1978, 
p. 28). Apart from this Gramscian and Lukácsian perspective, Bill Ashcroft and Pal 
Ahluwalia point out that Said’s description of his own experiences as an Arab Palestinian 
in the West, is an empowering gesture that also takes up the unfinished project of the 
Martiniquan existential Marxist and psychiatrist Frantz Fanon in Peau noire, masques 
blancs (1952) and Les damnées de la terre (1961) to move “from a politics of blame to a politics 
of liberation” (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2009, p. 53). Said thus creates an authorial persona 
of the wretched of the earth writing back. And so the insurrectional act at the beginning 
of Orientalism is embedded within a general Marxist project of the coming-to-
consciousness as a preliminary of revolution.  
However, in addition to this, Said’s attempt should also be read from his theory of 
beginnings as a critique of Foucault’s antihumanist conceptualization of discourse. 
Through this specific act of writing – and that of producing Orientalism – Said attempts to 
acquire and effectively secures a subject position within the system of knowledge that is 
Orientalism, to become an interlocutor within the Orientalism discourse. It is Said’s act of 
beginning; his way of creating authority through writing to implant that authority in a 
specific form and thus to conserve the imprint of his individual writing as force (see 1975a, 
p. 100). And so, what at first sight seems to be an exceptionally confessional outpouring 
about one’s personal lived experience in which Said wears his heart on his sleeve, is 
actually an important discursive act of writing through which Said first claims and then 
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exercises his right to speak as an ‘Oriental’, a fundamental human right that Orientalism 
as a discourse denies its ‘objects’. And so on a theoretical level, the autobiographical part 
of the introduction to Orientalism should be read as a highly crucial theoretical gesture to 
consolidate a subject position within the discourse of Orientalism. It should be read as the 
confirmation of subjectivity within discursivity. 
In this chapter I will analyze Said’s theoretical framework in Orientalism. In the first 
two sections I will discuss Said’s continued engagement with Foucault in Orientalism to 
make clear that Orientalism should be understood as a discourse in Foucault’s sense of the 
term that articulates a nexus of knowledge and power to hold its objects of study, the 
Orient and ‘Orientals’ in place. In the course of the following pages it will become clear 
how the theory of discursivity with subjectivity which Said elaborates in Beginnings finds 
expression in Orientalism. By discussing the pivotal concepts of ‘strategic formation’ and 
‘strategic location’, I will illustrate what I have labeled ‘the will to change’ in Orientalism. 
This discussion highlights Said’s method of humanist discourse analysis, according to 
which Orientalism should be conceptualized as a transindividual discourse that is shaped 
by individual writers and that can and should be resisted through deliberate and sustained 
acts of will. My discussion of these two concepts also make clear that a politics of 
responsibility informs Said’s analyses of Orientalism. For even though we should 
understand Orientalism to be working as a transindividual discourse, Said holds individual 
authors responsible for the socio-political uses to which their texts are put and hence for 
the perpetuation of Orientalist images and views. 
The section ‘Humanism and the Cycle of Criticism’ deals with the continued relevance 
of Said’s work on the phenomenology of perception for an understanding of the overall 
argument of Orientalism. This existential phenomenological intertext is vastly 
underacknowledged in the reception of Orientalism but crucial to understand the workings 
of Orientalism as a discourse and as a phenomenon of perception. By closely reading 
passages from Orientalism, I will illustrate how Sartre’s theory of the emotions and the 
theory of cognitive dissonance, which I associate with it, are important to understand the 
workings of Orientalism on human perception and the possibility of resistance that is tied 
to the cycle of criticism described by Said in his revised doctoral treatment of Conrad. In 
this section I will also discuss Said’s conceptualization of literature in Orientalism and its 
unique power to break the schematic authority of Orientalism, a power which it derives 
from Said’s combination of theoretical intertexts that I have discussed in this study. 
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In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the pivotal role of Gramsci’s writings on 
power and culture in Said’s own theory of agency and resistance, which is grounded in the 
contrapuntal combination of Foucault’s work on discourse on Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony. Said’s engagement with Gramsci leads him to emphasize the pivotal role of 
intellectuals in not only perpetuating the hegemony of Orientalism but also their ability 
to resist Orientalism and change society for the better. Orientalism is written from the 
perspective of social justice. By briefly sidestepping to the work of Noam Chomsky and 
his famous televised exchange with Foucault in 1971, I discuss how Said’s approach to 
culture and power relations and his emphasis on individual human agency, which 
distinguishes him from Foucault, is not only informed by Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
but by the ethical imperative to not only criticize power relations but at the same time 
combat social injustice.  
This chapter shows that the threefold definition of Orientalism as a discourse, as a 
phenomenon of perception and as the product of hegemony, allows us to fully grasp Said’s 
conceptualization of literature and agency in Orientalism. 
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4.2 The Will to Truth and Power: Orientalism as a 
Discourse 
Orientalism came out with a bang. It is one of those works of literary criticism that made 
such an enormously monumental impact that it continues to be the topic of adulation, 
emulation, as well as criticism and even downright hostility both inside and outside the 
field of literary studies. The main reason for this is Said’s intervention, which as Ashcroft 
and Ahluwalia summarize, 
is designed to illustrate the manner in which the representation of Europe’s ‘other’s 
has been institutionalized since at least the eighteenth century as a feature of its 
cultural dominance. Orientalism describes the various disciplines, institutions, 
processes of investigation and styles of thought by which Europeans came to ‘know’ 
the ‘Orient’ over several centuries, and which reached their height during the rise 
and consolidation of nineteenth-century imperialism. The key to Said’s interest in 
this way of knowing Europe’s others is that it effectively demonstrates the link 
between knowledge and power, for it ‘constructs’ and dominates Orientals in the 
process of knowing them. (2009, p. 47) 
The argument which Said presents about Orientalism is in line with Conrad’s so-called 
imperialism of ideas converting into the imperialism of nations (see Said, 1966, p. 140), in 
that it shows how Orientalism is not just a rationalization of colonial rule in the Middle-
East after the fact but actually helped justify imperialist interventions and colonial rule in 
advance (1978, p. 39). Orientalism, to a considerable extent, builds on Foucault’s 
conceptualization of discourse to show how the West in its attempt to come to terms with 
and master the Orient puts the Orient in discourse, ‘Orientalizes’ it, and thereby reduces 
the complexity of its reality to more simple linguistic representations (see Foucault, 1976, 
p. 25). It shows that allegedly ‘innocent’ or ‘pure’ knowledge about the Middle-East 
doesn’t merely describe the Orient and ‘Orientals’ but creates these very categories, and 
then, through this putting-into-discourse is able to gain actual control over the region and 
its inhabitants (see Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. 61-62). Though we have seen the 
threefold way in which Said defines Orientalism, he makes it explicitly clear in the 
introduction to the work that Orientalism is above all “a discourse that is by no means in 
direct, corresponding relationship with political power in the raw, but rather is produced 
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and exists in an uneven exchange with various kinds of power” (1978, p. 12). In the 
following pages I argue that, though I realize that the Foucaultian underpinnings of Said’s 
work are still up for debate, Orientalism must be viewed in Foucaultian terms, as a 
discourse which manifests power/knowledge. Said’s Orientalism above all demonstrates 
how Europe’s strategies for knowing that part of the world which it called the Orient, are 
at the same time its strategies for dominating that part of the world. 
With this kind of a claim, it can hardly come as a surprise that Said’s text received fierce 
criticism. By far the most hostile reactions to Orientalism came from those scholars most 
visibly occupied with “knowing Europe’s others”, that is, the scholars working in the 
academic field of Oriental studies and Area Studies (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia, 2009, pp. 70-
71; Hussein, 2002, p. 227). Perhaps the most well-known of these debates is Said’s 
acrimonious dispute with the Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis during the 1980s fought 
in the pages of The New York Review of Books (Lewis, 1982; Said, Grabar, & Lewis, 1982). 
Enraged by Said’s critique in Orientalism of Lewis’s scholarship as aggressively ideological, 
doctrinaire and propagandistic (Said, 1978, pp. 315-321), Lewis replied that Said was an 
amateur who made too many factual mistakes in his work, in general knew nothing about 
Oriental studies and therefore had no right of speaking (Lewis, 1982). Voicing this 
argument, Lewis represented the kind of professionalized Orientalist thinking that Said 
attacked and clearly did not share Said’s praise and emulation of Blackmur’s idea of literary 
criticism as amateurism to combat such professionalized thinking. But what was arguably 
the strongest attack on Said’s views was Lewis’s argument that he had no right of speaking 
because he was no specialist, hence articulating the connection between knowledge and 
power. In “Orientalism Reconsidered” (Said, 2000f), originally published in 1985, Said 
wrote another reply to Lewis by stating that the most important challenge to Orientalism 
is not to correct all facts and details of Orientalism as an academic discipline. Rather, 
Orientalism is written in the name of proper critical thinking and social justice. The 
challenge to Orientalism is the challenge to a powerfully persistent discourse and the 
legacies of the colonial era of which it is so organically a part, that on a more fundamental 
level is “a challenge to the muteness imposed upon the Orient as object” (Said, 2000f, p. 202) 
– precisely the same kind of muteness which Lewis was trying to impose on Said. 
More recently, a vitriolic book chapter in Robert Irwin’s For Lust of Knowing: 
Orientalists and their Enemies (2006, pp. 277-309) presents an attack on Orientalism that by 
producing a list of factual mistakes tries to dismiss Said’s entire thesis as intellectual 
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charlatanry. Irwin considers the whole book to be an intellectual act of reprisal that 
dishonestly targets ‘innocent’ Oriental scholars. He believes it to be an instance of the so-
called politics of blame that Said himself so frantically wants postcolonial studies to get 
rid of (see Said, 1986). According to him, it is 
obvious that bitterness about what had been happening to the Palestinians since the 
1940s fueled the writing of this book. But rather than blame British, American and 
Soviet politicians, Zionist lobbyist, the Israeli army and, for that matter, poor 
Palestinian leadership, in a weird kind of displacement Arabist scholars of past 
centuries, such as Pococke and Silvestre de Sacy, were presented as largely 
responsible for the disasters of Said’s own time. (Irwin, 2006, p. 282) 
Though my intention is not to defend Said against his Orientalist critics – not because I 
think Irwin’s critique doesn’t dignify a response, but because Orientalism is a work of 
serious and critical scholarship that easily withstands such bitter reproaches – I would 
nonetheless like to point out that Irwin, like Lewis, misses the whole point that Said is 
making. While Said claims that Orientalist scholarship, as the title of Stuart Schaar’s 
review article suggests, was and still is at the service of imperialism (1979), he does not 
claim that Orientalist scholars are themselves responsible for the way things have 
unfolded in a simple causal line of argument, as if they or their colleagues in the past 
directly incited European nations to go out and colonize the Middle-East. Rather, what 
Said attempts to demonstrate in Orientalism, should be understood both in line with his 
earlier Nietzschean-inspired thinking about the production of knowledge as a textual 
battlefield and in line with Foucault’s thinking on discourse and its relationship with 
knowledge and power. 
While Said was occupied in California with writing Orientalism, in France Foucault 
published the first volume of L’Histoire de la sexualité (1976). In this seminal work that 
examines the history of sexuality and the different ways in which sex emerges in discourse, 
Foucault emphasizes that there is no such thing as ‘innocent’ production of knowledge. He 
comes to the conclusion that the production of knowledge it is always an integral part of 
a society’s struggles for power and that the production of knowledge constitutes at the 
same time a claim for power (C. Gordon, 1980, p. 236; Mills, 2003, p. 69). His argument is 
that all knowledge depends on and even engenders a relationship of power in such a way 
that one cannot think knowledge without thinking power – hence, Foucault’s coining of 
the term ‘power/knowledge’ (pouvoir/savoir) (Foucault, 1976, p. 21; see also Foucault, 
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1980a, p. 52). The relationship between Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge and his 
notion of discourse is that this nexus of knowledge and power is articulated in a particular 
discourse, which in its turn should be seen as a tactical bloc in the field of a society’s power 
relations (Foucault, 1976, pp. 133-134). However, as Foucault shows not just in L’Histoire 
de la sexualité (1976) but in all of his works since Les mots et les choses (1966), in the course 
of human history discourses – of sexuality, psychiatry, penology, criticism, history – have 
increasingly clothed themselves as ‘innocent’ knowledge embellished with claims of 
scientific objectivity and truth, thereby effectively disguising its connections with power. 
The links between knowledge and power have been so hidden that it requires great critical 
skill, laborious work in archives, and critical activity to reveal these connections (Mills, 
2003, p. 61). 
Although Said does not mention Foucault’s first volume on the history of sexuality in 
Orientalism, Foucault’s theories on the nexus of knowledge and power and its articulation 
in discourse have found their way into Said’s analyses of Orientalism. In “Criticism 
Between Culture and System” (1983b), an essay originating from a recurrent National 
Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar at Columbia University that he gave 
from 1977 to 1979, Said balances Foucault’s conceptualization of the function of texts 
against Derrida’s and explicitly favors the former’s for its ability to not only show the 
internal workings of texts but also their worldly affiliations with “institutions, offices, 
agencies, classes, academies, corporations, groups, guilds, ideologically defined parties and 
professions” (1983b, p. 212). What Said finds so appealing about Foucault’s criticism is 
that unlike Derrida’s criticism which “moves us into a text”, his criticism moves “in and 
out” (1983b, p. 183). This is Said’s way of arguing that Derrida’s criticism is too much 
focused on the text itself, whereas Foucault’s criticism is more worldly. Said’s essay is a 
plea for critically emulating and applying Foucault’s criticism in order to be truly able see 
that every “text is part of a network of power whose textual form is a purposeful obscuring 
of power beneath textuality and knowledge” (Said, 1983b, p. 184). The job of the critic 
then is to reveal these obscured relations, disclose that which the text does not 
immediately disclose itself, and make the text’s connections with power visible again. 
Taking Foucault as his inspiration, Said forcefully argues in Orientalism that there is no 
such distinction possible between ‘pure’ and ‘political’ knowledge as all forms of academic 
knowledge are deeply complicit with the operations of power (Said, 1978, p. 9; Young, 
1990, p. 127). Whether one reads an explicitly Zionist or pro-Palestinian treatise, a 
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political study that examines the U.S. involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, or a 
numismatic, archeological or linguistic study of ancient Sumer, one should realize that all 
forms of knowledge, not just those forms that are explicit about it, are involved with 
politics and institutions of power.  
In the introductory essay to The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983f), a collection of 
essays written in the period 1969-1981, Said eloquently defines his stance on literature 
and literary criticism in Orientalism. His position “is that texts are worldly, to some degree 
they are events, and, even when they appear to deny it, they are nevertheless a part of the 
social world, human life, and of course the historical moments in which they are located 
and interpreted” (Said, 1983c, p. 4). Said’s analyses of Orientalism are informed by the 
broad, humanist and historical form of textuality of Beginnings that is based on the creative 
energies of the New Criticism, existential phenomenology, philology, Foucault’s 
poststructuralism and – now to a considerably greater extent – historical materialism. 
Consequently literary criticism must disclose the bonds between knowledge and power, 
culture and system, literature and politics by revealing 
the connection between texts and the existential actualities of human life, politics, 
societies, and events. The realities of power and authority – as well as the resistances 
offered by men, women, and social movements to institutions, authorities, and 
orthodoxies – are the realities that make texts possible, that deliver them to their 
readers, that solicit the attention of critics. (Said, 1983c, p. 5) 
Therefore, in Orientalism he argues that because culture is interrelated to real events, real 
power relations and real politics, all forms of writing – including a poem produced by the 
most eccentric artist or highly abstract philosophizing – must take into account the 
constraining and productive roles of society, cultural traditions, worldly circumstances 
and institutional influences like schools, departments, institutes, libraries, governments 
and ministries; all writers must take into account the constraints working on them and 
never “ignore or disclaim the author’s involvement as a human subject in his own 
circumstances” (1978, p. 11). This latter presumption brings us to the heart of Said’s 
quarrel with contemporary Orientalists like Lewis. For in Said’s opinion Orientalists in 
the past and most of their successors in the present claim for their knowledge a status of 
“suprapolitical objectivity” (1978, p. 10). Because of their self-proclaimed position of what 
he in that introductory essay “the triumph of the ethic of professionalism” (Said, 1983c, p. 
4), Orientalists come to share an awful lot in common with the postwar New Critics and 
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their professionalized approach to literature – as well as, according to Said, the New Yale 
Critics of the 1970s and 1980s. In his view they pay an incredible amount of detailed 
attention to their strict object of study, but in focusing too much on the text they have 
turned their backs on those matters concerning the world and the critic. The result is that, 
especially in the case of Orientalism, their scholarly discourse produced in a supposedly 
non-normative language of rationality and neutrality falsely disguises itself as objective 
truth devoid of any political interest. 
What Said painstakingly attempts to make clear in Orientalism is that Orientalism is a 
discourse in which representations about the Orient circulate that have no necessary (and 
quite often completely lack any) correspondence with an objective reality in the Middle-
East. This means that a study of Orientalism has less to do with the Middle-East than it 
has to do with the West (Said, 1978, p. 12). Moreover, Orientalism is the product and 
reproduces an uneven relationship of power between Europe as dominator and the Middle-
East as dominated. In all relationship which Said analyzes, Europeans have a positional 
superiority over Asians without ever losing the upper hand. Lastly, what strikes Said is 
the internal consistency of Orientalism as a discourse in that its essentially remained 
unchanged from 1840 to modern times. This leads Said to conclude that Orientalism’s 
power as a discipline well extends the narrow confines of a system of knowledge inside 
academia and has permeated into the general culture (1978, pp. 5-6). This seems to be 
Said’s way of demonstrating that Orientalism in the West is truly a master discourse in 
the meaning that Foucault ascribes to it in L’Ordre du discours (Foucault, 1971, p. 22), that 
is, such a powerful discourse that makes all kinds of individual utterances appear to be 
speaking for and in truth (see Said, 1983b, pp. 216-217). Having enumerated the 
qualifications of Orientalism as a discourse, Said posits three covering laws of 
Orientalism’s discursive formation or ‘discursivity’ (1978, p. 12). The first is what he calls 
a ‘distribution’ of a geopolitical awareness into all genres of writing, including but not 
limited to, literary, academic, economic, historical, philological, and political texts. The 
second is an ‘elaboration’ of the manmade, imagined geographical distinction between 
‘Occident’ and ‘Orient’. A whole series of connected interests, such as archeological 
excavation, architectural description, philological reconstruction, providing grammars, 
reconstruction of dictionaries, botanical description, psychological analysis, 
anthropological description, sociological study, are grafted on this false distinction and 
help reproduce and maintain it. Lastly, all individual statements that make up Orientalism 
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as discourse not only express but are themselves an ‘intention’ to know, a will to truth and 
power, to dominate, control, and incorporate the idealized and essentialized Orient that 
they conceive of as a fundamentally ‘other’ world (Said, 1978, p. 12). 
It is important to see how Orientalism worked and still works as a discourse in politics, 
the academy and literature. As Said already makes clear in his autobiographical description 
of Orientalism as a “uniquely punishing destiny” and frequently repeats throughout his 
work, Orientalism articulates a nexus of knowledge and power that is meant to dominate 
and control its objects, ‘Orientals’ such as him. He also mentions that Orientalism derives 
a huge part of its formidable power from the creation and consolidation of a consensus. 
This consensus works as an incredible censor or that regularizes or authorizes certain 
statements to be said as truthful and excludes false ones, preserving the homogeneity of 
Orientalism as a discourse and knitting all its statements even more together (see Mills, 
2003, p. 72). The result of this consensus is that  
 certain things, certain types of statement, certain types of work seemed for the 
Orientalist correct. He has built his work and research upon them, and they in turn 
have pressed hard upon new writers and scholars. Orientalism can thus be regarded 
as a manner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision and study, dominated by 
imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient. 
(1978, p. 202) 
In this passage Said describes Orientalism as a powerful discourse that forces individual 
writing and knowledge to conform to the authority of a discourse. The Orientalist 
consensus in writing, seeing, and learning was and continues to be so strong that 
Orientalism became an integral part of Western culture. For, Said’s argument is that 
because this Orientalist consensus was congruent with Europe’s geopolitical interests, 
Orientalist images and views could easily permeate political discourse, where they would 
displace opposing images and views, become central, increase its authority and press hard 
upon speaking subjects not just in the strict domain of politics but in the culture at large. 
In this way an indisputable nexus between knowledge and power came into being that 
allowed politicians to easily rely on the authority of Orientalist scholarship to derive their 
own authority from.  
Take, for instance, the British politician and former Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, Arthur James Balfour, who in an intervention in the House of Commons in 1910 
defended the British occupation of Egypt, a political position that seemed about as natural 
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for the Commons as drinking tea. Balfour built his argument of British supremacy over 
Egypt on the presupposition that “[w]e know the civilization of Egypt better than we 
know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more 
intimately; we know more about it” (Balfour quoted by Said, 1978, p. 32). Surprisingly for 
a modern reader, Balfour bases his argument of military supremacy not on military but on 
scholarly might, on philological knowledge of the Orient – thereby highlighting the clearest 
form in which knowledge and power are interrelated. But as Said makes clear, the lack of 
protest to Balfour’s remarks or even comment of any kind in the House of Commons, 
indicates that the consensus of Orientalism as a discipline had completely permeated 
political and public discourse and had become a consensus there too. This means that 
Balfour could easily rely on the authority of Orientalism as an academic discipline to give 
his own intervention in the House of Commons an air of naturalness or extremely powerful 
authority – thereby incidentally increasing the authority of Orientalist scholarship even 
more (Said, 1978, p. 32). This is how we should interpret Said’s argument that Orientalism 
as a discipline with a scholarly discourse helped shape European geopolitics and facilitate 
Europe’s domination and colonization of the Middle-East. In fact, as Said argues in The 
Question of Palestine, Balfour’s famous 1917 Declaration for a national home for the Jewish 
people in Palestine expresses the commonsensical Orientalist presumption that it is self-
evident that a Western colonial power can dispose of a territory and rearrange its people 
as it sees it fit – regardless of the disastrous outcome (1979, p. 16). The Balfour Declaration 
is one of the texts that lies at the basis for the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict and illustrates 
how governments, ministries and foreign affairs departments could easily tap into the 
discourse of Orientalism, incorporate its statements in their own discourse and truly make 
Orientalism at the service of empire. It also shows how Orientalism changed “from a 
scholarly discourse to an imperial institution” (Said, 1978, p. 95). 
The argument that informs Said’s indictment of Orientalism as an academic discipline 
is that though the discipline is only officially to have commenced with the decision at the 
Council of Vienne in 1312 to establish chairs of Greek, Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic at the 
Universities of Oxford, Paris, Avignon, Bologna and Salamanca (Irwin, 2006, pp. 47-48; 
Said, 1978, pp. 49-50), this inaugural moment was actually not a beginning but the 
continuation of a long tradition of Western representations about the Orient. The 
essential aspects of the Orientalist scholarship of such authors as Barthélémy d’Herbelot, 
Richard Pococke, Silvestre de Sacy, William Jones and Bernard Lewis, to name but a few, 
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should be understood as a set of structures inherited from the past within which their new 
texts and ideas are accommodated (Said, 1978, p. 122). As the inclusion of Lewis in this 
list suggests, to Said, even modern day Orientalist theory and its manifestations in U.S. 
foreign policy exist in a long continued line of descent from earlier writings that can be 
traced back in time beyond the Council of 1312, to Dante, the Chanson de Roland and the 
Poema del Cid, to the Christian Middle Ages, and eventually even to the writings of Homer, 
Herodotus, Euripides and Aeschylus (Said, 1978, pp. 50-73). There are, for instance, 
structural similarities between the playwright Aeschylus living and writing in the sixth 
and fifth centuries BC and the Orientalist scholar Lewis living and writing in the twentieth 
and twenty-first. In Aeschylus’ The Persians, a play set in Susa, one of the capitals of the 
Persian Empire, and performed just seven years after the decisive Greek victory at Plataea 
over Xerxes’ armies in 479 BC, the chorus of Persian elders mourns the Persian losses. 
According to Said it is important to note that the chorus of Persian elders gives an 
essentialized description of Asia as weak and irrational, attributes feelings of emptiness, 
loss and disaster to it, and thereby “speaks through and by virtue of the European 
imagination, which is depicted as victorious over Asia, that hostile ‘other’ world beyond 
the seas” (1978, p. 56). The idealized and reductive way in which The Persians portrays 
Asia, is basically the same way in which a modern-day Orientalist scholar like Lewis 
approaches his study object. According to Said, Lewis frequently reduces the complexity 
of his study object to an “essentialized description” (1978, p. 315) of Asia as weak, passive, 
and incapable of revolution, let alone self-government. Under the pretext of 
professionalized, objective and morally neutral scholarship Lewis’s “academic work . . . is 
in reality very close to being propaganda against his subject material” (Said, 1978, p. 316). 
What Said attempts to show by these comparisons are not just the bonds between 
knowledge and power or literature and politics, but that Orientalism is a form of creative 
repetition, of texts using a recurring vocabulary, conceptual repertories techniques to 
create “a common discourse”, “a set of received ideas”, or “a doxology, common to everyone 
who entered the ranks” (1978, p. 121). In short, what Blackmur would call the 
metamorphosis or degeneration of doctrine into intolerable dogma (see 1954a, p. 373). In 
his description of academic Orientalism, Said demonstrates how it loses its critical edge 
and turns into a form of doctrinal thinking, a discipline in which Gustave Flaubert’s comic 
parable for the transmission and degeneration of knowledge by the uncritical copyists 
Bouvard and Pécuchet has become a painful reality: 
 277 
Knowledge no longer requires application to reality; knowledge is what gets passed 
on silently, without comment, from one text to another. Ideas are propagated and 
disseminated anonymously, they are repeated without attribution; they have literally 
become idées reçues: what matters is that they are there, to be repeated, echoed, and 
re-echoed uncritically. (Said, 1978, p. 116)  
As a result of its enormous cultural presence, historical longevity, and sheer mass – 
according to Said, between 1800 and 1950 there were around 60,000 books written about 
the Near Orient alone (1978, p. 204) – Orientalism as a scholarly discourse comes to exert 
such a pacifying and intimidating force on new Orientalist scholars to produce writing 
conform to the rules of discursive formation that the conclusions, insights and scientific 
advances of Orientalism are less true to an objective reality than to a textual reality, that 
of the discourse. And so individual authority and intention is domesticated and subdued 
by the authority of Orientalism as a discourse to such an extent that originality or what 
Said would call beginning anew is made extremely difficult if not impossible. The painful 
consequences of this is not just that critical thinking degenerates in an academic field but 
that millions of people of Arab descent living in the Middle-East and elsewhere have been 
undergoing and continue to undergo their uniquely punishing destiny for nearly three 
millennia. 
The argument that Said presents in Orientalism is the same argument as the one he has 
been presenting about ‘truth’ in the works of Conrad and in Beginnings. In what is a 
recurrent passage in his early works, Said refers to Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth and Lying 
in a Non-Moral Sense”(1999) and its argument about truth as a mobile army of metaphors 
(1978, pp. 203-204). In the same way in which Nietzsche makes clear that all truth is 
embodied in language, Said stresses that all Orientalist discoveries or knowledge – 
editions of texts, translation, grammars, dictionaries, archeological studies, histories, and 
other types of positivistic learning – are delivered by language. Nietzsche’s work on truth 
and language, Said writes in Beginnings, painstakingly illustrates that language is usually 
confused with ‘objective truth’ and ‘objectivity’ but even in its highest flights and in its 
most rational form nevertheless remains an earthbound activity, a necessary contingency 
allied with power (Said, 1975a, p. 39). While Orientalist discoveries are thus often 
mistaken for objective truths they are ultimately instances of an earthbound army of 
metaphors, that, as Said goes on to show, was supported by a real army. For the production 
of Orientalist knowledge – especially since the late eighteenth century and, more precisely, 
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Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt and Syria – was to a considerable extent made possible 
because of the grossly uneven balance of power between Occident and Orient, in which 
the direction of power, learning and representation increasingly became unidirectional. 
Western armies, consular corps, merchants, scientific expeditions, archeological missions, 
pilgrims, tourists, journalists, poets and travel writers were almost exclusively going East, 
where the inexistent equivalent to Orientalist scholarship already attests to the Occident’s 
relative cultural, political, intellectual and moral strength over the Orient (Said, 1978, p. 
204).76 
The inclusion of writers in this list suggests that this uneven balance and one way 
direction of power was not only reflected into Western literary production but that 
literary production just as much contributed to and perpetuated this uneven balance of 
power. Indeed, the travel writings of Chateaubriand and Nerval with which Orientalism 
opens, Flaubert’s descriptions of courtesans and harems, Scott’s depictions of Saracens, or 
Disraeli’s highly offensive remarks in the novel Tancred that the East is a career, 
condensing millions of peoples into the background for a single individual’s professional 
accomplishment (see Robbins, 1993, p. 152) exemplify how in Western literature about 
the Orient, the Occident generally speaks for the Orient, usurps the Orient’s right to speak 
for its own, dehumanizes, essentializes and represents ‘Orientals’ as it pleases without 
‘Orientals’ having the possibility or chance to reply, to speak back and represent 
themselves. Said’s readings of these nineteenth-century imaginative and travel writers 
show how their authors could not uphold an objective perspective toward the material 
they describe but in their turn “strengthened the divisions established by Orientalist” and 
made “a significant contribution to building the Orientalist discourse” (1978, p. 99). And 
so their works should be seen as an important part of that unbroken arch of knowledge 
and power that connects Western politics, learning and literature. The Orient that 
therefore appears in Orientalism (its political, academic or imaginative variant) “is not the 
Orient as it is, but the Orient as it has been Orientalized” (Said, 1978, p. 104). This image 
is not objectively true, but the result of a whole system of morally-loaded representations 
                                               
76 This imbalance of power is a condition of possibility for the production of knowledge in general, not just 
Orientalism in particular. As Sara Mills makes clear in her introduction to the works of Foucault: the 
institutionalized imbalance between men and women in Western societies results in more studies about women; 
similarly, the economical imbalance between the working class and the middle class, results in more studies about 
the former than the latter; more about homosexuality than heterosexuality; and more studies about ethnic 
minorities than majorities (2003, p. 69). According to Mills it is fair to say “that the academic study within the 
human sciences has focused on those who are marginalised” (2003, p. 69). 
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– an army of conventional and binding metaphors, metonyms and imageries – created, 
controlled and disciplined by a master discourse that spans literary, academic, economic, 
historical, philological, legal and political texts and that is framed by a set of forces and 
activities “that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and 
later, Western empire” (Said, 1978, p. 203). What Nietzsche’s reflections on language 
reveal about Orientalism is that the ‘Orient’ as word may have once been a meaningful 
‘illusion’ grounded in a perceptual experience that was correspondent to reality, but now 
has lost all such correspondence. Generation upon generation of creative repetition has 
accrued to the word such “a wide field of meanings, associations, and connotations, and 
that these did not necessarily refer to the real Orient but to the field surrounding the word” 
(Said, 1978, p. 203). Thus, to sum up, in Said’s argument in Orientalism the will to truth 
and the will to power are inextricably entwined. The nexus of knowledge and power 
articulated in Orientalist discourse not only created, or ‘Orientalized’, the Orient but 
maintained the Orient, dominated, controlled and held it in place. The phenomenon of 
Orientalism should therefore decidedly not be seen as a form of objective knowledge or 
the kind of innocent scholarship Irwin still claims it to be, but as “a system of truths . . . in 
Nietzsche’s sense of the word . . . willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker 
than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its weakness” (1978, p. 204). 
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4.3 The Will to Change: Strategic Location 
Foucault’s concepts of ‘discourse’ and ‘power/knowledge’ are important tools in Said’s 
toolbox to analyze Orientalism. We have established that Orientalism works as a discourse 
in Foucault’s sense of the word that forces individual writing to conform to its authority. 
Moreover, because Orientalism articulates a nexus of power/knowledge, it is not innocent 
but an ideological product, producer and reproducer of imperial power. And even though 
Said also engages with the works of Bachelard, Nietzsche, Williams and Gramsci – to 
name but the thinkers whose names we have already seen to be explicitly referred to by 
Said – the theoretical influence of Foucault in Orientalism is apparent and crucial to 
understand the book’s argument. This is why in the introduction to Orientalism Said 
explicitly indicates that throughout his work he will be employing Foucault’s notion of 
discourse. He finds it inevitable to do so, because  
without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the 
enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage – 
and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period. (1978, p. 3) 
Though by writing these remarks Said may well have intended to elucidate his 
methodology and provide an inventory of the theoretical traces informing his analyses of 
Orientalism, this particular citation has done more harm than good. Recalling Robert 
Young’s remarks about the quintessential rite de passage in postcolonial studies of 
criticizing Said’s text in the introduction to this study, many of Said’s critics have used 
Said’s opening remarks on Foucault as the starting point of their own analysis of 
Orientalism (2001, p. 384). In fact, as Robert Nichols shows, because of this very citation 
critics have come to regard the Foucaultian intertext in Orientalism as the work’s prime 
theoretical underpinnings (2010, p. 137). Just as Beginnings has been simplified and 
reduced to a predominantly Foucaultian work of criticism ever since its first reviews in 
that special Diacritics issue devoted to the wok, so too was the fate that has fallen to 
Orientalism. By identifying Foucault’s criticism as the work’s single most important 
theoretical influence, most of these critics are either blind to the formative influence of 
other thinkers on Said’s text or downplay such influence (Clifford, 1988; Kennedy, 2000, 
p. 25; Loomba, 2005, pp. 42-53; Niyogi, 2006, p. 135; Racevskis, 2005; Young, 2001, p. 
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387). This one-sided Foucaultian reading of Orientalism had for effect that Foucault’s 
insights on the nexus between the production of knowledge and the claim for power, the 
workings of discourse, and the operations of power were used as the central 
methodological toolbox in the emerging field of postcolonial theory and colonial discourse 
analysis of the 1980s and the 1990s (Brennan, 2006, p. 103; Loomba, 2005, p. 49; Nichols, 
2010, p. 120; O'Hanlon & Washbrook, 1992; Young, 1990, pp. 10-11).  
But Said’s explicit formulation of Orientalism as a discourse and his use of that notion 
throughout the work have also generated intense critical activity on Orientalism (Young, 
2001, p. 186). Most of Said’s critics note a variety of faults, ambivalences, tensions and 
self-contradictions in Orientalism and reduce most of them to what they believe to be Said’s 
problematic application of Foucault’s model of criticism (see Hussein, 2002, p. 227; Veeser, 
2010, pp. 62-63). Generally speaking, the critics that have noted the self-contradictory 
attitude of Said’s work, commonly seem to take for granted that because of its explicit 
indebtedness to Foucault’s notion of discourse in the introduction, its conceptualization 
and analysis of power must be equally Foucaultian (Ahmad, 1992, p. 165; Bhatnagar, 1986; 
Clifford, 1988, pp. 255-274; Emig, 2012; Gandhi, 1998, pp. 74-75; Loomba, 2005, pp. 42-
53; Ochoa, 2006; Teti, 2014; Young, 2001, p. 387). According to these critics, the problem 
with Orientalism is a consequence of the work’s adoption of this Foucaultian stance on 
power that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, entails dismissing the individual 
human subject and its intentions as motors of historical change and transferring agency 
to the impersonal and determining forces of the épistèmè, the archive and discourse. And 
yet Foucault has always stressed, and explicitly repeats in L’Histoire de la sexualité (1976), 
that his focus on the determining workings of power on the individual does not mean that 
he merely considers power as a repressive force in society, a force imposed on the 
individual bottom-down (1976, pp. 121-135). To understand Foucault’s conceptualization 
of power, it is important to know that the constitution of an individual in the ideological 
order at a certain time and place or what he himself calls the “assujettissement” (1976, p. 
30) must be interpreted in a twofold way. Assujettissement means both the constitution of 
the individual as ‘the subjected’ and ‘the subject’. In the first case the individual is the direct 
object of this act of constitution in the ideological order; the individual is constituted. In 
the second case the individual itself is, evidently, the subject of its own ideological 
constitution. This twofold interpretation highlights that discourse is inscribed on the body 
as direct object, but also that discourse is interiorized by the individual and that power 
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sets out the conditions of possibility for action and works bottom-up in society through 
that very body of an individual as subject (1976, pp. 81-82). Foucault’s analysis of the 
history of sexuality and the way in which sex was discursivized, make him quite optimistic. 
He concludes that we must let go of the so-called ‘repressive hypothesis’, in which power 
is said to work in a top-down fashion, and consider power as an enabling and productive 
force in society that works from the bottom-up and therefore allows for the creation and 
proliferation of different and new sexualities (1976, p. 67).  
And though Foucault is quite optimistic about this way of seeing power, many critics, 
including Said, do not share his feeling (Baudrillard, 1977, pp. 45-55; Mills, 2003, pp. 123-
125; Said, 1975a, p. 295; 1992, pp. 239-240; 2000c, p. 47). In fact, Foucault’s view on power 
is frequently interpreted as an utterly grim conceptualization in which power is seen as 
tyrannical, nomothetic, unstoppable in the growth of its domination – down to what many 
consider the very last place of resistance, the body – and ultimately irresistible because it 
exhausts all human activity, dismisses the possibility of individual human agency, and 
empties out resistance and the production of counter-discursive knowledge. The problem 
of Orientalism is that because Said allegedly conceptualizes power in this Foucaultian way, 
critics have charged him with being trapped within the framework of Orientalism and the 
impassive workings of its discourse that controls, dominates and holds individuals in place 
– in the same way that Foucault’s notion of assujettissement is said to do. Moreover, in 
employing Foucault’s notion of discourse to analyze Orientalism, Said is even charged for 
perpetuating the very framework of Orientalism by denying the possibility of agency and 
resistance on the part of the colonized (Vaughan, 1994, p. 3; Young, 1990, pp. 127-128). 
Critics consider Said’s text to rob human subjects of agency, consider their role as 
individuals in the production of (counter-discursive) knowledge to be negligible, and 
therefore extend precisely those defining characteristics of Orientalism as a discourse that 
pacifies and mutes its ‘Orientalized’ objects. Orientalism, in short, contributes to 
‘Orientalizing’. To corroborate their argument they rightly point out that Said nowhere 
cites, refers to, or mentions ‘Orientals’ speaking and representing themselves in 
Orientalism but then go on to wrongly assume that this is because Said himself thinks they 
simply cannot represent themselves (Varisco, 2007, pp. 141-143). Critics seem to agree in 
unison that in Orientalism the subaltern can’t speak because the work is said to lack a theory 
of resistance – in the same way that Foucault’s work is said to do (Ahmad, 1992, pp. 159-
219; Clifford, 1988, p. 263). Is this truly the case though? 
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To make my argument explicit, these critics are wrong. In their argument that in those 
325 pages which make up Orientalism on not even a single one of them do we encounter 
an ‘Oriental’ speaking and representing him- or herself, they are precisely deaf to that 
single ‘Oriental’ voice which is speaking loud and clear for the duration of all of those 325 
pages: Said’s very own as the subject and author of the work. In the introduction to this 
chapter, I have precisely shown how Orientalism does have such a theory of resistance; how 
the entire work itself is a discursive act of writing that must be thought of as an 
insurrectionary act to challenge the muteness caused by Orientalism. Indeed, Orientalism 
presents the coming-to-consciousness of an ‘Oriental’ claiming a subject position as 
interlocutor to the very discourse that constitutes him as object of knowledge, 
dehumanizes and dominates him. It is Said’s claiming back his right as an individual human 
subject to speak back to Orientalism as a discourse. The problem with the commentary of 
this critics is first of all that, as Abdirahman Hussein too makes clear, most of it does not 
pay enough attention to Said’s own methodological infrastructure nor to his own 
theoretical elaborations in Orientalism (Hussein, 2002, p. 229). Next, the overwhelming 
majority of them discuss Orientalism in relation to Said’s overtly political works produced 
in the period after 1978 and hardly pays any attention to the relationship between 
Orientalism and such works as Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography or Beginnings. 
Because Said more self-consciously turns away from Foucault in his post-1978 writings to 
the works of Marxist critics as Gramsci, Lukács, Williams and Fanon, readings that 
unilaterally focus on the relation between Orientalism and Said’s later writings often make 
the mistake of Hineininterpretierung and attribute too much theoretical weight to these 
Marxists critics. 77  While I certainly do not wish to argue that Orientalism must be 
separated from Said’s later writings – think, in the first place of the next installments of 
the trilogy to which it belongs, The Question of Palestine (1979) and Covering Islam (1981) 
and the The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983f), a collection of essays written in the 
period 1969-1981 –, I want to deliberately pay attention to the relation between 
Orientalism and Said’s earlier writings. What I propose to do here is that which I have been 
doing all along in this study: to precisely look at the building blocks of Said’s own 
                                               
77 The work of Timothy Brennan is exemplary of this. Though Brennan produces wonderful criticism of Said’s 
Marxist affinities and is one of the few critics to read Orientalism in relation to separate works both before and 
after its publication, by claiming that “Orientalism is not Foucauldian” (Brennan, 2006, p. 102) and subsequently 
attributing all of Orientalism’s theoretical weight to such Marxist thinkers, he reads Said too much against the 
grain. 
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methodological infrastructure and the way in which he elaborates his own critical 
consciousness in a chronological order keeping such acts of ahistorical interpretation to a 
bare minimum. As we do so, the question whether the subaltern can speak in Orientalism 
can be answered positively, but only if it is approached from Said’s earlier work on 
perception and critical thinking in the work of Conrad and his prolonged meditation on 
beginnings. For the theory that informs Orientalism is precisely Said’s theory of beginnings 
that combines a humanist focus on subjectivity with anonymous discursive formation. To 
clarify my argument, let’s begin by looking at one of the most influential commentaries on 
Orientalism that is one of the few to actually discuss its methodology. 
In a defining commentary on Orientalism the anthropologist James Clifford admires the 
book for its pioneering attempt to apply a Foucaultian paradigm to the study of 
imperialism, but he ultimately finds Said’s use of discourse analysis flawed, theoretically 
inconsistent and wholly ambivalent (1988, pp. 255-274). The problem with Orientalism, 
according to Clifford, is that Said’s attempt to carry out an antihumanist Foucaultian 
discourse analysis of Orientalism with the matching determining vision on human agency 
is marred by an incompatible humanist credo in the powers of individual authors (1988, 
pp. 262-264).78 While the many individual authors whose names we have encountered in 
my discussion of Orientalism as a discourse already imply such a humanist stance, it 
becomes most clear in the introduction to Orientalism, Clifford argues (1988, p. 269), in 
which Said clearly avows his indebtedness to Foucault whilst at the same time distancing 
himself from the French thinker:  
I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise 
anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like 
Orientalism. . . . Foucault believes that in general the individual text or author 
counts for very little; empirically, in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere 
else) I find this not to be so. Accordingly my analyses employ close textual readings 
whose goal is to reveal the dialectic between individual text or writer and the 
complex collective formation to which his work is a contribution. (1978, pp. 23-24) 
It is precisely this humanist belief in individual human intention and the imprint of 
individual authors which Clifford finds incompatible with Said’s use of discourse analysis 
                                               
78 Clifford’s criticism boils down to the argument that Said’s analyses undermine themselves because they are 
too humanist and hence not Foucaultian enough – a critique which has often been voiced by critics (see Hart, 2000, 
p. 74). 
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derived from Foucault, who was of course a radical critic of humanism and developed the 
notion of discourse in the first place as a way of getting away from a philosophy of 
knowledge based on the human subject (Foucault, 1969, pp. 22-23).79 Such a philosophy 
presupposes a-priori unifying anthropological and psychological categories, usually 
foregrounding books, oeuvres and authorial subjects in cultural analyses (Foucault, 1969, 
pp. 31-43). In works such as Les mots et les choses (1966) and L’Archéologie du savoir (1969), 
Foucault does not focus on individual thinkers developing certain theories or ideas but 
explores the way in which more impersonal institutional processes establish something as 
fact or as knowledge (Mills, 2003, p. 67). As we have seen in the previous chapter, his 
elaboration of discourse analysis desubjectifies and removes the whole realm of 
psychology. It no longer regards authors as individuals with particular experiences but 
considers them to be functions or labels attached to discursive statements (Foucault, 
1994e). I believe it cannot be overemphasized that this does not mean that the notion of 
the author is banished altogether from Foucault’s analyses; it does however entail thinking 
of authors transcendentally as a purely ontological principle of a text, as functions without 
taking recourse to personalized, psycho-biographical terms to explain any form of 
textuality (S. Burke, 1998, p. 107). As such, Foucault does not employ any close readings 
of particular statements but focuses on the conglomerate formation of discursive 
statements. 
Said has adopted a contrapuntal approach to cultural analysis, which in line with 
Foucault sees texts not as merely the expressions of ideas but as worldly and material, in 
ways that vary according to genres and historical periods (1978, p. 23). Yet unlike 
Foucault who argues that authority is always a product of discourse and not of individuals 
(Mills, 2003, pp. 118-119), Said’s theory of beginnings is committed to a humanist project 
which does not dismiss, does not want to dismiss, the authority of individual writers and, 
consequently, pays attention to both discursive and personal statements. What Said wants 
to do in studying Orientalism as a discourse is to study it historically and 
anthropologically “to describe both the historical authority in and the personal authorities 
of Orientalism” (1978, p. 20). His analyses “consequently try to show the field’s shape and 
internal organization, its pioneers, patriarchal authorities, canonical texts, doxological 
                                               
79 Four years later, Aijaz Ahmad made the same remark about Said’s ambivalences about antihumanism and, 
hence, humanism in Orientalism. Most of it comes down to what Ahmad considers to be an “impossible 
reconciliation between that humanism and Foucault’s discourse theory” (1992, p. 164). 
286 
ideas, exemplary figures, its flowers, elaborators, and new authorities” (Said, 1978, p. 22). 
This clear departure from Foucault’s strictly antihumanist method of reading is reflected 
in Said methodological devices for studying authority. On the one hand, he uses the term 
‘strategic formation’ to describe the ensemble of relationships of an individual text with 
other texts and the way in which these analyzable textual formations become acquire 
unity, mass, strength and thus authority in the culture at large. Said analyzes both the 
(discursive) relations of such textual formations to other textual formations and the (non-
discursive) relations to audiences, institutions and the Orient itself (1978, p. 20). On the 
other hand, he applies the term ‘strategic location’ to denote the way in which a particular 
author in a text locates himself in regard to the Oriental material he describes. Said is 
interested in the previous knowledge an author relies on and refers to, the motifs he uses, 
the images he conjures up and the voice he adopts (1978, p. 20).  
Said’s use of the term ‘strategic formation’ incites him to read literature not as an 
isolated cultural practice but as a medium of representation connected to political texts, 
journalism, travel books, religious treatises, philosophical studies, linguistic analyses, 
archeological descriptions and all other kinds of Orientalist writings. It is Said’s way of 
stressing how writings of different genres are knitted together by unidentified impersonal 
forces into a homogenous discursive formation. It also seems to denote what Said means 
by describing Orientalism as a discourse and conceptually mirrors Foucault’s description of 
the regularities of discourse and the formation of concepts and strategies in L’Archéologie 
du savoir (1969, pp. 87-91; see also Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. 69-73). There, Foucault 
makes it clear how discourse analysis as a method has a threefold focus: first, it studies the 
internal formative relations between statements, next, the relations between different 
groups of statements thus established (discursive formations) and, finally, the relations 
between these groups of statements and events of a different kind (technical, economic, 
social, political) (1969, p. 41). This is precisely what Said does when analyzing Orientalism 
as a discourse. 
Yet the term ‘strategic location’ is a clear sign that Said does more and that departs 
from Foucault by showing a continued interest in authors not as things but as persons, 
that is, not as passive authorial labels attached to discursive statements but as active 
subjects with a psychophysical existence, individual intentions, experiences and 
contributions who actively locate themselves vis-à-vis an anonymous collective formation. 
To analyze this strategic location in a text the literary critic has to apply a broad, humanist 
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and historical approach to textuality that studies the author’s choice of certain formal and 
stylistic characteristics of a text in relation both to other formal and stylistic qualities 
circulating in discourse and to the existential actualities of human life, politics, societies, 
and events in which the author is hopelessly involved. These are the “close textual 
readings” (Said, 1978, p. 23) that Clifford finds so problematic about Said’s discourse 
analysis.  
Whereas Clifford believes that these kind of readings weaken Said’s overall Foucaultian 
method that does not allow the critic to combine in the same analytic totality such readings 
of personal statements with more detached readings of discursive statements in relation 
to other statements in a field (1988, p. 269), Said is precisely at his best in these readings. 
In these close textual readings he presents himself as a literary scholar schooled in the 
formalist approach of the New Criticism and its minute detail to metaphors and paradoxes, 
who additionally taught himself a phenomenological approach to literature that takes into 
account the existential realities of literature. In fact, the strength of Orientalism lies 
precisely in Said’s deviation from Foucault and his combination of close readings that 
allow us to see in detail how Orientalism has so destructively divided human reality in 
essential categories with those larger discursive readings that stress the sheer cultural 
mass and weight of Orientalism as a discourse. Both types of readings are not mutually 
exclusive and are indeed compatible. 80  For though Said believes that texts convey 
individual human experiences, his primary goal in Orientalism is not to produce the kind 
of close readings that focus on these experiences. “The things to look at”, he specifies the 
intention of his readings, “are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical 
and social circumstances, not the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some 
great original” (Said, 1978, p. 21; his emphasis). Again, Said’s emphasis in the last sentence 
is to stress that his primary analytical focus is not on the interiority of Orientalism, on 
what lies hidden in the Orientalist text seen as a unique experience that cannot be 
paraphrased, but rather on the exteriority of Orientalism, on the paraphrasable surface of 
                                               
80 Ahmad rightly points out that Said has problems trying to fit these complex close readings in the unidirectional 
‘Orientalist’ mode (1992, pp. 185-186). However, where he argues that this is the unintentional failure of Said’s 
method of reading, my own analysis makes clear that this is precisely the point of such readings. For these close 
readings stress not only the complexity and variety of Orientalism as a discourse that consists of an innumerable 
collection of texts, they illustrate how the individual field of play or direction of such texts does not always 
converge with the general sense of direction of Orientalism as a discourse. The result of this, is that resistance 
to Orientalism is possible. 
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the text and what it describes (Said, 1978, pp. 20-21). It entails analysis of Orientalism as 
a system of representations, rather than on what it precisely represents. 
Said’s choice of words to designate the process in which authors strategically locate 
themselves to the existing discourse is crucial. ‘Strategic location’, he writes, is “the 
author’s position in a text with regard to the Oriental material he writes about” (Said, 1978, 
p. 20; my emphasis). This clearly links Orientalism to Beginnings where the problem of 
beginnings is approached as the problem of discursivity and rephrased “as a position taken 
by any writer” (Said, 1975a, p. 13; my emphasis). I hope it is clear that I am making this 
comparison to highlight how in Orientalism Said does not revise his position on authority 
and continues to disagree with Foucault on the question of whether individuals hold on to 
the authority over their texts. To him, they clearly do. This is why, as we recall from 
Beginnings, Said considers writing to be an ethical act that comes with the burden of 
responsibility. For at the beginning, an author must choose how to position him- or herself 
to the existing discourse. Does he or she strategically locate his or her writing in a 
continued line of descent, such as the overwhelming majority of Western writers about 
the Orient have done? Or does one strategically locate one’s writing alongside or in 
opposition to this Orientalist writing, by using, for instance, a different style or figures of 
speech? To be clear, I am raising these questions about Orientalism not to argue that the 
choice to locate oneself in a dynastic line of descent and to conform one’s writing to the 
authority of Orientalism as a discourse is always done reflectively. I am aware that many 
of Orientalism’s successes precisely come down to authors irreflectively reproducing its 
dominant representations. However, by considering ‘strategic location’ as an author’s 
position Said sees the reproduction of Orientalist representations as an ethical choice, 
regardless of whether it is the position is taken up irreflectively or reflectively. Said’s term 
‘strategic location’ illustrates how in his model of criticism, individual writers hold the 
spotlight of his critical attention and cannot simply hide behind the façade of an 
anonymous discourse. They are always responsible for the authorial choices they make 
and must be held accountable for the (perhaps unintended) socio-political uses to which 
their texts are put. Given the devastating effects of Orientalism on so many of the earth’s 
population, there is no time or place for bad faith. 
What I am trying to make clear is that the main difference on a methodological level 
between Said’s application of discourse analysis and Foucault’s own discourse theory, is 
that Said persistently holds on to individual intentionality as an explanatory category of the 
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mechanisms of power articulated in discourse. In this way Orientalism is clearly in line with 
the theory of reading elaborated in Beginnings that thinks through discursive formation 
with the category of subjectivity. And although I hope to have amply shown how Said 
shares Foucault’s interest in the circulatory network of power producing knowledge and 
knowledge imposing power on the Oriental, he seems to approach these networks from a 
different perspective. Whereas Foucault argues that power is intentional and has certain 
goals, it does not mean that power is the result of an individual’s choice or decision (1976, 
p. 125). An explanation of the effects of power cannot be found at the level of individual 
intentionality as all human volition is constituted by structures of discourse. Foucault is 
ultimately not interested in the statements of individuals but solely focusses on the 
relations of statements in a field and the underlying ‘archive’ – the enabling rules of 
discourse and its underpinning interests (1976, p. 16). For Said, on the other hand, power 
is something someone or some group possesses with an intention or will using, exploiting 
or abusing these power relations (Racevskis, 2005, p. 92). According to Foucault, whose 
project is French-oriented and does not deal with the kind of geopolitical topics of 
Orientalism, such located or embodied power is impossible because power is everywhere, 
comes from everywhere and is therefore highly multidirectional and unstable (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 117; Foucault, 1976, p. 122). In Orientalism as a historical phenomenon 
power comes from the West and is located in the West (Brennan, 2006, p. 112; Kennedy, 
2000, p. 25). 
One of the three laws of Orientalism’s discursive formation, we recall, is that its 
statements express “a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, 
manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different (or alternative and novel) 
world” (Said, 1978, p. 12). While I have labeled this to be Said’s translation of Foucault’s 
anonymous will to truth and power, the translation is not literal. As Said makes clear in 
the essay “Criticism Between Culture and System”, the difference between his analyses and 
Foucault’s, is that he wants to take into account the forces driving individuals in history 
such as “profit, ambition, ideas, the sheer love of power” (1983b, p. 222). His analysis of 
Orientalism therefore takes into account personal and impersonal forces, and considers 
the phenomenon that it treats as “a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the 
large political concerns shaped by the three great empires – British, French, American – 
in whose intellectual and imaginative territory the writing was produced” (Said, 1978, pp. 
14-15). By labeling Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between personal and impersonal 
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forces, Said effectively combines a Marxist, dialectic approach to history with Foucault’s 
archeological one (see Hussein, 2002, p. 6). Though the effects of Orientalism may be 
inhuman, Said’s double approach allows him to treat Orientalism itself as “a kind of willed 
human work” (1978, p. 15). While in the next part of this chapter it will become clear how 
these remarks are related to Said’s affiliation with the historical materialism of Gramsci, 
they should equally be understood from his long elaboration on intentionality in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography and in Beginnings, both works in which authorial 
intention and the category of the human will are central to their respective arguments. 
Let me begin with Beginnings. In Said’s theory of beginnings the human will is afforded 
a crucially important role in the intentional act of consciousness that is beginning to write. 
The position taken up by a writer at the beginning is the assertion of the author’s will that 
initiates, structures, and thus authorizes writing, the result of which is the introduction of 
individual writing in the existing field of writing. In Orientalism there is a passage that 
precisely describes such an introduction of individual writing in the discursive field of 
Orientalism, or what Foucault would call the addition of a new statement to the existing 
discourse. The passage I am about to cite makes clear that Said’s answer on the authority 
of a text is Beginnings is of continued relevance to our understanding of Orientalism. The 
passage picks up on the argument that the representations in Orientalism amount to a 
discursive reality. It begins at the beginning, that is, the question of strategic location in 
the discursive field of Orientalism that is already heavily saturated, and then moves on to 
discuss the impact of the introduced writing on the whole field.  
[W]e must . . . view representations . . . as inhabiting a common field of play defined 
for them, not by some inherent common subject matter alone, but by some common 
history, tradition, universe of discourse. Within this field which no single scholar 
can create but which each scholar receives and in which he then finds a place for 
himself, the individual researcher makes his contribution. Such contributions, even 
for the exceptional genius, are strategies of redisposing material within the field; 
even the scholar who unearths a once-lost manuscript produces the ‘found’ text in a 
context already prepared for it, for that is the real meaning of finding a new text. 
Thus each individual contribution first causes changes within the field and then 
promotes a new stability, in the way that on a surface covered with twenty 
compasses the introduction of a twenty-first will cause all the others to quiver, then 
to settle into a new accommodating configuration. (Said, 1978, p. 273) 
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What is described here is the way in which an individual act of human will, a strategic 
location or position taken up by an author vis-à-vis the existing discourse of Orientalism, 
gives to the newly produced work an intention which determines the work’s method, the 
direction or field of play for the work. In this case, the strategic location is the redisposing 
of existing materials. As the metaphor of the compass used here suggests, the work’s 
introduction to the discursive field will momentarily produce change in the existing 
discursive field causing all compass needles to quiver for a short moment of time. 
Eventually all needles resume their stable position and point north, which makes it clear 
that its introduction does not produce a radical change of direction but a new discursive 
stability is found and the work is accommodated in the discursive field. The discursive 
field of Orientalism should, according to this metaphor, be thought of as a magnetized, 
common field of play that is governed by the magnetic force of the archive that attracts all 
individual compass needles and decides the direction in which its discursive statements 
point. What Said describes here is that the authority of the discourse, itself governed by 
the archive, and not the authority of the individual author decides the direction of the 
writing. The individual writing has conformed to the rule of discursive formation. 
Interestingly, as Paul A. Bové notes, Said’s description makes use of and combines T.S. 
Eliot’s notion of tradition in his 1920 “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1920b) and 
I.A. Richards metaphor of the “balanced compass” from the 1926 Science and Poetry (1926, 
pp. 15-16), two humanist literary critics whose work were of paramount importance for 
the evolution of the prewar New Criticism (see Bové, 1986, p. 29). The surfacing of 
precisely these humanist intertexts at this crucial location in Orientalism should not be 
underestimated. James Clifford would draw our attention to this passage to argue that it 
is one of the many passages included in Orientalism in which it becomes clear how Said 
misreads Foucault by conflating ‘discourse’ with the humanist notion of ‘tradition’ that is 
built on the whole idea of individual authors contributing to it, an idea that is precluded 
by Foucault’s notion of discourse (Clifford, 1988, p. 286). The passage be evidence for how 
Said’s humanist perspectives are incompatible and completely out of sync with his use of 
Foucault’s discourse analysis. Likewise many other critics reading Orientalism in a 
Foucaultian light would argue how this passage corroborates their argument that Said’s 
interpretation of discourse analysis is the result of a rather careless and unmeditated 
reading of Foucault (Ahmad, 1992, p. 165; Chuaqui, 2005, pp. 99-100; Clifford, 1988, pp. 
271-272; Emig, 2012, p. 140). To me, however, this passage is a sign of how Orientalism 
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presents a well-thought critical reaction to Foucault. In fact, I believe Said’s metaphor of 
the compass to be evidence of his own strategic location vis-à-vis the discourse of the crisis 
of man in U.S. literary criticism that, as a result of the increasing institutional influence of 
structuralist and poststructuralist theories of reading, was becoming increasingly 
antihumanist in tone (see Greif, 2015, pp. 281-315). It is a reactionary riposte to the so-
called dissolution of man in the American debate that had proclaimed the death of the 
midcentury discourse of man and subjectivist humanism (see Greif, 2015, p. 303). For by 
willfully affiliating his criticism with these originary figures of Anglo-American literary 
criticism, Said strategically locates himself as an Anglo-American humanist literary scholar 
who approaches theories as the manmade works of individual thinkers with flaws and 
inconsistencies rather than as complete, orthodox, take-it-or-leave-it packages. And so he 
analyzes Orientalism as a discourse without taking over all of Foucault’s antihumanist 
concepts and tools but by building his own toolbox of critical humanism. As Bové argues, 
Said “deals with the problem of the individual’s relation to the existing discourse in Anglo-
American terms, in part, to offer an alternative to . . . Foucault’s quietistic sense that 
individual authors can have little effect on power and have little responsibility for 
confronting it” (1986, p. 30). Said’s humanist description of the introduction of new writing 
to the existing discursive field of Orientalism serves a twofold goal. First, it is the 
legitimation and empowerment of the critical humanist as an authoritative figure within 
the academy (Bové, 1986, p. 31). Secondly, it is an argument in favor of that determining 
imprint of individual writers on an anonymous discourse like Orientalism. Even though 
the imprint described here is very momentarily and little, the imprint is there at the 
moment of its introduction to the discursive field. What Said’s use of the compass 
metaphors suggest is that with a strong enough magnet of his or her own, an author can 
leave an individual imprint that is powerful enough to change the direction of an entire 
discursive formation (or part thereof), to attract all the needles and have them face not 
north, but south, east or west – in the same way that the presence of a strong magnet 
overrides the natural attraction of the Magnetic Pole. The implication of this is that with 
strong enough authorial willpower, with strong enough individual talent, as Eliot would 
say, Orientalism can be changed. And so this metaphor is another important empowering 
theoretical gesture that opens up the possibility of resistance and the production of 
counter-discursive knowledge. 
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The metaphor helps us understand Said’s analyses of Orientalism as a discourse. As he 
relentlessly makes clear throughout his work, individual writers with individual intentions 
contributed to Orientalism by “doing something describable, in place defined temporally, 
spatially, and culturally (hence archivically), for an audience, and, no less important, for 
the furtherance of [their] own position in the Orientalism of [their] era” (Said, 1978, p. 
131). His close textual readings illustrate how such determining imprint of individual 
writers can be found. Scholars like Jones, Anquetil, Sacy, Renan, Lane, for instance, created 
a vocabulary and ideas to be used by anyone wishing to become an Orientalist. They left 
a decisive impact on Orientalism, solidified its official discourse, systematized its insights 
and established its intellectual and worldly institutions, giving Orientalism a much greater 
visibility in the culture at large (Said, 1978, p. 130). But because their individual interests 
were in line with underlying impersonal interests of Orientalism as a discourse – the texts 
of Sacy and Renan, for instance, were rooted in the philological process by which the 
Orient took on an inferior discursive identity to the West – these scholars did not change 
the direction of the discourse (Said, 1978, pp. 122, 156). 
Producing direction-changing works in such an authoritative discursive field as 
Orientalism is a difficult task that requires well-thought and well-planned writing. To 
illustrate this point, Said singles out the work of Louis Massignon, a French Oriental 
scholar writing in the first part of the twentieth century. Although Massignon was a 
devout Catholic, he nevertheless showed a great openness for Islam and explicitly wanted 
to avoid analyzing Islam in the essentializing and deeply hostile way of his contemporaries 
and predecessors such as the Belgian mediaeval historian Henri Pirenne, winning Said’s 
sympathy (see 1978, pp. 70-71). “In reading Massignon”, he writes,  
one is struck by his repeated insistence on the need for complex reading – 
injunctions whose absolute sincerity it is impossible to doubt. . . Put into practice in 
the reading of an Arabic or Islamic text, this kind of Orientalism produced 
interpretations of an almost overwhelming intelligence; one would be foolish not to 
respect the sheer genius and novelty of Massignon’s mind. (Said, 1978, p. 269) 
In Said’s typically humanist style of writing, he describes how Massignon seemed to 
possess such a strong magnet that was able to change the direction of Orientalism as a 
discourse, producing refined works that were a constant challenge to his colleagues and 
made an intellectual impress upon them (Said, 1978, pp. 264-266). And yet, in spite of 
Massignon’s intentions, a close textual reading of his works unveils the persistent 
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Orientalist framework in which the Islamic Orient is assigned to an essentially ancient 
time and the West to modernity, leading Said to conclude that  
[n]o scholar, not even a Massignon, can resist the pressures on him of his nation or 
of the scholarly tradition in which he works. In a great deal of what he said of the 
Orient and its relationship with the Occident, Massignon seemed to refine and yet 
to repeat the ideas of other French Orientalists. We must allow, however, that the 
refinements, the personal style, the individual genius, may finally supersede the 
political restraints operating impersonally through tradition and through the 
national ambience. Even so, in Massignon’s case we must also recognize that in one 
direction his ideas about the Orient remained thoroughly traditional and Orientalist. 
(Said, 1978, p. 271) 
In what bears a remote likeness to a game of tug-of-war, Massignon’s strategic location 
to the existing discourse of Orientalism provided his works with a strong counter-
discursive direction that impacted Orientalism as a discourse. However, because 
Massignon works in a scholarly tradition the archival rules of Orientalism pulled his 
works to the dominant discursive direction. The result is that Massignon’s works did not 
cause the intended radical change of direction but only a slight change of direction – 
change nonetheless. According to Said’s compass metaphor, specifically designed to 
illustrate Massignon’s individual imprint his works impacted Orientalism in such a way 
that the compasses were pointing a couple of degree east, but still predominantly facing 
north. 
What makes Said deeply sympathetic to Massignon in spite of his Orientalist views is 
that he considers the French scholar of Islam to embody the principles of the philology of 
Erich Auerbach, a contemporary of Massignon’s whose approach to literature in Mimesis 
is foundational for Said’s own critical project in Beginnings and Orientalism. Said’s 
invocation of Auerbach constitutes one of the many resounding affirmations of humanist 
value in Orientalism (see 1978, pp. 45, 46, 246, 266-267, 328) and in particular serves the 
work’s overall argument for a ‘critical’ humanism. In what critics have rightly identified 
as a paradoxical situation in Orientalism, Said invokes an idealized version of Auerbach’s 
humanism to criticize Orientalism which, as Said himself makes clear, is itself a product of 
Europe’s high-humanist culture (Veeser, 2010, p. 62). Or, as Aijaz Ahmad writes, 
“humanism-as-ideality is invoked precisely at the time when humanism-as-history has 
been rejected so unequivocally” (1992, p. 163). What makes Auerbach’s Mimesis relevant 
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to a discussion of Orientalism is that, for Said, the work embodies all of humanism’s ideals, 
making it not only one of the best works of humanist scholarship of the period but also the 
standard by which all other humanist works can and should be judged (1978, p. 258). Said’s 
argument boils down to this: Auerbach succeeds where Orientalists fail. And so he lauds 
Auerbach for writing Mimesis in the humanist tradition of involvement in a national 
culture or literature not of one’s own and for working from a minute textual detail to 
understanding “culture as a whole, antipositivistically, intuitively, sympathetically” (1978, 
p. 258).  
Said’s choice of words to describe Auerbach’s method are used to highlight ex negativo 
that Orientalism is positivistic, premeditated and fundamentally unsympathetic towards 
its object of study. In fact, his idealization and reverence for Auerbach lead him to produce 
an unfair comparison between Orientalism as a discipline and Auerbach’s Weltphilologie. 
Not only does Said compare an entire discipline with the work of one critic but what makes 
the comparison even more unfair is that Mimesis provides a synthesis of Western culture, 
with some of its chapters even treating German literature, whereas Orientalist scholarship 
deals with non-Western cultures. Now, in the works of Auerbach that synthesizing 
ambition combined with the humanist ideal of involvement in a culture of one’s own leads 
to a vision of human reality in all its worldliness and detail as well as to “an enlargement 
of the scholar’s awareness, of his sense of the brotherhood of man, of the universality of 
certain principles of human behavior” (Said, 1978, p. 261). The difference between 
Auerbach and Orientalists is that the latter never saw their confrontations with a culture 
so vastly different from their own to be salutary or helping to better understand their own 
culture (Said, 1978, p. 260). And so in Islamic Orientalism synthesis did not lead to a better 
understanding of either the Orient or the Occident but “to a sharpened sense of difference 
between Orient and Occident as reflected in Islam” (Said, 1978, p. 261). In short, the 
suggestion is that Auerbach produces ‘authentic’ humanist scholarship, whereas 
Orientalism is antihumanist (Said, 1978, p. 266). Said’s invocation of Auerbach as a 
paragon for an idealized humanism in Orientalism is nothing short of bad faith. Humanism 
is Said’s game in which he wants to believe. Auerbach functions as a straw man in 
Orientalism for Said himself, a humanist literary critic who affiliates himself with Auerbach 
against Orientalism and thereby hopes to purify his own humanist method from 
humanism-as-history and the dehumanizing works of the scholarship he is analyzing. 
Said’s invocation of Auerbach should be understood as an act of critical self-fashioning, the 
296 
result of what can easily be described as a reduction of cognitive dissonance in the 
consciousness of a humanist scholar analyzing his own method’s failings. 
But let us get back to Auerbach’s French colleague. In the passage about Massignon 
that I have just cited Said explicitly chooses to leave open the possibility of an individual 
author successfully superseding the determining constraints and radically changing the 
direction of a discourse. But when we add Massignon’s failure to Said’s overall insistence 
on the impassive, relentless workings of discourse, with all its academic institutions, chairs, 
professorships, journals, publishers, conferences, links to ministries, foreign affairs offices, 
states, intellectual traditions and the overall sense that he evokes of Orientalism as a 
system of thought that in time gains ever more momentum, then the question of resistance 
to Orientalism becomes all the more pressing. Is resistance truly possible? Or is it just 
some belief, a credo or a game in which he chooses to believe? How does one successfully 
challenge Orientalism? How does one stop it? The answer to all of these questions may be 
found in the continued importance of Said’s existential phenomenological project in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, 
in Sartre’s theory of the emotions and the theory of cognitive dissonance connected to it, 
in Conrad’s notion of the ‘knitting machine’ and, especially, in the cycle of criticism that 
can stop it. 
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4.4 Humanism and the Cycle of Criticism 
In the second chapter of this book we have seen how in his treatment of Conrad’s 
consciousness, Said came to understand the author’s lived experience in terms of 
Schopenhauer’s individuation process or principle of differentiation. In Conrad’s writings 
this individuation process is described as the formation of one’s individuality through the 
assertion of human will in existential balancing act between a surrender to frightful chaos 
or to an equally frightful order of a system of thought, which is often depicted by Conrad 
as a ‘knitting machine’ that seeks perpetuation and provides the basis for thought, 
perception and activity. This ‘knitting machine’, Conrad believed, should be resisted by 
examining its ideas in a constantly to be renewed cycle of critical thought. In his critical 
engagement with Conrad, Said then rephrased Schopenhauer’s ideas about individuation, 
will and representation, which inform Conrad’s writings, in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception and Sartre’s theory of the emotions, which I in my turn 
connected to Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. This is, in a nutshell, the 
outline of my discussion of the cycle of criticism in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of 
Autobiography. As much as Orientalism should be understood as a discourse with an 
imprint of individual writers, reading Said’s analyses from the perspective of his work on 
the phenomenology of perception allows us to understand Orientalism as a phenomenon 
of perception. In fact, its workings are similar to the machinations of Conrad’s ‘knitting 
machine’, the process outlined by Sartre in his theory of the emotions, or the theory of 
cognitive dissonance in social psychology. 
Orientalism as a discourse exerts pressures on individual writing to conform to the 
rules of discursive formation. It regularizes potentially dissonant, heterogeneous and 
multidirectional writing into consonant, homogenous and unidirectional writing in which 
the same kind of essentialized, dehumanizing and impassive representations of the Orient 
are repeated. Orientalism works just like imperialism in Conrad’s writings. It is “a great 
embracing machine” (Said, 1978, p. 44) of power/knowledge that knits texts in and out 
producing a sheer mass of “knitted-together . . . Orientalist discourse” (Said, 1978, p. 6). 
“What the machine’s branches feed into it in the East – human material, material wealth, 
knowledge, what have you – is processed by the machine, then converted into more power” 
(Said, 1978, p. 44). Orientalism’s representations are less true to an external, objective 
reality than that they are true to a textual reality, that of the Orientalist discourse, which 
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means that we should see Orientalism as a “textual attitude to the Orient” (1978, p. 95). 
What Said is formulating here about Orientalism’s discursive formation, to me, seems to 
be the ground rule of the theory cognitive dissonance, that “there is pressure to produce 
consonant relations among cognitions and to avoid and reduce dissonance” (Festinger, 
1962, p. 9). The regularizing authority of the archive of Orientalism pressures statements 
to be in consonant relation with other statements. So when an author has counter-
discursive or dissonant views about the Orient – based on his or her treatment of materials, 
such as Massignon for instance – there is archival pressure on him or her to bring these 
views in a consonant relation with other Orientalist views but not with the objective 
reality of some sort (that of the study material for instance). For, Said’s often criticized 
remarks that there is a lack of correspondence between Orientalism and a ‘real’ Orient, at 
the very beginning of his study (1978, p. 5), suggest that Orientalist representations stand 
in such a dissonant relation to an objective reality. 
As we have seen, cognitive dissonance is an everyday condition and small amounts of 
dissonance are not a problem per se (Festinger, 1962, pp. 4-5). So small deviations to the 
overall discursive direction – a few degrees east or west on the compass, if you will – are 
possible and can exist in the same discursive formation and the individual consciousnesses 
of the scholars writing in that formation without all too much a problem. But what makes 
it so difficult for even a scholar like Massignon to challenge and oppose the overall 
discursive direction of Orientalism – have the compasses face not east or west, but south 
– is that such counter-discursive knowledge causes too much cognitive dissonance in the 
discourse and in his individual consciousness-in-the-world because of the sheer cultural 
weight, importance and authority of Orientalism. Orientalist representations have a claim 
of ‘objectivity’ and purport to contain ‘truthful’ knowledge about an objective reality. They 
are, in other words, ‘veridic’ maps of reality that have such an importance in the 
individual’s mind and to the person’s sense of self that it is considerably more difficult to 
dismiss these cognitive elements and adjust them to new information, than it is to alter 
one’s dissonant perceptual experience and bring it into a consonant relation with these 
cognitive elements (see Festinger, 1962, pp. 3, 10-11). This, I believe, allows us to 
understand that an Orientalist text is  
not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, 
institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater 
prestige than its practical successes warrant Most important, such texts can create 
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not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such 
knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a 
discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, 
is really responsible for the texts produced out of it. (Said, 1978, p. 94) 
Anyone who is familiar with the work of Foucault will see that Said is describing the 
discursive feedback loop in which the overwhelming majority of individual Orientalist 
writing conforms to the authority of the existing discourse. The result is that the writing 
surrounds itself with even more authority and in its turn increases that of the discourse, 
adding to the cultural weight and power of Orientalism. However, the last sentences in 
which Said describes how Orientalism as a discourse can create the textual reality which it 
appears to describe, can also be read from an existential phenomenological perspective as 
a description of perception forming the basis for all thought and activity, as a description 
of a perceptual alteration of reality in accordance to one’s pre-held beliefs. In fact, the last 
sentences seem to echo Said’s remarks on Conrad’s ‘knitting machine’ formulated well over 
a decade earlier: 
The machine . . . knits us in and out – thought, perception, everything. In accordance 
with its devilish activity, men become the machine’s efficient servants, existing 
under its strictures, colonizing whatever is dark and different from them. The 
machine is responsible not only for the creation of assertive individualities, but also 
for the false ‘light’ with which these individualities illuminate, reform, and reorder 
everything. (Said, 1966, p. 139) 
Here we can see that Said describes how Conrad’s ‘knitting machine’, which is the author’s 
version of Schopenhauer’s principle of differentiation, has such a strong cultural weight 
and power that one can say that the ‘knitting machine’ of imperialism is really responsible 
for the production of knowledge – without, however, neither in Orientalism nor in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography, Said going as far as too actually dismiss individual 
writers of their intellectual responsibility. Conrad’s ‘knitting machine’ is similar to 
Orientalism in that it too is capable of creating a reality by its false light that it forces on 
individuals to irreflectively illuminate, reform and reorder their perception of reality.  
By comparing Orientalism to Said’s existential phenomenological project in Joseph 
Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography we can see how Orientalism is equally a 
phenomenon of perception or a response to cognitive dissonance that ‘magically’ – in 
Sartre’s sense of the word – alters reality so that this reality is not only perceived 
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differently but that this perception, then, is experienced as ‘truth’. Orientalist stereotypes 
are projected onto an objective reality which is thereby ‘Orientalized’. This, I believe, is 
what Said means by arguing that we must “think of Orientalism as a Western projection 
onto and a will to govern over the Orient” (Said, 1978, p. 95; my emphasis). This is also 
why Said describes the strategies of Orientalist scholarship for turning vast geographical 
domains into treatable and manageable entities and, hence, dominating them as activities 
that are at bottom “our will and representation, as Schopenhauer had said” (Said, 1978, p. 
115). Finally, this is also the reason why we must regard Orientalism “as a manner of 
regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision and study” (Said, 1978, p. 202; my emphasis). 
To this very day, very little substantial scholarship exists on this obscured 
phenomenological intertext in Orientalism and scholars that do have noted its presence 
consider it from the anthropological perspective of ‘othering’ (Leistle, 2010) or consider it 
to be a distracting residue from earlier works, a mere footnote to Said’s overall argument 
(Hart, 2000, p. 75). This existential phenomenological intertext is not just an accidental 
residue but a pivotal part of Said’s framework. For not only does seeing Orientalism as a 
phenomenon of perception allow us better to understand the workings of Orientalism on 
and by individuals but also the way in which it can be resisted through proper critical 
thinking.  
Let us begin with its workings. I’d like to single out and very briefly sketch Said’s 
discussion of Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt and Syria in 1797-1801 – that lies at the basis 
for the Description de l’Égypte, a monumental work of collaborative scholarship published 
between 1809-1829 and produced by scholars, Napoleon’s ‘savants’ accompanying the 
French campaign, who intended to comprehensively catalog all known aspects of ancient 
and modern Egypt – and Ferdinand de Lesseps’s construction of the Suez Canal in 1859-
1869. These two events are not only important landmarks in Europe’s domination of the 
Middle-East but illustrate the way in which Orientalism as a historical phenomenon was 
not limited to being a Western style of thought about the Orient but crystalized into 
military interventions, scholarly expeditions, material projects, and colonial rule – thus 
effectively becoming a contemporary problem in the postcolonial world (Said, 1978, pp. 
44, 89-90). What Said is trying to make clear is that all of Napoleon’s preparations for his 
invasion of Egypt and Syria were “schematic” and “textual”, “through experiences that 
belong to the realm of ideas and myths culled from texts, not empirical reality” (1978, p. 
80). Napoleon’s attitude to the Orient is that same textual attitude that I have been 
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describing above. This means that “he saw the Orient only as it had been encoded first by 
classical texts and then by Orientalist experts, whose vision, based on classical texts, 
seemed a useful substitute for any actual encounter with the real Orient” (Said, 1978, p. 80; my 
emphasis). What Said is describing here, should be understood from the phenomenology 
of perception, that is, that Napoleon’s – and by extension that of many Orientalists – 
perception of reality is based on persistent Orientalist schemata, circulating in the 
discourse of Orientalism, that are imposed on that objective reality by his own 
consciousness-in-the-world and not based on his actual encounter with that reality. I am 
hereby not saying that Napoleon did not interact with reality. He did, but in the same 
manner that Sartre’s would-be grape-picker interacts with reality by ‘magically’ or 
irreflectively conferring a new quality on that objective reality that does not in any way 
change the objective structure of that objective reality. The grapes are green. The Orient 
is ‘Orientalized’. The result of Napoleon’s persistent textual attitude is that the Orient 
which he perceives, feels and experiences is not the ‘real’ Orient but an ‘Orientalized’ 
fiction of his own consciousness-in-the-world – that is therefore not felt to be less true. 
From the way in which Said describes the textual attitude of Napoleon and de Lesseps, 
it is hard to refrain from considering the phenomenon of Orientalism as a form of 
perception that provides the basis for all thought and meaning-given activity. This shows 
the continued influence of such existential phenomenological thinkers as Merleau-Ponty 
and Sartre for our understanding of Said’s Orientalism, a point which I would like to 
illustrate by citing a lengthy passage about Napoleon and de Lesseps: 
Everything they knew, more or less, about the Orient came from books written in 
the tradition of Orientalism . . . ; for them the Orient . . . was something to be 
encountered and dealt with to a certain extent because the texts made that Orient 
possible. Such an Orient was silent, available to Europe for the realization of projects 
that involved but were never directly responsible to the native inhabitants, and 
unable to resist the projects, images, or mere descriptions devised for it. . . . I called 
such a relation between Western writing (and its consequences) and Oriental silence 
the result of and the sign of the West’s great cultural strength, its will to power over 
the Orient. But there is another side to the strength, a side whose existence depends 
on the pressures of the Orientalist tradition and its textual attitude to the Orient; 
this side lives its own life . . . The perspective rarely drawn on Napoleon and de 
Lesseps is the one that sees them carrying on in the dimensionless silence of the 
Orient mainly because the discourse of Orientalism, over and above the Orient’s 
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powerlessness to do anything about them, suffused their activity with meaning, 
intelligibility, and reality. (1978, pp. 94-95) 
I have cited this passage at length because it depicts the way in which Orientalism as a 
discourse forms the basis for worldly Orientalist activity in the Orient that comes to create 
the very reality its texts appear to describe. Orientalism serves as the basis for perception 
and allows Napoleon and de Lesseps to invest their lived reality with meanings and values 
that essentially refer to them as conquering and active Westerners. To make sense of their 
reality, they constantly reinterpret it in relation to ‘the familiar’ or what they already 
know, which are the persistent clichés, stereotypes, dehumanizing views of Orientalism. 
For Napoleon, Orientalism and its ideas that the West is far more superior military 
allowed him to embark and conquer Egypt and Syria, thereby ‘proving’ their truth. 
Moreover the Grande Armée’s accompaniment of a full-scale academy of scholars to make 
sense of the place is very much an aspect of that same textual attitude, which again proves 
that inextricable bound of power/knowledge (Said, 1978, p. 83). Similarly, for de Lesseps, 
all of his knowledge was textual and schematic and the persistent Orientalist idea that 
Western powers can dispose of any territory in the world and its population as it sees fit, 
allowed him to cut across an entire continent, again ‘proving’ their truth. 
What cannot be overemphasized is that the Orient of Napoleon and de Lesseps is an 
‘Orientalized’ fiction that is fundamentally dissonant with the objective reality but consonant 
with their preexisting textual attitude. If we approach Orientalism from the theory of 
cognitive dissonance, we must conclude that the impinging reality of the Orient – which 
is infinitely more complex and ungraspable than its textual variant in Orientalism (Said, 
1978, p. 5) – on Western soldiers, architects, academics, travelers, writers, poets, 
diplomats, to name but a few, causes a feeling of dissonance, itself the result of non-fitting 
relations between the perceptual experience of that reality and the appropriate cognitive 
elements – Orientalist knowledge, opinions or beliefs that are considered to be truthful 
(see Festinger, 1962, p. 3). What happens then is that because of the sheer cultural strength 
of Orientalism as a discourse in the culture at large and its persistent claims of objectivity 
and truth, these Orientalist cognitive elements are sooner brought into a fitting or 
consonant relation with the individual’s perceptual experience than that they are changed. 
And so by way of least resistance, to reduce or eliminate the mental discomfort caused by 
the experience of dissonance, Western subjects irreflectively choose to either act upon 
themselves, changing their belief about reality in consonance with the Orientalist ideas and 
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‘Orientalizing’ their perceptual experience, or to act upon the situation, changing the 
physical environment itself in consonance with Orientalism, but not to change their 
preconceived Orientalist ideas (see Festinger, 1962, pp. 19-20). It is important to note that, 
this former kind of action happens irreflectively, causing the feeling that without the 
perceiving subject’s intervention – by magic, Sartre would say,– that world described by 
Orientalist texts truly exists, hence proving the ‘truth’-value of these texts and 
augmenting their authority. What matters not is that this Orient is a fiction – in a sense, 
all perceptual experiences are fictions of an ungraspable reality – but that this Orient is 
experienced, felt and perceived to be more real than others, thereby illustrating Merleau-
Ponty’s equation of ‘truth’ to ‘perception’. It is equally important to note that, as Festinger 
makes abundantly clear (1962, p. 20), the latter kind of action is only possible if the 
perceiving subject has sufficient control over the environment. What is therefore 
impossible for the would-be grape-picker in Sartre’s example of the high-hanging grapes, 
is a distinct possibility for Western writers producing imaginative and academic texts 
about the Orient (because of the uneven balance of power of Western writing and Oriental 
silence) and Western ‘agents’ in the Orient (because of Western activity and Oriental 
passivity, which is supported by a whole series of connected interests). 
Reading Orientalism from this perspective of the phenomenology of perception allows 
us better to understand a whole series of examples that Said cites, beginning with the very 
Ansatzpunkt of Orientalism that plunges us into the whole problematic of the work. For 
what happens with the French journalist on a visit to Beirut in 1975-1976 is similar to 
what happened, or at least to how Said describes what has happened, with his countrymen 
Napoleon and de Lesseps visiting the region well over a century earlier. A brute reality 
impinged on the journalist, causing the presence of cognitive dissonance between this 
reality of the Orient and his textual attitude of Orientalism. The journalist’s irreflective 
choice to reduce or eliminate the dissonance makes him unable to see or perceive anything 
that is not supported by his ‘Orientalized vision’. This collectively regularized vision of 
Orientalism blocks the individual, eccentric – and thus irregular – vision of the journalist. 
He is sensitive only to his Orientalist experience of a disappearing Orient and tries to 
bring what he sees in the gutted down-town area of Beirut in relation to his textual 
attitude, informed by the writings of Chateaubriand and Nerval. As a result of this, the 
French journalist has no actual contact with the people whose city he is visiting. Their 
suffering is invisible to him. The failure of human thinking exemplified by Napoleon, de 
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Lesseps and the French journalist is that they prefer, what Said calls, “the schematic 
authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human” (1978, p. 
93). Though it may be a defeat of rational thinking, it is a painful victory of emotional 
behavior. Cognitive dissonance, as became clear in Sartre’s theory of the emotions 
associated with it, is a phenomenon of irreflective emotional behavior that is our primary 
way of being and acting in the world (1939, pp. 38-39). Moreover, we also recall that 
persons will generally try to avoid situations and information that would likely increase 
the state of dissonance (Festinger, 1962, pp. 3-4). So rather than risk the increase of 
cognitive dissonance caused by (what are in every sense of the word) truly disorienting 
encounters with the human and risk the tottering of their Orientalist doctrine – what if 
these ‘Orientals’ are not in the least like their devilish textual variants, and Orientalism as 
a discourse must be proven wrong? – they choose to avoid it altogether, preferring to fall 
back on texts, look at things with the false light of Orientalism as a discourse and the 
soothing experience of consonance.  
Now we can also fully understand Said’s description of Marx in Orientalism. According 
to Said, in his writings on India Marx was on the brink of reframing one of Orientalism’s 
stereotypical views that in the Orient only vast anonymous collectivity mattered and find 
“existential human identities” (Said, 1978, p. 155), with their own feelings, experiences and 
struggles caused by the economic modes of production. 
That Marx was still able to sense some fellow feeling, to identify even a little with 
poor Asia, suggests that something happened before the labels took over. . . It is as 
if the individual mind (Marx’s, in this case) could find a precollective, preofficial 
individuality in Asia – find and give in to its pressures upon his emotions, feelings, senses 
– only to give it up when he confronted a more formidable censor in the very 
vocabulary he found himself forced to employ. (Said, 1978, p. 155; my emphasis) 
Reading this passage in a Foucaultian light allows us to see the restraining workings of 
Orientalism as a discourse and see it workings on individual writing. Orientalism as is a 
formidable censor that authorizes the use of a certain vocabulary in writing, to say things 
in a certain way and, hence, to produce knowledge in a discursively-authorized way, 
censoring that what cannot be said. But such a Foucaultian reading does not allow us to 
understand why Marx could momentarily envision an alternative to Orientalism, why he 
could even for a short moment feel sympathy with the Indian people only to give it up to 
the pressures of a discourse that persuaded (or forced) him to take up its lexicography. 
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The reason is that Foucault’s model of determination does not allow an individual like 
Marx – or Massignon – to think, even just for a very brief moment, outside the outer limits 
set by the épistèmè (Marrouchi, 2004, p. 91). And yet that is precisely the suggestion of this 
passage, which at the same time suggests that it is ultimately Marx himself who 
irreflectively chooses to dissipate his emotions and have the Orientalist labels take over. 
Understanding Orientalism as a phenomenon of perception allows us to understand why 
Said doesn’t simply describe how it pressures Marx’s writing, but his emotions, feelings, 
senses. Surely this is the kind of process which Said describes in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography in which an individual chooses to change his or her belief about reality as 
a result of an unbearable tension, a textbook example of irreflective emotional behavior? 
This is how we should read the passage above in which Marx himself irreflectively chooses 
to change his belief about reality as a way of reducing or eliminating the cognitive 
dissonance caused by his feelings of sympathy and a discourse that forbids seeing 
‘Orientals’ as humans capable of evoking sympathy. Marx’s use of the lexicography of 
Orientalism dissipated his sympathy but diminished the experience of cognitive 
dissonance. 
I have cited the passage about Marx above to illustrate that reading Orientalism from 
an all-too strictly Foucaultian perspective obscures the workings of Orientalism and that 
it should therefore be seen as a phenomenon inextricably tied to perception. Moreover I 
have singled out Said’s discussion of Marx in order to show how seeing Orientalism as a 
phenomenon of perception is an important theoretical move that reaffirms the centrality 
of the human subject and its will in thinking about literature – which, as we have seen, is 
the conclusion of Said’s intellectual project in Beginnings. Additionally, the reason why I 
have singled this passage out is to emphasize that in Said’s model of criticism, Orientalism 
is a choice – admittedly, a choice often taken irreflectively and bordering on a choice that 
is forced upon the subject by cultural determinants, but a choice nonetheless. There is no 
escaping that choice. Said’s argument seems to echo Sartre’s famous words on the 
absurdity of freedom in L’Être et le néant, that “la liberté est liberté de choisir, mais non la 
liberté de ne pas choisir. Ne pas choisir, en effet, c’est choisir de ne pas choisir” (1943, p. 
561). Therefore, individuals like Marx who reproduce the dominant Orientalist images, 
haven chosen to submit to Orientalism as a discourse, and can and should be held 
accountable for repeating its dehumanizing views. It almost goes without saying that 
when it comes to viewing Orientalism as Marx’s individual’s responsibility, Said distances 
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himself from Foucault’s position on ethics in such works as Surveiller et punir (1975) and 
L’Histoire de la sexualité: la volonté de savoir (1976) and comes very close to such 
existentialist Marxist thinkers – the label is, indeed, ironic in this situation – as Fanon and 
Sartre, who, in writing about racism, have a strong belief in the powers of humanity, 
individual responsibility and stress that racism is a choice (see Bernasconi, 2012, p. 348). 
Fanon and Sartre focus on both the individual and the system and while they argue that 
an understanding of the colonial situation calls for the analysis of determining structures 
of thought, seen as factitious and concrete obstacles to individual freedom (Sartre, 1943, 
pp. 561-552), they ultimately express a view on freedom according to which the individual 
is always free to choose (Bernasconi, 2012, pp. 343-349). The political goal of their work 
on colonialism and racism is deeply connected to the humanist commitment of reaching a 
multiracial postcolonial project, nowhere better expressed then in Fanon’s final plea in Les 
damnées de la terre, which takes the form of asking its readers to develop a new skin, neither 
black nor white, a new critical consciousness through which a new humanity can be born 
(Fanon, 2002, p. 305; L. R. Gordon, 2015, p. 140). And so the ultimate goal of Orientalism 
is to develop a liberating new critical consciousness that challenges the workings of 
Orientalism and actively tries to change worldly situations in such a way that Orientalism 
should no longer be a choice on offer.  
Said’s stress on individual responsibility and the ethical obligation to choose is 
decidedly a turn away from the prison house of the épistèmè and an important theoretical 
step to think resistance. But it takes a lot more to actually offer resistance. To illustrate the 
implications of my argument for Said’s theory of resistance in Orientalism, I would like to 
address two final examples from literature in Orientalism. In a subchapter devoted to 
French and British nineteenth-century imaginative travel writing, Said compares 
Alexander William Kinglake and Richard Francis Burton. Said begins by discussing 
Kinglake’s Eothen, a very popular travel narrative published in 1844 that describes 
Kinglake’s journey in Syria, Palestine and Egypt about ten years earlier. Having read 
Eothen, Said concludes that it is nothing but “a pathetic catalogue of pompous 
ethnocentrisms and tiringly nondescript accounts of the Englishman’s East” (1978, p. 193). 
Throughout his work Kinglake makes so much sweeping generalizations about the Orient, 
its culture, it mentality and its people, that repeat many of the canonical attitudes found 
in Orientalism. Orientalism as a discourse “forced him to confront a set of imposing 
resistances to his individual fantasy” (Said, 1978, p. 193). But Said does not single out 
 307 
Kinglake just to illustrate the blatant Orientalism of his writings. The main reason why 
Said selects Kinglake is to point out that Eothen relates Kinglake’s own travels to the 
region. The author has visited what he depicts in his novel and has seen himself those very 
places about which he writes. When we take this biographical information into 
consideration – a sign that Said sees authors in personalized, psycho-biographical terms – 
the Orientalist stereotypes stand out even more and “it is interesting how little the experience 
of actually seeing the Orient affected his opinions. Like many other travelers he is more 
interested in remaking himself and the Orient (dead and dry – a mental mummy) then he 
is in seeing what there is to be seen” (Said, 1978, p. 193; my emphasis). Kinglake’s 
‘Orientalist vision’ merely asserts the ‘Orientalness’ of the Orient and the Westerness of 
himself. This regularized vision blocks all understanding and sympathy with the people 
he meets; he looks at monuments, customs, and daily life but does not in the least 
comprehend what he sees, nor is he capable of identifying with the people he meets. 
In Said’s argument Kinglake’s blatant Orientalism in Eothen serves as a point of 
departure for him to contrast with Burton’s Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-
Madinah and Meccah, published in 1855-1856. Just like Kinglake’s travel narrative, 
Burton’s account is based on the author’s personal lived experience of traveling in the East. 
Yet unlike Kinglake, Burton takes up a very different strategic location to the Orientalist 
discourse in that during his travels he self-consciously tried to identify and share “the life 
of the people in whose lands he lived” (Said, 1978, p. 195). According to Said, Burton was 
very successful at this and in actually living together with the peoples in whose lands he 
was traveling, meeting them as existential individuals rather than as ‘Orientalized’ fictions, 
Burton “was able to become an Oriental; he not only spoke the language flawlessly, he was 
able to penetrate to the heart of Islam, and . . . accomplish the pilgrimage to Mecca” (1978, 
p. 195). We could thus say that Burton’s assertion of will, his strategic location in 
opposition to the existing discourse, was strong. What differs him from Kinglake is not 
that he was completely free of Orientalism – Burton at times still falls prey to reducing 
“the complexities of Oriental life” and making “generalizations of the Oriental” – but that 
these generalizations “are the result of knowledge acquired about the Orient by living 
there, actually seeing it firsthand, truly trying to see Oriental life from the viewpoint of a person 
immersed in it” (Said, 1978, p. 196; my emphasis). Burton self-consciously and reflectively 
chose to immerse himself in the object of his representations and seek out those 
disorienting encounters with the human that we have seen others, like Kinglake, evade. 
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Burton made it a way of life to seek out the cognitive dissonance that such encounters 
would evoke and in a manner that is similar to that constantly renewed act of living that 
is the cycle of criticism in Conrad’s writings, reformulated his preexisting ideas and their 
regularized distinctions for viewing the region he was living in and the people he was 
meeting there, in order to make his perception of reality (and his depiction in his work) as 
consonant with the objective reality as possible – and not with the authoritative Orientalist 
discourse, which, as Said makes clear, Burton saw as a sign of Victorian moral authority 
to be rebelled against (1978, p. 195). 
The result of Burton’s open rebellion against Victorian authority are his self-conscious 
association with Arabs during his travels in the East and his actual immersion in life there. 
These in their turn made Burton become “preternaturally knowledgeable about the degree 
to which human life in society was governed by rules and codes”, that is, he knew “that to 
be an Oriental or a Muslim was to know certain things in a certain way and that these 
were of course subject to history, geography, and the development of society in 
circumstances specific to it” (Said, 1978, p. 195). From the way in which Said describes 
Burton’s insight in the workings of culture, it is hard to refrain from considering Burton 
to embody some of the insights of Orientalism itself and thereby, by virtue of Said’s 
description, obtain a position of unique freedom within his cultural moment – a position 
that is remarkably similar to the one which Conrad embodies in Said’s 1966 monograph. 
“[H]is prose”, Said writes about Burton, “is the history of a consciousness negotiating its 
way through an alien culture by virtue of having successfully absorbed its systems of 
information and behavior” (1978, p. 196). This conscious absorption and insights of 
Eastern culture, of its system of thought, knowledge and behavior resulted in the author 
being able to achieve a position of what Said calls “Burton’s freedom” (1978, p. 196; my 
emphasis). This freedom, Said goes on to precise, is not absolute. It is not the complete 
detachment of Orientalism and all its ideas; his authorial voice still “perforce encounters, 
and indeed merges with the voice of Empire” (1978, p. 196). Rather Burton’s freedom is 
the freedom that results from his ability to have shaken “himself loose of his European 
origins enough to be able to live as an Oriental” (1978, p. 196; my emphasis).  
Said’s use of the word ‘origins’ in his description of Burton’s freedom is highly 
significant. Though ‘origins’ is of course not an unusual word to encounter in the kind of 
description which Said gives, I would nonetheless like to remind that it does have a special 
significance in Said’s theory of beginnings where it connotes ‘passivity’ and refers to the 
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circumstantial existence of determining conditions. In Beginnings, Said therefore contrasts 
the word with the more active ‘beginnings’ to express the intentional beginning act of an 
individual (see 1975a, p. 32). The whole point about beginnings, as distinct from origins, 
is that they are chosen. And so what Said’s choice of word to describe the way in which 
Burton is able to obtain a position of freedom suggests, is that Burton’s freedom is a 
freedom of choice: to detach himself enough from his Western cultural ambience and live 
as an Oriental. Burton thereby reaches a self-conscious position of subjectivity in-between 
two cultures, but outside neither. Moreover, even though he is unable to dispose of all the 
Orientalist generalizations in his thought – Burton is still a creature of its time – he is the 
very first author that we encounter in Orientalism to actually treat people like people, 
thereby choosing to take up a position against the dominant Orientalist discourse and 
system of knowledge. The kind of knowledge which Burton produces is a knowledge that 
is based on lived experience, on actual encounters with the human, that, according to Said, 
should therefore be read as “a testimony to his victory over the sometimes scandalous 
system of Oriental knowledge” (Said, 1978, p. 196). Said lauds Burton for taking “the 
assertion of personal, authentic, sympathetic, and humanistic knowledge about the Orient 
as far as it would go in its struggle with the archive of official European knowledge about 
the Orient” (Said, 1978, p. 197).  
Just like Said’s invocation of Auerbach, so too does Burton serve Said’s own metacritical 
purposes. In his deep commitment to what Said considers to be ‘authentic’ humanism, 
Burton functions as a metaphor for Said’s own critical practice as a humanist. It is 
important to note that in Said’s description, he comes to take up a counter-discursive 
position to European culture and its Orientalist system of knowledge that is the same 
position which Said urges all critics to take up in the essay “Criticism Between Culture 
and System” (1983b). In that essay Said holds a plea that “[b]etween the power of the 
dominant culture, on the one hand, and the impersonal system of disciplines and methods 
(savoir), on the other, stands the critic” (1983b, p. 220). In Said’s account it is imperative 
that criticism stands between culture and system, semi-detached or ‘shaken loose’ enough 
from both but outside neither – for the critical consciousness is always embedded in a 
worldly context. Burton’s freedom is the freedom that results from standing in that critical 
in-between position which allows him to succeed in beginning to resist Orientalism. 
Burton’s freedom is the same kind of freedom as Conrad’s. We have seen how the Polish-
born, French-speaking and not quite fully accultured Englishman, still to an extent falls 
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prey to the monopolizing imperialist system of representation of his time, but nonetheless 
on account of his critical in-between position and his lived experience of imperialism 
succeeds in beginning to resist the knitting machine of imperialism (see also Said, 1993, p. 
25). Last but not least, Burton’s freedom is the same kind of freedom that Said fashions for 
himself in his autobiographical and metacritical writings. Orientalism is Said’s version of 
Burton’s Personal Narrative. It is Said’s version of how someone who, as the title of his 
memoir suggests, is fundamentally Out of Place (1999), Palestinian by birth, ‘Oriental’ by 
culture, Arab by ‘race’, French-German-English-American by methodology, humanist by 
belief, English by language, American by location, and a critic by choice, through a series 
of empowering theoretical gestures fashions for himself a kind of critical agency and 
freedom in the interstitial place between culture and system, a place that allows him not 
only to read, analyze, criticize the dominant culture and its system of knowledge but 
combat it through what Said calls the production of personal, authentic, sympathetic, and 
properly humanist knowledge that is, in short, the counter-discursive knowledge. 
From all that we have seen, Orientalism seems to present only an argument against 
something and not sufficiently develop an alternative to the particular system of ideas 
which it attacks – a quality of his work that Said himself readily admits (1978, p. 325). 
Though in the conclusion to Orientalism Said writes that his project “has been to describe 
a particular system of ideas, not by any means to displace the system with a new one” 
(1978, p. 325), Said does in the course of his book provide us with ample sketches and 
remarks that allow us to outline an alternative to Orientalism, which seems to be 
remarkably close to Said’s own blend of humanist literary theories with the antihumanist 
theories and insights of Foucault. In fact, the alternative to Orientalism seems to lie in the 
power of literature that it derives from Said’s conceptualization which I have outlined in 
this study. 
In the final subchapter of Orientalism that reworks and extends parts of “The Arab 
Portrayed” (1970a), Said’s first essay about openly political topics that ultimately set in 
motion Orientalism itself, he discusses a wide variety of contemporary Orientalist clichés, 
stereotypes and images in American popular culture and social science. The representation 
of Arabs that circulates is unidimensional and demeaning: the Arab is represented as a 
shadow that dogs the Jew, a lecherous, bloodthirsty marauder and jihadist fanatical that 
threatens the stability in the region (Said, 1978, pp. 286-287). In journalism, newsreels 
and news photos is that “the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no 
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personal characteristics or experiences” (Said, 1978, p. 287). He stresses that the dominant 
representation of Arabs in the West is uniquely negative, essentialized and dehumanized 
and does not correspond to a lived experience, any form of individuality or concrete human 
life whatsoever. What Said finds striking about American studies of the Middle-East is 
not that they do not contradict but even support these crude, mythical and dehumanizing 
ideas that circulate in U.S. culture at large. After all, given his book length discussion of 
Orientalist clichés and stereotypes from Aeschylus’ The Persians down to such authors as 
Kinglake, Burton and good-intentioned scholars like Massignon, the presence of 
Orientalist dogmas in American social science of the postwar period can hardly come as a 
surprise. Rather, what strikes him most is that this American pendant and successor of 
traditional French and British Orientalism has completely severed its ties with the long 
tradition of philology and literary humanism that had informed Orientalism as a discipline 
from its moment of inauguration in 1312. The result is an academic discipline marked by 
“[t]he absence of literature and the relatively weak position of philology” (Said, 1978, p. 
291). What is interesting is that literature is not only absent in American Orientalism but 
avoided even: 
One of the striking aspects of the new American social-science attention to the 
Orient is its singular avoidance of literature. You can read through reams of expert 
writing on the modern Near East and never encounter a single reference to 
literature. What seem to matter far more to the regional expert are ‘facts,’ of which 
a literary text is perhaps a disturber. The net effect of this remarkable omission in 
modern American awareness of the Arab or Islamic Orient is to keep the region and 
its people conceptually emasculated, reduced to ‘attitudes,’ ‘trends,’ statistics: in 
short, dehumanized. (Said, 1978, p. 291) 
The passage above is highly revealing of Said’s conceptualization of literature and its 
role in combating Orientalism. Though we have seen how literary texts have in the past 
been equally guilty of perpetuating Orientalist dogmas, as Said’s discussion of Burton 
suggests, they do appear to be somewhat more independent and able to achieve a relatively 
more autonomous status in relation to the Orientalist discourse than other genres of 
writing. This is not merely because, according to Said, authors like Nerval or Flaubert, on 
account of their craft as writers, construct the world they depict with “artistic dignity” 
(1978, p. 188) “verve and style” rather than “according to impersonal academic rules of 
procedure” (1978, p. 189); nor because the scope of artistic work is aesthetic and thereby 
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exceeds the strict academic limitations of Orientalism as a discipline (1978, pp. 181-182); 
and lastly nor merely because of the habitual insight into the mechanisms of existence that 
their craft allowed them to develop like Burton in Orientalism or Conrad in Said’s other 
writings. The reason for this lies in what Said describes in the relative clause of the third 
sentence of the passage I have just cited. There he labels a literary text to be a “disturber” 
of ‘facts’, the modern equivalent of Nietzsche’s ‘truth’. What Said is arguing here is that 
there is something inherent to literature that fundamentally resists being paraphrased or 
translated into positivistic knowledge, such as attitudes, trends or statistics. Moreover, he 
is arguing that the reading of literature causes a disturbance of such positivistic Orientalist 
knowledge, it causes a feeling of cognitive dissonance, if you will, between such positivistic 
knowledge and the perception of that which can therefore only be described as the 
antipositivistic knowledge of the literary work. Lastly, there is something inherent to 
literature that the net effect of omitting literature in the study of a region results in the 
emasculation and dehumanization of that region, by which he is ex negativo saying that 
that which is intrinsic to literature is something empowering and humanizing. 
All of this is in line with the reason which Said himself gives for seeing literature as a 
disturber: 
Since an Arab poet or novelist – and there are many – writes of his experiences, of 
his values, of his humanity (however strange that may be), he effectively disrupts the 
various patterns (images, clichés, abstractions) by which the Orient is represented. 
A literary text speaks more or less directly of a living reality. Its force is not that it 
is Arab, or French, or English; its force is in the power and vitality of words that . . . 
tip the idols out of the Orientalists’ arms and make them drop those great paralytic 
children – which are the ideas of the Orient – that attempt to pass for the Orient. 
(Said, 1978, p. 291) 
In this relatively short passage, one finds references to nearly all of the theoretical 
intertexts that inform his view of literature. The first sentence makes clear that literature 
is a manmade product that expresses the lived experience of an author, his or her values 
and humanity. We should understand these words as references to the idea that literature 
manifests an authorial consciousness, a voice engaged in a dialogue with us, a ‘palace of 
crystal’ with a moral view, psyche, character and intentions of its own. The power of 
literature is that it not only speaks of humanity, which is of course the single underlying 
theme that unites all of the intertexts informing Said’s view of literature – the (prewar) 
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New Criticism, criticism of consciousness, existentialism, and philology –, but that it 
speaks of a living reality, a lived experience, a vécu that resists being paraphrased and can 
only be comprehended or experienced first-handedly in the act of reading. This humanity 
and life force in literature produces a kind of non-conceptual knowledge that cannot be 
paraphrased and utterly resists logic, as the prewar New Critics stress, an existential 
knowledge that always resists being reduced to essences, as critics like Poulet, Merleau-
Ponty or Sartre would argue. Moreover all of this is expressed in a powerful or what 
Blackmur would call ‘gestural’ language, that is, an expression which is directly 
apprehended or felt by readers; the semantic thickness and worldliness of literature that 
make readers feel and experience that they are reading a complex human expression. 
Literature is temporal, singular and complex, which causes it to disrupt atemporal, 
generalizing and simplified representations in Orientalism. In fact, Said’s suggestion is 
that literature is the most complex linguistic expression, and that any literary text is 
ungraspable as it is. As a result of this, all attempts at literary interpretation in one aspect 
or another fall short; all interpretative acts have their blindness and insight. 
I have cited the passage above because it shows that, for Said, regardless of it being the 
product of a European or an Arab author, every literary text expresses a lived experience. 
To be clear, Said is not arguing that the lived experience of an Arab author is always out 
of sync with Orientalism – their subjectivity is also to a considerable extent determined 
by Orientalism (1978, p. 325). His is arguing that the reading of Arab literature is so 
powerful and contributes to the unlearning of Orientalism and its dehumanized way of 
seeing ‘Orientals’ because it precisely expresses the humanity of its author, as an existential, 
singular and unique individual. Moreover, what matters for Said is that literature is 
characterized by what he calls “narrative” (Said, 1978, p. 240), by which he means that a 
literary work is a totality that expresses the complex dynamics of human life. A literary 
work progresses and forms a dramatic unity, or what the prewar New Critics would call a 
verbal icon, artifact or Gestalt. As a result, literature can resist what Said calls the “static” 
(Said, 1978, p. 239) view of Orientalism as a discourse that is characterized by the 
synchronic essentialism of its ‘Orientalist vision’. To understand Said’s argument, it is 
important to identify the Foucaultian intertext in his words. Said draws a parallel between 
this Orientalist vision and the disciplinary vision which Foucault analyzes in the punitive 
discourse in Surveiller et punir (1975). Just like that punitive vision or what Foucault labels 
the Panopticon (1975, pp. 201-206), the Orientalist vision orders, reorders, synchronizes, 
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categorizes, makes intelligible and essentializes because “it presumes that the whole Orient 
can be seen panoptically” (Said, 1978, p. 240). Orientalist vision allows the Orientalist 
writer to survey 
the Orient from above, with the aim of getting hold of the whole sprawling 
panorama before him – culture, religion, mind, history, society. To do this he must 
see every detail through the device of a set of reductive categories . . . Since these 
categories are primarily schematic and efficient ones, and since it is more or less 
assumed that no Oriental can know himself the way an Orientalist can, any vision of 
the Orient ultimately comes to rely for its coherence and force on the person, 
institution, or discourse whose property it is. (Said, 1978, p. 239) 
Literature, or narrative, disputes such vision. It shows that those schematic categories fall 
short when confronted with the infinitely complex reality of a literary text. Reading it is 
already an act of resistance to Orientalism, because narrative  
asserts that the domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a 
will to truth and interpretation, and not an objective condition of history. Narrative, 
in short, introduces an opposing point of view, perspective, consciousness to the 
unitary web of vision; it violates the serene Apollonian fictions asserted by vision. 
(Said, 1978, p. 240) 
Such is the power of literature and its potential for combatting not just Orientalism but 
any ideology, dogma or orthodoxy. Said’s argument is an argument for considering 
literature as something ungraspable as it is, something which resists paraphrase and, I 
would like to add, causes cognitive dissonance. Approach Orientalism from the theory of 
cognitive dissonance, allows us to understand Said’s remarks about the absence and 
avoidance even of literature in American social studies, because it confronts the Orientalist 
with an inconvenient, dissonant experience that is wholly different not just from any 
representation – for all representation is in one way or another a misrepresentation – but 
from Orientalist representation in particular. Similar to the avoidance of an existential 
human contact with ‘Orientals’ lest such an encounter cause or increase the experience of 
cognitive dissonance, so too can the avoidance of Arab literature be explained. Said’s plea 
then for reading Arab literature should be read as a plea to willfully seek out such 
dissonance, to apply his method of humanism as a technique of trouble that is built on 
what I have labeled Conrad’s cycle of criticism. It should be read as a plea to turn away 
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from the false light of Orientalism and seek out that unfathomable heart of darkness of 
literature that questions, subverts and complicates Orientalism. It should, in short, be read 
as a plea for not less but more humanism to combat Orientalism and its devastating 
workings on humanity. 
To conclude, I would like to recap the implications of the combined perspective of 
seeing Orientalism as a discourse and as a phenomenon of perception for our 
understanding of Orientalism as a phenomenon and of Said’s theory of resistance in 
Orientalism. Orientalism in the West is such an all-pervasive discourse that acts as one of 
the most important constraints on writing, thought and action. It provides the basis for 
individual thought and meaning-given activity and acts as a referential framework of 
culturally established linguistic meanings that surround each speaking subject, whose 
consciousness-in-the-world finds itself in the center of its lifeworld. The difference 
between Said and Foucault, is the order within which existence and essence precede one 
another. For Foucault, the a priori of human existence is the épistèmè, an impersonal system 
of thought that needs to be recovered. While Said does not deny the existence of such 
pervasive systems of thought, for him they do not precede human existence but are 
themselves the products of such existence. His argument is that such things as an épistèmè, 
a worldview and a discourse are manmade products, or in phenomenological terms, that 
they are the intentional products of a consciousness-in-the-world.  
Every consciousness-in-the-world intentionally (in the phenomenological sense of the 
word) irreflectively and spontaneously constructs for itself a subjectivity, an identity or 
what Sartre calls an Ego (see Sartre, 1978). While subjectivity for many people is such an 
important factor of their existence that it even appears to be an integral part inside of their 
consciousness, because of the principle of intentionality of consciousness, subjectivity is 
always an object of consciousness and therefore outside the nonobjective consciousness. To 
paraphrase Sartre, subjectivity is not the owner of consciousness but the object (1978, p. 
77). Subjectivity is the product of a dynamic encounter between the uniquely singular 
consciousness-in-the-world and the chaotic lifeworld within which it is embedded; a 
dialectical Gestalt, a Sartrean fiction produced by a consciousness-in-the-world, a dynamic 
and singular product of an equally dynamic and singular encounter. By this, I mean that 
one’s subjectivity is never fixed and can be changed by that very consciousness-in-the-
world in other such dynamic encounters with the world. Now, as Said painstakingly makes 
clear how Orientalism as a discourse is worldly, meaning that it is a part of the lifeworld, 
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one of the important existential realities that can influence an individual consciousness-
in-the-world’s creation of a subjectivity, is precisely Orientalism as a discourse. This 
means that subjectivity and discourse are to be thought on the same worldly level, without 
one or the other preceding each other. Discourse might surround speaking subjects, it does 
not precede them. What precedes both is an individual consciousness-in-the-world, who 
can, of course, in an infinite series of dynamic encounters with the world define its 
subjectivity in strict terms to the discourse of Orientalism. In this case one’s subjectivity 
is so determined by Orientalism that we could talk about Foucault’s assujettissement, that 
is, about one’s subjectivity as the ‘subjected’ of Orientalism. However, this submission 
needn’t necessarily be the outcome of every encounter, as Said’s model also allows the 
theoretical possibility defining one’s subjectivity in opposition to Orientalism as a 
discourse, and all gradations in between. 
Because discourse does not precede consciousness, it can also be changed through many 
such dynamic encounters. It is, in other words, just like subjectivity a fiction produced by 
many consciousnesses-in-the-world that can be changed by those very consciousnesses-
in-the-world. This happens in dialectical interactions with the world, which bring us to 
the phenomenon of perception and the theory of cognitive dissonance. When an unfamiliar 
and alien objective reality – such as a text, a monument, a landscape, an entire city or a 
unique human being – that is always too complex and therefore ungraspable as it is, 
impinges upon an intentional consciousness, the appropriate cognitive elements serve as 
the first familiar point of reference from which the initial perception of reality is judged 
and perceived to be ‘truthful’ by the intentional consciousness. In other words, to make 
sense of an objective reality or to give meaning to, that reality is seen from what already 
makes sense or already has meaning, such as the discourse of Orientalism. But because an 
objective reality is always ungraspable, it will always produce a certain amount of 
cognitive dissonance. The problem with Orientalism is that it amassed such an 
authoritative cultural weight, which means that an individual speaking subject will most 
likely be tempted to irreflectively bring his or her perception in a consonant relation with 
those cognitive elements constituted by Orientalism, irreflectively giving ‘new’ meaning 
to that reality. This is how the Orient is ‘Orientalized’ – but also how it can de-Orientalized. 
Taking stock of Said’s reflections on the cycle of criticism, at such moments of cognitive 
dissonance criticism becomes possible. Whether such moments are called moments of 
‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger), ‘unbearable tension’ (Sartre) or ‘crisis’ (Lukács), they 
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are moments of opportunity for choice, for beginning anew, for properly critical reflection 
to reflectively (instead of irreflectively) change one’s pre-held beliefs, adjust them in 
consonance with the perceptual experience of reality and thus gradually, one step at a time 
in a constantly to be renewed act of criticism, escape the determination of Orientalism as 
a discourse. This is how in Said’s model individuals can challenge and begin to combat 
Orientalism. But given the sheer cultural weight of Orientalism, the power of one 
individual is limited. So in order to succeed, the individual must use that critical position 
to universalize the crisis that lead to the formation of an individual critical consciousness 
and cause a collective crisis in the system of Orientalism that leads to the formation of a 
collective critical consciousness. The critic, according to Said’s theory of resistance, must 
continue to unmask and oppose the machinations of power. He or she must speak truth to 
power.  
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4.5 Speaking Truth to Power: Hegemony and the 
Oppositional Humanist Intellectual 
Orientalism is written from the perspective of critical humanism and social justice. It 
therefore does not contend itself with describing the demeaning views, essentialized 
representations and impassive workings of a discourse and criticizing the excrescences of 
an academic discipline that, given its dehumanizing doctrines and reprehensible theses, is 
humanist in name only. Rejecting the historical insights and theses of that discipline is but 
the first step in combatting its general style of thought. The next is challenging and 
opposing its discourse with counter-discursive knowledge. In this light, I have identified 
a number of important theoretical gestures in which Said fashions a position of agency for 
himself that prepares for such an insurrectionary act, most notably, the liberation of 
existential consciousnesses from the prison house of the épistèmè, the willful and strategic 
location of individual subjects versus a discourse, and the formation of an insurrectionary 
critical self-consciousness through the inventorying of traces in the introduction to the 
work. This latter gesture was the very first we encountered and, as we have seen, should 
be understood from the writings of Antonio Gramsci on hegemony. It allows Said as 
‘Oriental’ object to take up a subject position and write back, against the discourse of 
Orientalism – perhaps the most important theoretical gesture of all. 
I am of course not the first to draw attention to this Gramscian intertext in Orientalism 
(see Brennan, 2006; Hussein, 2002; Marrouchi, 2004). It is by now even a commonly held 
view that the influence of Gramsci on postcolonial studies is precisely due to Orientalism 
and the Subaltern Studies Group of the early 1980s (B. Bhattacharya, 2012, p. 83). 
Timothy Brennan is perhaps the staunchest advocate for stressing the importance of this 
Gramscian intertext in Orientalism. In fact, he has argued many times that although 
Foucault’s theories are important for Said’s early work – Beginnings (1975a) most notably 
– they have hardly anything to do with the argument in Orientalism (1992, 2000, 2001). 
Orientalism, Brennan feels, should therefore not be understood as Foucaultian but as 
Gramscian and the central concept of the book to him is not the Foucaultian concept of 
‘discourse’ but the Gramscian or Chomskyan notion of ‘institution’ (Brennan, 2006, p. 123). 
Although Brennan provides a more than necessary counterweight in the debate about 
Orientalism’s theoretical underpinnings and rightly asks us to pay attention to the 
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Gramscian and Chomskyan line of thought in that work, from my discussion of 
Orientalism as a discourse it is clear that he bends the stick too far, obscures and 
downplays the book’s important Foucaultian underpinnings. The stick is bent less far – 
but still too far, in my view – by Neil Lazarus who, in line with Brennan, argues that 
although Said talks Foucaultian he clearly does not think Foucaultian and we should 
translate Said’s notion of discourse as something resembling the notion of hegemony that 
Raymond Williams, in the vein of Gramsci, elaborates in his 1977 Marxism and Literature 
(2011, pp. 192-193). While Lazarus’s attempt to counterpoise Orientalism’s one-sidedly 
Foucaultian reading, unlike Brennan’s, does not resolutely dismiss the Foucaultian 
underpinnings of the work, I think both wrongfully construct a one-sided Gramscian Said. 
As I have already stressed, Orientalism should be analyzed as a discourse in the 
Foucaultian sense of the word and we should take great care not to obscure the explicitly 
Foucaultian underpinnings of Orientalism.  
Instead of stressing the primacy of one intertext over the other or trying to bring Said’s 
analyses into harmony with either a Foucaultian or a Gramscian orthodoxy,81 I propose a 
contrapuntal reading of Orientalism in a complementary Foucaultian and Gramscian light. 
As we search for the final piece of the puzzle to solve the question of resistance in 
Orientalism, we will see how Said’s theory of resistance does not only draw upon Foucault’s 
notion of discourse but also upon Gramsci’s writings on power, agency, and culture. I 
argue for a contrapuntal reading of Orientalism’s theory of resistance in a combined 
Foucaultian and Gramscian light that does not take these intertexts to be conflicting, 
irreconcilable or undermining of each other – as the majority of Said’s critics has done – 
but regards them as complimentary. My reading draws upon Said’s very own 
conceptualization of the crucial notion of counterpoint in Culture and Imperialism (see 1993, 
pp. 51-52). Though the term ‘counter’ in ‘counterpoint’ is of course a term of opposition, 
contrapuntal criticism’s goal is not the separation and exclusion of ultimately polarized 
lines of thought but rather their inclusion into a mixed, hybrid form of thinking (Said, 
1993, p. 15). A contrapuntal reading, as Jonathan Arac has stressed, is therefore not 
aggressive and dichotomous but loving and joining (1998, p. 57). This is crucial, because 
conceptualizing Orientalism as a discourse and as the product of hegemony in counterpoint 
                                               
81 The phrase is Lazarus’s. Although he is right to point out that this is precisely what Orientalism’s Foucaultian 
critics have done (2011, p. 189), its Gramscian critics have also tried to reconcile Said’s ‘heterodox’ criticism with 
a canonical version of Gramsci – whatever that may be, given the unsystematic nature of Gramsci’s writings. 
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allows us to reevaluate the possibility of resistance to Orientalism by highlighting the 
agency of intellectuals that Said believed in. 
As we have already seen, in the pivotal essay “Criticism Between Culture and System” 
(1983b) Said discusses Foucault’s textuality and lauds it for its ability to show the worldly 
connections of texts – moving critics in and out of them. Yet despite its worldliness, Said 
finds Foucault’s theory ultimately unable to deal with historical change precisely because 
it does not pay attention to individual statements: 
Foucault’s thesis is that individual statements, or the chances that individual authors 
can make individual statements, are not really likely. Over and above every 
opportunity for saying something, there stands a regularizing collectivity that 
Foucault has called a discourse, itself governed by the archive. . . . Though obviously 
anxious to avoid vulgar determinism in explaining the workings of the social order, 
he pretty much ignores the whole category of intention. (Said, 1983b, p. 186) 
According to Said, Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse is accompanied by a very 
grim vision of determinism, as it allows for discourse to dominate and even completely 
constrain individual intention (see Foucault, 1970, p. xiv). This is why although Said 
clearly emulates Foucault’s method in Orientalism, he nevertheless takes great pains not 
to close that theoretical space opened up by his earlier engagement with Foucault in 
Beginnings. We have seen how Said’s conceptualization of beginnings and his allocation of 
authority with individual writers should be read as a humanist liberation of individual 
human intention from, what he calls, its domestication or enslavement even by Foucault’s 
concept of discourse (see 1975a, pp. 319-320). Orientalism, a work in which determinism is 
an explicit theme, is therefore a continued plea to see texts as culturally embedded 
intentional constructs produced by individual writers with individual intentions and 
experiences, and whose individual imprint on the discourse of Orientalism is analyzable 
and has to be taken into account. Having introduced the possibility of a certain distance 
between discourse and individual articulations in Beginnings by claiming for individual 
writing a position of “exile from the communal sea of linguicity” (1975a, p. 338), Said’s 
argument in Orientalism is that because individual writers take up strategic locations vis-
à-vis the existing discourse, they can make individual statements and contribute to a 
collective discursive formation like Orientalism but they can equally proclaim a self-exilic 
position for their writing, if you will, and oppose that discursive formation.  
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Now, Said’s argument in the essay about Foucault is basically a reiteration of his 
argument of Beginnings, that is, that Foucault’s work doesn’t allow for historical change 
because it doesn’t show why structure structures (1975a, p. 337). “Structure is 
nonrational”, Said wrote in 1975 about structuralism in general, “it is not thought thinking 
about anything, but thought itself as the merest possibility of activity. It can offer no 
rationale for its presence, once discovered, other than its primitive thereness” (1975a, p. 
327). What Said is stating here about structuralism’s approach to literature, can equally 
be applied to the work of Foucault, whose focus on discontinuities provides brilliant 
insights into how certain thoughts and statements are permitted to be thought and stated 
at a certain period in a certain place by a particular set of archival rules, but inevitably 
comes at the cost of a certain blindness as to why a particular text takes on this particular 
form. To be clear, I am hereby not in the least claiming that Foucault doesn’t study form, 
only that he doesn’t study the intention underlying such form. This is how we should 
interpret Said’s major criticism of structuralism and Foucault “that the moving force of 
life and behavior, the forma informans, intention, has been, in their work, totally 
domesticated by system” (Said, 1975a, p. 319). And though Said admits that since he 
formulated these remarks about Foucault in 1975, Foucault’s approach to criticism has 
significantly progressed in Surveiller et punir (1975) and L’Histoire de la séxualité: la volonté 
de savoir (1976), a work in which as its subtitle suggests Foucault does focus on such 
intentional processes of history as the will to truth and power, Said nevertheless still 
regards these forces to be “blindly anonymous” and to “overwhelm the individual subject 
or will and replace it instead with minutely responsive rules of discursive formation, rules 
that no one individual can either alter or circumvent” (1983b, p. 187). So even though Said 
is in the main positive of Foucault’s view of the function of texts and uses Foucault’s 
concepts of will to truth and power in analyzing Orientalism as a discourse, he 
nevertheless finds Foucault’s textuality to be too little contextualized and ultimately 
ahistorical because it ignores what he believes to be the prime motor of human life and 
behavior, intention. According to Said, Foucault’s study of the workings of texts is flawed. 
It can only achieve fullness in its historically contextual mode, which means broadening 
the historical context to include amongst all other worldly affiliations the human 
intentionality that produces these texts (N. Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Brennan, 2005; 
Christopher, 2005, p. 118).  
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Orientalism marks an important moment in Said’s critical position to Foucault. Said’s 
analysis of Orientalism as a discourse and its workings on individual writing brings to 
high point his critical engagement with Foucault begun in 1972. But this analysis should 
at the same time be read as an even clearer turn away from Foucault than Beginnings when 
it comes to discussing intentionality. Said’s belief is that by disregarding human 
intentionality Foucault imagines power as too sterile and irresistible and, he was to say in 
an interview in 1992, “ultimately becomes the scribe of domination” (1992, p. 239). Said’s 
personal involvement with Orientalism and his political commitment to the struggle for 
Palestine make him feel uneasy about Foucault’s rather disinterested approach to the 
operations of power and criticize him for leaving out oppositional forces, thereby lapsing 
into passivity and political quietism – a criticism which in France was also often voiced by 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and other critics of the Left (see Eribon, 2011, pp. 
276-280). In a 1966 interview Sartre polemically called Foucault’s air of neutrality and his 
precedence of structures over existence the final bulwark of the bourgeoisie against 
Marxism (1966). Although Said is distinctly less sympathetic of Marxism as a movement, 
he shares many criticisms of Foucault with Sartre, especially when it comes to that 
argument of passivity. The argument that underpins both Beginnings and Orientalism, is 
that individual writing is always the product of an interplay between an active individual 
and an impassive system (see Said, 1975a, pp. 52-56). Nowhere does this become more clear 
than in that pivotal passage of the compass metaphor in Orientalism, in which we have seen 
how Said uses Richards’s compass metaphor to describe the individual imprint of writers 
on an otherwise anonymous collective formation, and willfully conflates Foucault’s notion 
of discourse with Eliot’s notion of tradition (see Said, 1978, p. 273). The passage vividly 
illustrates how individual writing is the dialectical product of an exchange between 
impersonal archival rules that restrain the eccentricity of the individual speaking subject’s 
statement and that speaking subject’s individual creativity to circumvent these 
constraints, to not passively submit to them, but to use them productively. By conjuring 
up the works of Richards and Eliot, Said adds to implied standpoints to his treatment of 
Orientalism. If we read the passage from Richards’s standpoint then the imprint of an 
individual author, the quivering of the twenty compasses, seems to be caused by the 
author’s addition of what Richards in Practical Criticism calls a ‘tone’ – one of the four kinds 
of meaning he identifies (Richards, 1930); that is, the imprint of the individual of an 
individual writer lies in the intentional act of beginning in which he or she is aware of his 
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or her relation to a set of discursive conventions and consequently chooses not to let these 
conventions dictate his or her relation to an audience or constituency, to arrange words in 
the way he or she likes, and to intentionally produce a form (see Richards, 1930, pp. 179-
188; Said, 1975a, p. 338). In this case, the author does not allow the authority of 
Orientalism as a discourse to dissipate his or her own individual authority. Such a reading 
is congruent with a reading from the other implied perspective of Eliot’s “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent” (1920b): the passage makes clear how individual writing is always 
the product of an interplay between tradition and the individual talent. While such 
rephrasing might at first sight cause Said’s argument to look hopelessly outdated and 
nostalgic, it is actually quite close to Noam Chomsky’s simultaneous intervention in the 
field of linguistics and the philosophy of mind. 
While I do not wish to discuss Chomsky’s intervention in linguistics in all that much 
detail so as not to distract from my main argument, which is to read Orientalism in a 
combined Foucaultian and Gramscian light, it is nevertheless important to pause for a 
short moment with Chomsky’s theory of Universal Grammar, its contribution to our 
understanding of language acquisition and, especially, the implications of that theory for 
our conceptualizing of human agency. Chomsky’s argument is based on what he calls ‘the 
poverty of the stimulus’, which he framed after noticing how children are able to 
understand the meaning of new individual statements they have never heard before and 
are capable of forming an infinite amount of linguistically correct and more complex 
statements than the simplified ones they hear from their parents to them. Chomsky first 
presented his poverty-of-the-stimulus argument in the first chapter of his 1965 Aspects of 
the Theory of Syntax (1965, pp. 3-62). It boils down to being a defense of rationalism and 
one could say Cartesianism even (see Greif, 2015, p. 313), that because of the relatively 
limited linguistic data available to children learning a natural language, every individual 
speaking subject or child must be born with a creative capacity to compensate or 
supplement that lack (Chomsky, 1966, 1980).  
This argument forms the backbone for the highly debated theory of Universal 
Grammar and is, in effect, Chomsky’s way of emphasizing the agency of individual 
speaking subjects, because everyone who has acquired language has already proven to be 
a genius on account of his or her realization to learn something as difficult as an entire 
language out of simplified baby talk. Chomsky’s argument is that every human being is 
born with an innate universal ‘deep grammar’, which transforms on the surface level 
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through a combination and recombination of given elements into the world’s different 
languages. While Said does not follow Chomsky’s Universal Grammar all the way in 
positing that universal structure of consciousness, he does find Chomsky’s argument 
human nature and behavior appealing. In Beginnings, he notes that Chomsky shows how 
all human behavior is an “interplay between these ‘deeper’ laws and individual creativity” 
(1975a, p. 56). 
Chomsky’s view on human nature elaborated in his work on linguistics informs his 
study of the connection between the Vietnam War and the notion of objective scholarship 
that is used as pretext to cover state-sponsored military research, a work written in 
opposition to the Vietnam War which Said cites to corroborate his argument about the 
inextricable connection between Orientalism and empire (1978, p. 11). Similar to Said’s 
argument about the affiliations of Orientalist scholarship with imperial power, in American 
Power and the New Mandarins (1969) Chomsky considers U.S. intellectuals in universities 
and in government to be responsible for the atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. in the 
Vietnam War. Chomsky shares Said’s views on agency and determination, in conceding 
that state institutions and the institutions of knowledge put severe constraints to 
individual creativity but that it is nonetheless the intellectual’s moral obligation to resist 
such determining institutions – an argument that is clearly based on his view of human 
nature and human agency according to which everyone is a ‘genius’ and always has the 
ability to rebel. Chomsky’s stance on human nature puts him at odds with Foucault, who 
in that same period, in such works as Les mots et les choses (1966) and L’Archéologie du savoir 
(1969), explicitly dismisses such humanist notions of ‘geniality’ and other forms of 
heroization and anthropomorphization in the history of thought. For Foucault, as we have 
seen, human existence is always preceded by a system, which means that a history of 
human thought should not focus on distracting surface phenomena of seemingly great 
thinkers with great ideas, inventions and theories, but on discontinuous moments when 
radical changes in the direction of those preceding épistèmès took place (Foucault, 1969, pp. 
22-23; Mills, 2003, p. 27). Foucault’s project is as political as Chomsky’s and Said's and 
serves an equally demystifying and liberating goal; but unlike theirs, his goal is an 
antihumanist one that attempts to free itself from all forms of humanism. And so 
Foucault’s argument basically boils down to this: no one in the history of thought, not 
even a person like Newton, Bohr or Einstein, is a genius but merely someone who happens 
to occupy an epistemically pre-approved position in a discursive field. 
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My schematic comparison of Chomsky’s work with Foucault’s (and Said’s), serves to 
highlight that the differences between Chomsky’s studies of politics and Foucault’s 
analyses of power are more symbolic than actual – an observation that also became clear 
during Chomsky’s famous exchange with Foucault on the subject of human nature, 
broadcasted on the Dutch television in November 1971 (see Chomsky & Foucault, 2006). 
While it is of course highly questionable whether a position according to which no one is 
a genius is truly all that different from a consideration of geniality that inflates that notion 
so much that by making everyone as a genius no one eventually really is, Mark Greif 
argues that both thinkers are actually not all that different (2015, pp. 314-315). Both share 
a common focus on determining systems, but where Foucault’s attempt is primarily to 
offer a critique of the operations of power by revealing the determining and coercive 
constraints of a system of thought that sustains a ruling class and does not want to declare 
himself on any justifications of that struggle, Chomsky’s project is rooted in a tradition of 
social justice and adherence to a standard of moral order according to which good people 
always defend justice against the normative powers of the state and a better justice for all 
must always be the critic’s goal (Greif, 2015, p. 315). And though Chomsky and Foucault 
could not find much common philosophical and political grounds during their exchange, 
the stances they embody, Greif argues, are not clear and mutual exclusive positions. In 
fact, he even goes as far as to call Chomsky “the ideal counterpart to Foucault on the 
Anglo-American side” (Greif, 2015, p. 313).  
Greif’s remarks on Chomsky could easily be extended to Said. Doing so allows us to see 
that the difference between Said and Foucault is that Said writes and performs his criticism 
from the same standpoint of social justice that is Chomsky’s. In Orientalism, Said identifies 
with justice rather than with order, with freedom rather than against it.82 This is also why, 
even though by citing innumerous examples where Orientalism seems to have gotten the 
upper hand and reinforces its power relations, his analyses could strike us as grim and 
pessimistic, his rhetoric is optimistic and always emphasizes the possibility of individual 
human agency to combat and topple such normative orders as Orientalism. The difference 
                                               
82 Again, the similarities between Said and Sartre are striking. In the second chapter of Qu’est-ce que la littérature? 
Sartre holds a sweeping plea for engaged literature, arguing that “[o]n n’écrit pas pour des esclaves. L’art de la 
prose est solidaire du seul régime où la prose garde un sens : la démocratie” (1948, pp. 71-72). His argument is 
that one cannot write a good novel about antisemitism, fascism or colonialism that purposefully thinks with the 
oppressing class, against the oppressed (Sartre, 1948, p. 70). I’ll not comment on whether this is true, but Sartre’s 
argument as an existential Marxist is that every author, every reader, every individual has the ethical duty to 
identify with the freedom of others and do everything in their power to combat oppressing injustice. 
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between critique and justice makes it clear why Foucault in such works as Surveiller et punir 
(1975) and the first volume of L’Histoire de la séxualité (1976), focuses on the standpoint of 
power’s actualization, and Said in Orientalism approaches the whole problematic from the 
standpoint of its opposition. And while one would argue that the difference is but a mere 
conceptual choice of focus, for the fighter of social justice it is a choice of ethics and a highly 
important one with that.83 Said’s approach to power seems to embody Gramsci’s famous 
aphorism, penned down in a letter from prison to his brother Carlo on December 19, 1929, 
that “I’m a pessimist because of intelligence, but an optimist because of will” (1994) 
“What one misses in Foucault”, Said goes on to write in the essay, “is something 
resembling Gramsci’s analyses of hegemony, historical blocks, ensembles of relationship 
done from the perspective of an engaged political worker for whom the fascinated 
description of exercised power is never substitute from trying to change power 
relationships within society” (1983b, pp. 221-222). To supplement Foucault’s 
conceptualization of the workings of texts and in lieu of what he considers to be flawed 
ideas on power and agency – both of authors and the critic – Said favors Gramsci and his 
ideas on hegemony to conceptualize culture, agency and power relations, both in the essay 
and in Orientalism: 
ideas, cultures, and histories cannot seriously be understood or studied without their 
force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied. To believe 
that the Orient was created – or, as I call it, “Orientalized” – and to believe that such 
things happen simply as a necessity of the imagination, is to be disingenuous. The 
relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, 
of varying degrees of a complex hegemony. (1978, p. 5; my emphasis) 
Next to restating that Orientalist discourse is driven by an intention – both on the level 
of the anonymous will to truth and power and on the individual level of writers (Hussein, 
2002, p. 240) – Said argues that the relationship of power that informs Orientalism and is 
perpetuated by Orientalist discourse should be seen as a form of cultural leadership or 
what Gramsci has identified as ‘hegemony’. “Culture, of course”, Said goes on to precise,  
                                               
83 Said was later to openly clash with Foucault on precisely this matter, arguing that Foucault never thinks about 
power from the standpoint of opposition, rather from that of its actualization: “Foucault’s imagination of power 
is largely with rather than against it. […] [H]is interest in domination was critical but not finally as contestatory 
or as oppositional as on the surface it seems to be. This translates into the paradox that Foucault’s imagination 
of power was by his analysis of power to reveal its injustice and cruelty, but by his theorization to let it go on 
more or less unchecked” (2000c, p. 242). 
 327 
is to be found operating within civil society, where the influence of ideas, of 
institutions, and of other persons works not through domination but by what 
Gramsci calls consent. . . . It is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony 
at work, that gives Orientalism the durability and strength I have been speaking 
about so far. (1978, p. 7) 
To be clear about my own interpretation of Gramsci, in my discussion of the Gramscian 
notion of ‘hegemony’ I am aligning myself with Peter Thomas’s understanding of it. 
Contrary to Perry Anderson’s widespread antinomian view in which hegemony (consent) 
and domination (coercion) are seen as qualitatively distinct and oppositional forms of 
power (Anderson, 1976, pp. 20-25), Thomas argues that one should see them “as 
strategically differentiated forms of a unitary political power: hegemony is the form of 
political power exercised over those classes in close proximity to the leading group, while 
domination is exerted over those opposing it” (2009, p. 163). The unfolding of power, 
Thomas argues, happens through the winning of consent of included classes and coercion 
against excluded others (2009, pp. 162-163). In a dialectical integrated process, hegemony 
both prepares for a future domination and secures that achieved dominance: consent 
always appears in tandem with a certain degree of coercion (Thomas, 2009, pp. 163-164).  
Not only do I consider Thomas’s understanding to be closer to Gramsci’s 
conceptualization of power relations in The Prison Notebooks as the dual nature of 
Machiavelli’s Centaur “half-animal and half-human . . . levels of force and consent, 
authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation” (1971, p. 170), it also closely fits Said’s 
description of how Orientalism helped first to unfold and later maintain European-Atlantic 
dominance over the Orient. Historically speaking, Said finds it remarkable that in the 
Orient “very little consent is to be found” (1978, p. 6). Orientalism’s relationship of power 
is unitary in that non-Orientals hold onto power and speak for Orientals, who are excluded 
from the right of self-representation and held in check through a series of colonial 
institutions (military, legislative, judiciary, administrative, educational, religious, 
academic, imaginative). The relative strength between the Occident and the Orient 
allowed the former to dominate the latter and enabled the formation of Orientalism as a 
Western discourse to support that dominance in the culture at home and prepare for 
colonial interference abroad (Said, 1978, p. 6); subsequently, from Napoleon’s invasion of 
Egypt in 1798 to the present, one is able to see the manufacturing of consent of the 
Oriental population by both Western and Eastern intellectuals alike, which is why Said 
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remarks that “the modern Orient . . . participates in its own Orientalizing” (Said, 1978, p. 
325). Orientalism, to put it in Gramsci’s words, can thus be seen as a power relation of 
“hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (1971, p. 263).  
The conceptualization of Orientalism as a discourse and as the product of hegemony at 
the same time is crucial in two ways.84 First, Gramsci’s term ‘hegemony’ allows Said to 
not only think of culture in terms of determining yet productive constraints – an idea that, 
it has to be emphasized, one can also find in Foucault’s cultural analyses (see 1976, pp. 
123-124) – but to do so without dismissing the individual agency of subjects. After all, 
Gramsci argues that although there are forces of dominance and subordination at work in 
history which are independent of human will – such as refractory social forces as a city’s 
population or the number of firms (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 180-181; Williams, 1977, p. 108) – 
these forces serve as the conditions on which a society can transform and certainly do not 
rule out human intention or overwhelm willed human work. ‘Hegemony’ is a sensitive 
analytical term which takes into account the constraints working on subjects and at the 
same time does not fail to acknowledge the active role of these subordinate subjects in the 
operations of power (Jones, 2006, p. 41). An analysis of power must therefore study both 
the historical conditions in which men live and which shape their subjectivity and study 
                                               
84 There are very few studies that consider Foucault’s and Gramsci’s understanding of power together. Though 
some critics forcefully reject the possibility of combining the work of the two thinkers, I am on firm ground with 
the few critics who suggest that the two oeuvres should be considered complementary and that the selective 
combination of their insights supplements the inevitable flaws or theoretical blind spots in either theory (Cocks, 
1989, p. 26; Ekers & Loftus, 2008; Hardt & Negri, 2000; Kreps, 2015; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Radhakrishnan, 
1990; Torfing, 1999). In 1979, Chantal Mouffe was one of the first to argue that Gramsci and Foucault approach 
many of the same theoretical concerns and that the former’s understanding of hegemony can be reconciled with 
the latter’s notion of discourse (Mouffe, 1979). She draws upon Gramsci’s insights that the struggle for hegemony 
happens in civil society during a war of position (Gramsci, 2007b, p. 267) to reconceptualize hegemony as a 
discursive phenomenon (Torfing, 1999, p. 14). According to her, social conflict is a struggle over meaning that 
is being fought at the ideological level by intellectuals of opposing blocs through the constant disarticulation and 
rearticulation of discourses (Mouffe, 1979, pp. 185-187). The struggle ends when one bloc has successfully 
disarticulated the opposing bloc’s discourse and has rearticulated certain key discursive elements in ideological 
terms of its own (Mouffe, 1979, p. 198). 
 Moreover, I find myself strengthened in combining the ideas of Gramsci and Foucault by the work of Michael 
Ekers and Alex Loftus on the political ecology of water. They too combine both writers’ ideas and stress that 
Foucault’s understanding of power has antecedents in Gramsci’s work on hegemony and the integral state (Ekers 
& Loftus, 2008, pp. 702-708). In their view, Foucault’s micropolitical theory of power follows up on Gramsci’s 
insights on hegemony and the consolidation of power from the public sphere of the state right down to the 
intimacies of everyday life, such as privative initiatives, the thought of intellectuals and the modern home 
(Gramsci, 1971, pp. 5-23, 55ff, n.25, 258). While Foucault does not deny the existence of the state in the 
Gramscian sense and even explicitly acknowledged that relations of power and the regimes of truth operate 
within broader, macropolitical forms of hegemony, he thinks it necessary to decenter power and take as a starting 
point the intricate, dispersed micropractices of modern power that were hitherto being obscured in analyses that 
focused too much on the apparently sovereign power of the state and its apparatus (Foucault, 1976, pp. 116-118). 
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the will and initiative of these men reacting to these conditions (Gramsci, 1971, p. 244). 
From the writings of Gramsci it is clear that meaningful and willful actions of men are 
after all the prime motors of history (Daldal, 2014, p. 151). Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
enables Said to pay attention to both personal statements and discursive statements, to 
conceptualize Orientalism as a dynamic exchange between general concerns and particular 
contributions, between an impersonal system of knowledge and individual authors, but 
most importantly “to recognize individuality and to reconcile it with its intelligent, and 
by no means passive or merely dictatorial, general and hegemonic context” (1978, p. 9). 
The second important consequence of Said’s use of the term ‘hegemony’, is that it 
tackles the criticism of allowing no alternative to Orientalism. Although Said avows that 
he has insufficiently paid attention to developing such an alternative (1978, p. 325), in a 
hegemonic analysis change is always possible simply because a hegemonic social form can 
never exhaust all human behavior, energy or intention (Williams, 1977, p. 125). There are 
always significant forms of human practice which happen against or outside the 
dominating hegemonic social order and, Said was to write later balancing Gramsci’s 
insights with Foucault’s, “this is obviously what makes change possible, limits power in 
Foucault’s sense, and hobbles the theory of that power” (1983e, p. 247). Every social form 
has the possibility to further develop into a new or alternative form, however marginal 
that development may be (Gramsci, 1971, p. 222). In effect, a social form can only be 
partially and temporarily fixed, never fully. For if such absolute fixity would exist in the 
social world, there would be nothing to hegemonize and we would simply speak of 
domination (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 134). This insight guarantees the possible 
emergence of new forces becoming hegemonic and formed the basis for Raymond 
Williams’s elaboration of historical change in terms of dynamic interrelations between 
residual, dominant and emergent forces, in which these emergent forces are representative 
to areas of human behavior which are neglected, repressed or even unrecognized by the 
dominant hegemonic order (1977, pp. 122-123). These new forces can become dominant 
and topple the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism for instance through meaningful and 
willed human action, led by intellectuals.  
Gramsci attributes an important role to intellectuals in the dissemination of hegemony 
and the manufacturing of consent, but also in the production of a counter-hegemony 
(Renate Holub, 1992, p. 6; Mouffe, 1979, p. 187). They are responsible for the elaboration 
of ideology through culture and are ultimately capable of realizing moral and intellectual 
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reform at the level of civil society (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 12, 60-61). Said too stresses the 
importance of intellectuals as agents in the practice of Orientalism, albeit mostly in a 
negative way. He specifically describes Orientalism as a form of “intellectual authority over 
the Orient within Western culture” (1978, p. 19; my emphasis) in which he distinguishes 
both “the historical authority” – Orientalism as an anonymous discursive formation 
weighing heavily on individual writing – and “the personal authorities” (1978, p. 20) – the 
personal authorities of individual writers. Intellectuals are in no way free-floating 
individuals and have to be considered in relation to the structures in which they function 
as intellectuals (Jones, 2006, p. 82). But within these structures they are still producers of 
objects, ideas, texts and, particularly in the case of Orientalism, representations posing as 
‘truth’. This raises some critical questions: 
How do ideas acquire authority, “normality,” and even the status of “natural” truth? 
What is the role of the intellectual? Is he there to validate the culture and state of 
which he is a part? What importance must he give to an independent critical 
consciousness, an oppositional critical consciousness? (Said, 1978, pp. 325-326) 
Despite Orientalism functioning as a discourse, Said’s term ‘strategic location’, as I have 
already indicated, implies that individuals must locate themselves in relation to the 
existing discourse of Orientalism, but ultimately hold on to authority and can therefore be 
held accountable for their statements and actions when they contribute to the Orientalist 
discourse, solidify its insights and perpetuate its structures (1978, p. 130).85 In that respect 
Said indicts modern Oriental scholars like Bernard Lewis for upholding that ahistorical 
textual attitude towards the Oriental material they describe to subdue the infinite variety 
of the Middle-East to an essentialized representation which then serves as a validation for 
the imperial subordination of its peoples (Said, 1978, pp. 315-321). Although they would 
consider their scholarly work to be impartial and detached from the political concerns of 
their time, it is actually saturated, Said believes, by political significance and ultimately 
validates the operations of imperial power (1978, pp. 9-11). As a result Orientalists like 
Lewis cease to function as critical intellectuals and instead become “experts of legitimation” 
(Said, 1983d, p. 172) of the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism. In order to remain critical, 
                                               
85 Brennan has recently argued that Said’s use of discourse differs from Foucault’s in that the former’s “does not 
preclude the idea of guilty agents of power, people with agendas and privileged interests, constituencies of active 
belief and policy, or the basic injustice of the operation that we should oppose on the grounds of human dignity” 
(2013, pp. 18-19). 
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intellectuals need to be aware of their worldly circumstances and their political function 
in civil society and remain oppositional to the workings of power in political society 
(Ashcroft & Said, 2004, p. 100).  
The critical intellectual must not only analyze and describe the workings of power, as 
Foucault does, but combat these workings in the name of social justice. Hence, Said 
remarks that the intellectual must think with freedom and see him- or herself “as exile and 
marginal, as amateur, and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to power” 
(1994b, p. xiv). His critical position in Orientalism, he makes clear in a long passage written 
a few years later, is that 
I take criticism so seriously as to believe that, even in the very midst of a battle in 
which one is unmistakably on one side against another, there should be criticism, 
because there must be critical consciousness if there are to be issues, values, even 
lives to be fought for. . . Were I to use on word consistently along with 'criticism' 
(not as a modification but as an emphatic) it would 'oppositional'. If criticism is 
reducible neither to a doctrine nor to a political position on a particular question, 
and if it is to be in the world and self-aware simultaneously, then its identity is its 
difference from other cultural activities and from systems of thought or of method. 
In its suspicion of totalizing concepts, in its discontent with reified objects, in its 
impatience with guilds, special interests, imperialized fiefdoms, and orthodox habits 
of mind, criticism is most itself and, if the paradox can be tolerated, most unlike itself 
at the moment it starts turning into organized dogma. 'Ironic' is not a bad word to 
use along with 'oppositional'. For in the main - and here I shall be explicit - criticism 
must think of itself as life-enhancing and constitutively opposed to every form of 
tyranny, domination, and abuse; its social goals are noncoercive knowledge 
produced in the interests of human freedom. (Said, 1983c, pp. 28-29)  
Criticism must always be performed from the standpoint of opposition. Apart from being 
a strategical positioning of Said in the camp of such critics as Sartre and Fanon, one clearly 
remarks the echoes to Blackmur’s idea of literary criticism as amateurism as a constant 
battle against doctrinal thinking, such as Orientalism, a critical position that makes him, 
in Said’s eyes, “much more of an intellectual, in the Sartrean or Gramscian sense of the 
term, than any of the New Critics” (2000d, p. 254). Moreover, in this explicit opposition 
to ideological professionalism and specialization Said affiliates himself with Chomsky and 
his charge of intellectuals being complicit with state power and responsible for the 
atrocities of the Vietnam War (see Said, 1975a, p. 379). 
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But though Said affiliates himself with a great deal of thinkers, the theoretical argument 
that informs his indictment of Orientalists is Gramsci’s distinction of the intelligentsia 
between traditional and organic intellectuals. Whereas an organic intellectual is connected 
to an emergent social group and is aware of his or her everyday function in the economic, 
social and political fields (Gramsci, 1971, p. 5), a traditional intellectual misrecognizes 
him- or herself as being severed from the social group of which he or she is a part and does 
not consider his or her workings to be of everyday political relevance (Jones, 2006, pp. 87-
88). Said’s critical intellectual is an organic intellectual who pays careful attention to his 
or her own worldliness as well as the worldliness of his or her study object. He or she is 
actively involved in society and constantly struggles to change minds (Said, 1994b, p. 4). 
Such an intellectual is needed in the service of proper humanist scholarship and 
emancipatory democracy to combat the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism which is 
perpetuated by traditional intellectuals such as Jones and Lewis who rely so much on idées 
reçues that they have become blind to the differentialities of the Middle-East and its peoples 
(see Said, 1978, p. 94; 1994b, p. 89). 
Orientalism on the other hand does not perpetuate the hegemonic framework it 
analyzes, but actively tries to combat that hegemonic discourse by analyzing it in the past 
and present in order to undermine its overwhelmingly powerful consent. The loss of active 
consent causes, what Gramsci calls, a crisis of authority in which the dominant class has 
lost its cultural leadership and exercises coercive force alone. This means that the 
subaltern classes “have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer 
believe what they used to believe previously” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 276). Coercion alone, 
without the accompanying consent, cannot ultimately prevent emergent ideologies from 
rising up, mobilizing people, and eventually becoming dominant (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 275-
276). To further this end, Said invokes Gramsci’s idea of self-consciousness as the starting 
point of every critical analysis in the introduction to Orientalism. After all, acquiring 
consciousness of the complex relations of which a subject is the hub already modifies these 
relations. “In this sense”, Gramsci continues, “knowledge is power” (1971, p. 353).86 That 
                                               
86 Gramsci employs this aphorism to argue that even the slightest knowledge of the ensemble of relations – both 
genetically in the movement of their formation and synchronically at a given period as a system – leads to a 
better understanding of one’s own environment and subjectivity. This understanding is a source of agency for 
individuals because it is the basis to modify this ensemble of relations and thus one’s subjectivity. In this way an 
individual is able to shape power (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 352-353). Gramsci’s notions of knowledge and power differ 
from Foucault’s in that Gramsci believes man to be the subject of knowledge and thus an agent or locus of power. 
Foucault, on the other hand, dispenses these ideas and considers man to be the object of knowledge that is 
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powerful agency stems from Said’s analysis of Orientalism as a discourse, his subsequent 
rejection of humanism-as-history by exposing the excrescences of humanism, and the 
insight that the production of knowledge and the operations of power can only be studied 
together in their full, imaginative, economic, social and political context (1978, p. 27). 
 But although Gramsci believes in the agency of individual intellectuals to change 
society, a lone intellectual is limited in his or her strength. Though we have seen the way 
in which Said thinks resistance possible – through that laborious and constantly to be 
renewed cycle of criticism – it takes a lot more to actually change Orientalism. A willful 
action becomes only meaningful when it is the organic will of a class or a group of people 
and, then, through strength in numbers, acquires the potential to be truly radical (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 353). In order to successfully combat a hegemony it is vital to link one’s own 
concerns to the socio-political concerns of others and to make clear that one’s own 
sufferings and experiences are connected to those of many (Gramsci, 1971, p. 221). This 
is precisely what Said sees as his intellectual vocation: 
The intellectual’s representations – what he or she represents and how those ideas 
are represented to an audience – are always tied to and ought to remain an organic 
part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the 
voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless. (1994b, p. 84) 
Recognition of human suffering is a crucial step, but insufficient in itself. Individual 
suffering must be universalized and linked to other peoples’ sufferings (Said, 1994b, p. 33). 
Said therefore takes great pains to stress that Orientalism is not just an isolated problem 
but representative of a significant problem in all human experience, identity formation and 
the representation of other cultures (1978, pp. 325-326; see also 1979; 1981). Orientalism’s 
failure is an intellectual as much as a human one, because in its opposition to a world region 
which it considered irreconcilably alien Orientalism dehumanized that region and its 
inhabitants and thus, Said writes, “failed to identify with human experience, failed also to 
see it as human experience” (1978, p. 328). Intellectuals in the postcolonial world must 
learn from Orientalism’s fatal mistakes and realize that though every experience is highly 
subjective, it is at the same time historical and secular and can thus be understood through 
                                               
produced by impersonal, diffuse and abstract relations of power (1975, p. 32). Being conscious of one’s subjectivity 
and the relations of power that produce this subjectivity – insofar as this would be even possible according to 
Foucault – is never enough to change them and does not generate agency for individuals (see Daldal, 2014, pp. 
166-167). 
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proper historical, secular and humanist scholarship (Said, 1986, pp. 55-56). In the 
conclusion to Orientalism, Said links the challenge of his work to the various worldwide 
decolonization movements, expressing their common goals: 
The worldwide hegemony of Orientalism and all it stands for can now be challenged, 
if we can benefit properly from the general twentieth-century rise to political and 
historical awareness of so many of the earth’s peoples. If this book has any future 
use, it will be as a modest contribution to that challenge. (1978, p. 328) 
Orientalism is organically tied to the struggle for the political, historical and imaginative 
emancipation of (formerly) colonized peoples. As such it is an act of resistance to the very 
framework it describes and contributes to the formation of a counter-hegemonic discourse. 
It is Said’s proper beginning anew. 
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4.6 Epilogue: Consolidated Vision 
The continued importance of this eclectic blend of theories which I have analyzed in 
Orientalism becomes most clear in its 1993 sequel Culture and Imperialism. To begin with, 
the threefold definition of Orientalism as a discourse, a phenomenon of perception and as 
the product of hegemony at one and the same time, is crucial for our understanding of 
imperialism in that work. In terms of which we now know the full implications, Said talks 
about an “imperial vision” (1993, p. 65) that is registered, supported and produced by a 
hegemonic discourse, which consolidates and to some extent disguises that ideological 
vision as a natural way of seeing the world. This “consolidated vision”, Said writes, “came 
in a whole series of overlapping affirmations, by which a near unanimity of view was 
sustained” (1993, p. 75). It informed the mission civilisatrice of imperialism and blocked all 
understanding of and sympathy with ‘the natives’ by hindering an actual existential 
contact. Said writes how literary works such as Kipling’s Kim, Camus’s L’Étranger or 
Gide’s L’Immoraliste cannot simply be regarded as great products of creative imagination 
but as worldly documents connected to the facts of power that inform and enable them, as 
well as discursively affiliated with other texts, such as travel writing, ethnography, 
political treatises, all of which make up the conformity that is characteristic of what 
Foucault calls a discourse (1993, pp. 110, 161). And so we should understand these texts 
as individual articulations of a nexus of knowledge and power that invests the colonizer 
with a discursive authority that translates into real power over the colonized. 
Moreover, imperialism as a discourse should be understood as a collective formation to 
which individual writers contribute – a claim that is reinforced by the book’s opening 
discussion of T.S. Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1920b), which illustrates 
Said’s continued conflation of Foucault’s notion of discourse with Eliot’s notion of 
tradition (1993, pp. 1-3). The theory of resistance that informs Culture and Imperialism is 
also similar to that of Orientalism, for the power relations that support the consolidated 
vision of imperialism are “the quotidian processes of hegemony”, by which we should 
understand imperialism to be “implemented and sustained not only by direct domination 
and physical force but much more effectively over a long time by persuasive means” (Said, 
1993, p. 109). As for the existential phenomenological undertone of that theory, in a later 
reaction to Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996), whose neo-imperialistic 
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thesis divides the world according to an essentialized clash between Western and non-
Western civilizations, Said pleads for “a profound existential commitment and labor on 
behalf of the other” (2000b, p. 584). To combat Huntington’s divisive worldview, Said 
places his hopes in the same kind of enlightening existential human contact and dialogue 
with the ‘Other’ that informs his view of literature in Orientalism. 
It is important to note that the theoretical weight attributed to Foucault seems to abide 
in Said’s writings post-1978. Though Culture and Imperialism (1993) attests to how 
Foucault is still an important presence, he is clearly on par with a wide array of historical 
materialists such as Raymond Williams, Antonio Gramsci, Aimé Césaire and Frantz 
Fanon. In “Traveling Theory” (1983e) Said already favored Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
over Foucault’s, to whose intellectual project he is still quite sympathetic in spite of the 
French thinker’s “overblown” (1983e, p. 245) view of power. But by the publication of 
“Traveling Theory Reconsidered” (2000h) in 1994, Said is remarkably more negative 
about Foucault. In that article, he favors Fanon’s revolutionary humanist project that 
stimulates action and resistance because, similar to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, it is 
also grounded in Lukács’ ideas about the formation of an insurrectionary critical self-
consciousness (2000h, pp. 444-445). Said considers Fanon’s whole project to be an 
empowering critique of colonialism and nationalism as orthodoxies which can be 
overthrown by an anti-essentializing and inclusive version of nationalism grounded in the 
principles of critical humanism (2000h, p. 450). Equally important to our understanding 
of Said’s critical practice in that essay, is his self-avowed membership to what he calls “an 
intellectual, and perhaps moral, community of a remarkable kind, affiliation in the deepest 
and most interesting sense of the word” (2000h, p. 452). The members of this imagined 
community are one by one humanist intellectuals who try to get past what Said calls “the 
weightlessness of one theory after another, the remorseless indignations of orthodoxy” 
(2000h, p. 452) and includes such thinkers as Lukács, Gramsci, Sartre, Goldmann, 
Williams, Fanon and Adorno. 
All of this makes clear how Said’s model of agency increasingly comes to attribute more 
authority to humanist intellectuals like himself. In this respect, Representations of the 
Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures (1994b) is a self-congratulatory celebration of Said’s 
own authority as an intellectual and a universalization of his own narrative self-fashioning 
as a critic. It opens with an empowering claim that there “has been no major revolution in 
modern history without intellectuals; conversely there has been no major counter-
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revolutionary movement without intellectuals” (Said, 1994b, p. 8). The task of the 
intellectual, we read, is to be oppositional and ‘speak truth to power’. He or she must not 
cower from attacking the dominant views in his or her own country and always uphold a 
universal standard of justice equal for all people, even for those who are not part of one’s 
own constituency (Said, 1994b, p. 71). The intellectual must represent the collective, 
historical experience of his or her people and then go on “explicitly to universalize the 
crisis, to give greater human scope to what a particular race or nation suffered, to associate 
that experience with the sufferings of others” (Said, 1994b, p. 33). The hardest part in that 
struggle for justice, Said concludes, is not to become an institution of one’s own but to 
represent that struggle in one’s interventions by constantly beginning anew so as to avoid 
conforming to an exterior authority. The only way of achieving it is to keep one’s vision 
pure from being consolidated, “it is to keep reminding yourself that as an intellectual you 
are the one who can choose between actively representing the truth to the best of your 
ability and passively allowing a patron or an authority to direct you” (Said, 1994b, p. 90). 
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Literature: Human Experience 
As much as every study needs a beginning, it needs an ending. I have begun this study of 
Said’s critical practice with two interrelated questions: ‘what is literature?’ and ‘what is 
agency?’. In the course of four chapters, I have tried to answer these preliminary questions 
by analyzing the theoretical framework that informs Said’s view on literature and agency 
in the period 1966-1978. In the process, I have identified five theoretical intertexts of 
which the combination determines the framework that informs these concepts, namely, 
the Anglo-American New Criticism, French existential phenomenology, European 
philology, French poststructuralism and Western historical materialism. In this 
conclusion I will offer a synthesis of this book’s overall argument about Said’s 
conceptualization of literature and agency. 
Said is deeply committed to a critically humanist project that reflects on ways to 
combine the creative energies of these theories and find theoretical common ground 
between approaches that at first sight seem incompatible and sometimes even radically 
critical to Said’s own humanist project but often share fairly similar goals. His critical 
practice constitutes an elaborate and constantly to be renewed attempt to define more 
precisely the humanity of literature in all its aspects: as a source of pleasure, joy, love, life, 
sadness, anger, violence and death. This attempt even at times pushes his thinking to 
engender, but never embrace, its own opposite and approach the problems of its own 
method and the problems of its object of study from an antihumanist perspective. The 
result of that project is a conceptualization of literature as the expression of human 
experience, including the belief that it expresses a living reality and that authorial 
intentions matter. This is, in short, Said’s conceptualization of literature. 
And though Said’s view on literature is characterized by a degree of stability 
throughout his works, we have seen how in each of the three major works discussed here 
that conceptualization is dependent on the precise theoretical constellation of those works, 
highlighting the ambiguity of literature. We have seen how Said’s conceptualization of 
literature evolves from an individual view in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography 
(1966) to a distinctly transindividual view in Orientalism (1978). We have seen how the 
focus of his method of reading changes from the interiority of literature and its 
embodiment of an authorial consciousness to the exteriority of literature and its affiliations 
and disaffiliations with other writings. We have also seen how Said gradually comes to 
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emphasize the repressive powers of literature, without ever renouncing a humanist view 
on literature that emphasizes the so-called liberating powers of literature. 
Said’s model of reading in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966) 
illustrates how he combines the creative energies of the (postwar) New Criticism and 
existential phenomenology to produce an approach to literature that balances formalism 
and contextualism by harmonizing a critique of literary form with an empathetic reading 
of consciousness. In doing so, Said reinterprets the New Critical notion that the literary 
text is unified by a structural intention, a unifying principle thought of as an impersonal 
textual consciousness, into an existential phenomenology notion of intentionality, which 
considers the text’s unifying principle to be a personalized, authorial consciousness. We 
have also seen how Said’s model of reading reinterprets the role of the reader or critic in 
the interpretation of literature: from the impersonal and abstract reader or critic, who 
practices a technical and positivist reading of an impersonally textual consciousness, into 
a personal and concrete reader empathetically reading an equally personal and concrete 
authorial consciousness. 
This model of reading pushed American literary criticism beyond formalism by 
challenging the institutionalized New Critical orthodoxy that approached literature in an 
overtly technical and positivistic way and, as a result, reified and dehumanized the literary 
work of art. It grasps literature as an intentional, manmade product; as a Gestalt or a whole 
which is different from the sum of its parts and speaks of a total living reality or life force 
in a unique language that is directly apprehended or felt by its readers. The literary work 
is the unified expression of the lived experience of its author; it is said to provide access to 
an authorial consciousness that is itself the product of the dynamic encounter between a 
uniquely singular individual consciousness-in-the-world and the chaotic lifeworld within 
which it is embedded. Literature is temporal, dramatic, ambiguous, paradoxical and 
unfathomable as it is. It is said to provide a precise, yet intuitive, non-conceptual kind of 
knowledge that resists paraphrase and logic, can only be comprehended through intuition 
and therefore disrupts atemporal, static, universal and positivistic or ‘factual’ knowledge.  
We have seen how this conceptualization of literature in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction 
of Autobiography is already to a considerable extent political and advocates an ethical 
approach to literature that takes into account that literature is a linguistic and therefore 
intersubjective product. We should in the first place understand literature as a means of 
aesthetic communication between an author and a reader, both of whom have a 
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consciousness and therefore responsibility of their own. The literary work is an 
intersubjective intentional object that depends both on the intentionality of the author at 
the moment of production and on the intentionality of the reader at the moment of 
reception, whose consciousness reanimates but does not wholly duplicate the author’s acts 
of consciousness. This means that there is always a way – and an ethical imperative even 
– to critically respond to a particular work and oppose determining and impassive systems 
of thought expressed in that work. 
Said’s ethics of reading turns into a truly elaborated politics of reading in Beginnings 
(1975a). As a result of his intellectual engagement with philology and poststructuralism, 
Said adapts the view of literature outlined above so as to more forcefully emphasize that 
the literary work is not simply the expression of an individual human consciousness in the 
process of living and coming to terms with reality – not as it is but as it is experienced, 
judged or perceived by that particular consciousness. Rather, it is also the expression of 
the worldview connected to the language used by its author, of the history, politics and 
power relations within which both are embedded. The literary work also expresses the 
epistemic pressures and discursive constraints that shape human life, often do violence to 
human experience and to a considerable extent determine the way individuals see and 
articulate reality.  
Building on Said’s earlier conceptualization of literature in his revised doctoral 
dissertation, the notion of beginnings emphasizes that the production of literature always 
entails a choice on the part of the author that sets in motion the worldly activity of writing 
which takes place within the constraints of other writing. Literature should therefore 
always be understood within a preexisting context of other writing, a discursive field in 
which every writing is itself a form of power and violence to other writing. This 
conceptualization of literature emphasizes that a particular work can exclude and 
dehumanize the experiences of others or rehumanize and include those experiences again.  
Beginnings constitutes a shift of emphasis in Said’s view on literature from considering 
the literary work as the product of an individual intention to seeing it at as the product of 
an individual and a collective intention. This means that the literary work has a meaning 
in excess of the individual author’s intention that is the product of the existential realities 
to which the author may be blind. Beginnings also constitutes a broadening of focus in 
Said’s approach to criticism. The empathetic dialogue between author and critic that 
characterizes Said’s model of reading in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography is 
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reframed as a conversation between the critic and the author and culture to which he or 
she belongs. This turns a humanist dialogue and criticism of form into a cultural politics 
and critical analysis of the literary work whose language is a gateway to not just the 
authorial consciousness and his or her lived experience but to the world. 
Said’s examination of the archive of Orientalism and his critique of imperialism in 
Orientalism (1978) leads him to methodically engage with historical materialism, the result 
of which is an increased emphasis on the historical density and material conditions of 
literature, on the fact that literature is interrelated to real events and real politics. Though 
his method of reading has always been to an extent political, Said’s analysis of Orientalism 
as a discourse shows how his approach to literature has gradually evolved from 
foregrounding the aesthetics of literature to considering the aesthetics of literature to be 
inseparably entwined with its politics. Every individual writing is the product of the 
existential writer’s authority and constraints on that authority caused by the writer’s 
worldly circumstances, such as the role of society, traditions, institutions, and other 
writing. While these impersonal circumstances pressure the existential writer to produce 
writing that conforms to the rules of discursive formation, and are therefore to an extent 
responsible for the images, ideas, values and viewpoints expressed in a particular text as 
well as to the uses to which that is put, these circumstances are not overdetermining and 
therefore do not relieve an author of his or her intellectual responsibility. The reason is 
that in all of the works studied here, Said’s conceptualization of literature is informed by a 
politics of responsibility that evolves into an increasingly self-conscious version in 
Orientalism which translates into Said’s method of humanist discourse analysis that sees 
individual texts as personal and eponymous contributions to an impersonal and 
anonymous discourse. Said considers an individual text to be an identifiable personal 
statement for which its author can be held responsible.  
Lastly, it is important to note that Said’s notion of literature is normative. Said’s theory 
of reading unconsciously foregrounds a particular literary genre, and derives its general 
pronouncements from this. It foregrounds the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth 
novel as genre and what has now been firmly established as the canonical literature of the 
West and hardly pays any attention to poetry, non-mimetic fiction, or experimental 
literature produced in that same period. The reasons for this, in the first place, is that the 
novel as genre better suits Said’s method of immersive reading derived from existential 
phenomenology and arguably shows its affiliations with power more plainly than poetry. 
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But we have seen how this emphasis on the novel is also symptomatic of a larger postwar 
cultural discourse in which a view of literature circulated that directly linked the novel to 
human freedom. And while this view also informs Said’s own conceptualization of 
literature in his revised doctoral dissertation and his meditation on beginnings, it is 
distinctly more thematized from Orientalism onwards and becomes part of his method to 
read these canonical works of great literature to precisely show how those celebrated 
expressions of humanity and freedom offered very little resistance to and even 
consolidated the practices of imperialism and Orientalism. 
While Said continues to emphasize the humanity of literature and its ability to change 
the world by showing the diversity and beauty of human life, his own work serves as a 
reminder that literature is at the same time the product, producer and reproducer of 
humanity’s darkest ideologies; that it is both the product and consolidator of certain power 
relations that lay at the basis for human suffering and social injustice and a possible site of 
resistance to these relations. It shows us that literature can be a means of violence or 
justice.  
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Agency: Human Will 
By taking Said’s conceptualization of literature as a critical locus to investigate the concept 
of agency, my intention has been to show the reciprocity between both concepts. In this 
study, I have shown how such reciprocity exists between Said’s view of literature and his 
view of agency, how both terms mutually reinforce and nuance each other. In the 
introduction to this study, I have stressed that both concepts are informed by what I have 
labeled to be ‘a problematic’ of Said’s critical practice in the period 1966-1978, namely, the 
formative tension between humanism and antihumanism. In the course of this study, it 
quickly became clear that Said’s view of agency transcends the realm of literary theory 
and has far wider human consequences. 
The brief answer to my preliminary question is that agency lies in the category of the 
human will. The elaborate answer is that though all of Said’s works studied here are 
marked by the centrality of the human subject and its will, his concept of agency evolves 
in reciprocal interchange with the concept of literature. In the same way that his 
conceptualization of literature should be understood as an attempt to define more precisely 
the humanity of literature, in both its admirable and reprehensible aspects, and defend it 
against reifying and dehumanizing methods of reading, so too should his conceptualization 
of agency be understood as the product of an intellectual campaign to define human will 
and defend it against indifferent passivity. Whether that passivity is the outcome of the 
dissociation of the historical author from the literary text, the denial of one’s role in the 
production of human meaning, irreflectively imposed upon oneself in an act of bad faith, 
the outcome of applying an antihumanist method of reading, or the uniquely punishing 
destiny of a discourse like Orientalism, in Said’s view all such forms of passivity can and 
must be countered through deliberate and sustained acts of will. This makes it clear how 
the concept of agency in the works of Said is inextricably connected to ‘resistance’. 
We have seen how the reciprocity between literature and agency in Said’s critical 
practice translates in the idea of ‘worldliness’, which emphasizes that literature and agency 
are embedded in concrete, worldly situations. Said is deeply committed to a humanist 
project to conceptualize an empowering model of reading in which agency is attributed to 
the concrete individual located within an equally concrete situation. In the course of his 
career, Said’s method of reading becomes increasingly more attentive to those repressive, 
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worldly constraints on agency, without however renouncing the secular humanist idea 
that human existence precedes essence.  
Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966) is the first of three works that are 
committed to that secular humanist project that safeguards the authority, choice and 
freedom of individuals and posits the ethical imperative of resistance to determining 
systems of thought. Contrary to the absolute, universal, unsituated and therefore 
meaningless conceptualization of agency propagated by the postwar New Criticism, Said 
posits an existential phenomenological model in which agency is meaningfully situated in 
a concrete, individual human consciousness-in-the-world. To counterpoise Poulet’s model 
of reading that robs the reader of agency in the process of meaning-giving, he defends the 
reader’s equal right to meaning. Said’s reading of Conrad is attentive to how language 
constrains the activities of individual speaking subjects. It illustrates how it is often easier, 
mentally less exhausting, and psychologically less discomforting to bring one’s perception 
of reality into correspondence with the preconceived opinions or received beliefs of one’s 
culture and act in accordance with the dominant worldview rather than to constantly 
rethink and revise one’s perceptions and actions. In spite of this, of the three works studied 
here, the model of agency in Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography arguably 
attributes the most agency to individuals. 
As a result of his engagement with Foucault’s work on discourse in Beginnings (1975a), 
Said’s model of agency is more attentive to the epistemic pressures and discursive 
constraints on one’s agency. As a counterpoint to Foucault’s antihumanist notion of 
discourse, Said advocates the impact of individual writers by defining the notion of 
beginnings in terms of an authorial position. The conceptualization of authority as 
nomadic in that work emphasizes that the authority of a text is different for each text 
because it is dependent on the precise outcome of an author’s positioning understood as a 
balancing act between either a powerful assertion of will by the existential writer to 
authorize his or her own writing or a total submission to the pressures of discourse. This 
is a crucial and powerful theoretical gesture that revalues the authority of individual 
writers and opens up the possibility of resistance to a discourse. It also highlights the 
existentialist underpinning of Said’s concept of agency: to act is to choose. 
The concept of ‘strategic location’ in Orientalism (1978) makes clear how the model of 
agency in Beginnings provides the framework for our understanding of the workings of 
Orientalism as a discourse. Orientalism is arguably Said’s most pessimistic work of criticism 
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because of its focus on authors whose writings conform to the authority of Orientalism as 
a discourse, making resistance to Orientalism hardly seems possible. And yet, Orientalism 
is marked by a remarkable optimism of the will. Its theory of agency is based on a 
humanizing approach to discourse analysis that attributes considerable agency to 
intellectuals who are responsible for organizing resistance. Like Said himself, they do so 
by universalizing their own suffering and linking it to the sufferings of many. By analyzing 
the constraints on one’s identity or deliberately seeking out the complexities of human life 
in a laborious and unfinished cycle of criticism that questions the origins of one’s own 
actions and beliefs, one is able to provoke a crisis in the system of Orientalism that reveals 
its determining workings and the false simplicity of its worldview. Such moments of crisis 
lead to the formation of a critical self-consciousness which results in a position of more 
agency; they are opportunities for choice, for carefully planned strategic locations 
direction vis-à-vis the existing discursive formation of Orientalism. Said practices what he 
preaches, for to combat the muteness imposed upon himself as ‘object’ of Orientalism, 
through a series of empowering theoretical gestures he fashions for himself a subject 
position and reclaims his usurped right to speak. 
A number of important observations should be drawn from this. The first is that Said’s 
model of agency is normative. His criticism is performed from the perspective of social 
justice to combat persistent structures of intellectual differentiation, epistemic 
determination, and hegemonic coercion and domination. For the fighter of social justice it 
is therefore imperative to counterpoise these forces of domination by attributing equal 
force or agency to the ‘dominated’ (in the broadest possible sense). The metaphysical 
assumption of Said’s critical practice is that though there are at any given moment in time 
and place many determining forces at work, through a laborious, mentally exhausting and 
constantly to be renewed process of criticism, these constraints are identifiable, knowable, 
and changeable. They do no not precede human existence and should therefore decidedly 
not be seen as absolute limits to individual human agency but as productive conditions 
that give meaning to an individual’s freedom. Though the speaking subject is surrounded 
by discourse, it is on the same level as that person’s identity, both of which are preceded 
by consciousness. The result of such a conceptualization of agency, is that every individual 
is responsible for his or her situation and can bring about change. Acquiescence in one’s 
situation of domination, in the status quo of hegemonic systems of thought, in the 
consensus that supports a discourse, is always ultimately a choice – as is the perpetuation 
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of or resistance to these constraints. Said’s model of agency does not deny difference but 
proclaims the universality of responsibility. We should understand this politics of 
responsibility as a way or arguing that regardless of how imposing the constraints on 
one’s personal situation might seem, historical change or resistance to the status quo is 
always possible. 
We could label such a view of individual human agency as unintentionally paternalistic 
or elitist even. For as postcolonial studies has shown, the powerful geopolitical, military, 
economic, cultural and psychological constraints determining the lives of so many people 
living in the Global South make it less evident for them to resist the status quo, without 
risking hardship, punishment or even death. While Said is not unaware of this, his position 
as an intellectual writing from the heart of academia is that the intellectual’s vocation is 
to universalize his or her own crisis that lead to the formation of a critical self-
consciousness, empower and take on the organic humanist’s responsibility to represent 
these people in the name of social justice for as long as it takes them to find their own voice 
and represent themselves. And yet the painful reality today is that in spite of Said’s call to 
challenge the hegemony of Orientalism and all its stands for, it still persists as an 
authoritative discourse and many of the earth’s countries and peoples are still subordinate, 
even though nearly all of them have now become legally independent sovereign nation 
states. This might be an indication that, in spite of its double focus on individual creativity 
and determination, Said’s model of agency and the politics of responsibility connected to 
that model overemphasize the role of individuals in historical change and downplay the 
determining role of impersonal historical forces, such as, for instance, globalization, 
capitalism, cultural imperialism, and the effects of global warming. This might be an 
indication that his model presents perhaps too idealistic an idea about human subjectivity 
and is ultimately not suited enough to deal with the complexity of the postcolonial world.  
Connected to this is the observation that Said’s model of agency transcends the realm 
of literature and does not really distinguish between the nature or degree of agency of the 
writer, the reader or the critic. The reason is that Said himself as a humanist intellectual 
embodies all three of these categories in his critical practice. The only distinction in Said’s 
model is to be found in the degree of awareness or lack thereof of one’s own agency as an 
individual. As a rule of thumb in Said’s critical practice: self-consciousness or self-
awareness leads to more agency. The writer’s realization of the constraints to his or her 
authority – which Said designates by the term ‘molestation’ – is the condition of possibility 
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for a carefully planned and intentional strategic location. The reader’s astonishment that 
he or she is temporarily giving way to the consciousness of an author, leads to the right 
amount of intimacy and distance that results in a balanced, critical reading. The critic’s 
awareness and insight in his or her own involvement as a human subject in civil and 
political society, leads to properly critical scholarship. In all three cases, the realization of 
the ‘traces’ working upon oneself leads to a moment of crisis that is the moment of 
opportunity for criticism. It leads to the formation of a critical consciousness from which one 
is able to fashion a position of greater agency for oneself and from which one can 
successfully begin combatting coercive forms of knowledge.  
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The Authority of Humanism 
The authority of criticism is grounded in Said’s conceptualization of literature as human 
experience and agency as human will. In my study of Said’s intellectual development in 
the period 1966-1978, I have tried to show that this development can only be understood 
in relation to the critical debates, the ongoing institutional discourses, and the cultural 
conversations and worldly events of the period. Only by taking into account all these 
aspects, have I been able to reconstruct the process of Said’s intellectual development in 
order to identify a number of important entities or themes that are be crucial to our 
understanding of his critical practice. The image of Said that has gradually emerged in 
this study is that of a secular literary critic who is deeply committed to worldliness, 
change, and humanism as a method of reading and a philosophy of life.  
In his view, literary criticism serves an important oppositional function in culture. It is 
neither reducible to a political position on a particular question nor to a political party but 
must always remain self-aware of its own position in the world and serve as an independent 
watchdog of the operations of power to which it speaks the ‘truth’. Its goal is the 
production of noncoercive knowledge in the interests of social justice and human freedom. 
It therefore sets itself up as a humanist bulwark against the forces of domination, 
determination and reification, and all forms of doctrinaire thinking, organized dogma or 
totalizing systems of thought – regardless of whether these are to be found inside the 
narrow confines of the literary departments such as the postwar New Criticism of the 
1950s and 1960s, or outside the academy such as Orientalism with its detrimental effects 
on so many of the earth’s population. By adopting or, to be more precise, fashioning for 
himself a critical persona of the oppositional humanist intellectual with a mandate and 
ethical imperative to ‘speak truth to power’, Said makes literary criticism an authoritative 
force in society to be reckoned with. The authority of criticism is its humanism.  
According to Said, the goal of literary criticism is to reveal and illuminate the human 
content of literature, its ambiguities, complexities, aesthetic beauty and the unique human 
experience it is said to convey. Literature speaks of a human existence that is ungraspable 
and therefore fundamentally resists attempts to find some essence in it. His view of literary 
criticism, then, is that it must draw our attention to the literary work and its complex 
human reality. In all that it does, criticism must not simplify that human reality but 
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illuminate and help readers comprehend it in all its ambiguity and complexity, showing 
how ‘humanity’ is a universality marked by a difference of experiences which can all 
nonetheless be understood through a profound existential commitment and labor on behalf 
of the other. Literary criticism must not silence but reinforce literature, enter in a dialogue 
with a text, its author and his or her culture so as to contest all essentialized and therefore 
dehumanizing knowledge. Its task is to reveal the worldliness of literature, to reveal the 
operations of power and expose their connection with the production of knowledge, to 
make the dialectic between the individual text and the complex discursive formation to 
which it is a contribution visible again and disclose that which the text purposefully 
obscures or does not disclose itself.  
In Said’s writings we have often encountered a rhetoric of disclosure and revealing. 
Literary works often have meanings that are indirect, ambiguous and revealing and need 
to be cracked open by the critic, who is able to reveal information which is not always 
plainly visible to the average reader. And though Said’s approach celebrates ‘amateurism’ 
and stresses that everyone can perform criticism and become an organic humanist 
intellectual, his approach to criticism is nonetheless a form of symptomatic reading that 
takes meanings to be hidden, repressed and in need of detection by a critic. As Said’s notion 
of amateurism strictly forbids that critic to be a specialist, he or she inevitably comes to 
resemble a humanist genius. This view of criticism attaches a considerable amount of 
power to the act of interpretation and, through a whole series of theoretical gestures, 
invests the literary critic with the authority to read literature against the grain, if needed 
contradict a writer’s explicitly made remarks about his or her own works, and transcend 
not only the disciplinary boundaries of his or her field of specialization but those of literary 
criticism itself to speak truth to power.  
As a result, literary criticism is transformed into a way of life. It is paradoxically a self-
imposed and willfully chosen intellectual vocation, a laborious and unfinished mode of 
living; a technique of trouble that deliberately seeks out the complexity and seeming 
inconsistencies of human reality in order to subvert, complicate or disturb things taken 
for granted, stressing that all certainties and ‘truths’ are ultimately only conventionally 
agreed upon meaningful ‘illusions’ susceptible to criticism, readjustment and change. It 
only accepts one set of truths: that the value of literature and its humanity mutually 
reinforce each other, are able to combat dehumanizing and orthodox ways of thinking, and 
should therefore be defended by literary criticism. It advocates responsibility and 
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accepting the consequences of one’s writing and one’s interpretation. Rather than settling 
issues once and for all or offering clear-cut answers, the job of criticism is to raise even 
more questions, rethink and revise its results.  
The authority of criticism is its ability to destabilize, its power to evoke a crisis of 
consciousness that sets in motion a constantly to be renewed cycle of criticism, the ideal 
outcome of which is the negation, adjustment and alteration of coercive forms of 
knowledge. In Said’s view, criticism is the midwife to human freedom, for in its opposition 
to tyranny, domination and social injustice, it makes individuals aware of the impassive 
workings of these coercive systems of thought. Criticism is empowering. Its goal is to 
empower ‘the oppressed’, ‘the dominated’, or ‘the wretched of the earth’, to rediscover their 
own voice and right to speak, define their identity in their own terms and to narrate. 
Criticism derives its authority from its sustained fight against reification and passivity. It 
removes obstacles to freedom and incites individuals to reconnect with their experience 
and assert their will.  
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Edward Said, ‘Apostle’ of Humanism 
The thread that runs through all of Said’s works and that informs his concepts of 
literature, agency, and criticism, is hence his profound commitment to humanism. Said 
approaches all his topics from a humanist framework, which he subjects to critical 
reflection but whose foundations remain ultimately unquestioned. The authority of Said’s 
criticism is paradoxically dependent on the authoritative discourse of humanism. 
Humanism, I mean to argue in these reflective pages of my conclusion, is the a priori of 
Said’s critical practice, his orthodoxy, his secular religion. 
Against the New Critical isolation of literature from its worldly human context and the 
dissociation of literature from its authors and readers – which served the anti-scientifically 
humanist goal of reading literature as literature but resulted in the unintended reification 
of the literary experience and the celebration of a universal, unsituated, and hence inflated 
concept of agency –, Said posits a model of criticism that is based on the secular humanism 
associated with the New Criticism’s prewar phase and existential phenomenology to 
reconnect literature with its human context, to resituate agency in the world and to 
advocate a politics of responsibility. By harmonizing the New Criticism with existential 
phenomenology Said’s model of criticism reinvigorates formalist criticism and helps it 
fulfill its humanist potential.  
To combat Foucault’s antihumanism, which he considers to reify writers into discursive 
functions, to deny human agency, to decenter the subject by dissolving it in language, and 
to reduce human consciousness from the a priori of human existence to an accidental 
residue of a preceding system of thought, Said invokes a kind of authoritative humanism 
which is based on the combined forces of the prewar New Criticism, existential 
phenomenology, philology and historical materialism, which puts the human subject 
firmly in the center of its lifeworld, attributes it with the authority to initiate writing and 
the production of knowledge, and burdens it with the responsibility to change society for 
the better. Said then reclaims Foucault’s antihumanist discourse analysis for humanism by 
infusing it with these humanist perspectives so as to elaborate his own humanist model of 
discourse analysis. 
Said’s humanism or what he himself calls ‘secular criticism’, is presented as an inclusive, 
open-ended, worldly, democratic, oppositional, life-enhancing, empowering and liberating 
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mode of criticism. According to Said, secular criticism is distinct from religious criticism, a 
term which he uses to designate the kind of critical orthodoxy that is based on the creative 
repetition of idées reçues and the conformity of individual writing to the rules of discursive 
formation (see 1983a; 1983c). Religious criticism is a form of doctrinal thinking that 
results in the production of impassive, tyrannical and coercive knowledge and the 
formation of institutionalized schools of thought or ‘-isms’. The workings of religious 
criticism are best characterized by Foucault’s notion of discourse, because Said considers 
individual writing in this kind of criticism to affiliate itself with the writings of ‘founding 
fathers’, beginners of a dynasty, or inaugural deities to constitute a collective body of texts, 
an affiliative or discursive system of thought no less orthodox and dominant than culture 
itself (1983c, p. 20). The paradox of Said’s own conceptualization of literature and agency, 
and the concomitant heroization of the humanist intellectual in his model of criticism, is 
that they presuppose such strong authoritative figures whose works can give rise to 
imitation and idolatry. The reception of Said’s works in the field of postcolonial studies 
painfully makes clear that his own secular criticism contributes to that kind of religious 
criticism. 
In his long campaign to defend the humanity of literature and reassert the value of the 
human will, Said wilfully affiliates his own practice with the works of such humanist 
thinkers as R.P. Blackmur, Sartre, Auerbach and Gramsci. The result is that Said’s 
criticism paradoxically derives its authority from its affiliation with the works of these 
‘authoritative’ names, which are often invoked as paragons of critical thinking, freedom, 
humanity, and liberation. In this way Said affiliates himself with what are perhaps the 
longest circulating idées reçues in the humanities, namely, humanism. The paradox of Said 
is that his own practice falls prey to precisely that which he criticizes throughout all of his 
works. That is, because of its discursive affiliations, his own writing conforms to these 
humanist writings and, as a result of the rule of discursive formation, derives authority 
from these writings, meaning that the authority of Said’s criticism is highly dependent on 
the hegemonic discourse of humanism. The result is that Said’s own criticism comes to 
promote the seemingly exceptional value and importance of the writings of these 
authoritative figures in critical thinking. The affiliative bonds with this writing imbue 
Said’s criticism with the authoritative aura of being properly critical thinking, contributing 
to the institutionalization of a Saidian strand of postcolonial studies itself.  
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Humanism can therefore be seen as the master discourse of Said’s critical practice, his 
religion, if you will. For humanism, Akeel Bilgrami points out, is based on two 
fundamental principles, or two doctrines which we have frequently encountered 
throughout this study. The first is its aspiration to find some feature or a set features that 
distinguishes what is ‘human’ from what is ‘natural’, studied by the natural sciences, and 
what is ‘supernatural’, studied by theology (Bilgrami, 2004, p. x). Adding even more to its 
‘religious’ aura, this doctrine was first expressed in Latin by the eighteenth century 
Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico, whose claim is that humans know best what 
humans have made. In his 1710 oration “On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians 
Unearthed from the Origins of the Latin Language” (1988) delivered at the University of 
Naples, which was the first university in Europe dedicated to training secular 
administrators for the royal government (Astarita, 2013, p. 2), Vico coined what became 
known as the verum-factum principle, which is the idea that ‘truthful’ knowledge (verum) 
cannot be founded on certainty and facts but on reconstructive imagination and 
comprehension of intentional, manmade products (factum) such as history or literature 
(Belaval, 1969, pp. 83-84; Berlin, 1969, pp. 375-376). The underlying idea is that 
knowledge of the phenomenal chaos of our lifeworld and culture is a form of secular self-
knowledge that is the most difficult and therefore highest form of knowledge attainable, 
greatly surpassing knowledge of the fixed order of the natural world which Vico 
designated as certum, ‘certain’ (Auerbach, 2014e, p. 49). Self-knowledge is never fixed or 
certain and always needs to be renewed by the constitutive act of self-criticism, the unique 
human capacity to be critical of one’s own situation (Berlin, 1991, p. 60). 
The second doctrine of humanism is the yearning to comprehend and show sympathy 
for all that is human, wherever it may be found and however remote it may be from our 
own homes (Bilgrami, 2004, p. x). Expressed in the famous dictum “I am human, I consider 
nothing human alien to me” attributed to Terence, the Latin playwright of the second 
century BC, the humanist believes in the supreme authority of the human mind to 
investigate the human mind (Spitzer, 2015, p. 24). The humanist believes that the limits 
to humanist knowledge are boundless, that everything which pertains to human life can 
be known through reconstructive imagination and that one can and must show sympathy 
for all that is human in this world. From this doctrine, the humanist takes on a position of 
moral supremacy which is founded on the ethical imperative that one cannot be indifferent 
to the sufferings of people under the yoke of tyrannical systems of thought like racism, 
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fascism, communism, or in Said’s case, Orientalism, colonialism and imperialism. The 
humanist cannot stand idly by in the face of oppression and abuse but must combat such 
inhuman practices and the indifference supporting these practices. 
Said fuses these two doctrines into a coherent critical practice which is characterized by 
the method of secular imagination, by which we should understand the capacity of 
humanity to think about its own existence in the absence of a transcendental authority 
(see Gourgouris, 2004, p. 55). His secular criticism combines the Vichian and Terentian 
ideals into a Saidian ideal that an existential human contact with the Other’s humanity 
leads to what is in many ways a truly eye-opening and dissonant experience which sets in 
motion a never-ending cycle of criticism that enhances one’s understanding of the Other 
and the Self. It is important to note that Said’s strand of criticism degenerates neither into 
a fetishism of multiculturalism and diversity (see Bilgrami, 2004, p. xii) nor into a form of 
cultural relativism, because it claims that though every experience is highly subjective, it 
is at the same time historical and secular and can thus be understood and especially judged 
through proper historical, secular and humanist scholarship – based on precisely those two 
doctrines. 
Even though Said is critical of humanism, he is critical in the name of humanism and 
therefore does not fundamentally question the doctrines of humanism. Even when he 
shows himself at his most antihumanistically in his intellectual engagement with the work 
of Foucault to whose project he is deeply sympathetic, we should understand him to be 
working in line with or even in obedience to the humanist doctrines of self-criticism and 
sympathy. In pushing the method of self-criticism to obtain self-knowledge as far as it 
allows him to go, Said develops a sympathy for humanism’s opposite in Foucault’s works, 
but it remains unfathomable for him to think Foucault’s antihumanism through and deny 
the human subject and agency, those universal ‘truths’ of humanism. Instead of renouncing 
humanism, Said chooses to reclaim Foucault’s antihumanism for humanism by infusing it 
with the humanist perspectives which I have outlined in this study. 
The humanist a priori of Said’s critical practice, means that he does not question the 
intellectual, moral and political supremacy of the humanist intellectual as the voice of 
universal justice, truth and resistance to tyranny, a position which is supported by the 
cultural authority of humanism. Though the secular humanist is by definition in and of 
this world, through his laborious criticism he or she is able to fathom all of human life. 
Nothing that is in and of this world can escape the critical gaze and ethical judgment of 
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the humanist. As a result, Said himself reproduces and reinforces humanism’s will to power 
which antihumanist thinkers like Foucault if not in practice than at least in theory 
attempted to get rid of (1994c, p. 109). This is the painful but perhaps inevitable paradox 
of an empowering approach to criticism that is precisely built on the disclosure of power 
relations and the dismissal of all forms of doctrinal thinking. By claiming an oppositional 
position in society that allows him to allegedly ‘speak truth to power’, Said disregards the 
worldliness of that position and the fact that no truth is over outside or without power but 
always the product of ideologies held in place by a discourse. He disregards his own 
method’s will to power. 
“All humanisms, until now, have been imperial” (Davies, 2008, p. 131). Though Said’s 
criticism precisely discloses the affiliative, historical bonds between humanism and the 
inhuman practices of imperialism, to so unequivocally reject all forms of imperialism and 
contribute to a kind of noncoercive knowledge produced in the interests of human freedom, 
liberation, emancipation and the fight for social justice, these words also hold true for Said. 
By reclaiming antihumanism for humanism, Said is able to devise a method that in one 
analytical totality is able to comprehend, respect, criticize, and do justice to historical 
human experiences and disclose, criticize and oppose the machinations of power. Said’s 
criticism raises itself as a paragon for human freedom. It thereby appeals to an ideal version 
of humanism that serves as a universal moral standard to judge all other writing, challenge 
social injustice and think of a better and more just future. If such a form of imperialism is 
the price to pay to reach these goals, then Said pays it gladly. And so these words designate 
the paradox that is the authority of criticism. 
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